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cities
SYNOPSIS
Public-Private Partnerships, Sport and Urban Regeneration in Britain and Spain
In a period of apparent new economic, political, social and cultural configurations in
Western cities, a general diminution of belief in the ability of local government itself to
affect significant policy change in response to the global restructuring of the economy has
facilitated the emergence of new forms of urban governance in the post or neo-Fordist era,
often following American models. Despite the fact that there are some differences in the
interpretations of which new forms of urban governance are emerging, there appears to be a
general recognition of the need for policy solutions represented by the development of
partnerships and coalitions of interests ('regimes') in urban contexts, involving not only
local authorities but also a range of private and semi-public actors.
The rise of the entrepreneurial model among city governments also forms part of the so-
called new urban politics of the post-Fordist era. Similarly, it is commonly argued that there
is a growing inter-urban competition between cities for prominence as centres of
consumption as one means to replace those traditional urban industrial activities which have
gone into decline. This 'post-modern' strategy, including the use of a wide range of
prestigious urban projects in areas of consumption such as sports, culture and leisure, has
recently become commonplace in the restructuring of many Western cities. In Britain and
Spain as elsewhere, some cities are using sport and leisure to drive the regeneration of their
cities.
Focusing on two European cities subject to large-scale deindustrialisation, Bilbao (Spain)
and Sheffield (Great Britain), this thesis applies an urban regime analysis to evaluate the
emergence and operation of public-private partnerships in a process of urban regeneration.
This comparative study of urban politics also examines the role of sport and leisure in urban
regime or coalition construction and the role of urban regimes or coalitions in the
development of a sports strategy in the case of Sheffield and a cultural strategy in the case of
Bilbao.
Following an introductory chapter, the second chapter examines new practices and forms of
urban governance, using traditional and 'new wave' urban theories, in particular the
formation and operation of urban regimes and their implication for sports policy changes.
The contribution of this thesis is to examine the applicability and validity of American
models of urban change to the analysis of two different Western European cities that may
help to understand how contemporary cities respond to contemporary urban problems. In
i
addition, this thesis expects to expand the analysis of the role of sport in urban regime
construction and the role of urban regimes in the development of sports or cultural
strategies. The choice of regime theory has implications for both methodology and the
subsequent interpretation of events. Thus, the third chapter addresses the general description
of the ontological, epistemological and methodological assumptions underpinning regime
theory. The fourth and fifth chapters review how urban planning and sport policies have
evolved in Spain since the Spanish Civil War and in Britain since the World War II. This
provides a context to the core of the thesis, which evaluate urban regime formation and
operation and their implications in the development of sports strategies in Bilbao and
Sheffield. The concluding chapter seeks to summarise the findings of the empirical research
and relates the examples of Bilbao and Sheffield coalitions or urban regimes for economic
regeneration to the nature and characterisation of contemporary urban and sports politics.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Introduction	 Chapter One
1. Introduction
In the economic, political and cultural studies literature of the 1980s and 1990s, one can
discern a general consensus in acknowledging that the major features of the developed
Western economies had began to crumble in the 1970s. In particular, social democratic
politics, 'Fordist-Keynesian' economic and social arrangements, and even modernist
cultural patterns, had given way to new social, political, cultural and economic
configurations. Whether or not, these should be termed as a transition from the dominant
Fordist regime of accumulation to a new phase of capitalism variously described as 'post-
Fordist', 'neo-Fordise, 'post-industrial', 'post-modern', or 'late modernity' is contested
(Amin, 1994; Harvey, 1990; Jessop, 1990, 1994; Painter, 1995; Scott, 1997). The first
three terms have been associated with economic and political change, while the latter,
though related, are more often associated with changes in the areas of consumption,
aesthetics, culture and lifestyle in Western societies. Despite the lack of a broad consensus
about the new social, political, cultural and economic configurations of this new period,
what is nevertheless accepted in the 'post-Fordise debate is that significant (if not, for
some commentators, structural) changes have occurred.
In this new period, different traditional and 'new wave' urban theories have also emerged
to highlight the progressive decline of the nation-state as the relatively unchallenged,
primary actor for territorial governance and economic regulation, reflecting the increased
significance of de-centralised agencies, sub-national governments, transnational bodies
and, in particular, cities in the restructuring of the economy (Amin, 1994; Moulaert and
Demaziere, 1996; Hambleton, 1990; Jessop, 1990; Borja and Castells, 1997). There are
those who argue that the degree of such change has been exaggerated, and that the nation-
state's role, though diminished is still central to both economic accumulation and social
regulation (Harvey, 1990; Harding and LeGales, 1997; Scott, 1997). In line with the current
political success of neo-conservative assumptions, several commentators argue that we are
seeing a gradual reorientation of the local state, from the characteristic 'managerial' city of
the Fordist period (involved as a direct provider of local services) to the 'entrepreneurial'
city (aiming to promote local capital accumulation) over the last two decades as part of a
dominant urban entrepreneurialist stance to solve economic, social and environmental
problems of the large urban areas (Cochrane, 1991; Hall and Hubbard, 1998; Harvey, 1990;
Harding, 1995; Logan and Molotch, 1987; Osborne and Gaebler, 1992; Stone, 1989).
Cities have thus seen an enhancement of their role in local economic development
activities, as well as in their place in the political agenda in Britain and Spain and in many
other advanced Western economies.
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However, a general diminution of belief in the ability of local government itself to affect
significant policy change has facilitated the emergence of new practices and forms of urban
governance in the post or neo-Fordist era, often following American models (Amin, 1994;
DiGaetano, 1997; Hambleton, 1990; Harvey, 1990; Harding and LeGales, 1997; Stone,
1989; Stoker, 1995; Stoker and Mossberger, 1994). Although there are some differences in
the interpretations of which new forms of urban governance are emerging, there appears to
be a general recognition of the need for policy solutions represented by the development of
partnerships and coalitions in urban contexts, involving not only local authorities but also a
range of private and semi-public actors.
A further development of the urban entrepreneurialist approach is the growing inter-urban
competition between cities for prominence as centres of consumption as one means to
replace those traditional urban industrial activities which have gone into decline. This
'post-modern' strategy, including the use of a wide range of prestigious urban projects in
areas of consumption such as sports, culture and leisure, has recently become
commonplace in the restructuring of many cities. In particular, sport has traditionally been
a key element in the economic regeneration strategies and in the re-imagining of American
cities (Baade and Dye, 1988; Chapin, 1996a; Crompton, 1995; Robinson-Barnes and
Wright, 1996; Sack and Johnson, 1996; Shropshire, 1995). In Britain and Spain as
elsewhere, some cities have become part of a trend of what Harvey has called 'serial
reproduction of strategies' of using sport to drive the regeneration of their cities (in relation
to both countries, see for example, Brunet, 1994; Roche, 1992; Hill, 1992; Loftman and
Nevin, 1996; Williams, 1997). Despite some homogeneity of urban policy responses, cities
also recognise the need to promote their comparative advantages. This dualistic approach
(homogenisation and differentiation) also forms part of the entrepreneurial stance adopted
among city governments; and indeed is reflected in wider globalisation processes
(Robertson, 1996). However, some commentators highlight some of the social and spatial
stresses inherent in the current redirection of urban policy (Daniels, 1993; Harvey, 1990;
Hambleton, 1990; Hall and Hubbard, 1998; Mayer, 1994).
This thesis seeks to evaluate the nature of homogeneity and differentiation in policy
responses by urban authorities in Britain and Spain in relation to cultural policy, and in
particular sporting policy in the two countries. One of the emerging approaches, urban
regime theory, which originated in the US context in the late 1980s (see Stone, 1989, 1993;
Fainstein and Fainstein, 1986; Elkin, 1987) has been employed to evaluate the role of sport
and leisure in the process of urban regeneration in two European cities subject to large
scale deindustrialisation, Bilbao (Spain) and Sheffield (Britain). In addition, the relevance
of this theoretical tradition for cross-national urban political analysis of new forms of urban
governance in a European context is assessed (Stoker and Mossberger, 1994; DiGaetano
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and Klemanski, 1993; DiGaetano, 1997; Harding, 1994). As will become evident from the
literature reviewed in chapter 2, despite the recent growing literature on sport and
economic development, little research effort has specifically been expended on identifying
the role of sport and leisure in regime or coalition construction and the role of regimes
and/or coalitions in the development of sports strategies (see for example, Chapin, 1996a,
1996b; Cochrane et al., 1996; Henry and Paramio-Salcines, 1998, 1999; Logan and
Molotch, 1987; Sack and Johnson, 1996).
At the heart of the thesis lie several related research questions, which are structured in the
following way: firstly, what changes are taking place in contemporary urban and sports
policies and how might these be explained?. To answer this question, chapter 2 reviews
theoretical accounts of urban politics and policy, including urban regime theory, to explain
the nature and the degree of these changes; identifying why, in the North American
context, regime theory and growth coalition accounts have become the dominant
theoretical orientations. A second substantive research question asks: to what extent are
these approaches useful for conceptualising, explaining and characterising policy changes
in contemporary Western European cities?. To answer this, the two case study cities were
selected for detailed empirical investigation. Chapters 4 and 5 outline how urban planning
and sports policies have evolved in Spain since the Spanish Civil War and in Britain since
the World War II, providing an essential context for understanding the nature of policy in
the two cities. Analysis is undertaken of the wide range of urban programmes designed to
address urban problems in both countries. In terms of sport, it also explores the nature of
the major changes and developments operating, particularly, the recent phenomenon of
using sports-related projects as part of the urban regeneration of some of British and
Spanish cities and the commitment to sporting excellence in both countries (as elsewhere
see Roberts and Kamphorst, 1989). In addition, with the traditional bureaucratic
management approach of public service delivery of the Fordist period coming into
question, an increasing 'new managerialist' approach has been recently adopted in the
running of public services, including sports and leisure services. This situation is found
extensively in Britain under compulsory competitive tendering (CCT) and to a lesser extent
in Spain (in relation to both countries, see for example Farnham and Horton, 1993; Gratton
and Taylor, 1991; Henry, 1993; Leach eta!., 1994; Puig, 1996; Taylor and Page, 1994).
Subsequently, chapter 6 and 7 report the empirical analysis of policy in the two cities
selected and develops evaluation of how such policy may be explained via an urban regime
approach. The manifestation of the crisis of Fordism brought about similar socio-economic
problems to Bilbao and Sheffield to that of other major European and American industrial
cities. In the case of Sheffield, an introductory discussion of the role of the local authority
in tackling urban regeneration in the city focuses on how the nature of Labour politics at
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the local level, as in other major cities in Britain, has been subject to change over time.
After difficult relationships with central government, Sheffield City Council adopted a new
strategy of collaboration in relation to urban regeneration, called 'new realism' with local
capital, with the development of different governing arrangements between business and
political interest groups. As an element of the restructuring of the city, sport has formed an
important part of the strategies for revitalising its economy and promoting itself through
sport prestige projects. Since the 1991 World Student Games, numerous sports events
together with professional teams, have been developed in a city which today proclaims
itself as a 'City of Sport'.
In the case of Bilbao, a long-term regeneration process with ambitious urban projects is
concentrated around its city centre, seeking to regenerate its economy and to change its
image from an industrial city to that of a modern service based economy. As part of this re-
imaging, cultural prestige projects such as the setting of a spectacular post-modern
building, the new European franchise Guggenheim Museum, on Bilbao's riverfront form
an important part of the strategies for achieving both aims. After a period of ongoing
tension between the Bilbao City Council, (when Mayor Gorordo was in power), and the
other levels of Basque government, and central government, an increasing pragmatism on
the part of the Bilbao Council under a new Mayor Ortuondo, as related in the case of
Sheffield, has facilitated the emergence of governing coalitions.
Core research questions for the empirical analysis of the two cities focuses on the
development of governance and in particular the roles of partnerships and coalitions. They
include the following:
1. How do local governments make policy in urban, sport and leisure?
2. How can the partnerships or coalitions involved in urban governance in sport and
leisure be characterised? In other words, were there simply loose coalitions of interest
or could they be characterised as 'regimes'?
3. Who are the participants in these partnerships, coalitions or regimes?
4. What are the goals of these participants?
5. What were the types of policy initiated or sustained by these partnerships, coalitions or
regimes, in particular in the sports policy field?
6. How did participants evaluate the impact or success of policies?
4
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From the nature of the questions themselves and the theoretical perspectives employed it is
clear that an interpretative approach to the study of policy in the case study cities is
appropriate. Chapter 3 therefore reviews the strengths and weaknesses of interpretative
approaches, as well as reviewing other aspects of methodology such as the rationale for
selecting the case study cities, and the process of selection of respondents as representative
of participants and their constituencies. Finally, chapter 8 reflects on the extent to which
global forces and strategies are manifested in, mediated by, or resisted at, the local level.
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URBAN ECONOMIC REGENERATION, SPORTS AND URBAN POLITICS
Urban Economic Regeneration, Sports and Urban Politics 	 Chapter Two
2.1. Introduction
The function of this chapter is to undertake a review of the competing theoretical
frameworks developed to explain the political economy of the city in developed economies.
It does so by highlighting particular theoretical traditions and evaluating their contribution
to understanding the nature and characterisation of the contemporary city. The urban
politics literature of the 1950s and 1960s has traditionally been characterised by debates
between those who have adopted a pluralist, neo-pluralist or hyperpluralist approach on the
one hand (Dahl, 1961, 1986; Lindblom, 1977; Polsby, 1980; Ross et al., 1991), those who
have promoted the view that elites invariably control urban politics (Hunter, 1953; Mills,
1956; Bachrach and Baratz, 1970; Logan and Molotch, 1987), or that urban politics
invariably operate to facilitate the interests of capital (Cockburn, 1977; CasteIls, 1978;
Duncan and Goodwin, 1988).
However, since the mid 1970s it has been generally accepted that the main features of most
Western economies, such as social democratic politics, with the nation-state as the main
actor of economic and social intervention and a dominant Fordist regime of accumulation,
have given way to new economic, social, cultural, and political characteristics. With the
globalisation of the economy, it is argued by some commentators that the declining
significance of the nation-state, clearly evident in the economic, cultural, and social and
political fields, has been accompanied by an increased significance in the roles of de-
centralised agencies, sub-national governments, transnational bodies and, in particular,
cities in the restructuring of the economy (Amin, 1994; Moulaert and Demaziere, 1996;
Hambleton, 1990; Jessop, 1990; Borja and CasteIls, 1997). There are those who argue that
the degree of such change has been exaggerated, and that the nation-state's role, though
diminished is still central to both economic accumulation and social regulation (Harvey,
1990; Harding and LeGales, 1997; Scott, 1997). Nevertheless, commentators are virtually
unanimous in acknowledging the significance of such change even though they may differ
in relation to the degree of change acknowledged. These changes represent a transition from
the Fordist regime of accumulation to a new era variously described as 'post Fordist', 'neo-
Fordist', 'post-industrial', 'post-modern', or 'late modernity' (Amin, 1994; Harvey, 1990;
Jessop, 1990; Painter, 1995; Scott, 1997).
This chapter will argue that the emergence of urban regime theory must be seen in context,
that is, as a vehicle for theorising at the level of an urban political-economy paradigm, the
urban dimensions of such structural changes. Regime theory argues that the nature of the
outcomes of contemporary urban politics is a contingent matter (and not reducible in any
simple terms to, for example, class interests or market processes), and one which (in
principle at least) is open to empirical investigation (Stone, 1989; Stoker, 1995; Orr and
6
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Stoker, 1994). This approach accepts Judge's (1995) argument that there is in effect little
significant epistemological difference between more radical versions of the pluralist and
neo-pluralist accounts (those which refer to 'stratified', 'bounded' pluralism or
'hyperpluralism'), and the accounts of competition between urban elites given by elite
theories. In effect such accounts may be characterised as outlining different forms of
'competitive elitism'.
Pluralist accounts of urban governance have tended to focus on voter strength as a key
factor of political power, and to treat the public and private sectors as relatively distinct
actors in the policy process, while elite theories have focused on how a unified economic or
status elite has either shaped public policy agendas (as represented in 'non-decision
making') or has worked beyond the formal machinery of local government to achieve
particular ends. Regime theory is a product of the attempt to get away from the
conventional theoretical characterisation of the exercise of power in urban politics in the
post-war period as a social control (Dahl, 1961; Hunter, 1953), moving on to consider how
the power or control over the policy process is achieved (Stone, 1989). As a response to the
economic decline of most Western European cities, the literature on local governance
indicates that there is a growing emphasis on the increasing entrepreneurialist role adopted
by many Western European local governments and in particular, on the development of
partnerships and coalitions of interests ('regimes') in shaping urban politics in the 'post-
Fordist' or `neo-Fordist' era (Amin, 1994; DiGaetano, 1997; Harding and LeGales, 1997;
Lawless, 1994; Mollenkopf, 1992; Stone, 1989, 1993; Stoker, 1995; Stoker and
Mossberger, 1994).
Regimes are generally coalitions or compromise groups, which seek to effect particular
types of outcomes at urban level. Unlike pluralist and elite accounts of urban governance,
regime theorists seek to establish how such regimes achieve their goals. In effect they are
concerned with questions of how power is gained and exercised to achieve their ends (in
Stone's terms, 'power to') rather than how power is exercised in controlling, subverting or
excluding other parties in policy processes ('power over'). It might be argued that this
implies an 'amoral' approach to social explanation, one in which the moral issues of who
should exercise power in certain situations are deemed to be of no significance. However,
though the role of social theory may have shifted from the view of the theorist as
'legislator' of values to one of 'interpreter' of values (Bauman, 1992), questions such as
how power is exercised, and in whose interests, remain of key importance. Nevertheless
these will invariably be preceded by questions of by whom power is exercised, how groups
exercising power are mobilised or which groups are excluded.
7
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As Stoker and Mossberger have indicated, one of the significant contributions regime
theory can make is in the field of comparative studies (see also DiGaetano and Klemanski,
1993; DiGaetano, 1997; Harding, 1994). Stoker and Mossberger provide an account of
three ideal types of urban regimes, and invite a response as to how such regimes may form,
be sustained, and evolve or degenerate in different contexts to the American cities. These
three types of regimes are:
a) organic regimes which seek to sustain existing social and economic conditions
within the city, mobilising themselves to oppose change such as development
proposals for the city;
b) instrumental regimes which promote particular types of urban development, often
organised around a central project. The primary concern of such regimes is almost
invariably with local economic development; and
c) symbolic regimes which focus on changing the image or orientation of the city, for
example in promoting a service-based profile for in the face of deindustrialising
tendencies.
Such an approach offers a convenient point of departure for the empirical analysis of two
Western European cities, Sheffield and Bilbao. Since what Stoker and Mossberger provide
are in effect ideal types, it will be important to establish ways in which the nature of the
regimes identified in empirical work cohere in their rationale, structures and modes of
operation when compared to `anticipated findings' in respect of their typology. The
symbolic regime reflects to some extent the type of regimes which might be directly
associated with a current worldwide trend of city 're-imagining' through sport and other
symbolic means. However, sport could be implicated in both of the other types of regimes
and their strategies.
Sport in general and sports facilities, professional teams and sports events in particular,
have traditionally been used as key elements in the economic regeneration strategies and
`re-imagining' of American cities (see Baade and Dye, 1988; Chapin, 1996a; Noll and
Zimbalist, 1997; Shropshire, 1995). This phenomenon has also expanded, following what
Harvey called `serial reproduction', to urban regeneration processes in other cities
worldwide. In particular, some British (Birmingham, Glasgow, London, Manchester,
Bradford or Sheffield) and Spanish (Barcelona, Seville or Palma) cities are examples of this
'post-modern' trend, which includes the use of sports prestige projects and other means to
replace those traditional urban activities in decline (Brunet, 1994; Cochrane et al, 1996;
Roche, 1992; Henry, 1993; Hill, 1992, Loftman and Nevin, 1996; Williams, 1997).
However, despite an extensive literature on sport and economic development, few
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researchers specifically address the role of sport in regime or coalition construction and the
role of regimes and/or coalitions in the development of sports strategies (see, e.g., Chapin,
1996a, 1996b; Cochrane et al., 1996; Harvey, 1987; Henry and Paramio-Salcines, 1998,
1999; Logan and Molotch, 1987; Sack and Johnson, 1996).
This chapter seeks to develop an understanding of the role of sport and leisure in
contemporary urban economic development strategies. Different traditional and 'new wave'
urban theories have been used to conceptualise the emergence of public-private partnerships
for economic regeneration and their implications for sport policy changes over the 1980s
and 1990s in the two case studies. Structurally, this chapter is divided into four sections.
The first section discusses the chronology of the development of theories, considering the
socio-economic and political circumstances that facilitate their emergence. The second
section reviews epistemological issues involved in the conceptualisation of the city,
highlighting epistemological strengths and weaknesses. The third section considers global
and local change as reflected in urban development and sport. The final section examines
central-local government and their contexts in transnational relations.
2.2. Urban politics and economic, political and social circumstances
2.2.1. Pluralism, Neo-pluralism and Hyper-pluralism
After its emergence in the United States, pluralism experienced its greatest support in the
post-war period when most Western governments, in a time of relative economic growth
and political consensus, favoured the expansion of a welfare state, as in the case of Britain.
At the same time, pluralism has traditionally been regarded as the starting point for the
development of other urban theories (Banfield, 1961; Dahl, 1961), which have reflected
opposition to, or extension of, pluralist approaches (Judge, 1995). In this respect, pluralism
has been particularly relevant in the study of nation state-society relations, policy-making
and input politics (elections, party competition and interest groups) in liberal democratic
political systems.
The electoral process and its outcomes are considered central to the legitimating of political
power. However, pluralists have recently recognised some defects in party competition at
the same time that established political parties are facing problems of legitimacy (Dunleavy
and O'Leary, 1987). For pluralists, groups form society, with particular interest groups
making demands on government on their behalf, competing with other interest groups. In
contrast to the electoral process, pluralists value the interest group process as continuous
rather than episodic. In addition, groups can influence policy in more subtle ways than
electoral processes that deal with many issues at any, single, given election. However, it is
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recognised that the number of politically active people in the interest group process is
limited. Thus, the influence of lobbying may have less weight (or legitimacy) in policy-
making than the electoral process. Nevertheless, governments will contemplate three factors
to evaluate the relevance of particular interest groups: first, membership size; second, their
degree of mobilisation; and third, the intensity of their members' activity (Dunleavy and
O'Leary, 1987; Cawson, 1986). Nevertheless, an 'imperfect pluralism' is found when
competition between interest groups is unequal (Dahl, 1961; Dunleavy and O'Leary, 1987).
In particular, some economic groups are likely regularly to exert systemic power to further
their interests in certain areas where other groups may have limited influence.
For classical pluralism, political power reflects the capacity of one or more actors to achieve
ends against resistance by others. This conceptualisation of power comprising control and
resistance suggests a 'social control' model. However, pluralist accounts assume that power
is not itself a property of individuals, but instead all decision making will be the outcome of
a process of bargaining among a multiplicity of groups (Dahl, 1961; Polsby, 1980;
Mollenkopf, 1992). Power is seen to be dispersed among both politically active citizens and
a plurality of organisations, with different groups being influential in different areas. On
such a view, no group is likely to exercise absolute control, though elected politicians,
unlike other elites, are the key players in urban politics. The political system is thus
regarded as open to all prominent groups (influenced by the three factors underlined above)
and explainable in terms of a group process.
Pluralism has a strong normative component associated with an empirical descriptive
analysis of decision making which seeks to explain who has made political decisions and
who has influenced governments (Dahl, 1961; Judge, 1995). Dahl used his study in New
Haven, Connecticut to assess the pluralist model of power. At the same time, Hunter
(1953), writing from an elite theory perspective, analysed the distribution of power in
Atlanta, provoking what was subsequently known as the 'community power' debate (partly
concentrated on methodological issues) in the 1960s and the 1970s. Hunter claimed that the
economic and social structure of Atlanta, consisting of politicians and businessmen, exerted
control over city politics. To this end, he used a reputational analysis and asked prominent
local members to identify where the power lay in the city. His findings confirmed his initial
hypothesis, though his methodological approach has been criticised by traditional pluralists
such as Dahl, Wolfinger and Polsby. Dahl's study used a decisional analysis based on three
key areas (urban development, education and political nominations) (see Dahl, 1961, 11
page appendix). Under Mayor Richard Lee's leadership an extensive urban development
programme was undertaken in the city. Dahl concluded that political power in New Haven -
and by implication other cities - was fragmented (Dahl, 1986; Mollenkopf, 1992). Pluralists
were concerned about generalising their findings. In Britain, some case studies of local
10
Urban Economic Regeneration Sports and Urban Politics 	 Chanter Two
politics have used a pluralist framework (e.g. Newton's study of Birmingham between 1966
and 1972). In Newton's study (1976), three areas (housing, education and race relations)
were examined in order to ascertain the extent to which groups had been more involved in
urban politics. Newton found, as did Dahl, that different levels of group activity in decision
making influenced the outcome of different political decisions. Despite differences, both
theories suggested that local power was either highly concentrated in the hands of a small
socio-economic elite (elitism) or fragmented in a series of elites with different resources
(pluralism).
Following Dahl's study, classical pluralists claimed that politics were still of significance in
shaping public decision making and thus rejected the elitist model of urban governance. In
the same line of argument, in response to criticisms about the limited participation of
citizens in urban politics, pluralism considers that policies demands flow from the
"moderate degree of indirect influence" of citizens to elected politicians (Dahl, 1961, p.
164; Wolman, 1995). Other critics focus on Dahl's methodological approach, in particular,
on the limited number of key areas selected (Waste, 1986). At another level, Bachrach and
Baratz (1963) attacked Dahl for focusing only on the "first face" of power, namely its overt
exercise, while ignoring the second (described by Lukes (1974) as the 'hidden face of
power') which considers how the interrelation between politics and the economy shapes
urban politics. In this respect, there is a 'bias' presented and many relevant issues are not
even open to public discussion. Potential decisions are suppressed from the agenda and
disregarded. They are thus described as 'non-decisions', in which power is exercised but
not overtly (Bachrach and Baratz, 1970). Pluralists responded to the arguments of Bachrach
and Baratz, claiming that whilst decisions can be observed and identified, non-decisions are
more problematic to analyse because of their invisibility (Mollenkopf, 1992; Waste, 1986).
Polsby went further, considering that a non-decision is itself a certain type of decision, in
that it is an observable decision not to act. Thus, Polsby (1980) integrated the concept of
non-decisions after saying that "the second face of power in practice merges with the first
face and becomes identical" (pp. 212-213).
Classical pluralism treated the public and the private sectors as relatively distinct actors in
the policy process, with the economy always subordinate to politics (Dahl, 1961; Judge,
1995). On such a view, in Dahl's study, Mayor Richard Lee "exerted more direct influence
on redevelopment decisions than any other" (p. 137). Therefore, under the dominant control
of mayors, political leaders and private groups could form coalitions around specific issues,
though they might tend to be short-lived (Dahl, 1961; Mollenkopf, 1992; Stoker, 1995).
However, Domhoff (1978) challenged the central role of mayors, after re-examining Dahl's
study and relying on documents and correspondence not available to him. Domhoff noted
that, in turn, national business organisations, (in particular, First New Haven National Bank
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and Yale University) were at the centre of the city's decision-making before Mayor Lee
took power. Similarly, in later work, Dahl (1986) and Lindblom (1977), evolving from their
classical pluralist stance, recognised the constraints imposed by the economy over politics
and accepted the privileged position of business in capitalist societies.
In the study of state-society relations, American pluralists rejected the nation-state system
as part of a normative political theory considering that in the US authority resides in the
people rather than in the nation-state (Keating, 1991; Wolman, 1995). Nevertheless, since
the 1950s pluralists have subscribed principally to one of three different models of the state,
the neutral state characterised as "mediator, balancer and harmonizer of interests" of
pressure groups with the non-organised groups (Dunleavy and O'Leary, 1987, p. 46; Dahl,
1961). This and the 'cipher' model were both identified by Dunleavy and O'Leary to
explain the relevance of the nation-state as the main actor of social and economic
intervention in most Western economies in the post-war period. The cipher model refers to
a state highly responsive to political parties and to the dominant interest groups. A third
model, the broker state, in turn, reacts not only to external groups but also to actors with
their own interests inside the state. At the local level, pluralism recognises the important
role of local government to counterbalance the nation-state's power (Dunleavy and
O'Leary, 1987). Despite this assumption, it is perhaps rather more in the British case that
local government plays this role, rather than in the American context where pressure groups
more readily perform this function (Keating, 1991; Wolman, 1995).
If in the post-war period, pluralism was conceptualised as the dominant theoretical
approach in urban political analysis with the city characterised as non-conflictual, with
limited political power of groups and a stable process of group competition which was
responsive to politicians; the emergence of political, economic, urban and social crises in
American (e.g. the civil right movements and the anti-Vietnam protests) and European
cities (e.g. increased levels of inflation and unemployment) in the 1960s and 1970s, forced
a reconsideration of pluralism as a normative theory (Dahl, 1961; Dunleavy and O'Leary,
1987; Fainstein and Hirst, 1995; Mollenkopf, 1992; Thomas and Savitch, 1991). With the
increasing challenge to pluralist assumptions, these two decades witnessed in turn an
increase in political activism parallel to the growth in the number, diversity, and scope of
urban social movements in Western European countries (e.g. May 1968 in France or
political activism in the early 1970s in Spain). This occurred in conjunction with claims
about a diminution in the capacity and legitimacy of the nation-state, established political
parties, and elected politicians (Mills, 1956; Thomas and Savitch, 1991; Castells, 1981;
Fainstein and Fainstein, 1974). Neo-pluralism, unlike studies of community power, focused
its analysis on these new economic and political situations (Dunleavy and O'Leary, 1987;
Dunleavy, 1980; Harding, 1995). In this way, neo-pluralists like Marxists and neo-Marxists
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recognised the limitations of elected politicians in contemporary urban politics with the
systematic subordination of politics to business (Dahl, 1982, 1986; Lindblom, 1977). In
such new context, the state plays a new role not only as a direct promoter but also as a
facilitator of economic growth. Nevertheless, neo-pluralists insist that, although business
exercises considerable control over decision-making, political power is still legitimised by
the existence of democratic elections and a multi-party system.
The combination of new social movements, political activism and the relative decline of the
nation-state led to a period of an increasingly fragmented and ineffective process of
decision-making (Yates, 1977; Mollenkopf, 1992; Thomas and Savitch, 1991). Yates
postulated (after analysing American cities such as New York and New Haven) that policy
making was "fragmented to the point of chaos" (p. 34). It was also claimed by Ross et al.
(1991, p. 58) that the proliferation of urban movements has contributed "to make power in
cities...more pluralistic". Previously, Wirt (1974), in his study of San Francisco, described
the combination of both a decentralised government system and a highly fragmented
interest group as hyper-pluralistic. Hyperpluralism was characterised by "diversity,
variability, complexity, instability, and interdependence of interests and decision games,
and by the fact that policy making involves direct and well crystallised conflicts about urban
goods and services" (Yates, 1977, p. 37). On this basis such cities were deemed to be
ungovernable. His perception led to a characterisation of contemporary urban politics as
incoherent and ineffective where "nobody really makes decisions, or if decisions are made it
is remarkably difficult to trace exactly who exerted influence and at which stage in the
process of decision-making". Similar findings emerged from a study of 13 American cities
undertaken by Thomas and Savitch (1991). All these findings fostered a description of
urban politics of the last two decades as hyper-pluralist characterised by both a proliferation
of groups and a crisis of the public authority (De Leon, 1992; Stoker, 1991; Mollenkopf,
1992).
Neo-pluralist also point to the fragmentation of urban political power accompanied by the
decline of the state as an effective actor is reflected by an increased influence of
decentralised agencies, sub-national governments, transnational bodies and cities in the
restructuring of the economy. In this way, neo-pluralists challenge the unitary notion of
power of elite theory (Dahl, 1982, 1986). With the increasing complexity of current urban
politics, neo-pluralists emphasise the importance of power-dependency relations between
central and local government. Indeed, local government can exert substantial influence on
local economic development strategies, but their limited financial capacity forces them to
be still dependent on central state funds and to a lesser extent, on European funds.
Additionally, Stoker agrees with neo-pluralist writers on the importance of business
interests in influencing these processes (see Judge, 1995). Indeed, as we shall see below,
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most of the neo-pluralist assumptions inform, to some extent, new theories such as the
growth machine and the urban regime.
2.2.2. Elitism and Neo-elitism
'Classical elitism' or early modern elite theory emerged at the end of the nineteenth century
as a response to Marxist theory. Contrary to the strong egalitarian claims proposed by
Marxism, classical elitism advocated the control of society by a small elite (see Mosca,
1939; Pareto, 1935; Michels, 1959). Building on Mosca's later thinking, another version of
elite theory, 'democratic or technocratic elitism' evolved in the work of Weber and
Schumpeter. This variation of elitism synthesised some of the main assumptions of both
classical elitism and pluralism to explain the operation of the nation-state during the social
democratic period, with the emergence of a growing bureaucratisation. Schumpeter (1944)
(cited in Dunleavy and O'Leary, 1987, p. 142) defined democracy as "an institutional
arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to
decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote". However, democracy does
not mean equality for all people in terms of liberty and participation, but it is more
concerned with filtering political inputs in order to produce elite pluralism. Democratic
elitism assumed the compatibility of bureaucracy and democracy and stressed elite
competition. This version of elitism as with neo-pluralism, was opposed to the reductionist
classical Marxism as a valid framework to analyse emerging economic, social and political
characteristics.
Elitism does not offer a unified view about political power. Classical elitism took as
axiomatic that power is an inherited part of human nature. Lukes (1974) defined power
essentially as an unequal relationship that can not be considered consensual (Dunleavy and
O'Leary, 1987). Democratic elitism suggests that power remains in the hands of the few
who lead bureaucracies (Weber, 1968; Harding, 1995). In other words, power is a structural
property of organisations that subsequently exert control over the state. Critical elitism
regarded as the most influential approach to urban politics, emerged in opposition to
classical elitism but shared many assumptions of the democratic approach. One of its
representatives, C. Wright Mills analysed the structure of power in contemporary American
society. He suggested that power, unlike pluralism, had become increasingly bureaucratised
and hierarchical. At the top, three groups (named the 'power elite') exerted major control,
in particular, large business corporations, the military and the central executive machinery
of government who shaped all important national and international decisions, leaving the
less relevant to elected politicians (Mills, 1956; Domhoff, 1978). Elected politicians,
according to Mills, were thus relegated to a secondary level of power. At the same time,
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various special interest groups struggled for promotion, for example, labour unions. Finally,
at the lowest level was the mass society.
The 'power elite' was not an economic class based only on ownership of capital, but also
formed to some degree a unified group inter-linked through a series of personal networks as
well as the desire to maintain their own power (Mills, 1956; Domhoff, 1978). However, this
unelected power elite may sometimes disagree or fail to use their power. But, according to
Mills, they are the only group who can exercise this capacity. Power in Mills' terms is
domination. However, Mills' conceptualisation of power has been criticised on
methodological and theoretical grounds (Domhoff, 1978; Dahl, 1961). Both pluralists and
Marxists criticised, in particular, Mills' inability to demonstrate empirically how the leaders
of the power elite were united. Pluralists considered that there was competition rather than
cohesion. Additionally, despite the fact that Mills identified who held power in America
and what kinds of interests were served, he did not say anything about what the elite did
with its power or about the process of decision making. What is more, elected politicians
were not an effective counterweight to this unelected power elite. Surprisingly, Mills (1956)
regarded academics as the only group with capacity to challenge this elite.
Going on methodological grounds, classical elitism recognised the difficulty of
demonstrating empirically the direct exercise of power itself. As indicated earlier in relation
to the debate about pluralism, Hunter (1953) was the first to apply elite theory to test the
exercise of power. To this end, in his study of Atlanta, a reputational analysis was used to
prove that power of individuals was associated with their reputation for having that power.
He asked well informed local people to identify and rank, according to their reputation for
power, the most influential local leaders. After that, 40 top leaders were then interviewed in
order to ascertain who among them was perceived to be the most powerful (Harding, 1995;
Dunleavy and O'Leary, 1987). Hunter confirmed that the 40 leaders, all knew each other
well and formed themselves into groups depending on their main interests. The leaders of
each group consorted to form a powerful core of policy makers. Despite the fact that most
of them were senior executives within key Atlanta businesses, only a few were visible to the
local people. In particular, the mayor was the only government figure seen as belonging to
these cores. However, in contrast to pluralists, Hunter claimed that although elected
politicians play an important role in the implementation of policies, the formulation of
policy remained outside the formal structures of local political institutions. In this way, the
small elite identified by Hunter focused on local politics rather than on national and
international issues of Mills' power elite.
These findings emerged in the context of a broad community power debate. Pluralists
criticised Hunter's findings based on methodological issues. In particular, he was accused
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of using inadequate empirical methods, which predetermined his findings. Firstly, the
formulation of the list of influential leaders was dependent upon the institutions of both
Hunter, and the selected members on panels consulted, rather than being independently
empirically verified. Secondly, the reputational analysis ignored systemic power by
assuming that power was simply owned by individuals (Dahl, 1961; Polsby, 1980; Harding,
1995). The first critique did not discredit the reputational method. However, the second, as
Harding points out, totally opposed to pluralists' accounts, was entirely justified. Neo-
elitists counter-attacked pluralists' methodological criticisms. They highlighted defects in
pluralist analysis of decision-making and observable political conflicts (Dunleavy and
O'Leary, 1987; Harding, 1995). With respect to decision-making, pluralists, unlike Hunter,
failed to take account of the fact that power may be, and often is, exercised by confining the
scope of decision making to relatively safe issues (observable decisions) while putting aside
non-decisions. In fact, elite groups might exercise considerable power to ensure that only
certain issues, rather than the important ones, appear on the political agenda (Bachrach and
Baratz, 1970). One of the mechanisms used in biasing decisions in favour of the power
elite, as neo-elitists along with the growth machine theorists recognised, is through the
media (Harding, 1995; Molotch, 1976).
In contrast to pluralists, elite theorists such as Hunter and Mills, focusing on the upper class
as one dimension to the power structure, did not give much attention to the electoral
process. While Mills directly relegated political discussions to a secondary level, Hunter's
brief account of relations between the Atlanta power structure and the Georgia State
government left little room for independent action on the part of elected politicians. Unlike
pluralist accounts, elitists acknowledge inequalities of political influence between interest
groups, with some groups' interests excluded or marginalised from decision-making, while
others enjoy more favourable conditions. In practice, elites are aware that there are certain
interests not represented in decision-making. Olson (1965), Mills and growth machine
accounts shared the assumption that certain interest groups are primarily united by their
shared interest in selective incentives. Elitism as well as regime theory and growth machine
accounts expects stability within the interest group, by contrast to instability predicted by
pluralists. In essence, the community power debate focused on understanding power and
how it should be measured, but failed to place the analysis within a wider process of
economic change (Harding, 1995; Mollenkopf, 1992; Stoker, 1995).
2.2.3 Marxists and Neo-Marxism
Unlike pluralism, Marxist theories have sought to provide an explanation, critique and
alternative prescription to the capitalist system in advanced democracies (Pickvance, 1995;
Harvey, 1990). In this respect, Marxists accounts have been traditionally critical of the
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nature and requirements of the capitalist mode of production and the role of the nation-state
in this process. While pluralism conceives power as dispersed, for Marxists the dispersal of
power is restricted to those issues where the structural power of capital is not challenged.
Indeed power might appear to be pluralistic but the reality is different. Capitalist societies
are structurally dependent upon economic production which capital controls. Marxists and
neo-Marxists agree that economic power reflects political power. Under these
circumstances, the ownership of the means of production is translated to advantage capital
in terms of power over political elites. In this way, Marxism has tended to argue that the
differential distribution of power between capital and labour generates exploitation and
subsequently class conflicts (Castells, 1978; Cockburn, 1977; Duncan and Goodwin, 1988;
Miliband, 1973; Harvey, 1987; Pickvance, 1995). However, Marxism and neo-Marxism
start from the premise that capitalism cannot guarantee its own reproduction because it has
prerequisites which the market cannot secure and produces conflicts which need to be
regulated (Pickvance, 1995; Judge et al., 1995).
Marxism does not offer a unified view about the degree of autonomy of the state in relation
to the dominant classes, the unity of state institutions, and the influence of external actors in
urban politics. In this debate, 'instrumental' Marxists along with elite and neo-pluralist
accounts, have suggested that the state favours, through a wide range of policies, the
interests of capital (Cockburn, 1977; Dunleavy and O'Leary, 1987; Harvey, 1990;
Miliband, 1973; Pickvance, 1995). In addition, this strand of Marxism accepted the unity of
state institutions with local government having little autonomy from the nation-state. As a
result, local urban politics were relegated to a secondary level of analysis. In later work,
'structuralist' Marxist authors re-defined their view of the state by saying that the state is
relatively autonomous from capital (Miliband, 1973; Poulantzas, 1973; Castells, 1977; Gurr
and King, 1987). In fact, Poulantzas suggested that the state seeks to guarantee the long-
term benefits of collective interests. The state does not exercise power by itself; rather it is
argued to be the terrain on which class struggle takes place. State actors are, in turn, not
autonomous, but respond to pressure from different groups. Public policies therefore
emerge from this class struggle. Castells' initial thought argued, in turn, that the main role
of the nation-state during the Fordist regime of accumulation had been to guarantee the
reproduction of labour forces and to reduce class conflict, both essential for the
maintenance of the capitalism system (see also Harvey, 1990). Miliband went further and
differentiated the operation of the state in periods of economic growth and of economic
crisis. In the former case, the state becomes more autonomous and responds to a wide range
of interests while in the latter, the state responds primarily to the interests of the dominant
classes. In later work, Miliband (1973) along with corporatist theory, noted that the interests
of capital and labour are asymmetrical, that is, trade unions are subject to constraints which
do not apply to organisations of capital.
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As mentioned above, Marxists and instrumental Marxists have traditionally undermined the
importance of local politics to the extent that local government, far from responding to local
needs, was seen as concerned with legitimising the capitalist system as well as with
favouring local economic interests. Along the same line of thought, local government was
considered the local version of the nation-state with both entities shaped subsequently by
capital (Cockburn, 1977; Pickvance, 1995). Saunders in his 'dual state' thesis (1981) also
denied the independence of local state. This model revolves around the allocation of
functions between different levels of government, in particular, related to production and
consumption areas. As such, national and regional states are concerned with production
whereas local government acts as the main provider of collective services (see also CasteIls,
1978; Dunleavy, 1980; Cockburn, 1977; Duncan and Goodwin, 1988). This functional
division ensures that all state policies favour the needs of capital (until the arrival of the
Conservatives to power in 1979, the British political system approximated this model). This
view is not held by structuralists and neo-Marxists who claim that local government is
autonomous from both the nation-state and, to a lesser extent, the interests of capital
(Miliband, 1973; Gurr and King, 1987). Therefore, it was assumed that the local state could
pursue its interests without being constrained by local economic and social conditions.
However, Gurr and King noted that there are some financial constraints on what the local
government can do to maintain a locally healthy economy. Thus, Western local
governments are likely to seek additional resources from external sources to finance
development programmes.
As already discussed under pluralism, the 1960s and the early 1970s saw an increase in
political activism and the growth of urban social movements which coincided with the first
signs of a wider economic crisis in Western economies. Those social movements, according
to Castells (1977), arise from consumption crises, especially when government policies
shift away from social concerns. However, CasteIls' explanation is regarded as structuralist
and also in its scope is likely to exclude many other groups (Gurr and King, 1987). In a later
work, Castells (1984) redefines his theory and distinguishes between three types of social
movements according to their specific goals. However, only groups that combine the
objectives of all three have the potential to shape the local state's policies. In contrast to
American cities, Castells argues that the mobilisation of citizens has been crucial in shaping
urban politics in European cities.
The appearance of this economic crisis in Western societies has opened an intense debate
on a virtually worldwide scale involving competing theories. Marxists share with regulation
accounts the origin of the economic decline was essentially caused by the crisis of the
Fordist regime of accumulation, in particular, by the tendency of capitalism to
overaccumulation (Harvey, 1990). Marxists argue that this tendency can never be
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eliminated under capitalism. Neo-Marxists went beyond pluralism and elitism by
recognising the changing character of capitalist economies and how these changes are
influencing contemporary cities. Cities are no longer independent from economic and social
forces that operate on them, and therefore, the impact of global and national influences
cannot be ignored (Miliband, 1973; Gurr and King, 1987; Harvey, 1987, 1990). One of the
effects of the globalisation of the economy is that many decisions are more dependent upon
non-local forces than upon the immediate decisions taken at local level. Marxists regulation
accounts have focused on these new trends as well as on others such as the growth of
inequality and poverty with some cities no longer able to generate sufficient funds to
provide traditional local services (Harvey, 1987; Wolman and Goldsmith, 1992; Gurr and
King, 1987). O'Connor (1973) pointed out that the failure to maintain private sector
profitability has undermined the legitimacy of the nation-state and has resulted in a 'fiscal
crisis of the state'. In addition, the traditional conception of the dual state of Saunders came
under attack with the adoption of neo-liberal policies worldwide.
2.2.4 Corporatism
Corporatism emerged, along with other urban theories, in the 1970s as a response to
pluralism (Cawson, 1986). Corporatism can be understood in many different ways, but the
most common version refers to it as a distinctive way of understanding the relationship
between society (exemplified by `corporatised groups') and the state during the Fordist
regime of accumulation. The most important `corporatised groups' traditionally recognised
are those organisations representative of capital and labour. As one might expect, not all
groups have the capacity to become corporatised though there remains a certain competitive
interest group process. In fact, one of the main differences between corporatism and
pluralism concerns the number of groups involved in policy-making. While pluralism
subscribed to an indefinite number of organisations, corporatism makes emphasis on a
limited number of organisations. In this vein, the influence of pluralist groups, according to
corporatism, in the process of economic production is merely symbolic (Cawson, 1986;
Schmitter, 1974). Corporatism, like neo-pluralism and classical elitism, in turn, values the
systematic power conferred on business corporations and peak organisations of capital.
Beyond that, in contrast to Marxists who ascribe a governing character only to organisations
of capital, corporatism recognises the important role that trade unions have played in the
process of governance in many Western economies, though at a secondary level.
Based on the premise that everything is open to negotiation, corporatism points out that
macro-economic and social policies in many Western countries have been traditionally
negotiated in a tripartite manner between representatives of capital, labour and the state
(Cawson, 1986). Under corporatist arrangements, it has been generally accepted that the
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capitalist economy prospered most in the social democratic period. Cawson noted that
macro-corporatism arose only in a few small countries like Austria, Sweden or Germany in
the context of economic growth, while in the case of UK, the approach adopted from the
mid-1960s to late 1970s was identified as weak macro-corporatism (see also Wrinkler,
1976; Kavanagh, 1994). However, since the mid-1970s corporatist arrangements have been
challenged with the arrival of neo-liberal ideas.
Unlike classical and instrumental Marxism, corporatism views the state as acting
independently from capital and with control over economic production (Cawson, 1986;
Wrinkler, 1976). In a capitalist economy these groups exercise power in an asymmetric
way. Corporatist theory agrees with Marxist and critical elitist accounts of inequality and
hierarchy in the distribution of power, but departs from Marxism in attributing such
inequality to class structure and to the differential power of capital and labour (Cawson,
1986). Corporatised groups achieve power as a consequence of social closure whereby they
acquire a monopolistic representation of a particular category of functional interest. In this
sense, corporatism re-considers the pluralist concept of interest group by introducing the
concept of 'functional interests' to define those groups that have the capacity to become
corporate groups. Nevertheless, class interest is an extremely important factor for closure,
but it is not the only one. As an example, some professional groups may achieve a
substantial power by this means but corporatism argues that their power is limited. On the
other hand, some powerful professional groups such as legal and medical professions can
negotiate agreements in a bipartite corporatist basis (Cawson, 1986; Saunders, 1981).
Corporatist theory does not accept the pluralist and Marxist assumption that power is a
zero-sum process (e.g. for Marxism working class power can only increase if the power of
capital is reduced). By contrast, corporatists, as with Olson and Mills, share the assumption
that certain individuals join associations expecting not only general benefits (e.g. economic
growth) but also to influence governments and other organisations (Cawson, 1986). Once
organisations acquire a monopolistic representation, this status confers on them a systemic
power. In line with growth machine and regime theory explanations, the costs of forming an
alternative organisation are too high and also there is no competing organisation to join.
The internal cohesion of the corporatist organisation emerges from its relationship with the
state. In essence, centralisation and concentration of interest organisation constituted the
dynamic process of corporatism (Cawson, 1986).
As with pluralism, the nation-state is seen as synonymous with government. However,
corporatism differs from pluralism in that in any process of bargaining only the permanent
presence of the government assures a real process of corporatism. Moreover, governments
are not always responsive to all groups, but make use of certain monopolistic interest
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groups to shape decision-making. In this respect, unlike pluralism, governments are not
always neutral with respect to organised interests while other groups are deliberately
excluded (Cawson, 1986). At the same time, while pluralism stressed the separation
between public and private actors, corporatism stresses the interdependence of public and
private groups. This is evident not only by the proliferation of state agencies, but also by the
dependence of much of the private sector on state funds. Despite internal differences, major
socio-economic issues in many capitalist societies have been determined and implemented
in a process of restricted negotiation between government and particular interest
organisations. This assumption presumes that state agencies exercise power in their own
right, and that government is to a greater or lesser extent autonomous.
Most of the assumptions already outlined symbolise the most important form of
corporatism, macro-corporatism. At a secondary level exists `meso-corporatism' which
focuses its analysis on the process of negotiation between state agents and sectoral
organisations with a sufficient degree of representativeness rather than with the peak
organisations of labour and capital. At this level, different branches of production gives rise
to different monopolistic sectoral interests who may be organised into bodies such as
employers' or trade associations. Cawson argues that this level of corporatism is more
specific to traditional industrial sectors rather than in the new up-and-coming sectors.
Finally, at the lowest level stands 'micro-corporatism' where corporatist intermediation
takes a bipartite form with state agencies negotiating directly with firms. This process
occurs when there may be no appropriate interlocutor. Nevertheless, when firms decide to
join forces they can achieve certain arrangements in exchange for material incentives. This
selective political exchange can not be associated with either macro or meso-corporatism
because no interest concertation is involved. According to Cawson, micro-corporatism can
be a valid framework to analyse the emergence of public-private partnerships or the role of
networks in local economic development processes in the 1990s (see also Church and Reid,
1996).
In general, all varieties of corporatism share the need to have state agencies as negotiators.
However, critics claim that corporatism has failed to develop a convincing theoretical
account of the state, an aspect admitted in later work by Schmitter (1985 in Cawson, 1986,
p. 45). Also corporatism was criticised by pluralists on methodological grounds for not
providing an accurate description of interest politics and of the working of liberal political
systems. Nevertheless, after the mid 1970s the most extensive criticisms came from neo-
liberal accounts claiming that the kind of corporatist arrangements achieved in the period of
social democracy led to a diminution in the authority of the state in the face of powerful
trade unions and other sectional interests. On such view, at this time corporatism was said
to be responsible for many of the economic crisis of Western economies. With the
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globalisation of the economy, certain areas such as production, trade and finance are no
longer attached to national boundaries, which has contributed to diminish the power of
labour organisations. In the context of transnational capital, macro-corporatism is seen as
under threat and interest in corporatism was therefore limited to concern with meso and
micro-corporatist analysis in the 1990s.
2.2.5 New Right
Although many of the commentators, including Hayek, Friedman, Buchanan or Tullock
previously promoted neo-liberal or new right explanations, it is in reality since the mid
1970s that this type of account has re-emerged in importance (Gamble, 1988; Mollenkopf,
1992; Atkinson and Moon, 1994). The new right ideology is historically rooted in a
combination of two distinct strands, neo-liberalism and neo-conservatism. The key
assumptions of the classical `neo-liberalism' include the defence of minimal intervention of
the state in the economy with its actions strictly controlled and rendered compatible with
the market. In the same vein, the state is seen as essential to the creation of a general
context in which individuals can exercise their freedom. Neo-conservatism, in turn, places
more emphasis upon social and political control issues assuming that there is breakdown of
the authority of the nation-state, decline in the standards of morality, and general
disintegration of society. In this way, neo-conservatism promotes the restoration of the
authority of the nation-state lost progressively during the social democratic period. Despite
some differences, all strands of new right ideology share an opposition to the existing
economic and social principles underpinning the Fordist model of the post-war period. At
the same time they argue for both a liberal defence of the free economy with a conservative
defence of state authority. Gamble summarises this contradictory principle in the phrase
"the free economy and strong state" (p. 28) reflecting the paradox of the need to
simultaneously roll back and roll forward state influence. Under these circumstances, the
state becomes highly interventionist and centralised in particular areas while in others it
plays the opposite role.
Some of the major exponents of this ideology have been the Conservative governments of
Thatcher and Major as well as the Reagan and the Bush administrations sharing their
opposition to the main features of the British social democratic state and American
welfarism (Gamble, 1988; Kavanagh, 1990; 1994; Hambleton, 1990; Hutton, 1995).
Despite the fact that many of the main ideas of the new right ideology emerged in the US, in
the case of Britain, the long-term structural decline of the British economy associated with
the globalisation of the economy helped to favour the adoption of neo-liberal policies. In
addition to the aim of hollowing out the state, they share advocacy of shrinking,
restructuring and ultimately dismantling the entire thrust of the social democratic period,
22
Urban Economic Regeneration, Sports and Urban Politics
	 Chapter Two
including state intervention, industrial policy, commitment to full employment, trade
unions' strength, and high levels of public spending and taxation. Alongside the
discrediting of the Fordist model, new right accounts also recognised the weakened position
in the economic sphere of the US. All these factors led new right ideology to be associated
with an alternative accumulation regime characterised by deregulation of the labour market,
an ideology of individualism and entrepreneurship and a minimalist welfare state (Gamble,
1988; Stoker, 1988; Jessop, 1990; Kavanagh, 1990; 1994). Essentially, the new notion of
welfare combines more choice, more economic efficiency and more individual
responsibility.
As an extension of the need to restore a strong state, the 1980s and 1990s have also
witnessed a major dispute between central government and local authorities about their
respective powers and functions. In this context, local government in the UK (see chapter 4
for more details) and to a lesser extent, in the US came under attack by consecutive
Conservative governments (Cochrane, 1991; Gamble, 1988; Hambleton, 1990; Parkinson,
1989; Stoker, 1995; Wolman, 1995). The new right overtly criticises traditional welfare
programmes based on their cost and tendency for unchecked growth as well as their failure
to be responsive to local needs. In seeking more economic efficiency, British local
authorities have not only been obliged to cut public spending but also to privatise some of
their traditional functions and services, ranging from housing and social services to sport. It
is worth noting that contracting out public services has been a long-established practice in
many American cities. After all, the underlying driving force behind the various processes
of privatisation is an ideological belief that private sector services are always better than
public ones, particularly those provided by local goverment. Simultaneously, the
diminution of the traditional role of British local government coincided with a privatisation
of urban policy. Beyond that, new right ideology (along with regime accounts) aspires to
redefine the role of local government (as enabler) to ensure compatibility with the new
regime of accumulation and the adoption of an enterprise culture (Cochrane, 1991;
Goldsmith, 1992; Osborne and Gaebler, 1992). In terms of urban governance, the
Conservatives were attracted by the model of the 'entrepreneurial' American city and the
development of new political arrangements in the form of public-private partnerships
(Bailey et al., 1995; Gamble, 1988; Hambleton, 1990; Parkinson, 1989; Stoker, 1995). In
essence, urban entrepreneurialism was deemed as an essential policy response to promote
urban regeneration over the last two decades. However, a number of authors argue that one
of the negative effects of the implementation of the set of neo-liberal economics at the
urban level has been the growth of social polarisation (Hambleton, 1990; Harvey, 1987,
1990; Hutton, 1990; Squires, 1991).
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2.2.6 Regulation theory
Regulation theory emerged as a new theoretical approach during the 1970s. Originally, it
came from a small group of French structuralist Marxist economists, including Aglietta,
Lipietz and Boyer, who applied an economic perspective to explain the nature of the post-
war period of economic growth period up to the mid 1970s, known as Fordism, and its
crisis thereafter, but with a limited consideration of the state, government and urban politics
(Aglietta, 1979; Amin, 1994; Goodwin et al., 1992; Jessop, 1990; Painter, 1995). With the
globalisation of the economy it has been generally accepted by regulation accounts as well
as by other theories of transition that the nature of capitalism has been affected by
significant changes operating at the international, national and local level. As Amin notes,
with the globalisation of the economy, the main existing structures underpinning the Fordist
regime of accumulation have experienced crisis in Western economies, including
capitalism, industrialism and the nation-state system.
In the analysis of the nature of the new economic, political and social changes, regulation
theory goes beyond traditional urban theories and examines these changes at the macro-
level through the connections and interrelations between social, political, economic and
cultural factors (Amin, 1994; Goodwin et al., 1992; Harvey, 1987, 1990; Jessop, 1990;
Peck and Tickell, 1994). However, there is not a single regulation theory account. Jessop
has identified seven main schools within this framework that analyse Fordism using four
distinctive sets of key concepts such as labour process, regime of accumulation, mode of
regulation and mode of societalisation. In simple terms, Fordism refers to the dominant
mode of industrial organisation operating in most of the capitalist countries in the post-war
period that constituted a distinctive 'regime of accumulation'. Thereafter, regime of
accumulation refers to the stabilisation of relations between production and consumption
processes through an efficient allocation of social product between reinvestment, profit and
consumption (Jessop, 1990; Goodwin et al., 1992; Harvey, 1990). The expansion of this
regime of accumulation was continually secured through a specific 'mode of regulation'
which (principally) the state facilitated through its many economic, political and regulatory
mechanisms (Amin, 1994; Goodwin et al., 1992; Harvey, 1990; Jessop, 1990). Finally, the
'mode of societalisation' relates to a series of political compromises, social alliances and
hegemonic processes of domination that feed into a pattern of mass integration and social
cohesion.
Regulation theory along with other theories of transitions claims that the 1980s were the
turning point for the emergence of a 'post Fordist' or `neo-Fordise era' (Amin, 1994;
Jessop, 1990; Painter, 1995; Harvey, 1990; Scott, 1997). Though there is not a consensus
concerning the characteristics of the new post-Fordist mode of regulation, different authors
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identify as new, certain economic and social features: the declining size of production units,
flexible production, differentiated consumption or the increasing entrepreneurialism
adopted by cities (Amin, 1994; Harvey, 1990; Jessop, 1990; Mayer, 1994; Painter, 1995).
Beyond this, Jessop argues that these new conditions represent as a shift from the
Keynesian welfare state to a new `Schumpeterian workfare state'. At the same time, Jessop
highlights how the 'hollowing out' of the previously dominant nation-state system is
associated with the transfer of power upward, to supranational institutions, downward, to
sub-national and local authorities and outward, to market and private de-centralised
agencies. Peck and Tickell (1994) argue, in turn, that a coherent post-Fordist model has yet
to stabilise while they also dismiss Jessop's portrayal of neo-liberalism as only one
potential post-Fordist regulatory option.
According to regulation theory, local government has been a member of the range of
institutions that helped to sustain the Fordist mode of production (Duncan and Goodwin,
1988; Goodwin et al., 1992; Harvey, 1989). However, regulation theory offers a limited
consideration of the state, especially the local government. Despite this lack of concern for
the state, regulation theory, drawing on Marxist accounts, considers that the role of the state
within processes of social and economic regulation is to facilitate the transition of the
economy in the interest of capital accumulation. Goodwin eta!. (1992) argue that practices
and relations of regulation also take place locally with the local government playing an
important role in initiating and sustaining new modes of regulation, even though national
governments will ultimately need to share much of their traditional governing capacity
(Mayer, 1994). In contemporary urban politics, local government has therefore been both an
object and agent of regulation. In particular, the politics of local government, and the local
state in Britain, under four successive Conservative governments exemplify these changes.
Public services and institutions have been reshaped and the provision of public services
been temporarily postponed in order to develop entrepreneurialism in local economic
development strategies in the 'post-Fordist' era. Another implication of the new post-
Fordist politics has been the increasing development of coalitions and partnerships at local
level (Mayer, 1994). Mayer argues that some of these developments constitute a
reformulation of economic and social policies towards a post-Fordist Schumpeterian
entrepreneurialism (Amin, 1994). However, some authors rather than marshalling evidence
to confirm and describe the features of the transition to a new era (Lipietz, 1987; Rustin,
1989), suggest that:
Post Fordism is better seen as one ideal-typical model or strategy of
production and regulation, co-present with others in a complex historical
ensemble, rather than as a valid totalizing description of an emerging social
formation here and now (Rustin, 1989, p. 61)
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This stance highlights the strategic, relational and complex nature of any transition, and
Rustin sees Fordism and post-Fordism as the "resolution of conflicts at the level of social
relations, not as the automatic outcomes of the technological imperatives of 'mass
production' or its information based successor" (p. 63). This implies that in order to
comprehend either Fordism or its transition to a new regime, it is necessary to connect
social, economic, political, cultural or environmental contexts (Amin, 1994). Harvey (1987,
1990) adds a spatial component considering that changes in the mode of regulation will
necessarily involve changes in the spatial form and configuration of society. But more than
simply pointing out that such change takes a spatial form, Harvey suggests that particular
sets of social relations tend towards the production of a 'structured coherence'. The state is
then seen as crucial for the maintenance, undermining and dismantling of this structured
coherence, especially within a Fordist mode of regulation.
Regulation theory lacks the extent and range of empirical work for the analysis of local
government seen in other theories (Painter, 1995; Stoker, 1988, 1990; Goodwin et al,
1992). Nevertheless, studies of local government using regulation accounts have
concentrated more on national policy changes and how these changes affect local
government rather than examining the changing nature of local politics in an isolated form
(Mayer, 1994). As noted, regulation theory has been extensively criticised for lacking a
shared characterisation of Fordism (Cochrane, 1991; Goodwin et al., 1992). This diversity,
and the theoretical confusion which stems from it has led to questioning regulation theory
as a valid framework to study the nature of urban political change. Without rejecting
regulation theory totally, Goodwin et al. concentrate their analysis of local politics and the
local state within the notion of Fordism as a mode of regulation, rather than facing a shift to
post-Fordism.
Although pluralist, elite theory, Marxist accounts, corporatist and regulation approaches
focus on interests and power, few such accounts look beyond class to gender, ethnicity or
other variables (Goodwin et al., 1992; Pickvance, 1995; Roseneil, 1997). Under the Fordist
regime of accumulation, urban politics were male-dominated which did little to challenge
the patriarchal gender division of labour with women considered as domestic reproducers of
labour and their interests subordinated to men's incomes. In general, the challenge to the
ideas outlined above came not from new politics in the national political parties, but from
the women's movement often working through the 'new urban left' at the local level (with
the exception of a few sources such as Cynthia Cockburn's Marxist feminism account
(1977) where the application of feminist research to issues of urban governance is evident).
One of the effects of the global economy has been the fragmentation of the labour market,
and in particular, the substantial incorporation of women into the current labour market
(more than 40 percent in many of the advanced capitalist economies) (Harvey, 1990;
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Kasarda, 1993; Sassen, 1994). Despite this substantial incorporation of women in labour
processes, there is still an important gap between the role of men and women in public
decision-making. In fact, a number of writers on globalisation argue that women are
currently excluded from the political decision-making in the 'post Fordist' era (Roseneil,
1997).
2.2.7 Growth Machine
The growth machine concept, originally developed by Molotch (1976) (see also Logan and
Molotch, 1987), seeks to explain urban development processes, as well as the emergence
and operation of urban growth machines in American cities. These coalitions emerged
initially in virtually all American cities, as Molotch argued, after the first urban crisis at the
end of the 1950s and throughout the 1960s (Mollenkopf, 1992; Castells, 1981). The urban
crisis was concentrated around two issues: first, the decline of the large urban centres; and
second, the increasing alienation of growing ethnic minority populations located in these
areas. Therefore, in order to generate revenues from declining urban centres and to recover
these urban spaces for business activities, American cities such as Boston, Baltimore, Los
Angeles or San Francisco started to develop extensive urban development programmes,
mainly in city centres. Simultaneously, elected politicians developed coalitions with
business elites around urban development and economic growth issues (Mollenkopf, 1992).
Although traditional urban theories have ignored the politics of growth, even when debates
over growth infrastructure were the object of their analyses (Banfield, 1961; Dahl, 1961),
the use of land, and government activity to promote economic development, is not a new
phenomenon in the US context. The growth machine idea represents a partial reversion to
the concerns of the community power debate and rests on an urban political economic
approach. Elitism, Marxism and neo-Marxism inform growth machine analysis in
significant ways. Unlike pluralism, growth machine analysis focuses principally on the
action of, and interrelations between, the main actors in urban development process rather
than in local politics. Indeed, the growth machine approach revolves around the questions
of who exerts the greatest influence over the physical restructuring of the city, why, and
with what effect (Logan and Molotch, 1987; Harding, 1995; Mollenkopf, 1992). These
authors concentrate their study primarily within cities, though Logan and Molotch recognise
the importance of connections between local and non-local decision making within the
business community. Growth theory, along with regime theory, stems from a political
economic perspective 'on place' (Elkin, 1987; Logan and Molotch, 1987; Stone, 1989;
Harding, 1995). Like elitism, Marxism, and regime theory, the growth machine approach
recognises the systemic power of business in shaping local politics. It also draws on aspects
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of Marxism and neo-Marxists, in particular, the distinction between 'use values' and
'exchange values' with regard to property (Harding, 1994, 1995; Harvey, 1987).
A growth coalition, as defined by Logan and Molotch, comprises groups of influential
urban actors who seek to promote local economic growth. At the core of any coalition there
is a small group of local rentiers (property owners), as Molotch argued, who expect to
maximise the exchange values of their urban holdings through a more intense use of land.
These rentiers represent only parochial capital and therefore need to construct coalitions
with other actors to support their interests. Some of them have a fixed relationship to the
city while others are geographically unconstrained using national or even transnational
capital. Within this context, the coalition brings together other actors who are not directly
involved in land use but are associated with the local economic development process: the
local financial institutions, the local media and the legal profession. Additionally, members
of the coalition can be incorporated from other local institutions such as higher educational
establishments, professional sports clubs, trade unions, and retailers (Molotch, 1976;
Harding, 1994). The members described above represent a 'business elite' that collectively
controls the pattern of urban development and despite their different interests, they seek to
maximise the exchange values of urban settings. Under these conditions, growth machine as
well as regime theories assume the stability of any dominant coalition over time (Molotch,
1976; Logan and Molotch, 1987).
The coalition, meanwhile, tries to legitimise the gain of its members by espousing an
ideology of 'value-free' to urban development and growth (Logan and Molotch, 1987;
Harding, 1995; Savage and Warde, 1993). Although decision-making favours the interests
of coalitions partners, which are not brought up in public, the growth coalition will assert
that local growth strengthens the local tax base and provides jobs as well as resources to
solve existing problems. However, once these groups have achieved their goals, it is
secondary whether local growth has increased social and spatial conflicts or even resistance
from local residents (Levine, 1989; Logan and Molotch, 1987; Fainstein and Fainstein,
1989). The kind of new jobs generated are often for new residents and commuters rather
than for local residents. Molotch (1976), drawing on the US context, noted that, in reality,
"local growth does not make jobs, it only distributes them" (p. 320). In the case of the US,
where there is great worker mobility, new jobs may not change the aggregate rate of
unemployment (either locally or nationally). In short, despite the proclaimed benefits of
economic development, Molotch pointed out that there is no evidence to show that local
growth will reduce local unemployment. In addition, despite the fact that costs and benefits
of growth depend on local circumstances, if the anticipated growth does not materialise the
conditions of local residents can be negatively affected. This has created a certain degree of
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local resistance, with the emergence of 'no-growth' movements (Clavel, 1986; Savage and
Warde, 1993).
Nevertheless, conflicts within the city tend to be minimal and the issues that reach public
agendas do so precisely because they are matters, on which coalition partners have, in
effect, agreed to disagree. Thus, growth machine theorists along with neo-elitists, share the
idea that certain important growth affairs are kept on a symbolic level, often diverted from
public agendas to back rooms or negotiations within insulated authorities and agencies
(Bachrach and Baratz, 1970; Caro, 1974). To achieve this, some mechanisms are used, for
instance, the local media, may be especially useful in a debate around controversial
development projects. Editorials and news columns usually invoke the 'common good' and
'technical' planning expertise rationales to sell these projects to the public (Molotch, 1976;
Logan and Molotch, 1987). On the other hand, media executives tend to be sympathetic to
business leaders' complaints about a particular journalistic investigation which may be bad
for the expected good business climate (e.g., the Los Angeles Times sacked its celebrated
architectural critic John Pastier for incessant criticism of Los Angeles downtown renewal
projects (Clarke, 1983 cited by Logan and Molotch, 1987)).
Although local media are not directly involved in land use, they can indirectly benefit from
local growth through the newspaper achieving a position of statesman locally (Molotch,
1976). Similarly, leaders of local utilities companies, arts institutions, universities and
professional sports teams help boost local economic growth. In the same vein, union leaders
are often predisposed to support these coalitions. Drawing on the weakness of labour
movements in the US, unions are sometimes instrumentalised to support prestigious urban
projects or to oppose opponents of these urban developments (Logan and Molotch, 1987).
Retailers do not have a clear interest in generating aggregate rents, though they are
sympathetic to growth. In contrast, branch executives of large corporations located in a city,
have little direct interest in local land-use intensification (Schulze, 1961 and Kaplan's 1983
study of Houston cited by Molotch, 1976). Nevertheless, the local agenda may favour their
interests such that they have no need to participate. Only in special cases, will corporate
companies actively participate in city politics.
As already mentioned, internal disagreements between coalition members can reach public
agendas, but as Logan and Molotch have emphasised, these disagreements do not challenge
the recognised commitment to growth. Previous studies such as that of Banfield (1961) in
Chicago, found that much of the dispute was not over growth, but how it should be
internally distributed. Logan and Molotch argued that in Hunter's (1953) study of Atlanta,
elites were united over growth issues. Considering the intense inter-urban competition for
attracting inward investment, a major effect of the emergence of growth coalitions is that
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almost all American cities have been forced to favour business systematically (Molotch,
1976; Savage and Warde, 1993). Therefore, American cities are creating the physical and
economic conditions to generate a kind of business climate. To enhance the growth
potential of the city, despite their parochial ties, coalitions need local government to lobby
higher levels of government (in the American context federal and state governments) in
pursuing actions favourable to their interests. In this trade-off, according to Logan and
Molotch, US local growth elites play a major role in electing local politicians, but only
those close to the growth ideology. A number of authors (Alexander, 1983; Boyarsky and
Guillam, 1982, in Logan and Molotch, 1987) have pointed to the fact that virtually all
politicians in American cities depend on private campaign financing. As a consequence,
local candidates are expected to support growth coalitions. Despite the assumption that
local government will support growth coalitions due to its "primary concern with increasing
growth" (Logan and Molotch, 1987, p. 53), the growth machine approach has been
criticised for offering a weak explanation of local government's motivations for being part
of these coalitions and for failing to explain the non-participation of local governments in
some instances (Harding, 1994, 1995).
2.2.8 Urban Regime Theory
Regime theory emerged in the mid-1980s in America. The most prominent study using
regime theory as a conceptual framework to study urban politics in the US was undertaken
by Stone (1989) in Atlanta (for the period between 1946 and 1988), the same city that
Hunter had studied in the 1950s (see Elkin, 1987; Fainstein and Fainstein, 1986). Regime
theory as growth machine accounts stems from an American context where local
government is constitutionally limited in scope and authority over resources that are
traditionally privately owned. In addition, local government authority is more limited than
other levels of government in the US (Stone, 1989; Keating, 1991; Wolman, 1995). The
starting point of regime theory includes many of the concerns of neo-pluralists, these are
applicable to several contexts not just the American. In particular, regime theory accepts the
privileged position of business as well as the limited capacity of local governments to
promote urban change in contemporary urban politics. As a result, although relationships
between governmental and non-governmental actors are not new in urban politics, the
development of informal arrangements ('regimes') with private interests have emerged
through the post-industrial era to "allow public bodies and private interests to function
together in order to make and carry out governing decisions" (Stone, 1989, p. 6; Stoker,
1995; DiGaetano and Klemanski, 1993; Orr and Stoker, 1994).
As a relatively new approach for examining contemporary urban politics, regime theory is
informed by other theoretical traditions such as pluralism, elitism and neo-Marxism.
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Initially, the formation of coalitions was a focus of both regime and pluralist theories
(Stoker, 1995). However, pluralism has argued that coalitions are unstable, this contrasts
with the stability predicted by regime and elitist accounts. Regime theory, like pluralism,
emphasises that the process of local economic development policy is not a technical
problem but rather is a political process and therefore, "urban politics still matters" (Stone,
1989, p. 4). By saying that, regime theory also rejects the economic determinism of
Peterson (1981). As Stone has argued, the local economic development processes respond
to the intentional decisions made by individuals or groups in competition with others to
further their own interests. As a consequence, important decisions clearly favour certain
interests.
However, some fundamental differences separate both theories. Stone notes that pluralism
draws on the political culture approach of the 1950s and 1960s (Bonfield, 1961; Dahl,
1961), whereas regime theory, in common with the growth machine approach, is derived
from a political-economic perspective which emerged in the late 1970s (Elkin, 1987;
Fainstein et al., 1986; Stone, 1989). Urban political-economy theorists attempt to
understand how the division between market and state shapes current urban processes.
Unlike pluralist accounts of urban governance, regime theory postulates that both
governmental and non-governmental groups construct a stable dominant governing
coalition, in Stone's terms a 'regime' (Stone, 1989). This governing coalition does not
necessary coincide with the winning electoral coalition. In the current process of urban
governance, regime theory along with neo-pluralism, neo-Marxism and growth machine
approaches, values as essential the co-operation and participation of business to facilitate
local economic development due to the limited authority and financial capacity of local
governments (Judge, 1995; Stoker and Mossberger, 1994; Stoker, 1995; Stone, 1989, 1993,
1995). More precisely, Stone (1993, p. 4) defines a 'regime' as "not just any formal group
that comes together to make a decision but an informal yet relatively stable group with
access to institutional resources that enable it to have a sustained role in making governing
decisions". Hence, regime analysis along with neo-Marxism holds that the composition,
relationships and resources of the city's governing coalition can shape local politics.
Unlike growth machine accounts, regime theory goes beyond the composition of the
governing coalition and explores the contextual factors that predispose local politicians and
business interests in regime formation, maintenance and capacity. Achieving co-operation is
recognised as a difficult task, but stable co-operative relationships are seen as essential in
regime formation (DiGaetano and Klemanski, 1993; Harding, 1994; Stoker, 1995; Stone,
1989). Regime theory postulates that contemporary urban politics is about establishing
priorities and how a coalition will manage to produce the capacity to get things done.
According to Stoker, regime theory points to networking as an effective way of developing
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co-operation by recognising mutual dependency and reciprocity. In this way, it is expected
that members of the coalition will favour some goals over others, which are more
problematic to achieve. Commitment to these goals will also be linked to resources (Stone,
1989; 1993; Stone et al., 1991). Thus, any viable coalition must have a capacity to mobilise
resources commensurate with the requirements of its main policy agenda.
In essence, regime theory examines three basic questions such as who, how and with what
consequences coalitions shape local politics (Stone, 1989; Stone eta!., 1991; Stoker, 1995).
In this sense, regime theory, unlike a community power 'social control' model, offers a
distinctive perspective on power, namely the 'social production' model which Stone refers
to as "power to, not power over" (Stone, 1989; Stoker, 1995; Judge, 1995). Accordingly,
Stone and Stoker identified four forms of power to analyse the relationship between a
dominant coalition and different interests in the urban setting. These are as follows:
a) Systemic power is that which concedes strategic advance to certain individuals or
groups such as business by virtue of their position of power in the social, political or
economic structure over others;
b) Command power or social control is where individuals or groups actively mobilise
resources, whether material (finances, personnel) or ephemeral (reputation, knowledge),
to achieve dominance over others. This pluralist type of power, according to regime
theory, is limited to particular areas;
c) Coalition power is that which reflects the ability of political actors to negotiate and
bargain to achieve shared or compatible goals, but without the need for coercing or
inducing specific actions, and
d) Pre-emptive power or the power of social production represents the distinctive
contribution of regime theory. The act of power lies in the ability of interests within a
coalition to build an urban regime and achieve the capacity to govern. Through a long-
term coalition capable of solving problems of substantial collective action, leadership is
achieved (see Stone, 1995).
Drawing on his study in Atlanta, Stone identifies elected politicians and in particular,
business elites as the dominant interest groups in any regime or coalition in the American
context. In addition to the control of resources expected from business groups, regime
theory also privileges the incorporation of individuals and groups that possess ephemeral
resources such as political parties, universities, trade unions, and community groups. In
Western democracies, as Stoker indicates, regimes or coalitions expect to incorporate a
fourth category of bureaucrats. Despite the pre-emptive power of business elites, in contrast
to elite theory, regime theory asserts that no single group is likely to exercise command
power (Stone, 1989; Stoker, 1995). Mayors can lead a coalition only when they win
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electoral majorities and keep the political parties in opposition either fragmented or
demobilised.
According to Stone (1993, pp. 8-9), "governance is not the issue-by-issue process that
pluralists suggest.. .politics is about the production rather than the distribution of benefits".
In this respect, unlike pluralism, Stone states that once a regime is built, it empowers its
members and therefore, partners are expected to protect this co-operation. Regime theory
agrees with growth machine theory and elitism over the stability of coalitions being based
primarily on social ties, selective incentives, and other opportunities (e.g. the availability of
European sources in Western cities) (Stone, 1989; Stone et al., 1991; Olson, 1965). Despite
some conflicts, Stone's study of the Atlanta governing coalition shows a case of the
stability of a regime over years. However, certain coalitions may be ephemeral in nature,
formed around the idea of realising visible projects within a limited-time span. Regime
theory shares with growth machine accounts the assumption that certain urban
developments may face opposition in the form of mobilisations against their negative
impacts over local welfare services, or demands for government programmes that facilitate
upward mobility for excluded groups. Moreover, Stone directs attention to the fact that
regimes are dynamic, and new preferences within a coalition can affect its stability, and thus
it may need to adapt and assemble a new governing coalition. Changes may occur and
therefore, a regime's continuity and change needs to be studied over time (Stone, 1989;
Stoker, 1995; DeLeon, 1992). In any case, the costs of forming an alternative regime are
high, and opposition groups are expected either to 'go along to get along', or to assemble an
alternative one which clearly reflects a considerable exercise of power (Stone, 1989; Stoker,
1995; Mollenkopf, 1992). Stoker pointed out that established regimes might incorporate
certain marginal groups while they may also exclude other interests.
Unlike the single growth-machine model, regimes may be constructed with different
programmatic goals, but not all have to face the same degree of difficulty in governing city
politics. Stone sought to provide some guidance about the kinds of regimes found in
America, while Stoker and Mossberger (1994) and DiGaetano and Klemanski (1993) do so
in wider context. As Stoker and Mossberger have indicated, one of the significant
contributions regime theory can make is in the field of comparative studies (see also
DiGaetano, 1997; Harding, 1994). Stoker and Mossberger provide an account of three ideal
types of urban regimes, named organic, instrumental and symbolic, which were described in
the introduction. Associated with their typology of regimes, they introduce five dimensions
of the process of regime formation and development in the light of their implications for
cross-national research: (see Table 2.1):
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a) the purpose of regimes
b) the mechanisms for mobilising participation in the regime,
c) the ways in which a common sense of purpose within the regime is developed,
d) the quality of the coalition established within the regime and the congruence of interests
of regime partners, and,
e) the strategies employed by the regime in dealing with wider local and nonlocal political
environment.
Defining
Characteristics Organic Instrumental
Project
realisation
Symbolic 
Redirection of
ideology or
image
Purpose Maintenance
of status quo
Main motivation of
participants
Local
dependency
Tangible
results
Expressive
politics
Basis for sense of
common purpose
Tradition and
social cohesion
Selective
incentives
Strategic use of
symbols
Quality of
Coalition (Congruence
of interests)
Political
communion
Political
partnership
Competitive
agreement
Relationship with
environment:
Local
Non-local
Exclusive
orientation
Independent
Exclusive
orientation
Dependent
Inclusive
orientation
Dependent
Table 2.1: A typology of urban regimes in a comparative context
Source: Stoker and Mossberger (1994, p. 199)
Stone's typology, in contrast, does not consider the cross-national context. He identified
four types of regimes in American cities. Three of them, namely 'maintenance (or
caretaker)', 'redevelopment (or business-centered activist)' and 'middle class progressive'
are more common in the American context, while the fourth, the 'lower class expansion' is
claimed by Stone to be rarely, if ever, seen (see also Stone et al, 1991). Stone's
'maintenance' and Stoker and Mossberger's 'organic' regimes coincide in their goal. In
those cities where dominant elites are satisfied with the status quo, governing involves
merely diffusing challenges and pressure for change. The primary thrust of this regime is
thus to provide basic local services and to accomplish less demanding tasks, which do not
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require a large mobilisation of business interests and resources. In turn, 'redevelopment'
(Stone) and 'instrumental' regimes (Stoker and Mossberger) require more governing
capacity, as more resources are needed which emphasise more dependence on business
interests. Although this type of regime has often faced more difficulties, redevelopment or
instrumental regimes have prevailed particularly in those cities seeking to promote local
economic growth to counter deindustrialisation, often organised around ambitious urban
projects. As evident in his study of Atlanta (Stone, 1989), regime theory together with that
of the growth machine, explains the prevalence of these types of regimes by the promotion
of private development, particularly encouraged by the availability of federal and state
funds (Stone et al., 1991; DiGaetano and Klemanski, 1993). Unlike Stoker and
Mossberger's instrumental regime, Stone et al. argue that redevelopment regimes in the US
are by no means dependent on external resources. These coalitions (similarly to Logan and
Molotch's growth machine) exemplify the convergence of both high levels of resources and
of co-operation. Therefore, as in growth machines, certain elite groups share a commitment
to economic growth and have the resources to favour a 'good business climate'. In this kind
of regime, like maintenance regimes, wide popular support is not expected.
The third type identified by Stoker and Mossberger, the symbolic regime falls into two
categories (the progressive and the urban revitalization). The first, the 'progressive regime'
is related to Stone's last two types of regimes, the 'middle class progressive' and the 'lower
class opportunity expansion', both of which tend to emphasise: "basic values about the
quality of growth and the conditions under which economic investment or development
should occur. The goals of these are therefore ideological" (Stoker and Mossberger, 1994;
p. 201; Orr and Stoker, 1994). The middle class progressive regime of Stone favours issues
such as environmental protection, historic preservation and social goals more than growth.
In American cities with stable middle class progressive regimes such as Burlington,
Vermont, a large middle class population was able to undertake these actions independently
of the contribution of business groups. This kind of regime involves a mixture of
development but has also restrictions on it. Such regimes do not need the large-scale
participation of citizens, except in those cases when commitment to progressive goals is
required (Stone, 1993). The lower class regimes seek to expand local opportunities through
education and job training and widened access to employment and home ownership. As the
quality of the work force rises and ownership becomes more widespread, there are
economic and non-economic benefits locally (Stone et al., 1991; Stone, 1993). In short,
lower class regimes require an extensive involvement of citizens in conjunction with private
resources. Because of this, motivation to participate for both groups remains the real
challenge of these regimes. Citizens are expected to support this type of regime only when
tangible opportunities such as jobs are offered while without mass participation to keep the
pressure on, investment by elite groups remains problematic. Part of this could explain why
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Stone notes that this kind of regime is rarely found in US cities. Finally, the second subtype
of the symbolic regime related to Stoker and Mossberger is that of the 'urban revitalization
regime', which seeks to change the city's image in order to attract investment and/or
middle-income or high-income residents. This type of regime is sustained by the generation
of a shared vision of the city around which individuals and groups can be mobilised.
In summary, the viability of regimes depends on linking together sufficient resources
commensurate to the degree of difficulty of tasks. In this way, moving from the least
difficult to the most difficult regime, Stone et al. argue that human capital regimes (e.g.
lower class opportunity expansion and middle class progressive) are more difficult to
assemble than development regimes (e.g. organic and redevelopment). Nevertheless, some
cities may have regimes, which include some features of the different kind of regimes
described here. The applicability of American models of urban change and also of regime
theory to the analysis of two Western European cities will be addressed in the concluding
chapter.
2.2.9 Sport, Growth Machine and Regime Theories
As described in the introduction, the symbolic regime reflects to some extent the type of
regime that might be directly associated with a current worldwide trend of city 're-
imagining' through sport and leisure. However, sport and leisure could also be implicated in
both of the other types of regimes and their strategies. As part of the process of economic
development of American cities for the last forty years, urban leaders have adapted their
cities to changing economies by restructuring land use in an attempt to regenerate their
economic base (Logan and Molotch, 1987; Stone et al., 1991). The building of sports
facilities, office towers, convention centres or exhibition halls has been part of the
proposals of American local economic development processes.
Focusing on sport, regime partners, mainly politicians and economic elites, has valued the
significant potential of professional sports teams, sports stadiums and high-profile sporting
events to a city's economic development which both regime and growth machine theories
support (Baade and Dye, 1988; Chapin, 1996a; Logan and Molotch, 1987; Sack and
Johnson, 1996). Regimes have also valued sport in the overall enhancement of cities. As
part of this image building process, it is worth noticing that US cities which have at least
one major sports league franchise, sports stadium and arena are considered to be in the 'big-
league' (Shropshire, 1995). Nevertheless, the 'reimaging' of American cities has also
extended to other cities world-wide which have used, or are using sport to drive the
regeneration of their cities, such as Athens (2004 Olympic Games), Barcelona (1992
Olympic Games), Manchester (two previous unsuccessful bids to host the 1996 and 2000
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Olympic Games, but successful bid for the 2002 Commonwealth Games), Seville (1999
World Athletics Championships and failed bid to host the 2004 Olympic Games), Sydney
(2000 Olympic Games), Sheffield (1991 World Student Games and failed bid for the 2002
Commonwealth Games) (see Brunet, 1994; Cochrane et al., 1996; Roche, 1992; Hill, 1992;
Loftman and Nevin, 1996; Williams, 1997).
Partly explained by the lack of many studies over the effectiveness of sport as a
regeneration strategy in Western cities, much of the data used in this section is related to the
North American context. As mentioned above, the recognition of the role of stadiums and
professional sports teams in the urban development of North American cities is not a new
phenomenon. In this way, between 1960 and 1976, twenty-two new stadiums were built by
both American and Canadian cities (Chapin, 1996a; Chema, 1996). However, while
between 1977 and 1990 a decline in growth occurred with only six new stadiums built, the
1990s have represented a reversal in this trend not only in the number of stadiums and
arenas built (with more than twenty six facilities already completed and many others
expected to be added in the next few years) but also an increase in major public subsidies
(Baade and Dye, 1988; Baade, 1996; Chapin, 1996a; Rosentraub, 1997). Noll and Zimbalist
(2000) note that the three levels of government in the US will spend more than $7 billion in
building new facilities for professional sports teams between 1997 and 2006. This revival
involves not only cities replacing facilities built in the 1960s and 1970s such as Seattle,
Houston, Cincinnati or Milwaukee, but also has extends to other cities which, lacking a
professional team, expect to attract one after building a stadium, like St. Petersburg,
Nashville, Memphis and Jacksonville (Baade, 1996; Norton, 1993; Robinson-Barnes and
Wright, 1996). Indeed, Indianapolis did not build just a facility for a team, it has embarked
on a sports strategy for rebuilding its city centre and changing its image. Since 1977, eight
of thirty projects have been related to both professional and amateur sports with an
involvement of $172.6 million (Rosentraub et al., 1994; Rosentraub, 1997).
Relevant to the North American culture is the significant role that professional sport
occupies. Indeed, professional teams are considered an industry in themselves (Baade and
Dye, 1988; Chema, 1996; Logan and Molotch, 1987). This vast complex includes not only
franchised sports teams, but also individual sports, sporting goods, television and betting.
Related to this economic activity, growth coalition and regime members support
professional sports teams, stadiums and certain sporting events to help enhance local
growth (Logan and Molotch, 1987; Stone, 1989). Owners of professional teams are
expected to become part of these coalitions or regimes, as Logan and Molotch contend, as a
consideration of the increase in value of their properties and partly because of the
'apolitical' character of sport and sports politics. In any case, owners of teams are either
closely tied to local elites or already integrated in the governing coalition. In essence, local
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and state politicians, other members of coalitions, franchise owners and event organisers
become key players in the use of sport as part of the regeneration strategies of some US
cities. In addition, citizens of competing cities are also indirectly involved as voters and
taxpayers and can influence the direction of local investment in sport.
Regime partners justify spending public funding on sport as a result of the substantial
benefits claimed for cities' economies. In addition, professional sports teams also expect to
produce a psychological impact locally, as part of civic pride as well as enhancing the
outward image of the city (Baade and Dye, 1988; Baade, 1996; Rosentraub et al., 1994;
Shropshire, 1995). The combination of both economic and psychological factors is expected
by growth machine and regime theories to be a generator of a climate favourable to city
business. Therefore, the process of obtaining or retaining a franchise or event remains
within the scope of both theories. Chapin (1996a, 1996b), for example, has employed both
theories to explain the 'stadium provision process' and the impact of its location in
American cities (see also Euchner, 1993; Robinson-Barnes and Wright, 1996). In terms of
their spatial location, while many stadiums in the 1960s and early 1970s were located in the
edge of the city, in the 1990s they are located primarily on the outer edge of the city centre
in conjunction with other projects as part of a general economic development strategy.
However, these sport-related projects have generated substantial debate not only in cities,
which built new facilities, but also in those considering doing so. Therefore, team owners
and urban leaders, normally members of coalitions or regimes, usually commission an
economic impact study to support the acquisition or retention of a franchise or the
construction of a new stadium (Turco eta!., 1996). However, it is claimed that these studies
appear to be biased to the interests of those commissioning the study. By choosing 'the
multiplier effect' which best suits their expectations, these economic impact studies often
claim increases in local jobs and incomes (Baade and Dye, 1988; Chapin, 1996a;
Crompton, 1995; Norton, 1993). Owners of professional teams exploit these favourable
economic figures in conjunction with their systemic power originating from winning the
competition for the few new franchises. It is worth noticing the monopolistic power of some
professional leagues in the US, which keep the number of franchises below the number of
cities that could support a team. As a result, host cities are compelled to make concessions
to retain a franchise, and simultaneously other cities are competing through a bidding
process for relocations (Baade and Dye, 1988; Baade, 1996; Rosentraub et al., 1994). Noll
and Zimbalist justify the increase of the number of cities entering in the bidding process
because new stadiums produce substantially more revenues.
The possible loss of sports franchises could have negative political costs for a city's
politicians and thus they would often end up meeting these demands (Baade and Dye, 1988;
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Shropshire, 1995; Robinson-Barnes and Wright, 1996; Rosentraub et al., 1994).
Nevertheless, it was reported that twenty franchises which were offered better deals and
newer stadiums relocated between 1970 and 1985 (Bairn, 1990, 1992; Rosentraub, 1997;
Turco et al., 1996). In most cases, despite the fact that American cities are facing fiscal
pressure, and capital expenditure by all three levels of government has been declining for
two decades, state and local governments in the US have largely funded these newer
stadiums. Beyond that, US cities also offer tax concessions and other subsidies to
professional teams such as a percentage of local hotel-motel taxes (Baade and Dye, 1988;
Shropshire, 1995). Relevant to the US context is also the extensive commitment of
philanthropic and private donations to sport related projects. Indeed, 56 per cent of the
funds invested in Indianapolis came from both of these private sources (Rosentraub et al.,
1994). As noted, it is anticipated that this trend will continue in the next decade.
Certain cities have used referenda to ascertain the opinions of their residents regarding the
public funding of these projects. Sometimes, these projects have been stalled as a result
(Baade and Dye, 1988; Robinson-Barnes and Wright, 1996). In case of drawbacks,
coalitions or regimes have used sports celebrities and in particular, local media as 'local
boosters' to publicise the potential benefits to the city (Chapin, 1996a; Logan and Molotch,
1987; Sack and Johnson, 1996). In this respect, it is worth noting that sport receives more
media coverage proportionally in the US than for instance in Europe. Chapin claims that
those coalitions, after using some of the mechanisms related to overcome the resistance of
local residents, sooner or later will achieve their aims. As the literature in regime theory
notices, coalitions are expected to be united by a shared belief in economic growth and an
abundance of selective incentives. However, in terms of the distribution of benefits from
these sport-related projects, different authors (Baade and Dye, 1988; Baade, 1996; Okner,
1974; Rosentraub et al., 1994) conclude that private owners and players, rather than the
host city and its citizens, are primarily benefiting economically through profit, shared values
and subsidies. Apart from the good conditions generally achieved in the leasing of the
stadium, owners also gain substantial revenue from the selling or leasing of executive suites
(Chapin, 1996b; Turco et al., 1996). Moreover, as mentioned, keeping or obtaining a
franchise can benefit politicians in their attempts to be re-elected.
The use of sport as part of urban strategies in American cities has generated substantial
debate in those that have publicly financed new facilities and even more in those that are
considering doing so. This debate has also moved to the academic community, with authors
such as Bale (1989), Okner (1974), and Chema (1996) supporting the public funding of
professional sports teams and stadiums on the basis that they provide a good return on local
economies, or others such as Baade (1996), Bairn (1990, 1992), Euchner (1993),
Rosentraub (1997), and Noll and Zimbalist (1997, 2000) who criticise public subsidy based
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on its limited effects on overall economic activity and employment. Rosentraub et al.
(1994) note the absence of studies on the effectiveness or impact of sports as either a
development strategy or as a substantial part of a city's economic development. Chema
(1996) agrees with Baade (one of the most critical commentators of public funding of
stadium and professional teams) that sport venues need to be integrated within the existing
city centre infrastructure to generate spin-off effects in the area. Though only a few jobs are
created in the sports area, coalitions will argue that other areas of the local economy benefit
such as the retail and service sectors (Chapin, 1996a, 1996b; Chema, 1996; Rosentraub et
al., 1994). In addition, intangible impacts such as quality of life and city image are normally
valued, but rarely examined (Williams, 1997).
These positive outcomes have to be measured against other negative effects. Baade and
Rosentraub indicate that at best, the arrival of new professional teams would cause a shift
rather than an increase in local leisure spending. Meanwhile, different authors such as
Baade and Dye (1988), Baade (1996), Bairn (1990) and Noll and Zimbalist (1997) share the
view that local economic indicators do not change significantly when a new sports facility
is built, or when teams relocate. Indeed, Bairn, after examining the financial success of
fourteen US major stadiums, found that only one of those facilities was profitable. Perhaps
even more significantly, Baade determined that there is a lower rate of economic growth in
cities that adopt a sports-development strategy than those which develop different
strategies. Indeed, Baade's study of Chicago (1996) and Rosentraub et al.'s study of
Indianapolis (1994) showed the small impact of using sport as a development strategy. For
instance, in Chicago, despite hosting five professional teams, commercial sports accounted
for less than 1 percent of service income in 1992. Similar findings were found in
Indianapolis, with an impact of only 1.1 percent. Moreover, the expected jobs created by
sports activities differ substantially from the economic gains promised by sports boosters
and instead, tend to be low-wage and seasonal jobs (Baade and Dye, 1988; Baade, 1996;
Rosentraub et al., 1994). For instance, in 1989 in Indianapolis, sport-related jobs accounted
for 0.32 percent, with an insignificant increase of 0.03 percent after the introduction of its
sport strategy (Rosentraub et al., 1994). Williams (1997) challenges these criticisms over
sport as a development strategy by saying that the magnitude of the sports sector in the UK
economy is similar to that of many of the manufacturing industries which have traditionally
been the focus of local economy policy (see Henley Centre, 1992). Going further, many of
the jobs generated are neither unskilled (more than 25 percent are managerial and
professional), nor part time.
Stadium developers often underestimate the costs of constructing a new stadium, which are
predominantly paid for, in the US context, by local residents through taxation (Bairn, 1990;
Baade and Dye, 1988; Rosentraub, 1997). Moreover, for those cities facing the dilemma
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between whether to construct a new stadium or to repair the old one to attract a sports
franchise (Robinson-Barnes and Wright, 1996; Baade, 1996), new construction is often the
more appealing alternative. However it is surprising that despite the extensive evidence
about minimal economic benefits that public investment in sports facilities brings, US cities
continue to build stadiums and bid for professional sports teams.
In contrast to the major interaction between local governments and professional teams in
the US, in Britain and Spain most stadiums are privately owned by the clubs who play in
them and few local governments fund either stadiums or professional sports teams
(Churchman, 1995; Page, 1990). Similar to the US context, the 1980s and 1990s have
witnessed an unprecedented level of stadium development in Britain. Since the beginning of
the 1990s, Churchman notes that 45 of the 92 British football league clubs have either built
new stands or relocated to new stadiums (Williams, 1997). As noted, an alternative
approach by urban leaders in many worldwide cities is to attract major events such as the
Olympic Games, the Football World Cup, or lesser sporting events that may have a priority
for economic development. However, Logan and Molotch report that certain sports less tied
to a locality or team name (e.g., tennis, athletics, or swimming) and 'Sport for All' will be
denied support by coalitions, unless they are part of an Olympic or world-class competition
held locally and therefore relevant enough to enhance growth and city image. Sack and
Johnson (1996) provided an account of the role of regime analysis in explaining the
attraction and retention of a major tennis event to New Haven, Connecticut.
Regardless of the tangible and intangible benefits that sports related projects can bring to
cities, drawing on regime theorists (Stone and Saunders, 1987), these projects can also
bring considerable costs (financial mismanagement, reductions in public services, traffic
congestion, higher prices in services or the displacement of local population) (Baade and
Dye, 1988; Robinson-Barnes and Wright, 1996; Williams, 1997). Furthermore, the
substantial public funding of these projects may also postpone other local projects through
an `infrastructural trap', partly exemplified when cities decide to bet their future growth by
investing in ambitious urban projects (Daniels, 1993). Specific examples include the near
bankruptcy of the 1976 Montreal Olympic Games, the £.10 million debt of the 1991
Sheffield World Student Games or the displacement of local population (e.g. an entire
African-American population of 117 families in Chicago or displacement of 6,000 people
after the attraction of the Commonwealth Games to Edmonton, Alberta) (Robinson-Barnes
and Wright, 1996). In addition, sometimes these projects have to face local opposition to
stadium location. In some US cities like Phoenix, San Francisco and San Jose, after a
referendum, citizens refused to authorise spending on sports related projects considering
them to be a much lower priority than other local issues (Rosentraub et al., 1994). On the
other hand, few cities offer examples of how the distributive process associated with the
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impact of sport has had positive effects on local citizens. In Philadelphia and Atlanta some
percentage of revenues generated from sports ventures were directly channelled to help
other local problems (Shropshire, 1995; Rosentraub et al., 1994). In Sheffield, as part of the
agreement to fund the Ponds Forge Swimming Pool, Mowlem Ltd, the management
contractors were contracted by the Council after ensuring that 33 percent of the jobs would
be filled by local residents (Solley, 1991)
To summarise, US and other cities worldwide have used or are using sports related projects
as part of their economic regeneration strategies. Substantial debate arises on the economic
benefits and costs of these high-profile projects. The effectiveness of sport as either a
development strategy or as a substantial part of a city's local economic strategy has not been
fully explored, but cities continue to build stadiums, stage major events and bid for
professional teams (Rosentraub et al., 1994; Williams, 1997). Williams argues that the
sport sector in Western countries is of similar order of magnitude to many other traditional
sectors adopted by local economic policy. In the US, stadiums are built and owned by local
governments, which seek footloose professional sports teams as tenants to play in them,
whereas in Britain and Spain most stadiums and professional teams are privately funded
and owned, and local governments do not seek generally to attract footloose professional
sports teams. In some cases, in spite of the opposition of local citizens, governing coalitions
will exercise their power to direct a city towards growth policies with sports related projects
integrated in the economic regeneration strategies. As part of the mechanisms to justify the
public funding, coalitions or regimes are expected to use the favourable figures of economic
impact studies, and to promote their message through local newspapers and local sports
heroes. On the other hand, feasibility studies are occasionally done, but not followed up (see
the case of Sheffield). However, drawing on the Indianapolis case study, Rosentraub et al.,
(1994) concluded, that although the city's sports strategy might have helped to enhance the
city's image, and local elites managed to foster a public-private partnership with substantial
private investment, there were no significant shifts in local economic strategies. In this
respect, Indianapolis's experience suggests that sports will not generate the overall
economic impacts that boosters and supporters proclaim. Focusing exclusively on the
economic dimension, the sports industry seems only to play a very small role on overall
economic activity in a city.
2.3. Epistemological strengths and weaknesses
The community power debate of the 1950s and 1960s, concentrated around a social control
model of power, was developed in a context where it was assumed that the most influential
members of cities dominated urban politics (Dahl, 1961; Hunter, 1953). Urban political
power was thus characterised as relatively non-conflictual under a stable process of group
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competition being responsive to elected politicians. During the Fordist regime of
accumulation, the expansion of welfare services was facilitated by the post-war consensus
and relative economic growth that allowed elected politicians to increase the collective
provision of services in many Western cities. In the analysis of city politics, the dominant
paradigm in urban political analysis did not consider that any change in the economic and
political spheres could challenge the existing normative model of power (Harding, 1995;
Mollenkopf, 1992; Stoker, 1995; Stone, 1989; Fainstein and Hirst, 1995). As such, cities
were considered to be independent entities isolated from larger economic and social forces
that operate on them.
However, since the mid-1970s the decline of social democratic politics accelerated by a
global economic slump led to the emergence of political, economic, urban and social crises
in American and European cities. Moreover, this decade saw the breakdown of the
hegemony of social democracy at both international and national levels. At the international
level, it was caused by the emergence of the global economic crisis and the decline in the
international hegemony of the US, while nationally, policies and institutions of the Fordist
regime of accumulation began to be discredited. Subsequently, the emergence of new
agencies, different levels of government and transnational bodies has challenged two of the
traditional features of Western economies, the primacy of the nation-state and the Fordist
regime of accumulation. Under these circumstances, the dominant community power debate
was criticised for not being considered an appropriate framework for theorising these new
economic, political and social conditions. Thereby a new range of competing urban theories
such as neo-Marxist, new right, regulation theory, growth machine and urban regime have
emerged to explain the nature of these changes in contemporary urban politics. This debate
forms part of a new urban political-economy paradigm with the subordination of political
and social aspects to economic objectives (Elkin, 1987; Stone, 1989; Harding, 1994).
In explaining current urban politics, some theories of transition such as new right and
regulation accounts have characterised it as a shift from a Fordist model or 'Keynesian
welfare state' to a new regime of accumulation, variously described as: 'flexible
accumulation' (Amin, 1994; Harvey, 1990), a `Schumpeterian workfare state' (Jessop,
1990, 1994), or a 'post-welfare society' (Painter, 1995); or whether instead, the changes
currently operating are part of a temporary crisis of the Fordist model. In this new political
context, Keynesian concepts associated with the Fordist accumulation regime such as state
intervention and regulation, and public ownership, as traditional instruments of economic
growth have been gradually overtaken by neo-conservative ideas based on deregulation,
flexible prices and private ownership (Harvey, 1990; Jessop, 1994; Gamble, 1988;
Kavanagh, 1990; 1994). In line with these neo-liberal assumptions, there is firm evidence
that many Western local authorities are adopting an increasingly entrepreneurialist
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approach, and in particular, the development of partnerships and coalitions to enhance their
capacity to make and carry out governing decisions. Another component of this new
approach is the promotion of a wide range of prestigious urban projects.
Based on the emerging new political economy paradigm, several commentators consider
regulation theory as a valid framework to explain those changes based on its potential for
linking and relating changes in the economy to those in society and politics. Despite its
strengths, the diversity of regulation accounts to explain these changes also makes this goal
more elusive. In this sense, this confusion led Cochrane (1991) to reject this account to
explain the features of Fordism or changes in urban politics.
Other recent approach to theorising the urban political and economic context, growth
machine accounts concentrate on the study of who has the greatest influence over the
physical restructuring, why and with what effect in the process of local urban development
processes (Molotch, 1976). Harding (1995) summarises its potential based on the notion of
'place-boundedness', which facilitates the analysis of why certain sectors of the business
community are committed to local economic growth, and for research about power and
influence in and of itself, rather than reputational analysis (Logan and Molotch, 1987; Cox
and Mair, 1989). Despite these strengths, some commentators argue that growth machine
theory exhibits weaknesses in its analysis of local economic development processes
(Feagin, 1987; Cox and Mair, 1989). Similarly, Lloyd and Newlands (1988) argue that
although all businesses have an interest in land, most of them, including local capital, enjoy
a systemic power which goes beyond the ownership of land (see also Strange, 1993). The
local economic development processes based on property development were undermined,
based on two factors: a) their limited effects on the local economy, and b) property
development operates in a very competitive global market (Hambleton, 1990; Harvey,
1987; Daniels, 1993). To the latter, Daniels offers the example of how the economic decline
of the Canadian property developers Olympia and York (unable to deal with the decline in
financial service employment in London and New York at the beginning of the 1990s) led
to the bankruptcy of London Docklands Development Corporation. Growth coalition
accounts have also been challenged due to their failure to explain either local government
participation or exclusion from coalitions (Lloyd and Newlands, 1988; Harding, 1995).
Indeed, Lloyd and Newlands suggest a more complex relationship between local
government and business based on two assumptions: first, local government may share the
growth ideology of the coalition and be an active partner, or it may not and be excluded;
and secondly, local government is constantly exposed to interests other than business, to
which it may or may not respond.
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The growth machine thesis along with another American-based approach regime theory
have been criticised for their strongly voluntaristic orientation (DiGaetano and Klemanski,
1993; Harding, 1991, 1994), which fails to take account of the contextual limitations of
local action. As a basis for cross-national research, the American urban political economic
context can not be easily replicated in a cross-national context. In particular, Harding (1995)
points out some reservations about the ability of the growth machine approach to analyse
many of the current British local economic development policies. First, UK companies
rarely play local governments against each other for incentives in the way suggested by
Logan and Molotch. Second, local economic strategies need to go beyond property
developments. Third, as a result, the interests involved in growth coalitions must extend
further, and even sometimes ignore, the property interests if such strategies are to be
effective. Fourth, while businesses are locally dependent to varying degrees, growth
coalitions are to be found not only in cities but also beyond their boundaries. In addition,
the growth machine approach has also been criticised on methodological grounds. In this
way, Harding argues the lack of debate over the methodology used in growth machine
analysis makes it difficult to undertake any cross-national comparations. In Britain current
research using this theory has been applied to redescribe urban phenomena rather than used,
conceptually, as a basis for empirical study. One of its outcomes shows that there is little
evidence of private sector domination of growth coalitions or regimes of the kind, which
have developed in some American cities (Cochrane, 1991; DiGaetano, 1989; Keating,
1991; Bailey et al., 1995; Harding, 1994; Lawless, 1994).
Unlike the growth machine approach, regime theory is said to hold the potential for
understanding entrepreneurialism and the proliferation of governing coalitions or regimes in
contemporary urban governance (Stone, 1989; Stoker and Mossberger, 1994; DiGaetano
and Klemanski, 1993). Regime theory recognises the important role that the constitution of
regimes is playing in modern city politics. Unlike community power debate accounts,
regime theory seeks to understand who, how, and with what consequences, such regimes
achieve their goals. However, the pre-emptive power of business groups partly explains
how elected politicians build a coalition to achieve the capacity to act. Selective incentives
may not be the only way to pursue different actors to be members of a coalition. In fact,
structural factors may also contribute to the regime formation (Harding, 1994). Obviously
some coalitions may be ephemeral whilst others become an established part of urban
governance (e.g. Stone's study of Atlanta). To the latter, the assumption that particular
benefits are useful for collective action enables the formation of a long-term governing
coalition. This long-term governing coalition differs in nature from the one introduced by
the growth machine and pluralist accounts.
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Regime theory also goes beyond the growth machine theory to examine how higher levels
of government can influence or constrain the nature and direction of local politics and in
particular, local regimes (Elkin, 1987; Harding, 1995; Stoker, 1995; Stone, 1993).
Moreover, this inter-institutional linkage within coalitions may favour private sector
initiatives not only in the US context but also in the European one. Both theories share the
opportunity of local growth, but regime theory goes further by arguing that the development
of a city's governing coalition is a necessary precondition for success. However, because
this governing coalition may change, regime theory seeks also to explore the dynamics of
regime change as well as its continuity (Stoker, 1995). The stability of a regime is explained
by the solution-set it adopts. Once in place, solution-sets tend to dominate policy and
sustain the regime's policy perspective allowing some scope for incremental change. When
the conditions are more attractive, they may have the capacity to bring together new
members while altering the existing governing arrangements (Stone, 1989, 1993; Jones and
Bachelor, 1993). Building and maintaining regimes entails overcoming two related
problems: one is the inherent difficulty of promoting policy change while the other is the
tendency for coalition formation to be guided by the availability of selective incentives. As
a basis for cross-national research, regime theories, like growth theory, have only been
criticised for their voluntaristic and its ethnocentric orientation. The charge of
ethnocentrism is often associated with a promotion of the need for cross-national
comparison to understand which types of regimes may emerge, coalesce, proceed, and
succeed or fail in other contexts to the American one (Stoker and Mossberger, 1994;
DiGaetano and Klemanski, 1993; Harding, 1994).
2.4. Global and local change in urban development and sport
As mentioned, in most capitalist economies the nation-state was regarded as the primary
actor for territorial governance and economic regulation. At a secondary level, the city of
'collective consumption' gradually emerged with an expansion of local services and with
most industrial activities located in central areas or within its boundary lines. However,
since the mid 1970s there is little doubt that this situation has been substantially modified
with the crisis of the Fordist regime of accumulation in capitalist economies associated with
the globalisation of the economy, affecting particularly the economic and social base of
many of the relevant European industrial cities. These two related factors have subsequently
fostered the emergence of a new international division of labour, an increased global
mobility of capital with a growing significance of investment by transnational corporations
as well as the growth of high-tech, information management-oriented jobs (Amin, 1994;
Harvey, 1990; Hall et al., 1992; Jessop, 1990).
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In this rapidly changing world order, different urban theories share the view that the
primacy of one of the identities of the Fordist regime of accumulation, the nation-state has
reached its crisis point parallel to the increasing importance of de-centralised agencies, sub-
national governments, transnational bodies, and mainly cities. Not all commentators
consider the contemporary context as a crisis for the nation-state (see Hirst, 1995; Harvey,
1990; Harding and LeGales, 1997; Scott, 1997), but all agree that nation-state's role has
been at least significantly modified. Alongside this there has been an increase in the
demands for conceding more capacity and autonomy to the local level. Despite having less
power than nation-states, Borja and Castells (1997) argue that regional and local
governments are currently said to offer two advantages in the restructuring of the economy:
a) they seem to be more 'legitimated' than nation-states; and b) they can respond with more
flexibility to global factors and local conditions. However, local governments are still
dependent constitutionally, economically and legally on nation-states. Harding and LeGales
thus challenge the idea that the nation-state has been supplanted by new structures of
governance at the city or regional level, and further point out that globalisation as a process
is regarded as uneven. Whereas certain areas such as production, trade and the financial
system are increasingly organised on a transnational basis with national governments' role
being less significant, in other areas such as urban policy, air transport or industrial
relations, national governments, particularly those of the most advanced economies, are still
playing a central role in shaping these policies (Harvey, 1990; Harding and LeGales, 1997;
Scott, 1997).
In terms of city governance, the globalisation of the economy has facilitated the promotion
of entrepreneurialism among city governments. In Britain and Spain as in other Western
countries, several commentators argue that the characteristic `managerialise city of the
Fordist period has been gradually replaced by the 'entrepreneurial' city as part of a
dominant urban entrepreneurialist stance to solve economic, social and environmental
problems of the large urban areas (Cochrane, 1991; Hall and Hubbard, 1998; Harvey, 1990;
Harding, 1995; Logan and Molotch, 1987; Osborne and Gaebler, 1992; Stone, 1989). Cities
have thus seen an enhancement of their role in local economic development activities, as
well as in their place in the political agenda in Britain and Spain and in many other
advanced economies. Simultaneously, it is argued that the inability of local government
itself to deal with new economic, social, and environmental challenges has facilitated the
emergence of new forms of urban governance in the post or neo-Fordist era, often following
American models (Amin, 1994; DiGaetano, 1997; Hambleton, 1990; Harvey, 1990;
Harding and LeGales, 1997; Stone, 1989; Stoker, 1995; Stoker and Mossberger, 1994).
Although there are some differences in the interpretations of which new forms of urban
governance are emerging, there appears to be a general recognition of the need for policy
solutions represented by the development of partnerships and coalitions in urban contexts,
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involving not only local authorities but also a range of private and semi-public actors
(Stoker, 1995; Stone, 1989; Hambleton, 1990). In such a context, local traditional
government's role has progressively shifted to that of enabler (Cochrane, 1991; Goldsmith,
1992; Harding, 1995; Osborne and Gaebler, 1992; Stoker, 1995). In the same line of
argument, with the globalisation of the economy, cities have been forced to compete
directly at national and even international level around four areas: a) for position in the new
international division of labour; b) for position as centres of consumption; c) for economic
command and control functions; and d) for governmental redistribution (Hall and Hubbard,
1998; Harvey, 1990; Scott, 1997).
Under this new division, it is argued that the command centres of the global economy will
be concentrated in a small number of world cities. In particular, more than two thirds of
European transnational headquarters are located either in London or in Paris (Parkinson and
LeGales, 1997). At the same time, the new localisation of economic development activities
will tend to be reduced only to those second or third tier cities and regions that can offer
producer services, skilled labour force, and accessibility to markets (Amin and Thrift, 1992;
Borja and Castells, 1997; Sassen, 1994; Williams, 1997). In this debate, although growth
machine and urban regime theory accounts recognise the importance of 'place' in business
investment decisions, a number of writers on globalisation point out that this process has
contributed to diminish the significance of localisation in investment decisions (Amin,
1994; Amin and Thrift, 1992; Hall et al, 1992).
As mentioned, the globalisation of the economy as well as the deindustrialisation of many
Western European cities has inevitably increased inter-urban competition in the marketing
of cities as centres of consumption. This current mode of urban rivalry has brought with it a
concern with the development of a series of highly visible flagship projects in consumer
areas including sports (see previous section for more evidence), culture and leisure, as a
means of boosting the local economy, a catalyst for urban renewal and re-imaging the city
(Harvey, 1987; Featherstone, 1990; Bianchini and Parkinson, 1993; Hall and Hubbard,
1998; Law, 1994; Hambleton, 1990; Smith, 1991; Williams, 1997). This situation led
Harvey to describe modern urban life as an "immense accumulation of spectacles" (p. 377).
Precisely because of the generalisation of their responses, cities need to promote themselves
at the national and international level by putting more emphasis upon product
differentiation. This dualistic (homogenisation and differentiation) approach also forms part
of entrepreneurial approach adopted among city governments in the last two decades; and
indeed is reflected in wider globalisation processes (Robertson, 1996).
Disagreements also form part of the debate concerning the use of ambitious urban projects
to compensate for the decline of the economic base of some European cities in the 'post-
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Fordist' era. As part of a growing entrepreneurialism, Harvey asks the question: how many
ambitious projects such as convention centres, sports stadium, Disney Worlds or harbour
places do cities need to restructure their economy? In addition, Daniels (1993, p. 166) offers
the example of the Canary Wharf in London to highlight the high risks inherent in some of
these speculative investments due in part to the fact that: "the outcomes expected from
ambitious urban projects are nowadays more dependent on international decisions over
which cities have little control". Thus, the success or failure of local regeneration strategies
can be directly affected by global decisions. At the same time, in the `post-modern' era
success is regarded as ephemeral and some of the values embedded in certain urban
development projects (e.g. uniqueness) are highly vulnerable to devaluation because of the
competition of alternative projects from other cities (Harvey, 1990).
What is more, there is a fairly general consensus about the notion that the
entrepreneurialism of the last two decades seems to have negatively contributed to reinforce
social and spatial division within cities (Keating, 1991; Hambleton, 1990; Kasarda, 1993;
Squires, 1991). The cohabitation between community and elite-oriented projects has given
risen to contradictions and tensions within cities. As an example, cities seek to sell these
elite projects, located mainly in central areas, to a growing population of city users who
make a great use of local private and public services, whereas other urban areas and local
residents are often excluded from these services (Harvey, 1987; Mayer, 1994; Tye and
Williams, 1994; Scott, 1997). With a growing population of city users, 'post-modern' cities
seem to be planned for users and potential users rather than for their inhabitants. In terms of
urban governance, the much acclaimed entrepreneurialism and public-private partnership
model amounts to a subsidy for these affluent visitors as well as for corporations and
private investors to stay in the city at the expense of reductions in local needs (Harvey,
1990; Mayer, 1994; Scott, 1997). Globalisation is also leading to a flexibilisation of labour
markets with the loss of manufacturing and other low-skilled urban jobs in conjunction with
increases in the service and white-collars jobs, and female jobs. In essence, the creation of
boom conditions within any city does not guarantee that the benefits in terms of growth and
job creation will trickle down to all residents (Stoker and Young, 1993).
2.5. Central and local relations in a transnational context
Classical urban politics studies assumed that the public and private sectors operated
independently in the urban policy process, with the economy always subordinate to politics
(Dahl, 1961; Judge, 1995; Mollenkopf, 1992; Saunders, 1981). In this way, the actions of
the business community were assumed not to have implications for those of urban politics,
with business leaders not having the capacity to shape urban policies. The debate focused
predominantly on understanding power in cities and how to measure this, but failed to place
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the analysis within a wider process of economic changes. By restricting the debate within
the limit of cities, classical theories assumed that cities were independent entities in their
governance process (Harding, 1995; Mollenkopf, 1992; Stoker, 1995; Wolman and
Goldsmith, 1992). In addition, these theories also placed emphasis on the formal
relationship between central and local government with local government acting as a
decentralised agent of central government.
Globalisation has had a direct impact upon traditional central-local government relations in
many Western European countries. During the last two decades, it is worth noticing the
kind of different responses adopted (centralisation versus decentralisation of power) in the
face of a changing global economic environment (Goldsmith, 1992; Hall et al., 1992;
Harding and LeGales, 1997). The Spanish and British experiences offer an example of both
responses. Whereas in Spain, there has been a gradual decentralisation of power and
functions from the central government to the autonomous communities and to a lesser
extent to the local Councils during the democratic period, in the UK, the traditional central-
local good relations of the 1960s and 1970s contrast with the major disputes involving both
actors about their respective powers and functions of the last two decades. With a growing
centralisation, local government in the UK came under attack by consecutive Conservative
central governments, especially during the early years of Mrs. Thatcher, to increase their
power. However, John Major government's urban initiatives sought to improve these
relations by giving a greater role to local authorities in urban regeneration (see chapter
four). As part of the prevalent new right ideology in many countries, public welfare
programmes have also been challenged. In this context of economic efficiency, for example,
British local authorities were obliged to privatise some of their traditional functions and
services, in particular through contracting out some of these services, a long-established
practice in many American cities. The major alternative to privatisation under the
Conservative governments was public sector reform, with the emergence of new forms of
social provision in the form of social trusts, management co-operatives, tenants
management corporations and so on. This has happened particularly in the area of leisure
and sports where user groups have been involved in running major facilities in British
cities, as is reflected in the case of Sheffield in chapter 6.
At the same time, the diminution of the traditional role of the British local government
coincided with an increasing privatisation of urban policy. Thus, the growing British urban
entrepreneuralism has extended to many countries throughout the 1980s and 1990s with
Western cities, including the Spanish, being also more involved in economic development
activities. This trend follows the assumptions of the new right ideology that seeks to
redefine a new role of local government as an enabler to be compatible with the flexible
economic structure and enterprise culture adopted among city governments. In addition,
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since the mid 1980s Spanish and British national governments have also played a central
role in the promotion of public-private partnerships to attract different levels of
governmental funds. The rapid growth in the number of British local authorities pursuing
local economic development strategies have pragmatically forced them to develop these
kind of partnerships because of the enormous difficulties faced by the public sector in trying
to deal alone with economic restructuring. Thus, despite recent economic changes with an
enhanced role played by sub-national governments, supranational bodies or cities, the
constitutional, legislative and financial powers of national governments continue to give
nation-states a decisive role in central-local relations.
This chapter has reviewed the major approaches to conceptualising the nature of urban
governance in contemporary urban contexts and as a feature of that the role of sport and
culture in local economic development strategies. It is further sought to highlight the
epistemological implication of these approaches as a context to the evaluation of the place
of sport and leisure in urban governmental systems in Sheffield and Bilbao. The following
chapter goes on to discuss the methodological issues related.
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3.1 Introduction
Despite criticisms of the concerns of traditional urban theories, it is generally accepted
that the political economic paradigm operating after the Second World War is in crisis.
New theoretical and political positions have emerged which assume that the period
since the mid-1970s represents a transition from one distinct era of capitalism (Fordist)
to a new one. Simultaneously, the growth of urban problems on a world-wide scale
associated with other features such as the limitation of power of politicians and
democratic processes, the fragmentation and complexity of governmental decision
making parallel to the apparent limitation of the capacity of the nation-state, has
rendered possible new theoretical frameworks which aspire to analyse new economic
and social changes (see chapter 2). In particular, one of these new frameworks, urban
regime theory seeks to explain power in a complex urban context through the
examination of the relations between local government and non-government actors and
institutions working in co-operation ('regimes') in current urban politics. Such an
approach offers a convenient point of departure for informing our understanding of how
such coalitions of interest groups operate as well as how sporting and cultural prestige
projects have been used as an economic tool in local government development
strategies in a number of instances over the last two decades, but specifically in two
major European cities, Sheffield and Bilbao from the late 1980s to 1995.
In seeking to evaluate regime theory approaches to explaining aspects of urban sports
policy in the two cities a predominantly qualitative approach is adopted. In the
discussion below competing paradigms are also described. The approach of this study is
located within the assumptions and implications associated to the interpretative
paradigm. In effect the case studies selected and evaluated seek to answer a number of
research questions outlined in the introductory chapter. Similarly, methodological
aspects of the case studies in comparative research are discussed, including the criteria
adopted in the selection of the two cities, issues of access and the sample selection of
interviewees, the application of the methods, the details of the fieldwork in both cities
and finally, the analysis of data.
The methods adopted to generate answers to the research questions fall into two
categories. The first is a desk-based review of urban and sport policies in Britain and
Spain (see chapter 4 and 5). The revision of urban policies incorporates a detailed
analysis of how urban problems have been conceptualised since the post-World War era
in Britain (with reference to three distinct periods from 1945 to 1995) and since the
Spanish post-Civil War to the establishment of the democracy until the end of the
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Socialist government in 1995 with a review of policy initiatives adopted. As part of this
review, policy analysis is undertaken of the wide range of urban programmes and
initiatives designed to address urban problems in both countries. In terms of sport, an
overview of the historical evolution of sports policy in both countries covers from its
initial commitment to the welfare system until the recent phenomenon of using sports-
related projects as an element in the British and Spanish urban regeneration strategies of
the 1990s. The chapter also incorporates an analysis of qualitative data derived from
interviews conducted in Sheffield and Bilbao with politicians, policy-makers, and other
actors involved in the regeneration process, and a critical review of policy documents,
reports, policy evaluation, analysis of the economic, social and political conditions in
both case studies to assess the applicability of regime theory to an European context.
3.2. Competing Paradigms in Social Science Methodology
Over recent decades there have been, and continue to be, debates over the beliefs that
will inform any research. In this way, although it is generally accepted that there are
different paradigms, each with their own ontological and epistemological concerns and
methodological implications, there is little or no consensus about what is the appropriate
paradigm (Bryman, 1992; Denzin and Lincoln, 1994; Sparkes, 1992). However, after
briefly introducing the basic assumptions of three of the major paradigms, this chapter
will argue that an interpretative approach is the most appropriate given the research
goals.
In general terms, a paradigm has been widely described as "a world view, a general
perspective, a way of breaking down the complexity of the real world" (Patton, 1978, p.
203), "the source of methods, problem-field, and standard of solution accepted by any
mature scientific field at any given time" (Kuhn, 1970, p. 103) or "the basic belief
system or worldview that guide the investigator" (Guba and Lincoln, 1994, p. 105).
Within the basic set of beliefs adopted there are questions of ontology and epistemology
as well as methodological implications. Ontological assumptions illustrate the nature of
basic facts emphasised by the paradigm, starting with the fundamental question of
whether the reality to be investigated is external to the individual or is the product of
individual consciousness (Burrell and Morgan, 1979; Denzin and Lincoln, 1994).
Linked to ontological issues there are epistemological assumptions that refer to
questions of knowing (theory of knowledge) and the nature of knowledge (theory of
learning). These assumptions involve beliefs about how to obtain knowledge making
emphasis on what is regarded as 'true' from what is regarded as 'false', or theory of
learning which considers whether knowledge can be acquired by observation and rules
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of science (positivism) or by personal experiences (interpretative and critical
paradigms).
Methodological issues also form part of the paradigm debate. Methodology relates not
only to the systematic study of the general principles guiding an investigation and the
ways in which theory finds its application but also to the theoretical position taken
which will greatly influence the way to produce data. In this respect, it is also necessary
to distinguish between methodology (philosophical issues), research strategy (the way
that any study is designed and carried out) and research techniques (specific methods
used to gather data) (Bulmer, 1984). Thus, the specific methods employed in any study
are part of the research strategy, which need to be consistent with the methodology
previously selected. What has been regarded as the dominant methodology (positivism)
advocates a nomothetic approach that emphasises the importance of undertaking
research by adopting methods of study appropriate to the data at hand while the
alternative methodologies (interpretative and critical) refute positivists assumptions by
adopting an ideographic approach which considers that reality is better understood
through first-hand knowledge of the specific of particular cases (Burrell and Morgan,
1979; Denzin and Lincoln, 1994; Earls, 1986; Sparkes, 1992). In essence, all
researchers make inferences about ontology, epistemology and methodology issues, and
the choice of the research strategy emerges subsequently from the particular
methodological position adopted which reflects certain values and beliefs towards the
social world. Consequently, as part of this debate, any research process would always
be shaped by the paradigmatic assumptions adopted.
3.2.1. The Positivist Paradigm
This paradigm has historically experienced great support within the natural sciences.
Some of the diverse terms associated with this paradigm include positivist, scientific,
empiricist, empirical-analytical, behaviourist, or quantitative (Burrell and Morgan,
1979; Denzin and Lincoln, 1994). Positivism, originated with the scientific paradigm, is
generally concerned with objectivity, prediction, quality of measures, and the discovery
of scientific generalisations. The nature of scientific method is hypothetic-deductive,
whereby consequences are inferred from hypotheses and positivist method explores the
logical consequences of the hypotheses. As a result, positivism revolves around the
belief that the statements of science constitute a consistent framework by reference to
which the nature of any form of knowledge may be determined and the language of
science represents the universal language. With regard to ontology, positivism
postulates that the world is seen as an external reality independent of individuals
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(external-realist ontology) (Bryman, 1992; Burrell and Morgan, 1979; Denzin and
Lincoln, 1994). Therefore, the world exists prior to the existence and consciousness of
any human being and it is thus comprehended as it really is. This separation of mind and
reality leads to the view that truth has its source in an independently single reality
('objective reality') outside the values and interests of individuals. Truth is then a matter
of correspondence considering than any informant statement is measured by its
correspondence to the real object out there independently of the setting and the
researcher. By looking for objectivity, the researcher is expected to adopt an unbiased
and detached stance that can not influence the object of study. After adopting a realist-
external ontology and an objectivist epistemology, positivism advocates a nomothetic
methodology. As a consequence, positivism adheres systematically to a certain set of
methods, considered epistemologically privileged, to address issues of internal and
external validity as well as reliability (Kirk and Miller, 1986; Lincoln and Guba, 1985;
Cohen and Manion, 1992).
All these assumptions have traditionally led to present positivism as the normative
framework to study natural sciences, while its understanding of the social world has
been criticised for offering a mechanistic and reductionist view of reality (Sparkes,
1992). According to the scientific paradigm, the whole classes of events or human
behaviours are considered identical. Thus, the social world can be explained as the links
of a system of variables that are distinct and analytically separable parts of one
interacting system. It is believed that by identifying and interrelating variables, the
specific causes of behaviour within the system can be known. Unlike other paradigms,
the scientific does not make emphasis on interpretation considering that researchers set
the parameters of what is interesting to them, rather than their subject or context. In
making inferences about which kind of urban theories might be located within the
scientific paradigm, it might be argued that traditional urban theories such as pluralism
or elitism, which have a strong normative component associated with an empirical
descriptive analysis of decision making, may be linked to this paradigm. However,
given the aims of this project, some might argue that positivist approaches are simply
flawed so that whether to use them or not is not dependent on the aims.
3.2.2. The Interpretative Paradigm
Over the last two decades there has been a growing dissatisfaction with the positivist
paradigm and alternative ways of making sense of social reality have gained
momentum, some of them developed under the 'interpretative paradigm' umbrella.
Despite differences and similarities, the case study approach along with other research
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traditions such as ethnography, hermeneutics, naturalism, phenomenology, symbolic
interactionism and qualitative research, forms part of the heterogeneous terms linked to
this paradigm. Contrary to positivist assumptions, the interpretative paradigm adopts a
relativist ontology (the world exists but there are multiple realities), a subjectivist
epistemology (knower and subject create understanding of reality) and an ideographic
methodology (reality is represented for purposes of comparison) (Denzin and Lincoln,
1994; Guba, 1990; Sparkes, 1992). While positivism adopts a 'top-down' perspective,
using the general to describe the particular, the interpretative uses the particular to
illustrate if not to describe the general ('bottom-up' perspective). Unlike the objective
reality portrayed by the positivist paradigm, the interpretative views reality as
significantly socially constructed, based on a dynamic process of interpretation and
reinterpretation of the meaningful behaviour and language of different people (Guba
and Lincoln, 1989; Silverman, 1985).
A further difference is that in the interpretative paradigm the knower and the process of
knowing cannot be separated from what is known, and facts cannot be separated from
values. In this alternative paradigm, truth is not a matter of correspondence as it is in
positivism, it becomes a matter of coherence (Sparkes, 1992). To this point, truth is
what is agreed to be true at a particular time considering that in a world of multiple
realities, multiple truths can also exist with humans playing a central role in shaping or
constructing these. As a consequence, social reality cannot be replicated. To
comprehend the views of people, several methods can be used such as participant-
observation, various forms of interviewing, projective techniques, along with the
analysis of other written documents (Patton, 1990). Although there are not privileged
methods within the interpretative paradigm, in this study semi-structured interviews and
written documents were employed. In the same line of argument, the usual positivist
criteria of internal and external validity, reliability and objectivity is not appropriate to
value this study considering that the researcher decides what is relevant and important
to the study. Therefore, the prevailing criteria are replaced in studies that follow the
interpretative paradigm by terms such as trustworthiness, credibility, transferability,
dependability, and authenticity (Guba and Lincoln, 1989; Denzin and Lincoln, 1994).
In this way, any research following the interpretative paradigm needs to be reflect these
combined qualities. In a world of multiple realities, credibility refers to compatibility of
the constructed realities that exist in the minds of the individuals and groups involved in
the research with the description attributed to them. Transferability relates to the extent
that those findings can be applied in other contexts or with other respondents.
Additionally, Athens (1984) suggests three scientific criteria to evaluate qualitative
studies. First, 'theoretical import' (the contribution which qualitative studies make to
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the development of new concepts or theories or the refinement of existing ones).
Second, 'empirical grounding' (it exists only if they are consistent with (not identical
to) the empirical observations or cases from which they were developed). Finally,
'scientific credibility' (this is not an ascribed quality of study, but rather an achieved
one). Finally, Lincoln and Guba (1985) have proposed other strategies for enhancing the
value of qualitative studies such as prolonged engagement of the researcher in the
context studied, persistent observation, triangulation, referential adequacy materials,
peer debriefing, and member checks. These and others, as table 3.1 shows, summarise
the strategies adopted for enhancing the value of qualitative studies.
1.111r Examples	 11.11111IMMNnTechnique	 Results
Prolonged	 Build trust and relationships
Engagement Develop rapport
Obtain wide scope and accurate data
Persistent
	 Obtain in-depth and accurate data
Observation Sort relevancies from irrelevancies
Recognise deceits
Triangulation Verify data
Referential
	
Provide 'slice of life'
Adequacy
Peer	 Test working hypotheses
Debriefing	 Find alternative explanations
Explore emerging design and hypotheses
Member	 Test categories, interpretations, or
Checking	 conclusions (constructions)
Reflexive	 Document researcher decisions
Journal
Thick
	 Provide database for transferability
Description judgements. Provide a vicarious
experience for the reader
Purposive	 Generate data for emergent design
sampling
	
and emerging hypotheses
Audit trail	 Allow auditor to determine
trustworthiness of study
Length of time in the field
Avoiding premature closing
Purposeful, assertive investigation
Using different or multiple sources, methods, or investigators
Absence of data
Unobstructive measures such as brochures, etc.
Formal or informal discussions with a peer
Continuous, formal or informal checking of data with
stake holders such as at the end of an interview, review of
written passages, of the final report in draft form
Daily or weekly written diary
Descriptive, relevant data
Maximum variation sampling that provides the broadest
range of information bases on relevance
Interview guides, notes, documents, notecards, peer debriefing
notes, etc.
Table 3.1. Summary of Techniques for Establishing Trustworthiness
Source: Erlandson et al. (1993, p. 161) adapted from Lincoln and Guba (1985)
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In essence, all these strategies seek to overcome some of the limitations associated with
the interpretative paradigm, in particular, the possible subjectivity of the enquiry. In this
way, when different researchers make decisions about who to talk to, where to be, and
when to be in certain settings, these will obviously have an impact upon what kind of
data is or not collected. Therefore it would not be uncommon to turn out with different
outcomes (Ball, 1990). Different strategies, for example, triangulation, are frequently
used to elicit the various and divergent constructions of reality that might exist in any
interpretative study (Erlandson et al., 1993; Shipman, 1988; Patton, 1990; Yin, 1993).
Within an interpretative framework, coherence theory of truth advocates that a
proposition can be true if it is consistent with other propositions in a scheme or network
that is in operation at a particular time, thus making coherence a matter of internal
relations (Sparkes, 1992). Nevertheless, Sparkes has argued that agreement or
disagreement by the subjects of interpretation does not necessarily reduce or enhance
the credibility of qualitative study. In a world of multiple realities, multiple realities can
exist as stated before, and for interpretative researchers the criteria to value qualitative
studies differ from those adopted by positivistic researchers.
3.2.3. The Critical Paradigm
In terms of historical roots, the contribution of the work of the Frankfurt school, which
includes authors such as Adorno, Marcuse, Habermas has been relevant to the
emergence of the critical paradigm. Focusing their attention on the changing nature of
capitalism, the early critical theorists analysed the mutating forms of domination that
accompanied this change (Kincheloe and McLaren, 1994). As was described in the
discussion of the two paradigms previously, there is not a unified critical paradigm.
Nevertheless, different approaches included within the critical paradigm are neo-
Marxism, post-structuralism, post-modernism, feminism, participatory inquiry as well
as critical theory itself (Guba, 1990). Despite differences, all of them offer a critique of
modern society and seek to change social reality by empowering people involved in the
research (Griffin, 1990).
The critical paradigm criticises the assumptions underpinning the other paradigms
described. In particular, positivist theories have been criticised for their failure to value
the interpretations and meanings that individuals employ to make their reality
understandable, but also those of the researcher in identifying the phenomena to be
explained, while interpretativists have been criticised for their weakness in describing
the power relationships within which people operate (Carr and Kemmis, 1986).
Alternatively, the critical paradigm puts an emphasis on human consciousness and the
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ways in which social reality is shaped and limited by existing social arrangements in
such a way as to serve the interests of some groups at the expense of others. In this line
of argument, Griffin (1990) summarises the beliefs inherent in a critical perspective:
firstly, society is made up of groups and individuals with systemic power and groups
with little power (while the former seeks to maintain their power, the latter has interest
in social change); secondly, social institutions perpetuate the status quo of power
imbalance among groups; thirdly, competing interests generate conflicts which are often
below the surface of apparent consensus; and finally, it is concerned with 'why/why
not' questions. In essence, unlike the assumptions of the prevailing paradigm, validity in
the critical paradigm relates not only to the trustworthiness (interpretativists), but goes
further by seeking to empower the participants and enable them to create change
(Kincheloe and McLaren, 1994; Griffin, 1990; Sparkes, 1992).
For critical researchers, any form of social research is always a political act and
knowledge cannot be value free. Research is undertaken with the full participation of
the people involved in the study so that they are empowered to transform this situation
by themselves (Sparkes, 1992). Thus, there is reciprocity between researcher and
researched that serves not only to corroborate the interpretation of data (as in the
interpretative paradigm), but also to provide participants with insights that might serve
as the basis for action and change. As a consequence, in this 'collaborative research'
people are defined as participants rather than subjects to be studied (Griffin, 1990).
The research project reported in this thesis adopts an interpretative methodological
approach to understand how sporting and cultural prestige projects have been used in
the process of urban regeneration in two European cities. The rationale for doing so
rests on the need to understand a set of actors' explanations about the kind of policies
adopted in the regeneration of their cities as well as of the structural contexts within
which the action of these actors take place. Simultaneously, the adoption of an
interpretative methodological approach might lead to a critical stance in relation to the
knowledge generated and its application in enhancing actors knowledge in practical
policy settings.
3.3. Analysis of Policy or Analysis for Policy?
For the purposes of accurately characterising the interpretative approach adopted, it will
be important to define certain terms. Ham and Hill (1983) define policy as "the output
of a political process" (p.14). However, it is generally accepted that policy is not simply
the outcome of interaction in the policy process of a set of actors such as political
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parties, governments and major pressure groups. As the above definition implies it
includes all actions of governments, not just stated intentions but also an understanding
of why governments sometimes choose to do nothing about a particular issue (non-
decisions). Like Ham and Hill, Hogwood and Gunn (1981) consider that it is necessary
to provide an adequate understanding of government 'action' and 'no action'. Going
further, Heclo (1972) included both aspects suggesting that a policy may usefully be
considered as course of action or inaction rather than the specific decisions accepted.
After all these different assumptions are considered, it is not possible to agree on the
concept of policy either on a single definition of policy analysis or in the scope of
policy analysis (Dye, 1976; Ham and Hill, 1983; Wildavsky, 1979). Related to the
latter, Wildavsky argues that policy analysis is as much to do with advocacy as with
understanding, while Barret and Fudge (1981) and Dye (1976) maintain that social
scientists should not become directly involved in advising policy-makers on existing
problems, considering policy advocacy and policy analysis as separate endeavours.
However, Dye emphasises that all definitions of policy analysis aspire to achieve the
same aim:
The description and explanation of the causes and consequences of
government action and after that, the analysis may also help policy-
makers to improve the quality of public policy (p.108).
After considering policy analysis as the description and explanation of the causes and
consequences of government 'action' and 'no action' and addressing different research
questions, the policy analysis typology adopted by Hogwood and Gunn was considered
(see Figure 3.1). This typology comprises two broad categories: analysis 'of policy' and
analysis 'for policy'.
Information Process Policy advocacyStudy of Study of Study of Evaluation
policy policy policy for policy Advocacy
content process outputs making
Analyst as
political actor
Political
analyst
actor as
Policy Studies	 Policy Analysis
(Knowledge of policy and the policy process)
Figure 3.1. Types of study of public policy-making
Source: Hogwood and Gunn (1981)
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Although it is difficult to allocate the policy analysis in one or another category as has
already been stated, this study is closer to the analysis of policy (as a descriptive
activity) rather than analysis for policy (as advocacy activity). Nevertheless, this
research analysis seeks to be able to provide some guidelines to all selected actors
involved in policy under review. It is necessary to discuss the location of urban regime
theory within the interpretative framework.
3.4. Urban Regime Theory and its methodological implications
Unlike traditional theoretical accounts, urban regime theory provides middle range
explanations of the process of governance at the local level, through its understanding
of power. In methodological terms, it needs to prove that it not only offers a consistent
framework but also one that is flexible for analysing urban politics and in particular the
issue of power, as well as to both describe and explain a variety of patterns of power
distribution in cities (Stone, 1989; Stoker, 1995). In line with the interpretative
paradigm, regime theory's main propositions emerged inductively from observation of
the urban scene, particularly from the relevant study undertaken by Stone (1989) in
Atlanta. Nevertheless, Stoker argues that it is necessary to refine and further develop
this theory. Sharing some of the assumptions of grounded theory, regime theory aspires
to close the gap between theory and empirical research, by providing a rationale for
theory that is grounded, and simultaneously generated in the research process (see
Strauss, 1987). However, the groundedness of regime theory is a value that should not
be overlooked, but may be helpful to state in more abstract terms its approach to power.
In this aim, regime theory lacks the extent and range of empirical work of other
traditional theoretical accounts. In essence, the emphasis on regime theory as a process
led to stress the idea of grounding theory as moving continuously from theory through
empirical data and back to theory.
Considering the comparative scope of this project, regime theory needs to be placed in a
broader context than in the US and to look for a common methodological approach
which can be applied to a larger context as in the cases of two Western European cities,
Bilbao and Sheffield. For this reason, the typology developed by Stoker and Mossberger
(1994) seeks to sensitise the researcher to national differences in the way that functions
are shared within and between different levels of government as in Bilbao and
Sheffield. Going further in this analysis, regime continuity and change are also
considered two relevant issues to be addressed in any study. As such, in any context, as
people in that context might change, so their construction of reality and the relationships
among them also shift (even if the individuals are the same). Therefore, when findings
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are applied across contexts, the problem of transferability increases. Above all, it needs
to avoid the current broad use of regime terminology (as in the study of Savich and
Thomas, 1991) which is leading to a loose use of regime theory concepts (Stoker,
1995). Consequently, it is particularly these differences which offer some limitations to
comparative analysis.
3.5. The use of Case Studies in Comparative Research
The interpretative methodology adopted lends itself to the use of a case study approach.
On methodological terms many points can be used to justify the adoption of a case
study approach. Case studies can serve for different purposes such as explanations of an
under-researched area, testing, refining, and further development of theories, or
enhancing internal validity (Bryman, 1992; Eisenhardt, 1989; Silverman, 1985; Yin,
1993). In terms of epistemological assumptions, the use of the case study approach in
this research is more valuable in refining regime theory (interpretativist stance) rather
than in testing its applicability (positivist stance). The case study forms part of an
inductive approach. As such, the justification for employing this interpretative research
stance was based on the desire to study in depth the cases of the local economic
regeneration strategies employed in Sheffield and Bilbao, in a specific time period
during which key selected actors were significant for policy outcomes. The detail and
depth of the description rendered by the cases of Bilbao and Sheffield is likely to
increase the understanding of the empirical foundations of related theory, in this case,
regime theory. Above all, this research seeks to build up rich descriptions of the two
case studies under study (Patton, 1990; Yin, 1984, 1993).
The relative flexibility of the case study approach brings with it a number of practical
problems. Firstly, the case study approach has largely been accused of limited
generalizability by orthodox paradigms (Hamel et al., 1993; Erlandson et al., 1993). In
this research, the use of two cases might bring together a 'replication logic' considering
that any case study research that examines more than one site often comprises its own
replication (Bryman, 1992; Guba and Lincoln, 1989; Yin, 1984; 1993). Different
authors have suggested that the case study should also be judged by the positivistic
criteria of internal and external validity and reliability (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 1993).
However, this positivist conceptualisation of validity is different to the interpretative
since there is always the potential for multiple coherent interpretations of the same cases
under study. Furthermore, most of the case study research involves more than one
method of data collection, since no single method could simultaneously maximise
internal and external validity (Yin, 1984, 1993). In this study the combination of
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quantitative and qualitative methods was used to reinforce scientific credibility in line
with the scientific criteria outlined previously by Athens (1984) and to overcome the
weaknesses of subjectivity by using multiple sources of data (Denzin, 1970; Denzin and
Lincoln, 1994; Stake, 1994; Yin, 1993). Hence, the combination of quantitative and
qualitative data has been highly synergistic.
After all, Stoker (1995) stresses that regime theory, as a middle range theory, does not
need a large number of case studies to reinforce its position against the other traditional
theoretical accounts and therefore, there is no need for a regime analysis to discover an
effective and operational regime in every city, as Stone did in Atlanta. The conclusions
presented at the end of this thesis relate mainly to the specific experiences of the
regeneration strategies of Bilbao and Sheffield though some shared characteristics
might be transferable under a broad process of local government change.
3.6. Aspects of method in the case studies
This section seeks to explain some of the practical issues involved in the research
process. Initially, the evolution in the selection process of the case studies and the
reasons that contribute to the final decision are addressed. After outlining the selection
process, the issue of access, the interview process in Bilbao and Sheffield, the
description of the sample selection for interviewees are identified. Finally, the
management of data collected and its analysis in the two case studies are highlighted.
3.6.1. Criteria adopted in the selection of the cities
Selection of cases is valued as an important aspect of any research. The initial choice
was to be two cities in each country, Bilbao and Valencia (Spain) and Nottingham and
Sheffield (Great Britain). However, pragmatic, methodological and theoretical reasons
led to a reduction of the initial selection of two cities in each country to only one in each
country. The final choice of Bilbao and Sheffield, was partly facilitated by pragmatic
reasons such as the ease of access, through local intermediaries, in the form of staff at
Deusto University in Bilbao and the Leisure Industries Research Centre in Sheffield,
geographical proximity in the case of Sheffield, and financial constraints. Ease of access
may be a potential source of research data, as well as a threat considering that the failure
to gain access may limit the nature of findings and the scope of analysis (Bryman, 1992;
Morse, 1994). Methodologically, the amount of data expected to be gathered from both
cities was considered sufficient (defined as theoretical saturation) for the aim of this
research (Eisenhardt, 1989). Additionally, although both cities offered distinctive
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features, there were some positive issues of the phenomenon of interest which were also
relevant in the final decision process.
Initially, Sheffield and Bilbao's economies were heavily dependent on state investment
and nationalised industries in the post-war period (case of Sheffield) or private investors
in the Spanish post-war period (case of Bilbao). While in the case of Sheffield, the
influence of strong local labour movements contributed to the provision of a high
standard of public services, in Bilbao the centralisation of politics during the Spanish
post-war meant that local politics were less important in determining the provision of
public services. However, with the globalisation of the economy in the 1970s, both
cities have been sharing the problems associated with many city governments in
developed economies, in that deindustrialisation has undermined the local economy
with profound effects on the social structure. Finally, despite political differences, both
cities, Bilbao (controlled after the democratic period by a traditional right-wing
nationalist dominated coalition) and Sheffield (a traditional Labour controlled City
Council) are examples of variations in the nature of contemporary urban politics. Both
cities have started to foster alternatives to their traditional industrial models of
economic development to regenerate their local economies. One of the responses in the
restructuring of both cities has been the constitution of partnerships, operating outside
the traditional structures of local government. Another important factor of the
restructuring and re-imaging of these cities has been the use of high-profile events or
facilities, one of the symbols of Bilbao's regeneration relates to the siting of a new
European Guggenheim museum, while in Sheffield it was the 1991 World Student
Games. These cases do not represent general examples, but from their study the
generalizability of some of the findings might be transferable to other places, even
while recognising local differences (Bryman, 1992; Yin, 1984; Stake, 1994). Moulaert
and Demaziere (1996) note that the models of Sheffield and Bilbao can not be easily
replicated to cities with a low profile in industrial tradition, a history of a long rural
tradition and a significant disconnection with leading growth trajectories.
3.6.2. Data Access and Sample Selection for Interviewees
Interviewing has a wide variety of forms and multiplicity of uses ranging from the
structured to the unstructured interview (Briggs, 1986; Cohen and Manion, 1992;
Radnor, 1994). The structured interview is one that the interviewer asks pre-established
questions with a limited choice of answers. The interviewer introduces a great degree of
control over the interviewee's responses and there is little flexibility in the interview
relative to the way in which the questions are asked or answered. Positivism adheres to
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this approach considering that each interview is standard and identical. This technique
was also not considered at the beginning of the study considering the evolving process
of regime theory. In contrast to the structured interview, the unstructured ('open-ended')
interview offers greater flexibility and freedom. Within the unstructured interview there
is the opportunity for the researcher to introduce new questions in the process, and in
doing so, to allow the interviewee to respond freely. Located between the two extremes
previously mentioned, this study relied predominantly on the semi-structured interview
that is a more flexible version of the structured interview. Generally, this type of
interview is organised around a list of general areas of particular interest while
unexpected areas of interest might arise which lead to other questions worth noting.
In this study, the process of building-up the question sequences was not conceptualised
as a rigid process and followed the strategy of beginning with the most general
questions and narrowing down to more specific questions seeking to answer the
research questions. The interview process was designed to develop an understanding of
a number of key themes including perceptions of the causes of urban decline and the
strategies for urban regeneration (both planned and emergent); the process of
construction of local urban coalitions; and the role of sport and leisure in the re-
construction plans of Bilbao and Sheffield. Although, case study is a method that does
not imply any particular form of data collection, it can be either quantitative or
qualitative; a qualitative methodology was mainly employed (Stake, 1994; Yin, 1984;
1993). Thus, in depth semi-structured interviews and documentary analysis were the
predominant mode of data collection used.
The adoption of semi-structured interviews allowed this study to follow the assumptions
outlined by the interpretative paradigm as well as to refine and further develop regime
theory. Even though the interviews in the two cases were undertaken in different
periods, the research sought to maintain a balance between flexibility and reliability in
data collection. Flexibility is required to facilitate discovery of the interviewee's views
while consistency in the depth of detail, the types of questions asked, the amount of
exploration and confirmation covered in interviews is essential to draw appropriate
conclusions. Although this project does not value as appropriate the notions of validity
and reliability as defined by the positivistic paradigm, different strategies such as
prolonged engagement in both cities, persistent observation, purposive sampling,
triangulation of the information gathered by interviews with secondary data were
adopted to enhance the trustworthiness of this study (Denzin, 1970; Denzin and
Lincoln, 1994; Lincoln and Guba, 1985; Miles and Hubermas, 1994).
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The selection process of interviewees was a modified version of the 'snowballing
technique'. After following the recommendations of people and also examining existing
studies of the political economy and public policy development in both cities, a first
sample of potential respondents was built up. Also the initial selection of specific
interviewees was made on the basis of their formal position within the organisation (e.g.
in the case of Sheffield, three Council leaders and in Bilbao, two Council leaders for the
period of study were interviewed because of their strategic position) and their reputed
influence in appropriate policy areas (reported in the literature or cited by other
interviewees). The whole range of interviews in Bilbao were undertaken in a period
prior to the 1996 National General Elections, initial concerns were acknowledged,
however, only three people declined to collaborate due to a change in personal
circumstances. Preliminary contact was made with the interviewees by letter, informing
the individuals about the nature and the aims of the study and the availability of dates
for conducting the interviews (two samples are provided in the appendix I).
Subsequently, personal contact was made by telephone to explain the reasons for
seeking an interview and if the individual was willing to cooperate to arrange a
convenient time and place. The initial arrangements for interviewing were facilitated
through local intermediaries, in this aspect it is worth recognising the important
contribution of the staff at the Deusto University and the Leisure Industries Research
Centre in providing introductions to key local figures.
Additionally, there were a number of potential factors which could have been influential
in the interview process, in particular, institutional and linguistic issues as well as the
relationship of interviewer and the community under investigation (see Briggs, 1986).
Important features included the relationship between the interviewer's nationality and
the perceived local-regional identities and interests of those being interviewed. This is
important in both the Basque as in the Yorkshire case. In the case of Bilbao, prior to the
study it was not fully considered how the nationality of the researcher might have
affected the course of the research, and in particular, how specific potential participants
in the research could interpret this factor which could have led to some of them to
decline to cooperate. However, prior to the interview, all the participants were informed
both in the introductory letter and subsequent personal contact, that a Spanish
researcher, but one who was enrolled in a British university was going to undertake the
research. Additionally, access was facilitated, through local intermediaries, in the form
of staff at Deusto University. In the case of Sheffield, there were no such potential
problems and the initial intermediation of the Leisure Industries Research Centre in
Sheffield as well as the prestige of Loughborough University in this field contributed
greatly to facilitate access. Linguistic factors were of minimal significance in Bilbao
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since the language employed was Spanish, but in the case of Sheffield, some problems
of understanding were acknowledged in light of the specific accent of this northern area.
At the interview setting, after introducing the concerns of the study, all interviewees
were informed of certain predetermined topics, but without fixed questions. Ethical
considerations were also introduced to all respondents who were assured that they
would not be identified in any published materials (anonymity), and the academic,
scientific nature of the research was emphasised in order to ensure frank and open
responses (reliability of information) (Denzin, 1970; Janesick, 1994). A tape recorder
was used to facilitate the process of interaction between interview and interviewee as
well as the process of analysis (Briggs, 1986; Radnor, 1994). A copy of the full
transcription of the tape was offered to each interviewee (though, all declined this
offer). As Bryman (1992) suggests with the aim of infusing an element of reciprocity, a
copy of the main findings of the study was also offered to all the participants. In some
instances, after the tape recorder was switched off, an informal conversation between
the interviewee and interviewer started to take place. In this case, some of the details of
these conversations were transcribed into a notebook immediately after finishing the
interview with the interviewee's permission. Furthermore, at the end of each interview,
the researcher asked the interviewee to nominate other potentially well informed
respondents. It was through this approach that new people were selected (purposive and
snowball sampling). The details of both case studies are subsequently presented.
3.6.3. Case study: Bilbao
Qualitative research demands that researchers must stay in the context studied over
time. In the case of Bilbao, interviews were carried out between December 1995 and
February 1996 with twenty-eight respondents being interviewed during the course of the
research. The interviews ranged in duration from one and half to three hours. A series of
in-depth, semi-structured interviews were undertaken with key personnel in
organisations implicated in the urban and sport policy process. The network of
respondents interviewed included Bilbao City Councillors, particularly those
responsible for the Department of Urban Planning, the Department of Youth, Women
and Sports and the Department of Culture; the politicians representatives of all political
parties on the Bilbao City Council; council officers, particularly those from the
Department of Youth, Women and Sports; Bizkaia County Council's officer with
responsibility for sport within the Department of Culture; representatives of business
groups involved; representatives of the Bilbao Chamber of Commerce; board members
of the two private-public associations for revitalisation (Metropoli 30 and Ria 2000); a
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representative from local trade unions; representatives from the voluntary sector;
representatives of the academic community; a journalist of one of the daily newspapers
in Bilbao; and urban planners. The interview sample is shown in figure 3.2. In addition
to interviews, documentary analysis of materials produced by the local authorities,
Metropoli 30 and Ria 2000, local press coverage, policy analysis by independent
academic commentators, and central government reports were undertaken seeking to
corroborate or add the information provided by the respondents.
Figure 3.2. Interview sample in Bilbao.
Subsequent to staying in Bilbao, the period (March to June) was used to transcribe all
the tapes (whole transcription) (language employed Spanish) which were then translated
into English.
3.6.4. Case study: Sheffield
Simultaneously with the transcription of the interviews in Bilbao, interviews were
carried out between May 1996 and September 1996 with twenty-four respondents
during the course of the research in Sheffield. The interviews ranged in duration (less
than in Bilbao). It was originally intended that a small number of follow up interviews
would be conducted, but limited resources available did not allow for them to be
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undertaken. The network of respondents interviewed included past and present Sheffield
City Councillors; politicians, representatives of political parties on the Sheffield City
Council; Sheffield Members of Parliament; council officers, representatives of Sheffield
International Venues Limited; a representative of Sheffield Development Corporation;
representatives of business groups involved; representatives of the Sheffield Chamber
of Commerce; board members of the two associations for revitalisation, City Liaison
Group (CLG) and Sheffield Sports Association (SSA); a representative from the
voluntary sector in the city and representatives of the academic community. The
interview sample in Sheffield is shown in figure 3.3.
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Figure 3.3. Interview sample in Sheffield.
3.7. Data Analysis
The volume of data generated from interviews in both cities was immense which
represents one of the main problems of any qualitative research (Briggs, 1986;
Eisenhardt, 1989; Patton, 1990; Radnor, 1994). In the case of Bilbao, the whole process
(transcribing, translating and interpreting) was extremely time-consuming considering
that the initial process of transcribing was complemented by the whole translation of
tapes from Spanish to English. In the case of Sheffield, all tapes were also fully
transcribed. In terms of analysis of the interview data, the challenge of any qualitative
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research is basically "to make sense of massive amounts of data, reduce the volume of
information, identify significant patterns, and construct a framework for communicating
what the data reveal" (Patton, 1990, pp. 371-2). The information was initially organised
around the key issues previously selected by the researcher such as the causes of urban
decline and the strategies for urban regeneration (both planned and emergent); the
process of construction of local urban coalitions; and the role of sport in the re-
construction plans of Bilbao and Sheffield. Some of these issues (e.g. the process of
construction of local urban coalitions) were suggested by the urban regime literature,
especially the work of Stone (1989) and Stoker and Mossberger (1994), or by interests
of the researcher (e.g. the causes of the urban decline). Attached to the interpretation of
data was a comparison with findings anticipated from the theory. Some unexpected
findings grew out of the responses, such as the important role of European funding in
the regeneration process of both cities. According to Miles and Hubermas (1994), data
reduction is considered as a form of analysis that sharpens, focuses and organises data
in such a way that final conclusions can be drawn and verified. The information
gathered from interviews was triangulated with documentary sources seeking to
corroborate this data. After the initial analysis of Bilbao's case, the familiarisation with
theory and data as a whole made the analysis of the Sheffield's case more
straightforward. The data reduction led to the subsequent process of interpretation
which "involves explaining the findings, answering 'why' questions, attaching
significance to particular results, and putting patterns into an analytic framework"
(Patton, 1990, p. 375). The following two chapters go on to outline the British and
Spanish urban planning and sports policies as a context for the empirical analysis of the
two case studies undertaken in chapters 6 and 7.
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URBAN PROGRAMMES AND SPORT IN BRITAIN
Urban Programmes and Sport in Britain 	 Chapter Four
4.1 Introduction
The analysis of post 1945 British urban programmes can perhaps be best understood by
reference to three distinct periods: i) the Post-war social democracy period from 1945 to the
mid 1960s with governments, favoured by a relative economic growth and political
consensus, assuming that the welfare state, urban decentralisation policies and regional
planning were sufficient to address problems of British cities; ii) from 1966 throughout the
1970s, while the social democratic consensus began to crumble, an explicit national urban
policy moved inner areas of most industrial cities, suffering from urban deprivation, to the
top of the political agenda; and finally iii) from 1979 to 1995 with the rise of a new right
ideology, when urban policy during the Conservative governments moved away from social
concerns of previous policies to a more entrepreneurial approach with a focus on a physical
property-led regeneration, partly driven by the experiences of urban regeneration processes
in the United States.
An overview of the evolution of sports policy in post-war Britain shows that sport and
recreation were not included as part of a commitment to the welfare system until the early
1960s, when they were assigned an important role in dealing with youth and urban
deprivation. Along with this aim, if during the 1970s and the 1980s, interests were also with
the expansion of public sector sports facilities development and with mass participation, the
1990s has seen a gradual movement from sport as a social tool towards sports excellence as
well as the promotion of sport prestige projects as part of the entrepreneurialist approach,
recently adopted in some British urban regeneration strategies.
4.2 The Post-war period of Social Democratic consensus (from 1945 to mid 1960s):
Urban Planning
As World War II ended, Britain faced serious economic and social problems, in particular, a
deep economic recession (e.g. an extensive public sector deficit of £443 m. in 1947) and
mass unemployment in conjunction with the fabric of major cities also extensively damaged
(Rydin, 1993). There was clearly a need to rebuild both the economy and the cities. At this
time, despite these problems which severely affected its plans for a state-led economy, the
incoming Labour government of Clement Attlee was committed to establishing a welfare
state and to guaranteeing full employment with the Conservatives also accepting these
developments (Atkinson and Moon, 1994; Parkinson, 1989; Rydin, 1993, Young and Lowe,
1974). The period was thus characterised as social democracy, representing a thirty-year
post-war consensus between both major parties.
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At this time, the elected Labour government had clearly to intervene in the economy, in
contrast to the previous non-interventionist state with private enterprises exercising control
over the British economic scene. In doing so, the private sector had induced the location
pattern of industry and of housing, mainly to the South East which had had a negative effect
on other areas of the country (Atkinson and Moon, 1994, Prestwich and Taylor, 1990;
Rydin, 1993, Young and Lowe, 1974). However, this situation changed after the Labour
government introduced extensive controls on the private sector. Following the
recommendations of the 1939 Barlow Report of decentralising industry along with
population, central government aimed to contribute to the convergence of regions within
the national economy as well as to control urban growth. In this way, public intervention in
industrial location decisions, together with a regional policy, encouraged locating new
industries in depressed areas such as the Northern region, Scotland and Wales, while
restricting industrial developments in the South East. One of the first regional planning
initiatives was the launching of Development Areas (DAs) incorporating the urban centres
that had previously been excluded by the designation of the 1936 Special Areas. This
change affected 6.5 million people compared with 4 million in the Special Areas (Prestwich
and Taylor, 1990). Government incentives aimed to diversify industries and population in
these DAs and to reduce unemployment. Thus, the location of new industrial growth,
therefore, was to be in a limited spatial framework, both nationally (within government-
designated DAs) and locally (within local authority-designated areas) (Prestwich and
Taylor, 1990, Rydin, 1993).
At the urban planning level, concerns related to housing were inherited from the period
before World War II. In particular, there was an extensive housing shortage, and a
significant proportion of the housing stock, predominantly in urban areas, was in poor
condition (Atkinson and Moon, 1994). As a result of the Barlow report, a new Ministry of
Town and Country Planning was created in 1943 which launched a national housing
programme to provide new living and working environments as well as for rehousing the
growing urban populations. This growth was originated not only internally, but also from
the arrival of immigrants from Britain's former Empire attracted by great expectations of
employment. Old dwellings were therefore demolished and the sites redeveloped with new
municipal houses on green-field areas, under the direct ownership and management of local
authorities (Atkinson and Moon, 1994, Rydin, 1993). These new houses together with the
New Towns, were encouraged primarily near the DAs in order to centralise both housing
and industrial development. According to Atkinson and Moon, in the early years, most of
these new houses were funded and managed by the public sector. Central government
designed the 1947 Town and Country Planning Act as the first comprehensive law to
impose compulsory planning control on all local authorities, in contrast to the previous
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period of laissez faire' legislation (Atkinson and Moon, 1994, Rydin, 1993; Thornley,
1993).
After that, all development, excluding agriculture, was obliged to obtain prior planning
permission from the local planning authority (Rydin, 1993). Central government was also
concerned with protecting rural areas from the rapid growth of suburbanisation of the 1940s
and 1950s, by establishing green belts around large towns and cities and additionally
dispersing the urban population and jobs. These initiatives were, in part, inspired by the
'Garden City' movement, which had been exercising considerable influence over the
development of town and country planning during this period. The 1947 Act introduced two
other policy changes. One affected the reorganisation of local government functions with
county councils and county (urban) boroughs as the local planning authorities rather than
the county districts. The other augmented the role of public landownership and land
taxation policies compared to the previous 1944 Town and Country Planning Act which
had enabled local authorities to purchase land obligatory for planning purposes (Rydin,
1993).
The New Towns programme, an integral part of decentralisation, was formally initiated
after the 1946 New Towns Act. From 1947 to 1950 fourteen new self-contained towns were
built, each intended to accommodate between 25,000 and 80,000 inhabitants or more, to
absorb the population from the largest cities such as London, Liverpool, Manchester,
Birmingham or Glasgow. The first phase of this programme, which included eight new
towns built around London, was publicly funded and managed, but its planning control was
subsequently diverted to central government agencies, New Town Development
Corporations, operating independently from local authorities, with considerable powers
(Atkinson and Moon, 1994, Prestwich and Taylor, 1990; Rydin, 1993; Thornley, 1993). As
such, these public agencies were in charge of building and renting houses and providing
land for industrial and commercial development. Complementing public action, the private
sector was then expected to create new jobs for the incoming population. Beyond that, the
1946 Act gave central government responsibility for the dissolution of the Development
Corporations as soon as the New Towns programme was finished. Thereafter, powers and
assets of the new towns would be transferred to local authorities. However, a change of
government to the Conservatives altered the philosophy of new towns. The 1951
administration introduced the concept of the expanded town, through the 1952 Town
Development Act, whereby population could be decanted from overcrowded large cities into
newly developed new towns beyond the economic influence of the large city. During the
1950s, and with the shift from new towns to expanded towns, only one new town
development was established, at Cumbernauld in Scotland in 1956. In 1959 after launching
another New Towns Act, powers were allocated to a Commission for New Towns. Thirteen
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new towns were subsequently built between 1961 and 1971, including Milton Keynes
(described as the Super New Town), with three of them in partnerships between the
development corporations and local authorities (Rydin, 1993).
The driving force behind most designations of new towns continued to be regional and
industrial development, prioritising areas with high unemployment. This was obvious from
the extensive volume of legislation designed to improve regional policy after a
Conservative government was re-elected in 1959, which included the 1960 Local
Employment Act, the 1966 Industrial Development Act, the 1967 Special Development Act
and the 1969 Intermediate Areas Act (Prestwich and Taylor, 1990; Rydin, 1993).
Nevertheless, different Conservative governments throughout the 1950s and 1960s started
to intervene less in economic, industrial and urban development. Control over land and
industrial development was relaxed in order to encourage greater private sector
involvement. So the compulsory planning controls set by the 1947 Town and Country
Planning Act were substituted initially by the 1959 Town and Country Planning Act and
later by the 1968 Town and Country Planning Act which both opened all development to
private developers (Rydin, 1993). In addition, the 1968 Act affected land use planning
authorities, separating structure and local plans under the control of different levels of local
authority (county, metropolitan and districts respectively). After all, central government had
decided to abandon the decentralisation policies inspired by the urban model of Howard and
the Barlow Report.
Meanwhile, the national economy continued to grow in the 1950s and 1960s. However, its
expected redistributive effects did not contribute to reducing traditional regional
differences, with unemployment still twice as high in the northern areas as in the Southeast
(Keeble, 1976; Prestwich and Taylor, 1990; Rydin, 1993, Young and Lowe, 1974). During
these two decades, while the New Towns programme had managed to attract extensive
population, created employment (mainly for skilled young people) and provided high
quality houses and residential environments, Britain's largest cities started gradually to
suffer out-migration associated with indices of severe deprivation such as poor housing
conditions, poverty and unemployment primarily from their inner core. This context thus
became known as the inner city crisis, with similar problems to those previously witnessed
in American cities (DoE, 1977; Atkinson and Moon, 1994; Begg et al., 1986; Lawless,
1988a). The demographic decline in the largest British cities was difficult to explain as a
result of either the New Towns programme or as a consequence of a broader process of
suburbanisation and counterurbanisation, also evident in American and Western European
cities (Atkinson and Moon, 1994; Begg et al., 1986). However, some of the inner city
problems were not new. In fact, prior to the World War II, the government encouraged
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suburbanisation with the hope that by doing this, inner city problems would diminish, but
without much success.
In general terms, the government aspired to tackle the scale of problems of this period
through the redevelopment of the city, the creation of New Towns, protection of the
countryside and fostering regional policy. This approach seemed to be a coherent strategy to
deal with the post-war British urban problems; however, it was not until the late 1960s
when the obvious extent of urban problems in inner urban areas became a major political
issue (Atkinson and Moon, 1994; Parkinson, 1989; Lawless, 1988a; Prestwich and Taylor,
1990, Rydin, 1993). By this time, the Labour government began to adopt a corporatist
approach to national economic planning, incorporating the private sector and trade unions
(Cawson, 1986; Bailey et al., 1995; Kavanagh, 1994). This agreement extended to the
urban level, where the central government was working in association with local
governments in addressing city problems. With the expansion of the welfare state, not only
urban issues but also an increased range of services were transferred to local government
with the central government financing those services. Voluntary organisations played an
important role in shaping urban politics, though they were never given an active leadership
role.
4.3 Sports Policy in the period of Social Democratic Consensus
By the outbreak of the World War II, government was actively involved in sport and
recreation. The Central Council of Physical Education (CCPR) was established in 1935, and
within a few years the 1944 Education Act made physical education a compulsory subject in
the national secondary school curriculum. At the same time, this Act enabled local
authorities to provide facilities for sport and physical education (Houlihan, 1991; Coghlan,
1990). Both sport and physical education were also instrumentalised as part of a brief pre-
war campaign to improve the fitness of population. However, during the immediate post-
war years, despite the increasing general interest in sport and leisure activities, sport was
not included in the agenda of the central government, since the already established
voluntary sector continued to set the pattern of British sport. Other areas such as housing,
health or education gained priority on the public agenda. Under such circumstances, it is not
surprising, as Gratton and Taylor (1991) note, that only two indoor swimming pools were
opened between 1946 and 1959. This scarcity of public sport facilities built represented a
stark contrast with the 250 pools built between 1915 and 1945 (Gratton and Taylor, 1991;
Coghlan, 1990).
By the early 1960s, central government had decided to include sport (and recreation) as a
relatively discrete policy area within the welfare system. A national sports policy started to
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gradually develop, clearly influenced by the 1960 Wolfenden Committee Report
commissioned by the CCPR because it saw Britain falling behind provision made
elsewhere (Coalter et al., 1988; Coghlan, 1990; Houlihan, 1991; Polley, 1998). This
influential report advocated a much greater state involvement in sport to be established by
setting up a National Sports Development Council to promote sport at all levels. In
addition, it also reflected the need to increase the number of sports facilities, most of which
dated from Victorian times. Furthermore, it drew attention to the failure of young people to
continue sports participation after leaving full-time education. To achieve these objectives,
government was expected to increase public funding. In reality, little action was taken until
the newly elected 1964 Labour government introduced the Advisory Sports Council the
following year as a forerunner to the establishment of an executive Sports Council with its
own budget in 1972, after which sport became a legitimate responsibility of goverment
(Coghlan, 1990; Gratton and Taylor, 1991; Houlihan, 1991; Polley, 1998, Roche, 1992). As
part of this commitment, a Minister was appointed with responsibility for sport, Mr. Denis
Howell, MP, who also was to be the Chairman of the advisory Sports Council for the same
period (1965-1970). Subsequently, as will be explained later, responsibility for sport was to
be located in a variety of different ministries (also called Departments) over the period of
this study. For instance, the Minister of Sport, initially accommodated within the
Department of Education and Science, was transferred to the Ministry of Housing and
Local Authorities because of its focus on planning and building municipal sports facilities
(Coghlan, 1990; Houlihan, 1991; Polley, 1998).
The Sports Council was initially an advisory rather than an executive body. As such, it
focused on advising government on all matters relating to the development of amateur sport
and recreation, and on fostering co-operation amongst statutory bodies and voluntary
organisations. One of its first actions was to develop the 'Sport for All' policy adopted by
the Council of Europe in 1966 (Roberts and Kamphorst, 1989). Concurrent with this
government aim, the Sports Council considered two other priorities: first, to encourage the
provision of new sports facilities and second, to provide public funds to aid the
administration and development of national sports governing bodies (sports federations)
(Coghlan, 1990; Polley, 1998). Some of the governing bodies of sport which had previously
received some financial assistance, anticipated expansion of this aid with the establishment
of the Sports Council (Coalter et al., 1988; Coghlan, 1990). Public expenditure on leisure in
general, and sport in particular, increased gradually throughout the 1960s and 1970s.
To augment the number of sports facilities, two key issues were considered necessary: first,
to increase the grant-in-aid budget for facilities at the Ministry of Education and Science,
and second, to encourage the already important role played by local authorities in building
them (Coghlan, 1990). The Local Government Acts of 1958 and 1966 gave local authorities
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more power over their own expenditure and borrowing. In particular, a general rate support
grant for local authorities was approved which allowed them to decide, amongst other
things, whether or not to build any sports facilities. In addition, Regional Sports Councils in
England and national councils in Wales and Scotland were also established partly to speed
up the construction of new facilities. However, due to the lack of any previous accurate
assessment of the total number of sports facilities in Britain and on needs, an initial pattern
of provision (what the Sports Council called 'basic community facilities') concentrated
mainly on indoor sports centres, swimming pools and golf courses. To regulate the building
of these facilities, the 1970 Sports Facilities and the Planning Act government circular
recommended local authorities to consult with the Regional Sports Councils. In addition,
some regional authorities focused on water-based facilities and general recreation areas
(Coghlan, 1990). Overall this development represented the major breakthrough in British
sports in the period of 1965-1980. In 1964, Britain had only four sports centres, while
sixteen years later there were more than 400 (Coghlan, 1990; Polley, 1998). From 1964 also
another initiative, the 'dual use' policy, was launched to make more intensive community
use of existing schools facilities in the evenings and at weekends, involving local and
education authorities. Therefore, with the considerable growth of new schools in the late
sixties and seventies, this policy represented a sensible economic approach to value for
money (Coghlan, 1990). Furthermore, but not without some resistance, another agreement
involving the Countryside Commission, water authorities, clubs and users, was also
extended to generate greater use of waterways, lakes and reservoirs for sport and recreation
purposes.
Partly explained by the actions of the new Sports Council, there was an acceleration in the
demand for sport nationally, increasing participation rates in sport which had been low until
the 1960s (Sports Council, 1983). However, female participation still lagged behind that of
men. Traditionally, women's sporting roles had been heavily influenced by norms
established during the nineteenth-century debates over medicine and anatomy. These norms
had limited women in a number of ways. First, women's practice was directed towards
certain sports deemed 'appropriately feminine' while seeking to play those considered more
masculine such as football or rugby found resistance and little interest from major British
sports governing bodies (Brackenbridge and Woodward, 1992; Hargreaves, 1994, Polley,
1998). These differential roles were also extended to physical education classes that
separated both sexes, and taught them different physical activities based on cultural models.
In this context, women's access to sport was limited in scale, but the need to increase
opportunities for women in sport gradually emerged as part of a wider debate on gender
relations (Polley, 1998).
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At the other end of the spectrum, it was also envisaged that governmental financial
assistance could improve Britain's international sporting performance. Britain's steady
decline at the international level (e.g. only one single gold medal was achieved at the 1952
Helsinki Olympics) was explained by the lack of state funding for elite sport and contrasted
with the early sporting successes of the systematic sports planning of East Germany and the
Soviet Union in the 1950s and early 1960s (University of Birmingham, 1956; Houlihan,
1991; Gratton and Taylor, 1991, Polley, 1998). National Recreation Centres, later named
National Sports Centres, (at Crystal Palace, Lilleshall Hall, Bisham Abbey and Cowes and
Plas-y-Brenin) were established by the CCPR in the period from 1946 to 1972 with
philanthropic donations to help in the preparation of elite athletes. However, despite some
demands for public funds, financial support from government for international
competitions, initiated in 1965, was on a limited scale. This attitude responded to the
traditional amateurism and voluntarism of British sport, which implied that national
governing bodies of sport and the British Olympic Association (BOA) should be able to
provide the majority of such funds themselves (Coghlan, 1990; Polley, 1998). Thus, from
the 1960s government was giving a 'gentle push' to an already established system of
provision, essentially a voluntary sector system. Furthermore, the main targets of the Sports
Council in its initial period both at international and national level ranged from increasing
participation to assisting elite sport at international level while, at the same time, public
funds were channelled to enlarge the number of sports facilities together with the
modernisation of governing bodies of sports.
4.4 Urban Policy in the 1970s: Social Democracy and Pluralism in crisis
The key features of the social democratic state started to break down in the 1970s. Post-war
economic growth was negatively affected by internal and external factors such as the
restructuring of the global economy, the breakdown of fixed exchange rates, an increase in
oil prices, the recommendations of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to reduce public
expenditure, and the Winter of industrial discontent of 1979 (Kavanagh, 1994; Gamble,
1988). Changes in the economy posed also serious problems for governments to maintain
two of the key goals of the previous period, low inflation and full employment, as well as
having negative consequences over an important sector of the economy, the manufacturing
industry, traditionally located in inner city areas. Ethnic minorities were more vulnerable to
these changes and the symptoms of urban deprivation became more accentuated in these
inner areas of the most significant industrial cities (Parkinson, 1989; Atkinson and Moon,
1994; Rydin, 1993; Wilson, 1987). Prior to this, it had been assumed that the welfare state,
urban decentralisation policies and the regional planning, were sufficient to address the
problems of British cities. At this time, the Labour government of Harold Wilson defined
urban deprivation in inner cities as one of its policy priorities. However, the city continued
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to be under the responsibility of the Home Office, rather than of the 1970 newly-created
government department charged with urban development, the Department of the
Environment (DoE).
The decade was characterised by a wide range of initiatives to overcome social problems in
inner cities. Initially, education schemes (e.g. Educational Priority Areas) were introduced,
following the recommendations of the 1967 Plowden Report of targeting educational
disadvantage of working-class children in areas of social need. At the same time, the
government began to launch modest urban and housing programmes. These early
programmes adopted a social pathology perspective, which argues that the causes of
poverty should be attributed to the 'pathological condition' of people and communities who
remain in poverty, understood as a cycle of deprivation (Atkinson and Moon, 1994;
Parkinson, 1989; Robson, 1988). Furthermore, an area based positive discrimination
approach was also launched after recognising that disadvantaged people tended to be
concentrated in certain areas of the city characterised by multiple deprivation (Atkinson and
Moon, 1994; Edwards and Batley, 1978; Parkinson, 1989). Consequently, the combination
of both the social pathology and area based approaches entailed a better targeting of policies
and resources on selected areas and groups in an attempt to tackle related problems.
However, these early urban initiatives adopting an area based approach were criticised on
the grounds of their limited expenditure, and a lack of recognition of the broader
disadvantages experienced by ethnic minorities. Furthermore, as Holterman (1975) pointed
out, the approach adopted was unable to identify or to help significant numbers of
disadvantaged people living outside the targeted areas.
In 1968, the Labour government, for the first time, intervened specifically in the inner cities
by launching the Urban Programme (UP) and the Community Development Programme
(CDP), following American models. Through the UP, local councils obtained substantial
resources (up to 75 percent) to finance social and community projects in urban areas of
special social needs (Hambleton, 1978; 1990; Atkinson and Moon, 1994; Edwards and
Batley, 1978; Parkinson, 1989; Robson, 1988). Additionally, between 1969 and 1972
twelve CDP projects were also launched by the Home Office, combining community
projects with an extensive programme of research. CDP teams were then set up in those
areas, with a research team located at a nearby university. Under this initiative, the teams
analysed the main causes of deprivation and sought to encourage people in these areas to
improve their situation while the research team provided data for the Home Office and the
local authority. Concurrent with the CDPs and with the Conservatives in power, two new
initiatives were finally launched by the Home Office in 1972; the Inner Area Studies (IASs)
and the Comprehensive Community Programmes (CCPs) which sought to co-ordinate
actions across a number of traditionally discrete policy areas, with social, and latterly,
79
Urban Programmes and Sport in Britain	 Chapter Four
economic analyses of urban problems in areas of extensive deprivation (Atkinson and
Moon, 1994; Rydin, 1993).
However, insufficient co-ordination among all these bodies was later recognised. The most
disadvantaged areas were not always identified, with central departments and local
authorities choosing areas and projects with little real justification (Lawless 1979, 1988a;
Atkinson and Moon, 1994; Parkinson, 1989; Robson, 1988). Many of the CDPs attributed
the decline of inner cities to the late adaptation of British industrial sectors to Fordist norms
of production, thereafter encouraging residents in these areas to oppose some activities of
the central government and to claim more resources for local authorities (Atkinson and
Moon, 1994; Rydin, 1993; Bailey et al., 1995). Not surprisingly, in 1976 the Home Office
decided to curb this programme because of its unpopularity with central government and
local authorities. Urban problems during this period continued and in a sense were
legitimised by the ineffectiveness of urban initiatives and the limited resources allocated
(around £30 million per year) (Atkinson and Moon, 1994; Lawless, 1979, 1988a;
Parkinson, 1989; Robson, 1988).
At the beginning of the 1970s, Britain was facing a period of severe economic difficulty.
The incoming 1970 Conservative government of Edward Heath failed to counter this
situation by using traditional Keynesian instruments; a failure reflected in rising
unemployment and inflation levels. The defeat of the Heath government in 1974,
accelerated by an oil price increase and the second miners' strike of the decade, gave way to
the 1974-1979 Labour government which inherited high rates of unemployment (over one
million) and of inflation (25 percent). During this period, Britain was obliged, following the
recommendations of IMF in 1976, to cut back its public spending in order to control
inflation, with a subsequent reduction in local government funding.
Changes also affected urban policy. The New Towns programme was suppressed in 1976
and powers and assets of the New Towns Commission were finally transferred to local
authorities (Rydin, 1993). The previous emphasis on regional and industrial development
linked to the decentralisation of urban population to new towns was undermined by the
extent of inner city problems, which, thereafter, started to take greater priority. In this way,
the social concern of previous urban programmes was abandoned for a new emphasis on the
need to create economic growth as a means of reducing deprivation. As part of its
commitment to cities, the Labour government expanded public resources for urban
programmes (from £30 m. to £125 m. per year) with responsibility for them finally
transferred to the DoE in 1977 (Bailey et al., 1995; Parkinson, 1989; Rydin, 1993). One of
its first initiatives, the 1977 White Paper Policy for the Inner Cities (DoE, 1977a) marked a
new era of continuing inner city policy. With different criteria in the selection of urban
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areas, for the first time, inner city partnerships were created in cities with extensive
problems such as Liverpool, Birmingham, Manchester-Salford, Newcastle-Gateshead and
three London boroughs, Hackney, Islington and Lambeth. Despite the fact that the White
Paper encouraged the private sector to participate in these partnerships, the process of
disinvestment by the private sector in inner cities was an evident factor exacerbating urban
problems (Parkinson, 1989; Hutton, 1995). Central government and local authorities finally
integrated these partnerships with substantial funds and powers allocated to local authorities
which were considered the natural agency to tackle inner city problems (DoE, 1977b). At
the same time, housing policy continued a commitment to rehabilitation. In particular, the
Housing Acts of 1969, 1971 and 1974 increased the financial support for housing
improvement in areas of high unemployment (Rydin, 1993). However, the status of local
government was going to change after Labour's inability to confront growing
unemployment (it had reached 1,390,500 by 1979) and inflation. The long-term structural
decline of the British economy linked to the globalisation of the economy produced the
context for a new Conservative government headed by Mrs. Thatcher in 1979.
From 1979, Britain was at the forefront of the belief that neo-conservative policies are the
solution to economic and social problems (Bacon and Eltis, 1978; Kavanagh, 1990, 1994;
Gamble, 1988; Hutton, 1995; Parkinson, 1989). The Conservative political philosophy
challenged the prevailing social and economic assumptions of the social democratic period
and instead advocated as part of its alternative agenda, minimal state involvement in the
economy, competitive individualism, a free market and urban entrepreneurialism (see
chapter 2). Gamble (1988, p.28) summarised this doctrine by the phrase "the free economy
and the strong state". In this way, paradoxically, an increased centralisation of decision-
making as well as the diminution of the traditional role of local government coincided with
a privatisation of urban policy (Barnekov et al., 1989; Edwards and Deakin, 1992;
Parkinson, 1989; Thornley, 1993). The Local Government Act of 1972 had established a
new two-tier system of local government in England and Wales. Some of the city councils'
functions were taken over with the creation of thirty-nine non-metropolitan and six
metropolitan county authorities. However, it was really after 1979 that local urban politics
experienced radical change (Lawless, 1988b; Parkinson, 1989; Seyd, 1990). City councils
became one of the main targets of the recent Conservative governments. Traditionally,
central government had a wide range of powers and exerted control over local governments,
but left implementation to local authorities which had enjoyed considerable independence
and financial autonomy. With the Conservative governments, the role of local government
shifted gradually from that of provider to that of enabler, a role closer to its American
counterpart (Hambleton, 1990; Cochrane, 1985, 1991; Harding, 1995; Parkinson, 1989;
Osborne and Gaebler, 1992; Wolman and Goldsmith, 1992). Central government sought,
through its approach to local government and various urban policy initiatives, to restructure
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and subsequently to weaken the role of local government, at the time that it increased its
own powers of financial control (Loughlin, 1985; Jones, 1988; Parkinson, 1989).
A wide range of financial and legal initiatives was introduced to undermine the capacity of
local authorities, primarily those which were Labour controlled (Newton and Karran, 1985).
These included rate capping (1984 Rates Act), reductions in grants to overspending local
authorities, introduction of Compulsory Competitive Tendering (CCT), the privatisation of
many council houses, and new grants systems with targets, clawbacks and other penalties
(Page and Goldsmith, 1987; Goldsmith, 1992, Gamble, 1988; Parkinson, 1989; Stoker,
1988; Stoker and Young, 1993; Hutton, 1995). With reference to this change in the central-
local relations, Blunkett and Jackson (1987) argued that the most important reason for
challenging local authorities related to the control of local goverment expenditure.
Limiting public spending was part of a larger aim of hollowing out the state-system
(Rhodes, 1994). Nevertheless, expenditure cuts in general and cuts in local spending in
particular, had started during the Labour government's period of office after the IMF's
recommendations, with many local authorities considered as overspenders (Blunkett and
Jackson, 1987; Page and Goldsmith, 1987; Hambleton, 1990; Parkinson, 1989).
At the urban planning level, the nature of inner city partnerships already introduced by
Labour were abandoned and central goverment started to divert responsibility for urban
regeneration to a plethora of agencies and Departments resulting in a loss of influence of
the DoE and a reduction in local government autonomy. Simultaneously, the launching of
the 1980 Local Government and Planning Land Act and the 1988 Action for Cities
document marked the key principles of the Thatcherite urban policy with a new response to
inner city problems, an urban entrepreneurialism led by the private sector. Powers and local
leadership have been challenged by a number of inner city initiatives launched in the 1980s
and the early 1990s such as the UDCs, Training and Enterprise Councils, Enterprise Zones,
Local Enterprise Companies in Scotland, City Technology Colleges, City Action Teams or
Inner City Task Forces, which all introduced market regulations to urban policy.
4.5. Sport in the Post Social Democratic Era
In the run-up to the 1970 General Election, an intense debate was held about the role and
status of the Sports Council between some who wanted to keep its advisory role and others
who advocated a new executive role. With the unexpected victory of the Conservatives, the
most important change had been the transformation of the Sports Council to an independent
body with executive powers in 1972, but funded by government (Coghlan, 1990; Henry,
1993; Polley, 1998). In this context, the new Sports Council, which also assimilated most of
the CCPR's staff and assets (including the existing National Sports Centres), added to all its
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previous advisory functions, grant-aid to sporting organisations, activities and projects,
assistance to British representative teams competing at international level and the handling
of links with international sporting bodies, the provision and management of the National
Sports Centres and the forging of closer sporting links with and among local authorities, the
armed services, private enterprise and large spectator sports (Coghlan, 1990).
Under this new structure of sport in Britain, the CCPR started to develop its functions as
the body representing national governing bodies of sport advising the Sports Council. Some
tensions between the Sports Council and the CCPR have become notorious over the years
(Coghlan, 1990). Decentralisation manifested itself with the setting up of new Scottish and
Welsh Sports Councils, whereas the establishment of the Northern Ireland Sports Council
was postponed until 1974. Eldon Griffiths (1970-74) succeeded Denis Howell.
Responsibility for sport was moved from the Ministry of Housing and Local Government to
the DoE in 1970 where it remained under successive Conservative and Labour governments
until 1990. Then after ten years back in the Education Ministry it was finally located in the
newly established Department of National Heritage (DNH), later re-named the Department
of Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS). After 1976, the transformation of Regional Sports
Councils to Regional Councils for Sport and Recreation led them to include as part of their
responsibilities all other forms of outdoor recreation. In 1995 believing these hybrid bodies
of elected politicians, professionals and volunteers to be too big to be effective, Ian Sproat,
then Tory Minister of Sport abandoned them for small advisory sports forums.
Responsibility for sport in the United Kingdom was (and is) shared across many different
bodies (Houlihan, 1996). In this way, different Departments such as the DoE or the DCMS,
which have incorporated the Minister of Sport, have had a key role in shaping sports policy,
though they enjoy few executive responsibilities. Other government agencies relevant to
sport, located in the DoE, include the Countryside Commission and the Nature
Conservancy Council with responsibility for sports and recreation facilities. Further
national non-governmental bodies concerned with sport include the British Association of
National Coaches, the British Sports Association for the Disabled, the National Council for
School Sports, the Physical Education Association and the British Olympic Association.
Different Ministries and Departments together with public bodies at local level help to
complete the wide range of bodies with responsibilities for sport in the UK.
Shortly after the establishment of the Sports Council, the Labour government in a White
Paper identified sport and recreation as 'one of the community's everyday needs', was to
mean that meeting those needs would be problematic due to the increasing economic
problems that Britain was facing by the early 1970s (DoE, 1975). If the Wolfenden Report
contributed extensively to the development of sport in the 1960s, another report from a
Select Committee guided the philosophy of the Labour government 1975 White Paper,
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Sport and Recreation. This document aspired to be a comprehensive philosophy of sport as
well as recreation. In terms of funding, the initial Sports Council's budget was limited (only
£3.6 million), from which support for elite sport accounted for just below one fifth. Despite
this small budget, additional sports centres covering a wide range of sports were opened.
The rest of the Sports Council's income was distributed between an extensive range of
governing bodies and the local authorities to promote new sports facilities and related
projects (Coghlan, 1990). The Sports Council's budget moderately increased from its initial
amount of £3.6 m. in 1973 to £15.6 m. in 1980, whereas economic support to governing
bodies and other national sports organisations had been rising considerably from 1972
(£6.07 m) to 1989 (£9.3 m) (Sports Council Annual Reports cited in Coghlan, 1990, p. 172;
Henry, 1993). There was a proposal to launch a National Lottery in 1975 from which the
sport's budget could have benefited. However, in contrast to other Western European
countries (e.g. Spain) where national lotteries and football pools supplemented central and
local goverment' resources, this initiative was postponed when the Conservatives came to
power in 1979. It was only during the Conservative government of John Major that the
National Lottery was finally established. In the meantime, the Sports Aid Foundation
(SAP), following the German model, was launched to raise funds to support the preparation
of elite athletes. This national government agency managed to raise over £2 million
between 1975 and 1984 (Coghlan, 1990). Complementing this fund, national governing
bodies use of sport funds to develop excellence had risen from £2.4 million in 1978 to £3.7
million in 1983, but by then the policy, under government pressure, was to hold to this level
of support.
Parallel to the establishment of the Sports Council and with the expansion of public sector
leisure provision, a 'Sport for All' campaign was launched in 1972 to enhance participation
in sport and recreation at all levels. The nature of government sporting objectives, reflected
in a range of White Papers and government public actions (DoE, 1975, 1977a and 1977b),
not only envisaged sport and recreation as a right, but also placed strong emphasis on the
development of 'sport in the community', as a means of reducing anti-social behaviour, in
particular, on the part of young people (Coalter et al, 1988; Glyptis, 1989; Gratton and
Taylor, 1991, Henry, 1993; Houlihan, 1991, Polley, 1998). With reference to the expected
contribution of sport and leisure to address problems of urban deprivation, different Labour
and Conservative governments of the 1970s and early 1980s showed a willingness to
provide additional funds for sports schemes through the Urban Programme to the Sports
Council, though, in turn, both Labour and Conservative governments sought to reduce local
government spending (Henry, 1993; Glyptis, 1989). In 1975 the Sports Council launched its
first initiative into what were called areas of special needs, mainly in inner cities (notably
two years before there were urban riots across UK cities). Thereafter government, in
collaboration with the Sports Council and local authorities, continued to divert funds to
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inner city areas through a variety of schemes such as Areas of Special Needs, Urban
Deprivation Grants, Football in the Community in the 1970s, and Action Sport in the 1980s
(Glyptis, 1989; Glyptis and Pack, 1989; Gratton and Taylor, 1991; Henry, 1993). The latter
programme, for example, used sports leaders to interact with young unemployed people and
try to interest them in sporting activities.
The 1970s and the 1980s were also characterised by a continued investment in sports and
leisure facilities at local and regional levels in contrast to the national level (Gratton and
Taylor, 1991; Coghlan, 1990, Houlihan, 1991; Polley, 1998). In 1971, for instance, there
were only 500 local authority swimming pools and twenty sports halls nationally, whereas
between 1971 and 1989, 700 new swimming pools and 1,000 new sports centres were
constructed (Houlihan, 1991; Polley, 1998). By providing locally, participation was
expected to rise in response. At the same time, the reorganisation of local government in
1974 brought with it the significant expansion, as part of the logical expansion of the
welfare state, of newly established Leisure and Recreation Departments in local councils. In
addition to the substantial increase on sport and recreation of local authorities expenditure
in the period 1973-80 (see Table 4.1), the establishment of the local Leisure and Recreation
Departments provided an important advance in the planning and management of both sports
infrastructure and participation.
Financial year £ in Expenditure Percentage Increase
1973 191 ----
1974 252 31.9
1975 336 39.7
1976 365 9.4
1977 376 2.9
1978 409 16.7
1979 546 22.7
1980 682 27.3
Table 4.1. Local authority expenditure on sport and recreation (1973-80)
Source: Sports Council (1983) The financing of Sport in the UK, Information Series,
n. 8, London, Sports Council, in Coghlan (1990)
Some changes affecting women's sport have occurred in parallel with some continuities
from the mid 1960s. The idea of separate sports developments for men and women had
been gradually challenged by the increasing access of women to sports once were
considered more masculine, for instance, rugby and football. This has been reflected with
the establishment of women sports associations such as the Women's Football Association
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(WFA) in 1969 or the Women's Amateur Rugby League Association in 1983. Concurrent
with this trend, the Women's Sports Foundation (WSF) was established as an umbrella
organisation to promote women in sport (Polley, 1998). Nevertheless, the 'traditional'
female sports are still promoted strongly. This debate forms part of a broader campaign
about equality of access and opportunity between men and women in all spheres.
Legislation such as the Sex Discrimination Act of 1975 recognised equal rights, though
some developments in sport predated this law. Some commentators argued that equality of
opportunity has not been achieved and that not all women have had equal access to sport
(Polley, 1998; Houlihan, 1991). At the same, some advances have been made.
The establishment of the Sports Council in 1972, the appointment by successive
governments of a Minister for Sport and the launching of an important range of policy
statements and government public actions served to highlight the growing interest of
government in sport not only as a right but also as a means of social control. This idea was
also reflected, though more slowly, in the increase of public funds at the national but
predominantly at local level to enhance sport and recreation facilities and community
recreation with special emphasis on the participation of local deprived city communities.
However, according to Hillman and Whalley (1977), the real benefactors of the extensive
UK facility provision of the 1970s were not, in reality, the targeted groups of inner areas
where many of these facilities were located but middle class users from outside the areas.
4.6. Urban programmes in the 1980s and 1990s under Conservative governments
In these two decades, under four consecutive Conservative governments, the creation of
economic growth in inner city areas has gradually been at the top of British urban policies
and programmes (Barnekov et al., 1989; Parkinson, 1989; Hambleton, 1990; Hutton, 1995;
Bailey et al., 1995; Tye and Williams, 1994). In this way, the promotion of economic
development has taken greater priority over social regeneration. Partly driven by the
experience of the urban regeneration process of some US cities like Boston, Baltimore or
Pittsburgh, urban entrepreneurialism has also in some respects supplanted traditional local
politics. The British government was attracted by the model of the 'entrepreneurial'
American city, which, as one response to economic decline, started to develop new
political arrangements in the form of public-private partnerships. In the British context, the
kind of partnership established previously by the Labour government was therefore
reinterpreted as a partnership between the private sector and central government, after
questioning the legitimacy and efficiency of its traditional partner in urban regeneration,
local government (Atkinson and Moon, 1994; Bailey et al., 1995; Harding, 1991;
Parkinson, 1989). Most of these key features of urban policy during the Conservative
governments of the 1980s were similar to those adopted earlier by US governments
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(Hambleton, 1990). However, there was one main difference between American and
British urban policies in this period. While the American conservative policy intended to
decentralise federal power to the states and cities, the British government did the opposite.
It increased centralisation of power by undermining the fund raising capacity of city
councils especially through legal and financial restrictions. In this respect, the delivery of
many of the new urban initiatives of the 1980s and the early 1990s attempted to by-pass
local authorities, reducing their powers and led to greater intervention by central
government in local economic development strategies (Stoker, 1988; Stoker and Young,
1993; Parkinson, 1989; Parkinson and LeGales, 1995, 1997).
Parkinson went further to assert that these radical changes in policy, particularly under Mrs.
Thatcher, were not economically determined, but were mainly politically driven. In
response to Mrs. Thatcher's policies, during the early 1980s an increasing number of larger
Labour-controlled local governments started to intervene more in local economies
development strategies in order to attract investment and employment as well as to
challenge the primacy of the private sector in urban regeneration (Blunkett and Jackson,
1987; Gyford, 1985; Parkinson, 1989). This growth in local economic strategies was
strongly associated with the rise within the Labour party of a New Urban Left perspective.
Labour councils like Birmingham, Glasgow, Sheffield, Leeds and Manchester, dissatisfied
with both the failures of the earlier 1970s Labour central governments to pursue socialism,
and opposed to the Conservatives' market-led ideas, adopted interventionist economic
programmes. The emphasis of these initiatives was on practical actions such as setting up
their own industry and employment departments, developing co-operatives and community
enterprises, and supporting firms in crisis. Other strategies were also adopted such as
increases in local taxes, reduction of capital expenditure, particularly in housing and
industry and devising mechanisms to avoid spending controls (Blunkett and Jackson, 1987;
Newton and Karran, 1985; Parkinson, 1989). Nevertheless, housing was another area
exposed to market regulation and as such, the 1981 Housing Act forced local authorities to
sell council houses below market value to tenants who wished to exercise their right to buy.
In this process, over one million council houses were sold in the period 1979-86
(Hambleton, 1990). By reducing the public housing stock (e.g. from 6.5 million units in
1981 to under 5 million) and increasing private ownership, the Conservative government
expected to reduce public expenditure on housing investment (from 8 per cent (1978-79) to
3.8 per cent (1990-91)), encourage home ownership, benefit its own political constituency
and limit local authorities' capacity to use the proceeds of council house sales to build new
houses (Hutton, 1995; Kavanagh, 1990). In this context, housing associations, which began
as non-profit-making voluntary organisations, have been forced to become the main
providers of social housing.
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The country was suffering a deep urban social crisis, identifiable by the occurrence of riots
in more than 20 English cities throughout the 1980s. Explanations for this phenomenon
were diverse, including growing unemployment, the decline of local authority expenditure,
resentment of the climate of racism and the role of the police (Bailey et al., 1995; Blunkett
and Jackson, 1987). In particular, unemployment rose from 4 per cent (1,390,500) in 1979
to over 11 per cent (3,297,000) in 1986 (Glyptis, 1989). Under those circumstances, central
government expenditure on inner cities continued gradually to increase throughout the
1980s and 1990s (see Table 4.2), but cities have overall lost more resources as a result of
reductions in central goverment grants than they have gained in urban resources (DoE,
1994; Tye and Williams, 1994; Bailey et al., 1995). However, urban priorities had changed
to a greater expenditure on economic rather than on social projects, as Table 4.3 emphasises
(DoE, 1986, 1994; Parkinson, 1989; Robson, 1988). After the mid-1980s, despite the
continuity of some of the previous urban programmes, the introduction of new urban
initiatives clearly responded to a more entrepreneurialist approach to urban regeneration
with a focus on physical transformation and a property led approach. In many cities,
regeneration strategies have focused on investment and business promotion, employment
training and education, clearing derelict land and environmental and housing improvement.
In particular, the most significant initiative of the Thatcherite urban policy, the Urban
Development Corporations (UDC), could exemplify the British government's philosophy of
physical property-led regeneration, often by the use of prestige flagship redevelopment
projects:
UDCs are the most important example of the current government's philosophy,
presenting its distinctive view about urban regeneration, the way it should be
organised and financed and the results it should achieve. The model assumes
regeneration should be physically led by a single-purpose agency, free from the
restraints of local democracy, which should establish at minimal public cost the
conditions for private investment, which will generate wealth that will eventually
flow back into the community (Parkinson, 1988, p. 10).
Under the 1980 Local Government and Planning Land Act, UDCs were given extensive
planning powers and increasing amounts of government resources to regenerate specific
areas of cities as Table 4.2 highlights. The first two were established in 1981 in London
Docklands and Liverpool (Merseyside), being later extended in 1987 to eight English cities,
and with four 'mini-UDCs' being created the following year (including Sheffield UDC in
the Lower Don Valley). The last generation of UDCs was created between 1992 and 1993.
With UDCs being made planning authorities as well as responsible for regenerating inner
cities, local authorities lost their traditional planning powers over part of their jurisdiction.
Not only the UDCs but also most of the new urban initiatives were included in a central
government's document Action for Cities published in 1988. This document marked a new
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'1987-88	 1988-89 1989-90 1990-91 1991-92 1992-93 1993-94 1994-95 1995-96 	 I1986-87
Urban
237 246 224 223 226 237 243 176 91 80
Programme
64 214 214 214
City
Challenge
City Grants 24 27 28 39 45 41 60 71 71 83
Derelict 78 76 68 54 62 77 95 93 93 93
Land
URA — — — 2 2 2
Mrs and DI 12 I:3 255 477 607 602 514 33- 293 293
Task Forces 23 20 21 20 23 18 16 15
Manchester Olympics 1 13 35
City Action 4 8 8 4 3 1 1
Teams
CT extra receipts  -2
Other 14 8 3 8 1
Inner Cities Total
442 490 598 815 964 980 1014 952 813 800
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era of inner city policy with the introduction of entrepreneurialism as the instrument for the
economic regeneration of inner cities (DoE, 1988b; Edwards and Deakin, 1992; Parkinson,
1989; Parkinson and LeGales, 1995, 1997). The use of public resources (e.g. Urban
Development Grants, Derelict Land Grants, City Grants, etc.) and fiscal incentives (e.g.
Enterprise Zones) was promoted to attract private investment. In this process, central
government was initially giving local authorities incentives to collaborate with the private
sector in regeneration projects. However, from 1988 central government, dissatisfied with
the level of collaboration of local authorities, decided to exclude them and to fund the
private sector directly. A new system was thus launched, City Grants, integrating previous
programmes such as Urban Development Grants, Urban Regeneration Grants and Derelict
Land Grants (DoE, 1988b).
Table 4.2 Central government expenditure in inner cities (1986-87 to 1995-96).
Source: DoE Annual Report (1992), in Tye and Williams (1994, p. 11) and DoE Annual Report
(1993), in Bailey et al. (1995, p. 50).
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Category of Expenditure 1981-82 1982-83 1983-84 1984-85 1985-86 1986-87 1988-89
Economic 32 38 36 36 32 42 55
Environmental 27 29 25 21 26 25 20
Social 41 33 39 43 42 34 25
Table 4.3 Changes in expenditure on economic, environmental, and social projects
(1981-82 to 1988-89)
Source: Parkinson (1989, p. 431)
At the local level, the introduction of new urban programmes in the 1980s obliged some
Councils to de-emphasise some of their social priorities and to be more responsive to the
business community. Some of these local authorities began to reduce their spending, but
other Labour councils resisted and began to campaign. Sheffield City Council, for instance,
increased its property rates by 41 percent in 1980 and 37 percent in 1981, and was still
supported at the polls (Blunkett and Jackson, 1987; Gyford, 1985; Parkinson, 1989). By the
1981 elections, Labour controlled all metropolitan counties and some of the traditionally
Conservative counties as well. Because of this, the central government started to audit local
authorities more extensively together with the launching of the Local Government Finance
Bill to abolish local authorities' power to levy a supplementary rate, and introduced new
measures to penalise overspending councils (Newton and Karran, 1985). Despite some of
these unpopular measures, the Conservatives remained in power with a massive
parliamentary majority after the 1983 elections. As the 1980s progressed, considerable
financial pressure on city councils' budgets continued, for instance, the Rates Act 1984
imposed a limit on both local authorities' spending and on the amount of rates to be levied
(Newton and Karran, 1985; Page and Goldsmith, 1987). This 'rate capping' deprived local
councils of their historical tax raising and spending powers, which had traditionally
depended on three main sources of income: property rates, charges for rents and services,
and government grants (Newton and Karran, 1985). Central government abolished local
rates and instead, it imposed the community charge or 'poll tax' in 1990.
The 1987 general election confirmed Mrs. Thatcher in power with a majority. By this time,
it really looked as if the application of neoliberal policies had begun to transform the British
economy, with some signs of a national economic recovery (e.g. the control of inflation).
However, the impact of this economic growth on different groups as well as regions had
been uneven. Despite the deregulation of the labour market and the weakening of unions
and workers' rights, unemployment was still very high (in January 1987 was 3,297,000
which represented 11.9 per cent of the workforce), particularly for the young and the less
skilled black population in the most deprived urban communities, as the 1992 Policy
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Studies Institute (PSI) report suggested (cited in Stoker and Young, 1993; DoE, 1988a).
Between 1981 and 1984, 700,000 new jobs were created by the rise of the service sector,
but they, in part, complemented (though not compensated for) the decline of manufacturing
industry. Virtually all the new jobs were part-time and most of them have gone to women.
As part of the increasing polarisation between the North and the South, 18 of the 20 fastest
growing towns in employment terms between 1971 and 1981 were in the south (Hambleton,
1990). Moreover, Britain's largest cities continued their loss of population as the 1991
census confirmed. This combination of loss of population and urban decline entailed severe
social and economic problems (Robson, 1988). The effect of urban policies under the first
decade of the Conservatives with Mrs. Thatcher in power was analysed by the government
(see DoE, 1994) in over 120 British cities. After comparing the evolution of 57 urban areas
defined as in greatest need with that of other less deprived areas, the following issues
emerged. The money spent by government in all its programmes affecting cities was very
limited (£4 billion) compared to the total government budget (£200 billion). In addition, the
conditions of the 57 urban areas improved substantially, particularly in reducing
unemployment, attracting young residents and increasing demands for private housing,
compared with those not receiving financial support. However, economic distress continued
in the seven biggest cities of the study regardless of financial expenditure. Furthermore, the
major sources of funding for cities were still the rate support grant and the housing
investment programmes rather than the special urban funds. Finally, it was also noted that
there was insufficient co-ordination among the plethora of agencies and departments
involved in urban regeneration. Above all, as a number of commentators suggested the
growth of social polarisation emerged as one of the outcomes of the Thatcherite urban
policies (DoE, 1994; Hambleton, 1990; Lawless, 1988b; Parkinson, 1989; Stoker and
Young, 1993; Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 1995).
At the local level, some of those local authorities, which had previously adopted new Urban
Left policies, realised that their local economic development policies could only have a
minor effect on the regeneration of their local economies. In addition, despite the fact that
Metropolitan County Councils had previously assumed a leading role in economic policies
with a continuing centralisation of power, the 1985 Local Government Act abolished the six
Metropolitan County Councils and also the Greater London Council (GLC) and some of
their competences were transferred to the district councils, London boroughs and joint
authorities In essence, with the limited impact of the local economic development policies
on the local economies and, as regime theory advocates, the limited capacity of some of the
British city councils to affect significant policy changes, some of these local authorities
adopted a new realism, that is a new strategy of collaboration with local capital with the
development of partnerships with business groups, sharing some common trends with
American cities (Bailey eta!., 1995; Hambleton, 1990; Parkinson, 1989; Seyd, 1990; 1993;
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Lawless, 1989; Stoker and Young, 1993). However, the kind of partnerships which have
emerged in Britain seem to be substantially different to the ones addressed by Stone (1989)
and other authors (DiGaetano, 1989; Elkin, 1985; Turner, 1992) in the United States. In
particular, during the Thatcherite urban policy period the contribution and commitment
expected from the private sector in some British cities to urban regeneration, according to
Parkinson and LeGales (1995), have been more symbolic than effective, with the public
sector taking the lead in this process (see Bailey et al., 1995; Lawless, 1988b; Stoker and
Young 1993; Hambleton, 1990). By contrast, local authorities and local communities had
not been given a sufficiently wide role in regeneration processes during the same period
(Stoker and Young, 1993; Hambleton, 1990; Clarke and Stewart, 1992).
A new Conservative government lead by John Major emerged after the resignation of Mrs.
Thatcher on November 1990. One aspect of urban policy, the introduction of the
community charge contributed significantly to her downfall. The new Prime Minister's
political agenda was incremental, particularly his concern for greater social cohesion, with
only small changes to Mrs. Thatcher's policies (Kavanagh, 1990; 1994). There was
continuity in the various processes of privatisation already initiated and in the approach to
urban regeneration based on a physical property-led regeneration. The controversial
community charge was abandoned for a more proportional council tax. After his small
parliamentary majority in 1992 election, the capacity of Major's government was clearly
limited along with Maastricht and Europe becoming dominant in setting national economic
policy (a relevant and also polemic issue within his own political party) and by inherited
economic problems (Kavanagh, 1990, 1994). Britain's macroeconomic policy, as in many
other European countries whatever their political philosophy, has been largely determined
by the growing importance of EU institutions. Internally, the budget deficit continued to
grow (6 per cent of GDP in the 1993-94 financial year) and tax increases were introduced to
counterbalance this situation. Public spending was extensively cut, involving a further 17
per cent drop in public investment that was already the lowest as a proportion of GDP since
the Second World War (Hutton, 1995), and one of the lowest in Europe.
At the urban level, the central government recognised the incapacity of the private sector
alone as well as of the associated trickle-down effect to solve inner city problems
(Hambleton, 1990; Stoker and Young, 1993). Expenditure in inner cities from some of the
previous urban programmes was diverted to a new urban initiative, the City Challenge
Grant. Launched in 1991, the City Challenge Grant programme sought to overcome the
criticisms of the urban programmes of the previous decade by adopting a more holistic
approach to urban regeneration. From this new programme, based on a process of bidding,
31 local councils were chosen to each spend £75 m. per annum in urban regeneration over a
period of five years. In this way, central government continued to encourage great inter-city
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competition to attract governmental resources. Significantly, this programme has
encouraged a partnership approach, integrating local authorities, local capital and
community groups, in order to attract central government funding. One of the positive
aspects of this initiative was the attempt to improve the previously tense relationships
between central and local government by giving a greater role to local authorities in
economic development initiatives (Bailey et al., 1995; Parkinson and LeGales, 1995; Tye
and Williams, 1994). With John Major in power, local authorities and local communities
were then empowered as different authors had previously argued they should be (Stoker and
Young, 1993; Hambleton, 1990; Clarke and Stewart, 1992). Not only were local and central
government relations expected to change, but also social issues of urban areas were given
higher priority. This holistic approach to urban regeneration was also reflected in the last-
UDCs to be created, in Birmingham (1992) and in Plymouth (1993).
Following the City Challenge model, a new programme, the Single Regeneration Budget
(SRB) was also launched in 1993 as a way of integrating 23 separate funding regimes to
fund urban projects over a seven years period. The following year, another initiative,
English Partnerships, was set up to promote the reclamation and development of derelict,
vacant and under-use land and buildings in urban areas. This agency also incorporated some
of the previous urban programmes, including UDCs, Derelict Land Grant and City Grant
and English Estates and intended to act as an enabling body, a single point of contact for
private investors and local authorities (DoE, 1994; Bailey et al, 1995; Tye and Williams,
1994). Its responsibilities included assisting the private sector in developing land, and
working not only with local councils in identifying and reclaiming sites, but also with the
management of other inner city programmes and agencies. These new urban initiatives
aimed to reduce the wide range of agencies and bodies involved during the Thatcherite
urban policy and offered some potential for a reversal of centralist trends with local
authorities recovering their role in local economic development strategies. In addition,
urban regeneration seems to adopt a more holistic approach with enhanced opportunity for
the introduction of social issues.
4.7. Sports Policy in the 1980s and 1990s
Under Thatcherism, sport was also affected by a new context. The independence of the
Sports Council, following the demise of Hector Monro (1979-1981), was called into
question, particularly from 1981 onwards (e.g. the boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympics)
(Coghlan, 1990, Houlihan, 1991; Polley, 1998). When Neil Macfarlane became Minister of
Sport in the Thatcher government from 1981 to 1985, he advocated political control of
sports affairs including the Sports Council. There were several crises affecting the artificial
division between policy and politics in sport, including the apartheid debate over sporting
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links with South Africa and the Zola Budd affair, and the problems of football hooliganism
(Polley, 1998; Houlihan, 1991).
The previous emphasis in the provision of local sports facilities and community
participation continued to be reflected in the Sports Council's 1983 strategy Sport in the
Community, the Next Ten Years. This document represented a shift in policy from its heavy
funding of elite sport, (45 per cent of its budget in 1981-82), towards a positive
discrimination in favour of deprived inner areas by considering that "the deteriorating
situation in terms of unemployment, and the problems caused by social unrest in the inner
cities brought about a serious rethink by the Sports Council in terms of the strategy for the
future" (see Polley, 1998, p. 22; Sports Council, 1983; Glyptis, 1989). The Sports Council
realised that the 1972 'Sport for All' objectives had not been fully achieved and set new
plans for the 1980s to increase the participation of unemployed and other groups such as
women, school-leavers, the aged, people with disabilities and ethnic minorities (McIntosh
and Charlton, 1985; Glyptis, 1989; Houlihan, 1991; Henry, 1993). Through campaigns and
the establishment of special development projects non-participants from local deprived
inner city areas were expected to be attracted into sport and also to reduce the gap between
male and female participation. The 1983 strategy was also an attempt to provide a rational
basis for bidding for government money, in competition with other areas such as arts,
conservation, education and health. A further factor was Britain's poor showing in the 1980
Moscow Olympics and therefore, better national facilities and money for excellence were to
be claimed.
In 1987, with Colin Moynihan as the new Minister of Sport, the Sports Council produced a
consultative document, Sport in the Community... Which Way Forward? to evaluate these
aims which led to an updated strategy, Into the 90s, launched the following year (Sports
Council, 1988). This document outlines the objectives of the Sports Council from 1988 to
1993, after recognising that all the aims outlined in the 'Sport for All' policies of the 1980s
had still not been achieved, in particular the underprovision of indoor 'dry' facilities and the
fall in the number of women participating in outdoor sport. On the other hand, nearly one
million more women were taking part in indoor sport, and one million more men were
participating in all sports since the strategy was introduced, and the target for 'wet' facilities
had been exceeded.
Despite such an increase in the number of people taking part in sport, the pattern of non-
participation by certain inner city groups remained virtually the same from the first
campaign in 1972 (Coghlan, 1990). In its 1988 document, the Sports Council set its new
aims which included: first, to bring together the actions of public, private and voluntary
sectors; second, to enrol an extra 1.25 million women and 750,000 men in sports activities,
with special emphasis on three groups: black people and ethnic minorities, people with
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disabilities and women; third, to increase substantially the provision of sports facilities and
finally, to develop strategies for the promotion of sport for excellence (Sports Council,
1993). The government use of sport and recreation as an instrument of social control led
some authors to consider that it had gradually shifted its initial concern of the 1960s with
'Sport for All' to 'sport for the disadvantaged' and 'sport for inner city youth' in the 1980s
and 1990s (Houlihan, 1991; Polley, 1998). Nevertheless, different authors argue that there
is little evidence to support the assertion that participation in sport can significantly reduce
anti-social behaviour (Bramham et al., 1993) while others pointed out that sports policy is
seen to have direct and positive consequences for certain target groups, particularly the
young urban disadvantaged (Henry, 1987).
Local authorities still remained the most important providers of sports facilities and
services, though economic constraints imposed by successive Conservative governments
had diminished their spending capacities on sport by 25 percent between 1985 and 1990
(Henley Centre, 1992; Coghlan, 1990; Henry, 1993; Houlihan, 1991). Despite these
economic constraints, according to Collins (1990), 90 percent of public money being spent
on sport and recreation in 1990 came from local authorities. In the context of managerialist
policies, more than half of local authorities, in line with the Sports Council's aims, started
to adopt a more proactive role and encouraged target groups to participate in sport. One of
the first initiatives was Passports to Leisure Schemes, which offered differential pricing for
disadvantaged groups. By 1985 in the UK as a whole 64 per cent of local authorities were
operating special schemes for the unemployed, and a further 7 per cent gave general price
concessions (Glyptis and Pack, 1989; Glyptis, 1989). This initiative responded to the
recognition that public sporting facilities were failing to attract disadvantaged groups.
At the same time, though social goals for sport and recreation policy in inner city did not
completely disappear, the management of local sports and recreation facilities could not
escape from the new right philosophy of establishing the market principle as the universal
basis of any policy. This was formalised under the third Thatcher government by the 1988
Local Goverment Act which required local authorities to contract out or to offer to tender to
private companies the management of their local sports and leisure facilities through the
development and introduction of CCT (Henry, 1993; Houlihan, 1991; Gratton and Taylor,
1991). This 'new managerialist' approach continued also under Major's period of office,
and from 1993 all local authorities in England, Scotland, and by 1994 all those in Wales
were forced to expose the management of their facilities to this process. The only
exceptions to this requirement were for facilities of which the primary use was not sport
and recreation, or those used primarily by education (Henry, 1993). Tendering was
nevertheless immersed in a considerable debate, seen as an enormous threat to sport by
some and a great opportunity for sport by others (Gratton and Taylor, 1991; Henry, 1993).
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While one of the positive effects following the introducing of CCT has been the recognition
of the need to specify policy goals for public sector leisure provision (Henry, 1993), the
outcomes of a survey produced by Taylor and Page (1994) showed that the quality and
quantity of those services were in decline in a large number of local authorities as a result of
financial cuts and the employment of more causal, less well trained staff.
Another consequence of this financial pressure is that local authorities have been looking at
alternative ways of managing local sport and recreation services such as developing
partnerships with the voluntary or commercial sector and the establishment of charitable
trusts. Therefore, in the 1990s there has been a tension between on the one hand the
traditional bureaucratic manner of running public sector leisure facilities, and on the other
hand, the new managerialist approach which evaluates public management predominantly
in economic terms (Henry, 1993; Farnhan and Horton, 1993; Leach et aL,1994; Polley,
1998; Taylor and Page, 1994). In any case, the onus for fostering 'Sport for All' continued
to be placed on local government, with many local governments supporting local schemes
for disadvantaged groups (Sports Council, 1993). However, with the restructuring of the
Sports Council and the establishment of the UK Sports Council, it was anticipated that the
emphasis of these bodies would be placed on achievement of sporting excellence rather
than on 'Sport for All'.
With the increase in expenditure on aspects of sport and leisure associated with economic
development in the 1990s, some British cities (London, Birmingham, Glasgow, Sheffield,
Bradford or Manchester) are following a 'post-modern' trend of what Harvey called 'serial
reproduction' of strategies to revitalise their economies in response to global economic
changes and the policies of central government (Henry, 1993, Roche, 1992; Hill, 1992,
Loftman and Nevin, 1996; Tye and Williams, 1994; Williams, 1997). As part of this trend,
these cities have been competing to attract sport-related projects and subsequently
government investment (e.g. the £200 m. National Stadium) (DNH, 1995a; Cochrane et al.,
1996). This impact of central government policies on local government budgets is also
reflected by some initiatives such as the introduction of the National Lottery, tighter control
of the funding of National Governing Bodies and the evolution of thinking on the British
Academy of Sport (BAS). In particular, the National Lottery funding offers a new source of
capital to local authorities who had experienced cuts in capital expenditure over the past ten
years (Bramham, 1998; Polley, 1998). At the same time, the Sports Council (of Great
Britain) has begun to enjoy more power and resources through the Lottery and can exert a
more substantial influence in sports policy in British cities. The Sports Council announced
plans to invite cities to bid for the title 'City of Sport' which would involve a city
demonstrating its commitment to providing facilities for and hosting major national and
international events and promoting sports development at local level (Sports Council,
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1995). In 1995, Sheffield became the first city to obtain this recognition, closely followed
by Birmingham and Glasgow.
In July 1995, the central government published the policy paper Sport: Raising the Game
which articulated the aspirations of John Major and his government with respect to sport,
and in particular stated a commitment to the development of international excellence
(DNH, 1995b). As such, this commitment to the development of sport for excellence in the
UK shares some resemblance with other countries in a global context of sport (see Roberts
and Kamphorst, 1989). The Raising the Game set out proposals for a network of
institutions to provide the facilities and services to enable those with talent to compete
successfully at national and international levels. Despite the facilities explosion of the
1970s and the development of National Centres as well as the numerous major events held
in Britain (e.g. Euro 96 Football Championships), the country is still said to be lagging
behind other Western European countries in terms of suitable facilities for hosting national
and international competitions (Polley, 1998). After launching the National Lottery, one of
the first initiatives of the Sport Council was to build a new £200 m. National Stadium for
national and international football and rugby league matches as a replacement for the 70-
year-old stadium at Wembley. Alongside this concern, the relative decline of success of
both team and individual levels from the UK in international competitions has given rise to
the need of governmental backing towards sport for excellence. Thereby, the 1995 policy
proposed that a British Academy of Sport (BAS), later to become the United Kingdom
Sports Institute (UKSI), be established to effect a major impact on the development of
excellence in UK sport with the Lottery sports fund as the main source of funding for
development of facilities and the revenue costs. Other sources of funding might include
sponsorship and commercial activities, although the Australian experience shows these
may be limited (Houlihan, 1996).
In mid 1998, after a long period of debate about the model of the UKSI and two rounds of
competitive bidding and with a new Labour government, Sheffield was finally nominated
to be the hub site of a regional network by the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and
Sport. In the bidding process, Sheffield was one of a short list of three sites, including a
British Olympic Association sponsored bid to redevelop a former USAF air base at Upper
Heyford, and a consortium of Loughborough University, Queens Medical School at
Nottingham and the two National Sports Centres at Lilleshall and Holme Pierrepont. The
new Minister for Sport, Mr. Banks, previously announced the key nature of the UKSI in a
policy paper 'Creating Excellence in British Sport' (DNH, 1998) by saying:
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It is one of the most important developments in Britain sport for many
years. We are committed to ensuring that these proposals came to fruition.
The Institute will be a key element in the national strategy for sporting
excellence and in helping lift Britain back into the top ten sporting nations.
This will reduce the money for local municipal and club projects from £250 m. to £90 m.
The new Labour government is now planning to reduce the budget of the National Lottery
for sport and to diversify it to other areas such as education and health (The Sunday
Telegraph, 11 May 1997). The government has announced that with the demise of the
Millennium Fund in 2001, the money will go to this new cause and not to arts, sports,
heritage or charities as they had hoped. Indeed, the five Sports Councils have budgeted for
a National Lottery increase and have already started spending it.
The size of the sports sector in the UK economy has never been larger than it is in the
1990s. A 1992 survey for the Sports Council found that in 1990, the value of 'sport-related
activity' stood at £8.27 billion, 1.7 per cent of the GDP, with consumer expenditure on
sport and sports-related items accounting for £9.25 billion, and the sector as a whole
accounting for 467,000 jobs —similar in size to the postal and telecommunications sector,
and twice the size of agriculture, forestry, and fishing (Henley Centre, 1992; Williams,
1997). However, the widespread perception that sport is somehow now run as a business is
clearly linked to the major changes and developments that have taken place since 1987.
One of the most obvious changes has been the rapid commercialisation of professional
sports, particularly football. In addition, there have been organisational changes within
governing bodies and individual clubs attempting to run sport on more commercial lines
(e.g. the number of football clubs being floated on the Stock Market since their first
appearance in 1983 or Manchester United's commercial marketing which generates £24
million a year) (Evans, 1998).
These changes need to be seen in the context of developments in media coverage of sport,
particularly the growth of television, including satellite and cable systems from the 1980s
(Polley, 1998). Sponsorship together with television has also had a great effect how sports
and clubs have been run. The volume of money that has come to be involved, the
importance of the money to some clubs and some sports, and the constant need to
maximise the potential income have ensured that such sports have had to become more
business-like. With the deregulation of broadcasting as part of the 1990 Broadcasting Act,
television rights for sporting events are sold to the highest bidder with only a few events
protected for national network screening by legislation, increasing the mix of extending
individual choice while excluding large sectors of the population. In particular, a large
multinational corporation, BSky B now owns the exclusive right to broadcast, among
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others, live Premier Football League, overseas cricket test matches, the Ryder Cup and
international rugby. The BBC, the natural counterweight to these developments, has been
unable to match such bids, due to its limited and fixed resources. Meanwhile, the influence
of BSky B has extended even to traditionally amateur sports such as rugby union. This
sport was dramatically reconstructed in the interest of satellite television in 1995 though
against some resistance by clubs and supporters. Previously, broadcasters' fees,
particularly, in football were responsible for increasing polarisation between large and
small clubs. The Premier League, after its split from the Football League in 1992, secured
substantial money from BSkyB and other means (Polley, 1998). However, in this context
minority sports as well as some local sport and recreation services are finding it extremely
difficult to attract private funding.
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5.1 Introduction
This chapter examines the most significant aspects of urban planning and sport policies
as well as many of the changes that have taken place in the economic, social and
political conditions of Spain. Four distinct periods are reviewed, initiated from the
authoritarian 1939-1975 Franco period through the early stages of the social democratic
period until the 1982-1995 period of the Socialist government: i) from 1939 to 1959, an
autarchic economic system accompanied with a laissez faire' urban policy provoked an
extensive deficit of collective services; ii) the decline of the autarchic system led to a
period of economic growth from 1960 to 1975 which coincided with the application of
Keynesian-Fordist principles, as in other Western economies; iii) the political transition
to a social democracy coincided with a general economic and urban crisis. During this
period (1975-1982), the centre-right government (UCD) in conjunction with the first
democratic City Councils initiated a wide range of initiatives to meet long-term
political, social and urban demands; and iv) with the Socialist government in power, an
increasing number of local governments have adopted an entrepreneurialist approach
with an emphasis on the development of high profile projects as part of some of the
Spanish urban regeneration strategies. In addition, an overview of the evolution of
sports policy shows how the Franco regime clearly instrumentalised sport as a means of
nationalist propaganda and social control. It was only after the 1961 Sports Law when
central government, for the first time, intervened directly in the promotion of sport.
However, the importance of sport and sports policy has been gradually enhanced with
the involvement of all levels of public powers throughout the democratic period. If
during the 1970s and 1980s, sport was recognised as a public service as the 1978
Constitution states, with a prominent role played mainly by City Councils in the
significant growth of 'Sport for All', the 1990s, as in other European countries, have
seen a gradual movement towards sporting excellence and the promotion of sport
prestige projects.
5.2 The period 1939-1959 of an autarchic economic system
After the Spanish Civil War and with the advent of the Second World War, the Franco
regime was isolated, suffering a long-term international economic blockade. The state
was therefore forced to adopt an autarchic economic system with large-scale public
intervention in the economy, as in other regimes such as Germany and Italy. Internally,
the country faced a deep economic depression with weak industrial production together
with an extensive scarcity of basic products (De Miguel, 1975; Payne, 1997; Tamames,
1983). An immediate concern of the state was to stimulate a rapid industrialisation
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through, amongst other things, establishing in 1941 a state industrial holding (INI)
(based on an Italian model) responsible for creating new industries and investing in
existing firms in key sectors. However, the majority of these industries were initially
concentrated in the new symbol of the regime, the capital city, Madrid (Fernandez
Duran, 1996).
In addition to needing to rebuild the economy, the reconstruction of Spanish towns and
cities severely affected by the war was another priority (at least, in theory). If during the
Second Republic (under the Municipal Statute of 1924) urban planning was municipally
controlled, after the Civil War, urban planning relied on central government agencies
with local authorities playing virtually no part (Capel, 1977; Richardson, 1975). Some
upper-tier planning authorities were set up such as the National Housing Institute (INV)
established in 1939 to undertake the National Reconstruction Plan. However, the initial
urban planning, as in the industrialisation process, was very limited in scope, and
primarily concerned with reconstructing Madrid (Fernandez and Gavira, 1986; Teran,
1978; Richardson, 1975). The 1941 Madrid Urban Plan did not differ essentially from
previous urban plans drawn up during the Second Republic based on the 'Garden City'
model. So, housing areas were designated close to the industrial sites seeking to
accommodate immigrants (Ayuntamiento de Madrid, 1981). Indeed, Martinez de
Lamadrid (1948) highlighted the intention of this plan for segregating the working
classes:
The distribution of industrial zones responded to the need to localise the
working classes in satellite settlements that constitute true defensive nuclei
against the invasion by the inactive masses encamped in the periphery,
forming the suburban belts of misery against which we struggle (in Teran,
1978, p. 46) (Original in Spanish, translated to English by the author).
Rural poverty, because of the failure of agricultural policies, rather than the attraction of
urban jobs, caused a gradual emigration not only to Madrid but also to other major
Spanish cities. This emigration reached its peak during the 1950s and 1960s, and
produced rapid urbanisation but with an accompanying lack of urban planning. The
laissez faire' urban policy provoked a large-scale deficit in housing and other collective
services in the major urban centres (Borja et al., 1977; Capel, 1977, Gavira, 1994;
Simancas and Elizalde, 1969; Leira et al., 1976). Paradoxically, the housing deficit was
not even considered a social problem for the regime. According to Leira et al. (1976),
the combination of the massive scarcity of basic products and the low levels of the
population's income lead to not valuing housing as a priority. Under those
circumstances, private promoters were not interested in housing, focusing primarily on
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the industrialisation process (CasteIls, 1981). If prior to the regime, City Councils
enjoyed large-scale powers, the Franco regime completely undermined their role and
they were controlled politically by the Falange (the then only political party permitted)
and economically by the provinces (Gavira, 1994; Garcia, 1994; Richardson, 1975). In
such circumstances, the shortage of houses led to a rapid spread of shanty towns on the
peripheries of major cities.
Despite this chaotic urban growth, housing and urban planning were the responsibility
of the Ministry of the Interior (Home Office) with the city being seen by the state solely
as an object of public order. At this time, some central goverment agencies were set up
to control urban growth in major cities such as the Metropolitan Area of Madrid (1944),
the Urban Commission for Barcelona (1953) and the Administrative Corporations of
Valencia (1949) and Bilbao (1946). However, due to their limited powers, these public
agencies failed to regulate the urban growth of these cities. What is more, the large-
scale national housing deficit (1.5 million) and the continuous arrival of immigrants to
major cities forced central government, for the first time, to intervene more directly in
the housing sector, setting up housing policies in the late 1950s (Borja, 1977; Capel,
1977; Castells, 1981; Teran, 1978). Therefore, a coherent national urban policy (at least,
in theory) began to emerge after the 1956 Land and Urban Planning Act was launched
to be the first comprehensive law to co-ordinate all four urban planning levels
(municipal, metropolitan, provincial, and national).
At the local level, although the 1950 Local Regime Act made it compulsory for certain
types of city to have general plans, in reality, it was only after the 1956 Act that all
municipalities were obliged to draw up urban plans within the following 15 years. The
1956 Act also introduced a complex land law in order to regulate previously unplanned
urban development. As a result, all municipal land uses had to be classified into three
categories: urban, 'urban reserve' (land reserved for urban development purposes) and
rural in a manner consistent with the social function of property. Furthermore,
municipal plans would be integrated in metropolitan and provincial plans with the
National Urbanisation Plan as the highest level. Under this hierarchy, it was expected to
ensure the spatial development of the national territory and to favour the decongestion
of fast-growing cities such as Madrid, Barcelona and Bilbao (Richardson, 1975). At the
same time, the government sought to connect urban and economic planning by
launching 'Development Poles', a concept which will be considered later in this
chapter.
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Parallel to the legislation, the National Housing Institute was absorbed into a newly
created Ministry of Housing to implement and to regulate all the urban planning levels
as well as to speed up the housing process. The first National Housing Plan (1944-54)
was replaced by a second National Plan with a target figure of over half a million
houses between 1956 and 1960 (Borja, 1977; Cape!, 1977; Richardson, 1975). Another
public body, the Land Management Board was launched to be in charge of preparing
land in order to divert population and industries from the major urban areas to new
development areas, initially in Madrid, Barcelona, Asturias and Bizkaia and
subsequently extended to other cities (Capel, 1977, Leira et al., 1976; Richardson,
1975).
However, despite the significant boom in housing, the growing inflation rate forced
central government to impose restrictions on public sector borrowing. In this difficult
economic situation, the 1956 Act stimulated greater private sector involvement, by
introducing subsidies to finance the management of these development areas with
government providing public infrastructure (Leira et al., 1976; Richardson, 1975; Wynn
and Smith, 1978; Wynn, 1984). In the 1960s, for instance, construction of 90 percent of
all subsidised houses was undertaken by private developers, who obtained substantial
benefits which in turn resulted in land speculation (Ministerio de Vivienda, 1972;
CasteIls, 1981). Not surprisingly, buyers of the majority of these subsidised houses were
predominantly from higher socio-economic groups (Capell, 1977; Fernândez and
Gavira, 1986; Keyes et al., 1993; Teran, 1978). This model of urban growth created
physical and economic imbalances with the public sector unable to regulate them.
Tamames (1974, p.6) illustrates the whole process by saying:
Private investors obtained substantial benefits, through public subsidies, to
build public houses, which later were sold at a much higher price.
Considering the objective of housing policy, the way of developing these
subsidised houses was clearly incongruous. Central government, facing
deep economic difficulties was financing public housing that only middle
and upper class people could afford ('Original in Spanish, translated to English by the
author).
At the same time, the autarchic economic system was no longer viable. Conditions such
as high inflation, extensive trade deficit, a limited domestic market as well as
uncompetitive business behaviour did not favour any economic growth with central
government close to bankruptcy (Ros Hombravella et al, 1973; Payne, 1997; Tamames,
1983). This situation was aggravated by popular discontent. In early 1957, all these
factors were accompanied by the loss of the Falange's political power and the arrival of
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new Francoist right with a neoliberal technocratic orientation (Alonso Teixidor and
Hebbert, 1982; Linz, 1984, De Miguel, 1975; Harrison, 1993). Once in power, the
government introduced a new economic order based on Fordist production norms,
similar to other Western countries. A 1959-1961 Stabilisation Programme was adopted
to liberalise the economy and to open it up to foreign capital (Arango, 1978; Mateos and
Soto, 1997; Payne, 1997). This initiative, which marked a new era in the Spanish
economy, was accompanied by opening up of international diplomatic relations,
especially, pacts with the Vatican and the US in 1953, and integration into the United
Nations (1955) and the World Bank (1958). Simultaneously, foreign economic support,
in particular from the US, indirectly contributed to the entrenchment of the dictatorship,
and later to economic growth in the 1960s (Arango, 1978; Villas, 1981). Only a few
Latin American countries had previously supported Spain with the country being
excluded from the Marshall Plan aid for European reconstruction. Nevertheless, the
liberalisation of the Spanish economy did not affect the political and social context
significantly.
5.3. Sports in the initial period of dictatorship
With the country involved in a process of reconstruction, sport was not, in reality, a
priority for both the Franco regime and for the great majority of the Spanish people
during the early stages of the dictatorship. However, if during the 1920s and 1930s,
sport had grown mainly without government control, under the dictatorship, the
management and promotion of sport was entrusted to the Falange, rather than to the
Ministry of Education, which exercised absolute control over all sports as in the rest of
Spanish political life (Aguilera, 1992; Cazorla, 1979; Andres and Delgado, 1995;
Garcia Ferrando, 1990). The National Sports Delegation (DND), for example, was
created by decree in 1941, under the direction of one of the most outstanding figures of
the Franco regime, General Moscardo (Cagigal, 1975). This sporting body envisaged a
special plan for Spanish sport based on the German model with two instrumental aims:
firstly, to serve as a means to create a healthy and 'virile' race, and secondly, as a focus
for the international exhibition of patriotism and discipline as in other fascist regimes
like those in Italy and Germany (Porro, 1996; London, 1995). Whilst these two
countries invested massive amounts of money in sport in order to fulfil these objectives,
the Franco regime initially did not provide any special funding and sport was forced to
be practically self-sufficient (Cazorla, 1979; Shaw, 1987; 1988; Villalain, 1995).
At the institutional level, the change of the name of the sports body (DND) to National
Sports and Physical Education Delegation (DNEFD) in 1945 did not affect sport
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significantly. Sports federations and associations continued to be controlled by the
regime; in this case, the DNEFD appointed all the sports organisation chairmen.
Moreover, the wide-ranging control of sport by the DNEFD was also extended to the
regulation of all sporting events.
Sports participation and sports infrastructure lagged behind other European countries.
Andres and Delgado (1995) point out that, at this time, the only sports facilities were
football pitches, public frontones and few horse racing tracks. Football, the most
popular sport during the Franco era, overshadowed all other sports such as athletics,
swimming or gymnastics were nearly unknown to the great majority of people (Andres
and Delgado, 1995). Football was also regularly utilised to maintain a high level of
political passivity with the media close to the government contributing to the popularity
of the game. Marca, the first sporting newspaper which appeared in 1938 (Fernandez
Santander, 1990; Shaw, 1988; Villalain, 1995). After the war, this newspaper developed
a daily circulation of up to 400,000. Another newspaper close to the regime, Arriba,
highlighted the significance of football by saying: 'Spain is not a sporting country,
Spain is a footballing country' (Arriba, 30 April 1975 in Villalain, 1995). The national
television channel was officially launched in 1956. Thereafter, the regime started to use
it regularly (in particular, on the 1st of May during the late 1960s and early 1970s), to
reduce the attendance at the illegal demonstrations of the opposition parties and the
independent trade unions (Shaw, 1987, 1988; Villalain, 1995). As another example,
broadcasting football matches on relevant dates was a means of fulfilling an end as well
as being part of the all-pervasive 'culture of evasion' which prevailed during the regime
(Carr and Fussi, 1979; Cazorla, 1979; London, 1995).
Sport was also used for political promotion with the replacement of the national team's
red football shirts by blue ones representing the Falange and a compulsory fascist salute
before the start of all football matches (Shaw, 1987). This compulsory fascist salute was
also extended to other sports events, but only when medals were awarded.
Internationally, up to 1945, Spain's stance was close to that of other fascist countries in
fighting against Communism as well as trying to consolidate an Axis coalition with
Germany and Italy. Some Spaniards collaborated, in different ways, to achieve these
aims. Sport again made a contribution, mainly through international football matches.
As such, of the eight international games played by the Spanish national football team
during the Second World War, four were against Portugal, and the rest against
Switzerland, France, Germany and Italy (London, 1995). Parallel to this nationalist
feeling, an anti-regionalist attitude grew, with provincial sports organisations and
regional sports prohibited, though they had already begun in the Franco controlled zone
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during the Civil War. In essence, regional groups in all sports, (with a special emphasis
on Basque and Catalan teams), were not allowed to use their language, in order to
discourage any nationalistic activity. However, this strategy, in some ways, contributed
to emphasising independence, especially when teams such as Barcelona Football Club
and Athletic Bilbao were competing against to Real Madrid, which was considered to
be representative of the regime (London, 1995; MacClancy, 1996).
In the educational sphere, the Franco regime, unlike its counterparts under Mussolini
and Hitler, did not gain complete control over the education system because of the
influence of the Catholic Church. Physical education was not important occupying a
small part in the curriculum, despite its great potential for the promotion of the regime
(see Devis, 1997). Meanwhile, the same author notes that physical education focused on
utilitarian aspects such as body control and military training rather than on sports which
were not included in the curriculum. In reality, only a few private schools fostered
physical education. The role of women in sport was quite distinctive. The Falange
envisaged a submissive role for women not only in sport but also in other areas of life.
Sport for women was only a means to prepare for a maternal mission and by extension,
to support the regime (Buriuel, 1991; Cortes et al., 1994). The Women's Section of the
Falange, an independent body created in 1934, was in charge of all areas related to
women and in particular, of the regulation of physical education and sport. Among the
most notable of its activities was the running of a six-month social service, equivalent
to the male military service. This service provided an ideological context as well as
practical maternal training. Moreover, the popular notion of female-appropriate sports
such as volleyball, swimming and tennis was strengthened over other sports such as
football, rowing and rugby, which were banned due to their 'negative effect' on
women's bodies. The Women's Section also organised its own 'sporting' events,
though with an emphasis on display (e.g. gymnastic exhibitions) rather than competitive
sport. Here the emphasis was also on portraying appropriate forms of femininity
(Buriuel, 1991; Cortes et al., 1994).
All these factors, as Ors (1986) points out, indicated the nature of the sports policy in
this initial period which was used to promote the regime rather than promoting sport per
se. In this way, the Franco regime continued the previous tradition of a lack of any
coherent sports policy as such, with a complete absence of specific budget or policy
priorities. Sport also served, according to Coakley (1990), to divert attention away from
other important political and social problems of the Spanish life.
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5.4. Urban programmes in the period 1960-1975 of economic growth
After a short period of stagnation, the Spanish system of economic planning, initiated
with the Stabilisation Plan, contributed to a significant economic growth in the 1960s,
characterised by Peck and Tickell (1994) as 'delayed Fordism' (see also Coverdale,
1979; Harrison, 1993; Lieberman, 1982; Richardson, 1975). Indeed, the national
income rose rapidly (at an annual rate of 8.5 percent in the period 1963-1971) as well as
industrial production, which tripled between 1960 and 1970 and rose another 40 per
cent between 1970 and 1975. This 'economic miracle' was also connected to a gradual
integration of Spain into the international economic order, the attraction of foreign
investment and money from Spanish workers' abroad, and tourism (Mateos and Soto,
1997; TunOn de Lara, 1981). Over a billion pesetas entered the country from these
sources during the decade: 31 per cent from private foreign capital, 54 per cent from
tourist receipts and 15 per cent from remittances of emigrants (Alonso Teixidor and
Hebbert, 1982).
The Stabilisation Plan was followed by the launching of the First Development Plan
(1964-67). Inspired by the French and British planning model, this plan sought to
contribute to the convergence of regions within the national economy and to limit the
peripheral growth of major cities by encouraging the location of new industries in cities
of adjacent less developed provinces (Alonso Teixidor and Hebbert, 1982; Harrison,
1993; Richardson, 1975; Tamames, 1983). In particular, five development areas were
established in 1969 in cities of five provinces around Madrid. It was anticipated that the
economic growth in these cities would 'trickle down' to the less developed regions,
though this met with limited success (Fernandez Duran, 1996). With industry being
assigned a higher priority than agriculture, state economic planning continued to
contribute to an extensive migration of some four million people from rural areas to the
major Spanish cities. In particular, Madrid and Barcelona alone accounted for more than
14 per cent of the overall population and continued to attract over 100,000 people a year
(Ayuntamiento de Madrid, 1981; Tamames, 1983). By the mid-1970s, 61 per cent of the
population were in urban areas (with 37 per cent living in cities of over 100,000
inhabitants) (Gavira, 1994; Mateos and Soto, 1997) (see Figure 5.1). It is worth
comparing this outstanding growth of Spanish urbanisation, particularly from 1965 to
1975, with most other Western European countries where this phenomenon took
between 80 and 100 years (see Figure 5.1). State economic planning accelerated the
rapid transformation from an isolationist, predominantly rural, agrarian society to an
internationally integrated, urban, industrial nation (see Table 5.1).
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Figure 5.1 Evolution of the rural-urban Spanish population
Source: Gavira (1994)
However, this rapid evolution was not accompanied by the generation of a sufficient
number of jobs, which in turn provoked an increase in unemployment, from 91,000 in
1959 to 200,000 in 1960 (Mateos and Soto, 1997). In addition, the economically active
population increased significantly by approximately one million people (38 per cent of
the total population) during the 1960s (Arango, 1978). Parallel to the internal migration,
a massive exodus of over one million people from some of the most deprived regions
108
Urban Programmes and Sport in Spain 	 Chapter Five
to, mainly Western European countries, considerably helped reduce unemployment
levels. This process was prolonged until 1974 when the world economic crisis brought
this process to an end (Nicolau, 1989). In addition, this economic liberalisation
continued to benefit the same socio-economic elite at the expense of the working class
(Arango, 1978; Borja eta!., 1977; Castells, 1981; Harrison, 1993). The neutralisation of
trade unions facilitated the maintenance of relative low wages. What is more, the
economic liberalisation contributed neither to political democratisation with the
continued absence of political parties, nor to the development of a welfare system, as in
other Western European governments (Garcia, 1994; MerigO, 1982).
The third National Housing Plan (1961-1976) envisaged the creation of 3,7 million
houses in this period (Capel, 1977; Richardson, 1975; Wynn and Smith, 1978). Despite
this ambitious plan, the economic difficulties, faced by central government, affected
public sector housing negatively. At the political level, the fight about who should
undertake the public housing building between the Ministry of Housing (advocating
central government) and the First Development Plan Agency (supporting private
developers) was resolved in favour of the latter. In the first phase of this plan, the
private sector was in charge of building public sector housing, a process already
initiated in the 1950s. However, from 1965 onwards, private developers gradually
shifted their priorities from social housing to building unsubsidised houses (Borja,
1977; Capel, 1977; Castells, 1981; Leira et al., 1976). In Madrid alone, for instance,
commercial housing constituted 8 percent of the overall production of housing in 1963,
as opposed to 76 percent in 1969 (Coplaco, 1980). In this context, the 1956 Act and the
subsequent legislation failed to provide measures to control private developers which
built more than was anticipated and clearly benefited from the expansion of Spanish
cities (Borja et al, 1977; Capel, 1977; Wynn, 1984). What is more, though the 1956
Law required all City Councils to develop general plans, it was only, after the 1976 Law
that many Councils started, for the first time, to articulate them. In particular, by the end
of 1971, only about 10 per cent of municipalities nationally had followed the provisions
of the 1956 Act. Not surprisingly, the deficit in public housing and services still
constituted a major problem.
The attempt to integrate both economic and urban planning failed to reduce regional and
urban imbalances. The 1956 Act and the Development Plans were unable to co-ordinate
the provision of public housing with regional development policies (Capel, 1977;
Richardson, 1975, Wynn, 1984). The aims of the First Development plan were only
partially fulfilled: first, at the regional level it did not promote any relevant social
infrastructure (linked with the National Housing Plan) or employment as had been
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expected, and second, the development areas were publicly funded and managed by the
central government on behalf of private developers, but with the exclusion of local
interests as far as politics was concerned (Richardson, 1975; Mateos and Soto, 1997).
On the other hand, the process of urban growth and industrialisation was unevenly
concentrated in large cities rather than in the development areas which left major cities
in unplanned chaos with the production of urban speculation and peripheral sprawl on a
greater scale than ever before. Despite the 1956 Act, the same problems continued
during the 1960s exacerbated by the large-scale housing deficit (Capel, 1977; Castells,
1981). The next two Development Plans aspired to decentralise regional planning by
stressing the potential role of provincial and municipal governments in the preparation
and implementation process giving more priority to social needs for the less developed
regions (Richardson, 1975).
In 1969, a political shift from the Falangistas to technocrats in the Ministry of Housing,
for the first time, brought about new planning ideas to rationalise the housing problem
and to decentralise major urban centres. Inspired by the British New Towns programme,
the Urgent Development Act (ACTURS) was launched in 1970 (Sanchez Goyanes,
1994). This Act provided the Ministry of Housing with considerable powers to
expropriate land to develop green-filled new towns and short-cut statutory planning
procedures for the plan approval and implementation stages. In the first phase of this
programme, eight new towns located outside the largest cities like Barcelona, Madrid,
Valencia, Seville, Zaragoza and Cadiz were approved, each intended to accommodate
between 25,000 and 100,000 inhabitants (Borja et al., 1977; Castells, 1981; Fernandez
and Gavira, 1986). However, this initiative aimed to centralise both housing and
industrial development as well as to limit the peripheral growth of major cities.
Moreover, the state was in charge of providing land with private developers having a
leading role in planning, financing, and managing these new towns (Borja et al., 1977;
Castells, 1977, 1981; Leira et al., 1976). In essence, this model of 'concerted
urbanisation' required massive public acquisition of land and private developers were
obliged to provide basic services. A change of government from technocrats to
Falangistas postponed most of these projects, but with the advent of the democratic
period in 1975, the new Minister of Housing revived the ACTURS projects. In the
following year, two 'mixed companies', founded with public and private capital, were
created, one in Madrid to manage Tres Cantos, the other in Barcelona, to manage
Gallecs. After entrusting private initiative with the leading role in the realisation stage,
only one in Tres Cantos was finally built (Leira et al., 1976; Wynn, 1984). Thus,
commentators such as Capell were able to claim that that, in essence, the public sector
had been a facilitator of private economic growth.
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At the urban planning level, the 1976 Land Law replaced the 1956 Act, and, for the first
time, minimum standards for green spaces, service provision and population density for
municipal plans were introduced. This Law also introduced new planning regulations
with emphasis on urban renewal, such as the 'Internal Reform Special Plan' (P.E.R.I) to
be used for the improvement of mainly city suburbs (Presidencia del Gobiemo, 1976).
Although the 1976 Land Law sought to regulate the previous uncontrolled urban growth
process associated with the evolution of Spanish capitalism at that time, the lack of co-
ordination of economic and planning bodies made it possible for some of the traditional
problems previously outlined to continue in the 1970s (Borja, 1977; Cape11, 1977;
Arango, 1978; Keyes et al., 1993). In particular, by 1970 the housing deficit was 1.7
million houses (FOESSA, 1983). This chaotic urban situation fostered the emergence of
neighbourhood associations in the large urban areas, mobilised especially in the areas of
collective service improvements (Borja, 1977; Borja et al., 1977; CasteIls, 1978, 1981).
These groups intervened decisively in the decision-making process of local urban
planning in the post-Franco era. However, their claims were not limited to the planning
process and these associations, together with those of students, trade unionists and
regionalists, contributed, to some extent, through their demands for political change to
the crisis of the Franco regime. Locally, these groups attempted to take the lead in
generating urban demands, given the lack of capacity of City Councils under the Franco
period. Borja (1977) explained the origin of these groups in the 1960s:
The relative passivity of the working classes until the mid-1960s manifested
itself in a general acceptance of the disorderly growth of the city and the
scant publicity given to the role of local plans in the development process.
But from the mid-sixties onwards, the working classes and certain elements
of the press adopted more active stances, as witnessed in recent years in
increasingly successful campaigns against the lack of collective service
facilities (p.206).
5.5. Sports in the period of economic growth
The Physical Education Law of 1961 or Elola Olaso (in honour of the second chairman
of the DNEFD) was the first time that central government, not without tensions between
the Falange and the technocrats, intervened directly in the promotion of sport and
physical education (Devis, 1997; Ors, 1986; Real Ferrer, 1991). Despite the new
technocratic government, the DNEFD continued to be responsible for the direction of
all sports and the fostering of physical education. In this respect, the National Institutes
of Physical Education (INEFs) were established to prepare teacher training colleges and
sport coaches. Similar to the British 1944 Education Act, physical education (at least, in
111
Urban Programmes and Sport in Spain 	 Chapter Five
theory) also became a compulsory subject at all educational levels by this time.
However, the state of anarchy in physical education teaching, the scarcity of public
sports facilities as well as the lack of political will, failed to improve the status of
physical education (Devis, 1997). What is more, the 1961 Law favoured the legal
regulation of the use of sport by the regime, but, in reality, failed to regulate the
democratisation of sport (Aguilera, 1992; Real Ferrer, 1991).
The 1961 Law also improved the state financial system for sport. For the first time, after
the football pools were launched in 1946, funds were allocated from them to sport. Thus
sport was completely dependent on football pools rather than on public funding. Twenty
two percent of the whole football pools turnover was directed to the DNEFD, which
shared only a small part of this budget with the County Councils. Municipalities were
excluded both from the promotion of sport and from building sports facilities. Football
pool turnover increased rapidly from 704.3 million ptas in 1960-61 to 26.462 million
ptas in 1977-78. However, part of this revenue from the football pools was diverted, to
a considerable extent, to cover the basic needs of the population, rather than to sport
itself (Andres, 1983; Andres and Delgado, 1995). In 1966, Samaranch, the current
president of the Olympic Committee, was appointed as the chairman of the DNEFD.
Under his direction, the promotion of sports acquired greater significance. By contrast,
physical education and sports facilities still remained underdeveloped. In terms of sports
infrastructure development, it is worth distinguishing two periods: firstly, between 1940
and 1969, when 12.000 new sports facilities were built, though the majority of them
were undertaken in the 1960s and secondly, from 1970 to 1974 which saw a significant
growth in public sports facilities, though lagging far behind other European counterparts
(Martinez del Castillo eta!., 1989).
Despite this development of sports infrastructure, practically the only sport accessible to
most people continued to be football. Its popularity as a spectator sport contrasted
sharply with the low levels of sporting participation. In 1969, the audience for broadcast
football matches amounted to over 6 million with the regime continuing to control
political activity (Villalain, 1995), while the first national survey on sports practice
(1968) indicated that only 12 per cent of the population were actively involved in sport
(Martinez del Castillo, 1986). By this time, in 1967, the DNEFD organised the first
massive publicity campaign encouraging sport practice, but Shaw (1988) considered
that this initiative had limited success because of both an apathy on the part of the
population and the widespread shortage of public sports facilities. Nevertheless, this
campaign contributed to an unexpected increase in the interest in sport of the population
and public administration (Aguilera, 1992; Andres and Delgado, 1995; Garcia de la
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Torre, 1992). At this time, 'Sport for All' (the policy slogan of the Council of Europe)
was only popularised at school age through the Youth Championships promoted by the
National Youth Delegation. These campaigns were prior to the explosion of 'Sport for
All' which took place during the 1970s. The number of sports licences grew from
106,453 in 1960-61 to 1,106,665 in 1977-78 with football at the top of the list of sport
preferences (Villalain, 1995). However, according to Garcia Ferrando (1990), this
significant increase in sport licences was perhaps as much a product of the urbanisation
and industrialisation of Spanish society as of any specific sporting campaigns. At the
international level, with the lack of state funding for elite sport, Spain won only one
Olympic gold, two silver and two bronze medals during the whole of the Franco period.
In essence, sport continued to be controlled by the regime and thus failed to operate
independently of the political power. Only ad hoc initiatives were undertaken but
without being part of any coherent sports policy.
5.6. Urban programmes in the period of 1975-1982 with the establishment of
democracy
The political transition to a social democratic system started after Franco's death in
1975, with a parliamentary monarchy headed by King Juan Carlos (previously
nominated as his successor by Franco in 1969). Nevertheless, Franco was preoccupied
by the problem of the continuation of the authoritarian system and hence, Admiral
Carrero Blanco was appointed president until his assassination by Euskadi ta
Askatasuna (ETA), the Basque separatist organisation. Arias Navarro, a former member
of the Franco government, was then appointed in January 1974. However, Arias
Navarro was forced to resign after a short period (1974-75) by King Juan Carlos, and
was replaced by a new president, Adolfo Suarez, who had long been identified with the
National Movement (Moran, 1979; Tusell, 1997). With Suarez being appointed
president, the political reform process was definitely initiated in 1976: the National
Movement was disbanded, political parties legalised, the vertical labour syndicates
abolished and independent trade unions established (Tusell, 1997). As part of this new
political scenario, an electoral law was set up prior to the first democratic elections held
in June 1977 which were dominated by the centre-right party (UCD), a coalition party
headed by Suarez. Another important feature of this political transition occurred when
the Spanish Communist party was legalised in the same year. Above all, in 1978, as a
consequence of a political consensus among all the political groups of the early post-
Franco years a new Constitution was established which confirmed Spain as a
parliamentary monarchy and guaranteed the right of Spain's nationalities and regions to
autonomy (Fusi, 1989). In the new spatial organisation of the state, certain so-called
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historical communities, notably Cataluna, the Basque Country and Galicia have pursued
autonomy most vigorously.
In the first years in office, the incoming UCD administration was facing a period of
severe economic problems which included a high rate of inflation (26 per cent by the
end of 1977) and the slowing down of the economy (between 1975 and 1978 the growth
rate was 2.3 percent, falling to 1.1 percent in the period 1979 to 1983) (Tamames,
1995). These economic difficulties were aggravated by a plethora of global and local
factors including the world economic crisis, the decline of international tourism, the
return of immigrants from Europe and the integration of a large number of young people
and women in the labour market. These factors intensified the effects of the
employment loss during the 1975-85 decade. In this difficult context, in October 1977
the government launched the Moncloa Pacts, in a time of political consensus, in order
to solve this economic crisis. As part of the control of the economy, wages were sharply
limited and strike activity reduced to a minimum in exchange for government pledges of
political and social reforms (Coverdale, 1979; Tamames, 1995; Tusell, 1997). At the
social level, pensions and unemployment benefits were increased. Moreover, the Pacts
contained short-term legislative measures to adjust to the demands of the new political
system. As a result of the Pacts, a slowing of inflation and an improvement in the
balance of payments were achieved. What is more, Spain presented the formal
submission for consideration to join the EC in 1979. However, the Pacts failed to
address aspects of the new autonomy process and the long-standing problems of City
Councils.
The new political scenario also represented great complexity with different tiers of
government involved often in areas of overlapping responsibilities. After a long period
of centralised control, the 1978 Constitution embodied a philosophy of decentralisation
with a move towards a quasi-federal system, with 17 Autonomous Communities (Fusi,
1989). This gradual shift of governance to the autonomous regions has been
characterised by continuing tensions between the regions and central government
(Gavira, 1994; Tusell, 1997; Wannop, 1995). At the same time, despite the urgency of
the long-standing problems faced by local Councils, in particular the loss of political
and financial autonomy, the treatment of local government in the Constitution was
relatively brief and was relegated to the configuration of the Autonomous Communities.
Prior to the first democratic Council elections in April 1979, it was necessary to launch
financial 'urgent measures' to resolve the financial problems faced by many cities,
problems also witnessed by their British counterparts. Politically, the coalition
established by the Socialist and the Communist parties allowed both left-wing political
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parties to dominate most large cities in the first Council elections.
In the early period of the democratic period, local Councils started gradually to increase
their powers in relation to culture, education, health, social welfare and in particular,
urban planning. Nevertheless, there is a certain ambiguity of competencies between
them and the Autonomous Communities, which claimed powers in similar areas. In
fact, the Autonomous Communities were given power to create their own urban
planning legislation. With the Autonomous Communities exercising more powers in
urban planning, all the central government agencies set up prior to the 1956 Act were
abolished (Borja, 1990). This enlargement of local authority powers was not correlated
with an increase in financial autonomy, which restrained their capacity to provide
adequate collective services (Gavira, 1994; Garcia, 1994; Tamames, 1995). The lack of
financial autonomy of the first democratic Councils, with many of the larger cities
heavily in debt, was due to various factors such as the centralisation of politics during
the Franco regime as well as the expansion of local government spending in the 1980.
Thus, after the 1979 local elections, local councils, both individually and later through
the Spanish Federation of Municipalities and Provinces (FEMP), began to lobby the
UCD government for more financial resources.
As already stated, after the 1976 Land Law the housing deficit remained high. For
example, Castells (1981) referring to Madrid, points out that 53 percent of all families
(around one million people) had no access to a dwelling in 1975. But housing was not
the only problem, there were also demands for collective services in other areas such as
education, health or sport and leisure in the whole country (Borja, 1977; Leira et al.,
1976; Castells, 1978, 1981). All these factors were aggravated by the economic
difficulties together with the decline of the dictatorship and a period of 'urban crisis'
ensued (Castells, 1981). The symptoms of urban deprivation became more accentuated
in the inner areas of the most relevant industrial cities where industrialisation and
urbanisation processes were more concentrated from the 1950s to the mid-1970s. This
has had profound effects on the socio-economic structure of these cities in the form of
population loss, high unemployment, environmental decay and the creation of derelict
areas in central areas, problems previously witnessed in the British context. Thus, after
the constitution of the first democratic Councils, local governments in conjunction with
central government initiated multiple programmes to meet local needs. In fact, the
pressure exercised by the neighbourhood movements and the political parties
contributed not only to this process but also to reform local political life (Borja et al.,
1977; Castells, 1981). However, the same authors, after analysing the urban policy of
this initial part of the democratic period, highlighted that local Councils put an
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emphasis on infrastructure projects without meeting the main demands of the
neighbourhood associations.
Politically, confidence in Suarez diminished and in January 1981, as a result of growing
opposition from within his own political party, he resigned. Calvo Sotelo, hitherto the
Deputy Prime Minister, succeeded him until 1982. The economic conditions continued
to deteriorate while the limited, reluctant political reform contributed to growing
popular discontent which threatened to undermine the stability of the democracy itself
(Tusell, 1997). In February 1981, a group of armed Civil Guard members attempted to
take power, when the second round of the elections in the parliament to choose the
successor to Suarez was taking place, but the intervention of King Juan Carlos resolved
this crisis. The first parliaments (Basque and Catalan) were established in March 1980
and, in both elections, the UCD was heavily defeated by the regionalist parties.
Subsequently, other parliaments were elected, such as for Galicia in October 1981 and
for Andalucia in May 1982. General elections held in the same year also represented the
beginning of the Socialist government.
5.7. Sports policy in the period of 1975-1982
The importance of sport and sports policy started to develop in the democratic period.
Part of this phenomenon can be explained by the involvement of all levels of public
powers as the 1978 Constitution states, an increasing general interest in sport, the
decentralisation process and what is more, the nomination of Barcelona for the 1992
Olympic Games (CSD, 1992; Garcia Fen-ando, 1990, 1991; Garcia de la Torre, 1992;
Puig, 1996). The chaotic situation inherited from the Franco period also fostered public
intervention. As such, the 1978 Constitution article 43.3 stated that "it is up to the
public powers to foster health education, physical activity and sport. It should also
foster the most advantageous use of leisure time". In this context, as in other European
countries, sport is recognised as a social need and even a public service.
With the UCD in power, the DNEFD became the Spanish Sports Council, under the
auspices of the Ministry of Culture in 1977. In this early stage of the democratic era, the
Sports Council's budget increased gradually from 6,534 million ptas in 1978 to 8,033
million ptas in 1979 (Cazorla, 1979). The decentralisation process extended also to
sport with elite sport being part of the responsibilities of central government with a
substantial allocation of public funds to governing bodies of sport (sports federations)
and to the provision of new sports facilities, while the promotion of 'Sport for All' was
gradually undertaken by the 17 Autonomous Communities and municipalities (Andres
116
Urban Prozrammes and Sport in Spain	 Chapter Five
and Delgado, 1995; Garcia de la Torre, 1992). At a national level, the political
manifesto of the two most popular political parties (UCD and PSOE) in 1979 agreed
about the need for public sector support to achieve 'Sport for All'. In the same way,
different initiatives such as the 1974 National Congress of Sports Architecture and the
1977 General Assembly of Sport together with the increasing demands of sport by the
population contributed, not without some tensions, to the promulgation of the 1980
Sport Law that conceded significant intervention to public powers (Aguilera, 1992;
Puig, 1996).
Sport could not escape the decentralisation process (see article 148.1 of the 1978
Constitution). Hence, the Autonomous Communities have gradually assumed some
competences, such as the power to legislate within territorial limits, control of
autonomous sport federations; promotion of sport associations and the promotion,
building and management of sporting facilities. In this respect, the Autonomous
Communities built between 30 and 40 per cent of all public sports facilities in the
period 1980 to 1985 (Martinez del Castillo et al., 1989). At the time of writing, only
four Autonomous Communities have passed their law on sport: Madrid, the Basque
Country, Catalonia and Castile-Leon (Garcia de la Torre, 1992). At the same time, the
Spanish Olympic Committee (COE) and national sports federations were recognised as
private bodies with legal status, but still dependent on public funds. In addition, the
1980 Sport Law changed the previous way of funding sports (via football pools) with
the decision to include specific public funds for sports in the state budget (Aguilera,
1992; Puig, 1996). Furthermore, the 1980 Sport Law confirmed physical education as
part of the school curriculum and also regulated the anarchy of sports qualifications
(Devis, 1997). Despite these developments, youth sport was hardly mentioned.
Prior to the advent of the first democratic Councils, the situation of sport at local level
was dramatic with existing sport facilities privately managed together with the complete
absence of any municipal sporting body and minimal sport budgets. Despite this
situation, the prominent role played by City Councils has been generally recognised in
the growth of 'Sport for All' in the early period of democracy (Aguilera, 1992; Puig,
1996). 'Sport for All' became a priority of all Councils with popular events flourishing
in most cities as another way to claim more freedom and democracy. As one of their
first initiatives, City Councils started to launch newly established Sports Departments,
either through direct management via Sport Institutes or indirectly via Foundations
which have also been crucial in the sporting change during the last two decades, in
particular in the planning and management of both sports infrastructure and
participation (Andres and Delgado, 1995; Garcia Ferrando, 1989). In the period 1979-
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1983 alone, nearly 400 Sport Institutes were created nationally. More recent legislation,
the 1985 Local Government Act, states that "all City Councils with over 20,000
inhabitants should create a municipal sports department". Parallel to this public
involvement, sports infrastructure was another priority with municipalities being
particularly active in building sports facilities, mainly swimming pools, football pitches
and `polideportivos' (sports centres of considerable size that can accommodate various
activities). In the period 1970-75 alone as many public facilities were built as over the
thirty years 1940-1970 (Martinez del Castillo et al., 1989). This public involvement in
sport infrastructure has been constantly increasing, as Figure 5.2 illustrates. However,
this boom took place without any legislation and afterwards, in 1980 the Sport Council
launched some recommendations to legislate for all sport facilities whereas the 1976
Land Law had placed an obligation on urban plans to reserve land for building sport
facilities.
Before 1940-1969 1970-1974 1975-1979 1980-1985
1940
Figure 5.2: Changes in sports facilities provision 1940-1985
Source: Martinez del Castillo et al. (1989)
The combination of municipal sport departments, the gradual increase of sport facilities
as well as access to more resources have directly contributed to a gradual increase in
sport practice in conjunction with widening the scope and diversity of tastes (Aguilera,
1992; Martinez del Castillo et al., 1989). Surveys from 1982 to 1991 highlight this trend
with participation in sport reaching 36 per cent of population in 1991 (Garcia Ferrando
1982, 1986, 1991). This manifest itself in the continuing practice of sport amongst the
aged and the spectacular increase in the participation of women. On the other hand, the
reduction of participation in 'community sports' had become apparent by the late 1980s
while sport practised at the individual level has tended to increase. This is a common
international trend (Roberts and Kamphorst, 1989).
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5.8. Urban programmes in the 1982-1995 period of the Socialist government
During the last phase of the political transition the Socialist Party (PSOE) was in power,
from 1982. Its leader, Gonzalez, former president of the Spanish government, claimed
that the PSOE, when in opposition was the only democratic alternative which proposed
fundamental socio-economic reforms to correct the imbalance between social groups
(Arango, 1978; Tusell, 1997). Two of its initial promises were to create an additional
800,000 jobs and to take Spain out of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)
which Spain joined in 1981. Once in power, the Socialist administration, in the midst of
a serious economic crisis, abandoned these commitments, and despite its majority,
speeded up the process of economic reforms previously initiated by Suarez with
economic priorities dominating over social ones (Fernandez Duran, 1996; Petras, 1996;
Tamames, 1995). The Socialist government adopted neo-liberal policies as other
Western European governments did, with great emphasis on bringing down inflation,
controlling public expenditure and industrial restructuring while the fight against
unemployment and the need to improve the status of less-favoured sectors remained a
secondary concern.
After the internal normalization of economic and political life, Spain became a member
of the European Community on 1 January 1986. Some positive effects of entry can be
acknowledged, beginning with the break down of Spain's long-term isolationism.
Economic indicators also improved: from a growth rate of 1 percent in 1982 to 5
percent by 1987; inflation was cut at the same time, from 14 percent to 5 percent;
foreign debt was reduced and the trade balance improved (Santillan, 1993, Tamames,
1995; Tusell, 1997). On the other hand, this integration produced some adverse effects.
The first was to dismantle the protectionist industrial policy inherited from the Franco
period. From that moment onwards, the Socialist government gradually introduced
market mechanisms to improve the competitiveness of Spanish production. The urgent
need to carry out the restructuring of many industrial sectors led to the Socialist
government launching a national re-industrialisation process prioritising some industrial
regions as 'Zones for Urgent Reindustrialisation' (ZURs) (Navarro, 1990; Pascual,
1992). Despite the improvement in macro-economic indicators, these neo-liberal
policies have brought some important social consequences as in other Western
countries; in particular, a substantial escalation in unemployment (from 150,000 people
in 1974 to 2,750,000 people in 1988) to one of the highest in Europe (see Table 5.3).
Two groups have been clearly affected, young people and women. The female rate, for
instance, experienced the sharpest rise since the mid-1970s, especially between 1980-
1985 from 11.4 percent to 27.7 percent (Alcobendas Tirado, 1993; Petras, 1996;
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Santillan, 1993). Finally, despite the fact that the welfare state system as known in most
European countries had never been fully developed in Spain, since 1986 the Socialist
government undertook major reforms in the social security system (Garcia, 1994). One
of these constituted a reduction in the number of people receiving unemployment
benefits from 69 percent (1974) to 42.5 percent (1988) (Fernandez Duran, 1996).
The Socialist government started to suffer a decline in support, beginning in the general
elections in June 1986 and continuing through the European Parliament elections in
June 1987, as well as in 13 of the 17 regional parliaments and in municipal
governments. In December 1988, a general strike against its economic policies (the first
since 1934) was also supported by almost eight million people.
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Figure 5.3: Changes in unemployment 1979-94
Source: Anuario El Mundo, 1995
At the local level, after the 1982 general elections the Socialist government had made a
commitment to secure the financial autonomy of local government through structural
reforms. However the need to control public spending and the costs arising from
regional devolution postponed it again (Gavira, 1994; Page and Goldsmith, 1987). In
the meantime, the 1985 Local Government Act introduced more flexibility for local
government, but may have also resulted in added financial and administrative burdens
by multiplying the number of government tiers involved in providing services. In fact,
most of the functions designated by the Act as belonging to local government (see
article 24) are by no means exclusive to the local level, but are also shared with the
national state and, to an increasing extent, the Autonomous Communities (Garcia, 1994;
Suarez-Pandiello, 1996). Despite having a much more fragmented system of urban
government, there has been a continuous fight about competences and resources
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between the three levels of government.
The 1992 Pacts between the central government and the Autonomous Communities
agreed to transfer more resources to the regional level but not to the local level, which
to date remain underdeveloped (El Pais, 17 July 1998) (see Figure 5.4). Despite the
1988 Ley Reguladora de Haciendas Locales recognised Councils' autonomy to manage
their own budgets; in reality, so far, the Councils do not enjoy much more financial
autonomy and still reinforce their financial dependency on the central government and
the Autonomous Communities. City Council budgets come predominantly from local
rates (47 percent of the whole) and government grants. Their borrowing of money has
gradually expanded over the years (by 1991 it was 12 percent). Nevertheless, central
government and the autonomous communities have limited it to a maximum of 25
percent (Gavira, 1994).
Figure 5.4: Public expenditure by administrative level (%).
In terms of urban planning, the 1976 Act prefigured the 1992 Act. The 1992 legislation
was developed in a period where there were continuous disputes over the respective
competences of the national and regional tiers of government with respect not only to
urban planning but also to other fields. In addition, the 1992 Act established a hierarchy
of urban plans where each plan is required to conform with higher level plans and
require that higher level authorities approve the urban plans at city level. As in other
areas, the autonomy of municipalities in relation to urban planning seems to be limited,
but in reality, no National Plan and few Regional Plans have been prepared (Sanchez
Goyanes, 1994; Keyes et al., 1993).
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At the same time, similar to other European cities, Spanish cities were facing a range of
economic, social and environmental problems, including growing inter-city
competition, high unemployment, social polarisation, housing shortages, transport
congestion or fiscal stress (Ajuntament de Valencia, 1987; CasteIls, 1990). In response
to these problems, an increasing number of local governments have adopted an
entrepreneurialist approach, as the politics of economic development become more
significant (Busquets, 1990; CasteIls, 1990). Cities have also been using strategic socio-
economic plans reflecting the perceived inadequacy of the traditional statutory urban
planning system (Busquets, 1990; CasteIls, 1990; Fernandez Giie11, 1997). A key
component of these Plans has been the investment in high-profile prestige projects (for
instance, the 1992 events —Olympics, Expo and European Culture Capital- or the Bilbao
Guggenheim Museum) as well as the development of partnerships between public and
private organisations to strengthen political integration within urban areas. At the
national level, the Socialist central government through the Ministry of Public Works,
Transport and the Environment, launched a programme 'Coordination of Action in
Cities' (following the public aid given to the 1992 events) to reproduce this integrated
approach in cities like Madrid, Bilbao and Oviedo. This urban programme favoured also
a partnership approach in order to attract private investment to finance urban
development projects mainly located in central urban areas by selling the most strategic
piece of lands, owned by central government (Fernandez Duran, 1996).
Following several years of strong economic expansion with a substantial reduction in
inflation, late 1992 saw a sharp deterioration in Spain's economic situation, one of the
worst recessions for 30 years. The increase in public expenditure contributed
substantially to this situation because of the events of 1992 and an incremental rise in
unemployment benefits. The Prime Minister then, clearly influenced by the 1991 EC
Maastricht Treaty, launched the 1992-1996 economic 'convergence programme' (which
involved drastic cuts in social spending) to address Spain's serious economic crisis. In
November 1993, however, there were demonstrations against this economic strategy
with the government compelled to modify its initial economic plans. Local elections in
May 1991 reflected the steady decline of the Socialist government with the loss of
control over several major cities. This tendency was confirmed again at the general
election of 6 June 1993, when the Socialist government, for the first time, lost its
absolute majority and was forced to sign a coalition agreement with the Catalan (CiU)
and Basque (PNV) nationalist parties. The general elections of 3 rd March 1996 gave
power to the Conservative Party (PP), but without an absolute majority. In this way, the
PP continued with the same coalition partners as the Socialist government had had,
namely CiU, PNV and the Canary Island nationalist parties.
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5. 9. Sports policy in the 1982-1995 period
By the mid 1980s some of the main Spanish cities began to value leisure, sport, culture, and
tourism as part of their urban regeneration processes. Afterwards, the 1992 events held in
Seville, Barcelona and Madrid initiated this trend of using high profile projects to promote
urban renewal and changing the city's image. Nowadays, cities like Barcelona, Seville and
Palma have used sports prestige projects as part of their urban regeneration strategy
reflecting the trend worldwide (Brunet, 1994; Fernandez Duran, 1996).
As noted, the nomination of Barcelona for the 1992 Olympic Games was one of the most
significant factors in sport policy in the 1990s (Puig, 1996; Gonzalez and Urkiola, 1993).
This nomination brought with it substantial financial resources for the city and for the
development of a large number of sports facilities in the rest of the country. Locally, Brunet
in his study of the economic impact of the 1992 Olympic Games notes that public sector
investment totalled 643,613 million ptas (67 percent) while private investment totalled
313,017 million ptas. Nationally, more than 40 percent of 49,000 sports facilities were built
in this decade (Martinez del Castillo et al. 1989). This development was provided with
government funds through the Sports Council in conjunction with the Autonomous
Communities and City Councils. For instance, Councils received 4,446 million ptas from
1986 to 1990 for sports infrastructure (Aguilera, 1992). Parallel to this expansion of sports
facilities, central government gave considerable impetus to a Physical Education Plan
(1987-1992) in order to improve school sports facilities and to provide physical education
teachers for all educational levels. Prior to its initiation in 1987, 86.8 per cent of schools did
not have appropriate sports facilities while 50 per cent of schools also lacked physical
education teachers (Aguilera, 1992; Andrès and Delgado, 1995). At the same time, this Plan
sought to maximise the use of these public facilities installing a 'dual use' philosophy of
recreational access, as in the British context, with local sports clubs and the local
community utilising facilities outside school hours. At the educational level, physical
education was finally recognised as a compulsory subject at all pre-university levels in the
1990 Sport Law.
The 1992 Games also facilitated launching special programmes on sport for excellence and
building National Sports Centres. In this respect, the central government started to value
sporting excellence as a way to improve both Spain's image in the international context,
and internally to develop Sport for All (CSD, 1992). Although since 1980 there had been a
programme for sporting excellence, it is only in 1988 that sporting excellence became one
of the main priorities of the central government. Complementing this public concern, the
same year a privately funded programme called Association of Olympic Sports (ADO) was
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launched to promote the 1992 Olympic preparation of the Spanish teams. In particular,
12,600 million ptas were given by 21 private companies between 1988 and 1992 (Sanchez
Bariuelos, 1992; CSD, 1992) (see Table 5.3). Since its origin, an annual list of top-level
athletes has been drawn up according to selection criteria. In this way, 900 elite sportsmen
and women were initially assisted in 1989, a number which was subsequently reduced to
269 in 1992. The outcome was a substantial improvement in the Spanish performance with
22 medals, almost as many as the 26 achieved in all previous Olympics. This programme
continues, though with a substantial decrease. By 1997, its budget was to be only 1,000
million ptas with 300 elite sportsmen and women included in this Plan (El Pais, 2
December 1996). Not only the Sports Council but also the sports federations and in some
cases, the Autonomous Communities have responsibilities for top-level athletes.
Year CSD ADO Income Total
1988 2,664 1,654 365 4,638
1990 3,534 1,893 985 6,414
1992 3,915 1,735 970 6,621
Table 5.2 Association of Olympic Sport (ADO) 1986-92 (million ptas)
Source: CSD, (1992); Sanchez Baliuelos, (1992).
Public funding for sport as a whole was enhanced from 79,000 million ptas (1987) to
145,000 million ptas (1991). From this amount, 44.7 percent came from City Councils, 22.6
percent from the Sports Council, and the remaining 32.6 percent from the Autonomous
Communities (see Figure 5.5). The size of the sport sector in the Spanish economy has also
been gradually enhanced. In 1992, the value of sport related activity stood at 1,2 percent of
the GDP, similar to other European countries, and the sector as a whole accounting for
150,000 jobs (CSD, 1992; Toria, 1992).
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Figure 5.5. Public funding of sport in Spain 1992.
Source: CSD (1992)
The 1990 Sports Law replaced the 1980 legislation and defines the functions of both public
and private bodies. In the current organisation of sport, (see Table 5.3), above all bodies in
the governmental sector stands the Sports Council (CSD), which implements the
government's policies for sport.
Governmental
•
Non-governmental
Spanish Olympic committee
National Level • Sports Council • Federations
• Professional Leagues
Regional Level • Autonomous Communities • Regional Federations
Local Level • Municipalities • Clubs
Table 5.3 Organisation of Sport in Spain in the 1990s
Source: CSD (1992)
The organic structure of the CSD includes representatives from the central government, the
Autonomous Communities, City Councils, the national sport federations and various
personalities in the field of sport. The CSD sport policy focuses on four different areas:
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sporting excellence, research in sports issues, the promotion and dissemination of physical
education and sport, and the general planning and building of sports facilities (CSD, 1992).
In terms of sport and leisure, it supports physical and sporting activities in co-operation
with City Councils and sports organisations to develop 'Sport for All'. In respect of sport
and education, in addition to developing sports facilities and implementing the Physical
Education Plan, the CSD provides support to specific groups, school and university sports.
Despite all these functions, the CSD concentrates primarily on controlling the national
sports federations to improve the performance of elite sport groups (Aguilera, 1992).
The 55 national sports federations, which are private bodies with legal status, share
responsibilities at the national and international levels with the CSD. In this new sporting
structure, despite the fact that public funds were diminished after the 1992-1996-
convergence programme, elite sport is considered the main priority of the central
government and subsequently, the sports federations have seen their budgets with public
funding increased substantially (international trend reflected by Roberts and Kamphorst,
1989), in particular, from 8,000 million ptas in 1989 to 9,000 million ptas in 1990
(Aguilera, 1992). During the same period, although the Spanish Olympic Committee (COE)
is a non profit-making body, the 1992 Olympic Games provided it with extensive resources.
At regional level, the sports federations limit their actions to the Autonomous
Communities. Finally, the professional leagues were set up under the new sport Law,
specifically, in football, basketball and handball. These professional leagues have legal
status, operational autonomy, the capacity to organise their own events and the power to
enforce discipline within their own clubs. As part of these leagues, the law sets up limited
sport companies (commercial companies with a sports purpose) for those sport clubs or
professional teams participating in official events of a professional nature. Nevertheless, it
is surprising that central government decided in 1990 to write off the debt of all first
division football clubs. To this end, more than 5.900 million ptas were given to first
division football clubs in the short period from 1986 to 1990 (Aguilera, 1992). In the 1990s,
private business enterprises have been becoming increasingly active, in particular,
television rights for football matches have rapidly increased in value, as is the case in other
Western European countries (Toria, 1992).
At the local level, the municipalities operate in conjunction with other public bodies to
promote and develop local sport activities. It is also their responsibility to provide spaces
for new sports facilities, to help build and manage public sports facilities, to develop
programmes of 'Sport for All' and to assist local sports clubs. In reality, municipal sports
departments predominantly are involved in running the 'Sport for All' programmes,
organisation of local events and making sports facilities available to clubs and individuals.
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Levels of sports participation identified in the 1980s continued to rise throughout the 1990s
with a continuing increase in the individualisation and segmentation of tastes together with
a concern with health and lifestyle and a drop in demand for collective sports (Gonzalez and
Urkiola, 1993; Garcia Ferrando, 1991; Puig, 1996). In 1990, for instance, 35 percent of the
population between fifteen and sixty years of age engaged regularly in sports. Football
continued to be the dominant sport, but its growth is explained by the introduction of 5-a-
side indoor football. Other sports such as swimming, cycling, jogging, adventure sports and
outdoor pursuits also have a big hold on participation. Table 5.4 shows the evolution of the
most practised sports from 1990 to 1995. In this process, although since 1968, women's
practice has remained behind that of men, the 1990s showed a substantial increase, with
women seeming to adopt a similar model of sporting behaviour (Bufiuel, 1991; Garcia
Ferrando, 1990; Puig, 1985; CSD, 1992).
1990 1995
Football 28 36
Swimming 39 33
Cycling 15 27
Fitness 14 16
Basketball 23 14
Jogging 15 13
Tennis 18 12
Aerobic 5 12
Mountaineering 4 9
Athletics 9 9
Table 5.4: Changes in the most practised sports 1990-1995
Source: Marca 3 February 1996.
If between 1983 and 1992 the principal objective of sports policy was to gain political
return from the actions undertaken, the 1990s represents a period of rationalisation of
public funding for sport (Andres and Delgado, 1995; Burriel, 1992; Puig, 1996). After
signs of deep economic crisis from 1992 and the launching of the convergence
programme, economic viability in sports management has become one of the main
concerns of public agencies. In addition, despite the general assumption of public
support for sports in the democratic period, public powers have started to introduce a
'new managerialist approach' with respect to the traditional local authority, in
particular, in the management of sports facilities (a trend also reflected in the British
context) (Puig, 1996). Also, despite all of the sport legislation, sporting excellence, to a
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great extent, remains at the centre of all public agency programmes with 'Sport for All'
receiving symbolic attention.
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6.1. Introduction
This chapter seeks to evaluate the emergence and operation of public-private
partnerships for the economic regeneration of Sheffield, Britain's fourth largest city. It
also evaluates to what extent these partnerships constitute an example of the
development of an urban regime in a European context and if does, to consider what the
implications are for the nature of urban politics and sports policies in the city. This
chapter also seeks to outline ways in which sport has been incorporated as part of the
strategies for revitalising its economy as well as providing a new image for the city as a
'city of sport'. Indeed, since the 1991 World Student Games, numerous national and
international events have taken place in one of the few British cities which gained the
Sports Council's title of 'city of sport'. These sports events, together with professional
teams, have been employed by city leaders for different purposes.
The very particular political culture of Sheffield is rooted in the nature of the local
economy and social structure. After the Second World War, the city, traditionally a
leading British industrial city based on the steel and heavy engineering industry, has
often been renowned for its good local services embodied with the ideology of
municipal socialism. However, the collapse of the world market for metal products of
the 1970s with the loss of many jobs in its traditional industries and the interventionist
urban policies of the Conservative central government affected this status. The nature
of Labour politics at the local level has nevertheless been subject to local variations as
well as to change over time within Sheffield. The chronology of Labour politics in the
city since the mid-1970s is best described as falling into three distinct periods: the first
up to 1980, a period of 'traditional Labourism' prevailed; the second from 1980, when
David Blunkett gained the leadership of the local Labour Party (and therefore the City
Council), until 1987, there was a period of new urban left politics in the city; the third
from 1987 to the mid 1990s, there was a period of new 'Labour realism' and co-
operation with business interests, which facilitated the emergence of partnerships
between business and political interests. The following sections of this chapter go on to
describe these stages in political development in the city as the context for evaluating
the formation and operation of public-private partnerships.
6. 2 Local Labour politics and economic policy in the 1970 and the early 1980s
Sheffield traditionally has been left wing with a close association between the local
authority and the unions (Hampton, 1970; Goodwin et al., 1992; Lawless, 1989; Seyd,
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1993). Labour controlled the city, for almost an unbroken period of over fifty years
from the 1930s, signalling the expansion in the post-war years of local services,
especially in the areas of council housing, education and local arts, libraries, and sports
and leisure facilities. For much of this time, Council policies on the whole were related
to consumption rather than production policies, which remained beyond its remit in
central government and private sector hands, reflecting to some degree the 'dual state'
thesis identified by Saunders (1981).
The Local Government Act of 1972 affected the power of local authorities with new
structures being created. Thus, a new body, the South Yorkshire County Council was
established in April 1974, taking on some of the traditional local government functions,
in particular, police, water and fire services. In addition, from the time of world
recession in the mid 1970s, local government also came under pressure from the
Labour controlled central government to reduce its expenditure (Lawless, 1989).
Because of this, relations between Labour central government and the Council
deteriorated sharply. Policies introduced by the Labour central government undermined
Council expenditure, and a growth in local taxes aimed at compensating for expenditure
cuts, resulted in a drop in electoral support of 12 per cent for Labour locally (Seyd,
1990).
At this time, a group of new, younger politicians, the 'New Urban Left' emerged
locally as in a number of cities in Britain (Gyford, 1985). The original members of the
'New Urban Left' in Sheffield included Bill Michie, David Blunkett, Roger Burton and
Peter Price. They were joined later by Joan Barton and Clive Betts (Seyd, 1990; 1993).
The emergence of this group was initially a reaction against the Labour central
government's policies (1974-1979) and later, against those of the Conservative central
government (Darke, 1992; Lawless, 1989; Seyd, 1993). After the failure of Labour
central government to reduce inequalities, the new left-wing Labour leadership elected
in 1980, sought to promote change at a local level. To this end, the Council was
committed to adopt a more proactive role in local economic development. This
approach of greater control of the local economy was summarised in Blunkett and
Green's (1983) 'Building from the Bottom' (see Blunkett and Jackson, 1987) and was
complemented by a commitment to decentralising decision making to local residents.
The policies associated with this interventionist approach included: technology
networks, planning and enterprise agreements, the identification of social needs, and
the encouragement of co-operatives (Darke, 1992; Seyd, 1993). There was an extensive
programme centred around the District Labour Party's manifesto which was the product
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of elaborate discussions between members of the local Labour Group and the District
Labour Party (Darke, 1992; Seyd, 1990). As a result, an extensive local socialist
programme, more wide ranging than the initial workerist commitments of the New Left
leadership, including education, health, the environment, equal opportunity, housing
and recreation and the arts, was developed. In essence, Council direct intervention in
the economy sought to minimise the impact of market forces and also to provide and
maintain the generally high standard of local services. After Blunkett was elected as
Sheffield's Labour leader in 1980, the city became popularly known as the Socialist
Republic of South Yorkshire (Middleton, 1991; Seyd, 1993).
From the beginning of the 1980s, the loss of jobs in the steel industry hit the local
economy very hard. The industrial decline accelerated throughout the 1980s with local
unemployment exceeding the national average from 1981, and growing threefold from
5.1 percent in January 1980 to 16.2 percent in September 1987. In 1971, almost half of
the industrial workforce (around 45,000 jobs) was engaged in the manufacturing
industry, but this had fallen to 24 percent by 1984, with job loss in the metal-based
manufacturing sector being double the rate for the UK, in general between 1981 and
1984 (SCC, 1984, 1993; Smith, 1991; Lawless, 1989; 1994; Lawless and Ramsden,
1990). The effects of the economic restructuring and industrial decline were described
in the following terms:
From the late seventies to the middle eighties we lost in one area of the
city, the Lower Don Valley, 40,000 jobs. It was one major shutdown after
another and it was both the loss of jobs, the rise in unemployment and loss
of opportunities to get new jobs. This demoralised the local population and
changed their view of the city to a negative one.. .most of these people live
in certain areas of the city where unemployment has gone from 5 to 20 per
cent in a period of 10 years. Young and old people with no hopes of
getting another job (Interviewee 14, former leader of the Council, Labour
MP, 21 June 1996).
The impact of unemployment was recognised by politicians and local officials as being
spatially concentrated in certain city wards, especially in the east end (those controlled
by the Labour Party) while the western part (which tended to be middle class) was not
directly affected, contributing to the increasing gap between rich and poor. Thus, in
some of the poorest inner city areas, such as Castle, Manor, and Sharrow,
unemployment rates ranged from 18 to 21 per cent in 1981 (Seyd, 1993):
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[There has been] a huge increase in the divisions [in the city]. For
example, 20 years ago, the ratio between the best and the worst electoral
wards [in terms of unemployment rate] was 2 to 1, roughly 6 to 3 per cent.
The ratio now is 5 to 1, 30 to 6 per cent (interviewee 15, member of the
CLG, 24 June 1996).
Figure 6. 1: Map of Sheffield
The decline of steel-related industry was compounded by the relatively poorly
developed service sector, with growth in the business, financial, and high-technology
sectors being well below the national average (Darke, 1992; Strange, 1997). Despite the
movement to the city of the headquarters of the Midland Bank (2,400 employees by
1988) and the Training Agency (previously the Manpower Services Commission) and a
growth in service jobs of 25,000 between 1971 and 1984, local growth was not only
below the national growth rate, but also behind its to two regional competitor cities,
Leeds and Manchester (Henneberry and Lawless, 1989). As a result, this relatively low
Sport, Urban Regeneration and Urban Regimes: The case of Sheffield 	 Chapter Six
growth in the service sector failed to compensate for the loss of jobs from the shrinkage
in manufacturing employment. If until the early 1980s economic production was
assumed to be the responsibility of central government, in 1981, Sheffield Council
established the Department of Employment and Economic Development (DEED), one
of the first such initiative in the UK, as part of its greater intervention in economic
affairs (Lawless, 1989; Goodwin et al, 1992). This initiative aimed to co-ordinate the
Council's economic and political responses to high unemployment and economic
decline.
The philosophy was very much based around the interrelationship between
public sector regeneration (sic). The turnover of the local authority, 3/4 of
a billion pounds, represented a huge investment. The theory was indeed to
maximise the use of that investment to stimulate jobs across the city. The
DEED and myself tried to put the emphasis in those early days on job
creation, on training and equal opportunity community involvement
(interviewee 21, former chair of SERC and Labour MP, 26 July 1996).
In this context, the Council attempted to maximise public sector-led initiatives as well
as to protect its own workforce (SCC, 1984). The Council was (and still is) thus the
major employer within the city; five times larger than the largest private employer, with
an annual budget of over £200 million (Strange, 1993; Leigh, 1995). However, the
Department's expenditure was minimal, at £1 million (1981) rising slowly to £5 million
by 1988 (Seyd, 1993; Lawless, 1989). By the mid 1980s, the DEED realised that these
economic policies could only have a tiny effect on the regeneration of the local
economy and decreasing unemployment. Lawless states that in the early 1980s, the
DEED only managed to create about 1,000 jobs a year, while more than 1,000 jobs
were lost in manufacturing alone (Darke, 1992; Strange, 1993). In addition, although
Sheffield was at the fore in terms of resistance to the policies of the Thatcher
Conservative government, the local economic strategy failed, as a former leader of the
Council recognised:
A lot of powers were taken from the Councils. The Sheffield UDC was set
up and took power. At the same time massive cuts on grants from central
government. We realised that jobs were not coming back. It took a long
time for people to accept this. We had the initial response of setting up
municipal enterprises and having strategies for the public sector, creating
jobs. But in reality this was never a possibility under the Conservative
government (Interviewee 14, former leader of the Council, 21 June 1996);
and
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The Conservative government regarded Sheffield as an example of how
badly a city can be run by Labour. ..So, very often the Council was
pursuing local initiatives without any help or encouragement from central
government. Blunkett had a left-wing reputation, which alienated many
people from central government (Interviewee 16, Liberal Democratic
Councillor, 24 June 1996).
In essence, urban regeneration under the new urban left was clearly dominated by the
old Fordist coalition between elected politicians and the city's unions with the chief
officers from different Council departments also holding significant power. Local
businesses were not involved directly in city politics, only through their representatives,
in the Chamber of Commerce or the Cutlers' Company. By this time, the city's two
universities did not play a significant role in urban politics (Seyd, 1993) and relations
between the trade unions and the Labour Party on the one hand, and the Council and the
employers and bodies such as the Chamber of Commerce, on the other, were not good,
in part due to the high property taxes in the city.
The Labour Party and the unions were clearly in conflict with the
employers, the employers blaming the employees for inefficiency, the
employees blaming the employers for not running the firms correctly.
Relationships were extremely bad. We said all these jobs have been lost in
the private sector but we can not sack people as well because we are in the
public sector. We raised taxes by 14-15 percent in the years which
followed. Firms then came back and said that if the council raised taxes
they would have to sack more people. By 1983-4 people hardly spoke to
each other, there was real antagonism (Interviewee 14, former leader of
the Council, Labour MP, 21 June 1996).
6. 3. The development of partnerships in the City
Following the failure of a strategy of confrontation with central government in the
late 1970s and early 1980, the antagonistic, anti-business politics of traditional
Labour was rejected by the Labour group, and a new strategy of collaboration
with local capital was initiated in the mid 1980s (Lawless, 1989; Seyd; 1993;
Strange, 1993). In 1987, Clive Betts replaced Blunkett as Leader of the Council,
and although both had been members of the new urban left group that had taken
control of the Labour Party and Council in 1980, Betts' accession to power was
seen as a watershed. How much of a watershed this really was is debatable, since
the Sheffield Labour Group, under the leadership of Blunkett had already begun to
make overtures to the city's business interests.
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In the mid 1980s, the Tories were in power [in national government] and
things got quite difficult and Clive Betts took over. Clive was generally
regarded as being 'right wing' on the Labour Party. He is pragmatic and
had a different view, and instead of playing the role of socialist who will
never get in bed with businessmen, Clive took the view that he had to
drive a different kind of politics because he wanted to show that he was a
different kind of leader (Interviewee 17, Council leisure officer, 5 July
1996).
Traditionally, relationships between the Council and the business groups had been
difficult. However, by the mid 1980s, there was a recognition by most of the interested
parties that the economic and industrial decline had had a profoundly adverse impact on
the city, particularly, on the Lower Don Valley area, and that local government alone
could not hope to redress the problem. Informal meetings then initiated the process of
co-operation to develop a regeneration strategy for the city after recognising mutual
dependency, as indicated by a former leader of the Council:
In the early 1980s, there was a recognition between the education sectors,
the industrial and commercial leaders, and the political leaders that
something had to be done about the economic, industrial decline. It was an
economic necessity that forced them to come closer together than they had
been in the past. By 1985, we came to recognise that we had to start
working with the private sector and there would be no possibility of
significant redevelopment unless all the elements of the city work together
(Interviewee 14, former leader of the Council, Labour MP, 21 June 1996).
The first informal approach between the Council and business groups was in 1983
when Clive Betts and John Hambidge (Chief Executive of the Chamber of Commerce)
shared a trip to China (Seyd, 1990, 1993; Strange, 1993). As part of this initial contact,
some local government officials, in particular John Darwin, were regarded as important
in the promotion of coalitions with business interests (City Council officer, 5 July
1996). At the same time, this shift in attitude from the Council was also replicated by
individual members in the Chamber of Commerce. Seyd identifies these leading
business people as Richard Field (senior vice president), Norman Adsetts (junior vice
president), Bev Stokes @resident) and John Hambidge (see also Strange, 1997). As part
of the process of building confidence, other initiatives such as the Ranmoor Church
Forum were established in 1986, which provided a common ground where politicians
and businessmen could meet. The Chamber of Commerce created an 'Image Working
Party' with Council officers as members, regarded by Strange as the embryonic
partnership association, to examine the internal and external image of the city.
Formalisation came in December 1986 with the establishment of the Sheffield
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Economic Regeneration Committee (SERC) in the Council's Department of
Employment and Economic Development (Lawless, 1989; Seyd, 1990; Strange, 1993,
1997). This coalition brought together those organisations that had taken part in initial
contacts, including representatives of the City Council, local business community, the
trade unions, higher education institutions, central government agencies, and local
organisations. The aim of the coalition, as stated in the principal planning document it
produced, Sheffield 2000, was to develop a long-term economic regeneration strategy
for the city, with a particular focus on the Lower Don Valley. This recommended the
diversification of the local economy around manufacturing, information technology,
environmental protection, public services, culture industries, and sport. Coalition
partners, meanwhile, were also united around the idea of creating a new city image,
which stressed a competent, collaborative leadership (Strange, 1993, 1997), though
SERC was City Council-led.
The Council may take the lead in inviting people and we tried to select a
representative group.. .Regarding the Games, the Chamber of Commerce
appointed the people and we developed the new facilities for the Games.
We had a trust set up responsible for the operation of the facilities. So they
were two representative key bodies and the Development Corporation
came in its own right. The two universities were also involved with bodies
like the Health Authority playing a lesser role (Interviewee 14, former
leader of the Council, Labour MP, 21 June 1996).
A Labour MP and former board of the SERC noted about the contribution of the
Council and the Chamber of Commerce in this initial coalition:
Producing reports, commanding general agreements, which resulted in
finance coming into the city which, was important. SERC had its backup
offices in the City Council and the Chamber of Commerce used to write
reports and it had officers working for that committee (Interviewee 21,
former board of the SERC and Labour MP, 26 July 1996).
The traditional allies of the Council (the unions) initially played a role in the coalition,
but gradually their contribution declined:
They lost a lot of members and some of the more weighty leaders at this
time like Bill Owen (Transport) and George Caywyn (Engineering)... By
the end of the 1980s, the reality was that the unions had little influence at
that sort of level, because they were involved in bodies like SERC and not
in other partnerships and did not bring a lot of power to play anymore. But
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the Council would invite them to bodies like the TEC, but they were
neither invited to join the Sheffield Development Corporation nor to play a
part in the Games (Interviewee 14, former leader of the Council, Labour
MP, 21 June 1996).
In March 1988, another public-private partnership, Sheffield Partnerships Limited, was
established to unite the main actors within the city around a commitment to local
economic development and the fostering of an entrepreneurial climate (SCC, 1988).
The partners involved in Sheffield Partnerships Limited were representatives from the
City Council, the Chamber of Commerce and the Cutlers Company and it was generally
accepted as an outcome of the Chamber's image initiative (Strange, 1993, 1997). This
came to fruition through other initiatives such as the private sector-led investment bank,
Hallamshire Investment Limited in 1988 which incorporated local businessmen and the
City Treasurer as directors, with the aim of encouraging and developing local economic
development initiatives. As part of the regeneration process and following the
recommendation of commercial consultants that a flagship project be required to
spearhead the drive for regeneration, the city developed a successful bid in 1987 to
stage the 1991 World Student Games. This project stemmed from the partnership
process (business and civic leaders together put forward the bid to the governing body
of the World Student Games), and both groups further contributed to partnership
activity. However, the Games were also the source of divisions that began to appear in
the partnerships established as the Games approached.
Previously, a major coalition crisis threatened to appear after the introduction of the
Sheffield Urban Development Corporation in March 1988. This non-elected agency
was set up with a seven year budget of £50 million, and the sole power to execute
development policies in the deindustrialised area of the city (Lower Don Valley),
leading to market-led, property-based regeneration. Local government planning powers
were thus suspended over this area, in the interests of developing an economic
regeneration package. This agency imposed by central government against the wishes
of the Council, undermined SERC's partnership plans for regenerating the area and
promoted the notion that business enterprises provided a better motivator of economic
development (Seyd, 1990, 1993; Strange, 1997). This formed part of the central
government strategy to redirect urban regeneration to the private sector excluding local
governments. Initial Council antagonism towards the Sheffield Development
Corporation was evident, since SERC (rather than the Sheffield UDC) was seen by the
Council as the appropriate body to promote local economic development. As a former
chair of SERC stated:
137
Sport, Urban Regeneration and Urban Regimes: The case of Sheffield
	
Chapter Six
I am sure that our preference through SERC was that the regeneration
would continue to have a city wide context, and channelling so much
under a different administration into one area of the city [ran counter to
this]. We did not feel, and still do not feel, that this was the most effective
way of channelling those funds into Sheffield. At first, the Council was
very worried at central government imposing its will on a particular area
of Sheffield, which was the Council's responsibility (Interviewee 21,
former chair of SERC, Labour MP, 26 July 1996)
Notwithstanding this view, it was recognised that central government funds (estimated
in £350 million) would not be available to undertake the regeneration of the Lower Don
Valley unless co-operative arrangements were reached (Seyd, 1990, 1993). Therefore, a
pragmatic co-operation was adopted and the Council initially agreed to collaborate with
the Sheffield Development Corporation and later on, with another central government
agency, the Training and Enterprise Council (TEC), in 1990. The agreement with the
Sheffield UDC was contingent on the following mutual concessions: (1) the UDC
would expand its activities beyond the Lower Don Valley; (2) the Board members of
the UDC (which included three local businessmen, three Councillors, a local newspaper
representative, and an ex-Sheffield Labour MP) would incorporate representatives of
SERC; and (3) the Council would modify its opposition to a proposed out-of-town
(£230 million development) shopping centre (Meadowhall) which received planning
permission in 1987 commencing operation in 1990 largely under the control of a local
entrepreneur, Eddie Healey (Middleton, 1991; Seyd, 1990, 1993; Williams, 1997).
Subsequent experience has suggested that the Meadowhall complex has had some
negative impacts on the city centre development, and the UDC's planning statement A
Vision of the Lower Don Valley reawoke the Council's fears that industrial
development would be subordinated to service sector development, and the UDC would
promote an additional out-of-town retail park (Seyd, 1993). The fears of the Council
were echoed by members of the Chamber of Commerce, and by two large city stores,
all of which were concerned that the proposed retail park would deepen economic
depression in the city centre. Thus, as this issue illustrates, despite their mutual
adjustment, the tensions between the Council and the UDC were never far from the
surface. The differences in strategy, which were suspected, or emerging, between, the
UDC and the other members of the city's coalition illustrate some of the difficulties
inherent in the construction and sustaining of such a project. At the time of writing, it
was expected that the UDC would be replaced in 1997 by a new body, the Sheffield
Regeneration Agency set up by the Council, but "not just limited to one geographical
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area" (Interviewee 18, a representative of the Chamber of Commerce, 5 July 1996).
Although the Games produced the first significant coalition between the Council and
the commercial sector, the ensuing financial problems associated with the Games
"temporarily reduced confidence in partnership" for all those involved (interview with a
member of the Liaison Group, 24 June 1996). As part of the process of overcoming
these differences and with a new leader in the Council (Mike Bower), the major
organisations of the city came together again in late 1992 under the umbrella of a new
partnership body called the City Liaison Group (CLG):
When the Games were finished and also the Council had a new leader
...(he) felt it important to have a new vehicle for partnerships and this is
why he created the City Liaison Group (Interviewee 15, member of the
CLG, 24 June 1996).
The evolution of partnerships from the SERC to the Liaison Group was considered a
logical step, according to the former leader of the Council. The Liaison Group evolved
from the broad membership of the SERC (24 members) to a small group of 12
members, and was described by both a member of the Liaison Group as moving from a
'talking shop' (i.e., the SERC) to a more 'active role' (Liaison Group). The function of
the Liaison Group was described as acting as a forum in which interested parties could
formally exchange ideas and information "to ensure that plans for regeneration do not
just stay plans and make things happen" (interview with a representative of the
Chamber of Commerce, 5 July 1996):
The leaders come to the meetings, the institutions support what we are
doing and all contribute financially to the cost of the Liaison Group
(Interviewee 15, representative of the Liaison Group, 24 June 1996).
The Liaison Group had no executive power, no resources, and a small staff (as SERC
had had); yet as one member described it, the very fact of partnership was recognised as
empowering: "if we all agree to do the same thing that gives us power in a different
sense". The Liaison Group included some individuals and representatives of groups at a
senior level in the city that previously had been involved in partnerships. These were
the Council, the Chamber of Commerce, central goverment agencies (the Sheffield
UDC and the local Training Enterprise Council), the two city universities, the Cutlers
Company and the Sheffield Health Authority (see Sheffield City Liaison Group, 1994).
A former senior local Councillor suggested that the most positive feature of the new
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organisation was that the two universities were to take a more proactive role in the
economic development. This is also relevant because both universities are among the
largest employers in the city (Leigh, 1995). But particular groups, (e.g. opposition
political parties, small employers) and individuals (e.g. the Chief Constable) who might
have been anticipated as members of a wider coalition were finally excluded from the
partnership.
The fact that the Universities came in, the Liaison Group was really on the
agenda of the Vice-Chancellor of Sheffield University, Gareth Roberts.
His view was that if we are going to have a liaison which is going to
influence policy you must be represented by the top people of each
institution, not some chap who is down the line...The two Universities
have an influence because they are the major source of intellectual
resources as well as they have close connections with the Labour Party
(Interviewee 1, former city Director of Sport, 4 June 1996).
As part of the activities of the Liaison Group, a strategic plan The Way Ahead,
incorporating both the economic and social regeneration within the city, was developed
in April 1994. At this time, the economic and employment potential of sport was
apparently given greater relevance in the Liaison Committee (Sheffield City Liaison
Group, 1994). A discussion paper Shaping the Future (January 1995) also focused on
social regeneration and as a result of a process of open consultation, a new plan
Sheffield Growing Together was published the same year. This plan represented an up-
dated version of The Way Ahead (Sheffield City Liaison Group, 1995).
Despite tensions and differences amongst coalition partners, which were acknowledged
by interviewees, there did appear to be a general unanimity and consensus on the
improvement of image, economic growth, and the attraction of inward investment
within the partnership (as in SERC) (Interviewee 18, member of the Chamber of
Commerce, 5 July 1996). Although the Liaison Group was seen as certainly 'led' by the
Council (as SERC was), the significance of contributions from the other coalition
partners was acknowledged by representatives of all constituencies at the interview.
This consensus was reflected in the strategic plan published by the Group, Sheffield
Growing Together (Sheffield City Liaison Group, 1996).
The Council clearly is the most important actor because of its democratic
legitimacy and we got our legitimacy from this. All the institutions are
important in different ways. The UDC not only has its own planning
powers but also a lot of money to regenerate the Lower Don Valley. The
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TECs have significant sums of money and the private sector is desperately
important for us through the Chamber of Commerce and the Cutlers
Company (Interviewee 15, member of the Liaison Group, 24 June 1996);
and
The Liaison Group is driven by the Council who decides who should be
members. We like to believe that the Liaison Group could take the lead.
Realistically it does not appear to...We do not see a real partnership there
(Interviewee 20, a representative of a community group, 25 July 1996)
As a representative of the Liaison Group admitted, in this public-led partnership, the
participation of the private sector remains more opportunistic than with a real
involvement in city—wide initiatives (Interviewee 15, representative of the Liaison
Group, 24 June 1996). In addition, one of the Labour MPs also pointed out that: "the
private sector has not come forward with a significant amount of risk capital to
regenerate the city, but they have enjoyed being brought through into the partnership
committee taking the credit of being close to the decision making". Despite the central
position of the Council, the participation of the private sector within the coalition was
nevertheless considered important in attracting external funding (particularly from
central government and European funds) which would favour its developmental agenda
(see Strange, 1997). In this way, the representative of the Chamber of Commerce
described the abilities to network and broker as the attributes which local business
interests were expected to bring to bear on the Liaison Group:
The business sector adds credibility to any proposal for regeneration, for
attracting funding and it also has added a large measure of practical
experience and a keener, sharper economic focus. The Council realised
that particularly here, because of its reputation, they needed our credibility
to succeed. I think that it has worked to some extent.. .A lot of people in
the private sector think it should be more private-sector driven and feel
that there is an element of being invited into the partnerships for the sake
of appearances and when it comes to the crunch their views are not always
heeded. But it is infinitely better than it was... Therefore, if you look out of
your window and you see that the city is not successful and one of the
reasons for that it might be predominance of left-wing views on the
Council and you have the chance to moderate their views by going into
partnerships, you will say yes. Because at the end of the day, you will
benefit from proper infrastructure, easy access to customers, to suppliers
both locally, national or internationally.. .when you choose where to place
a business these are very important factors and you will be crazy not to
take a chance to enhance your lot. Partnerships are seen as a way of having
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some influences in that process (Interviewee 18, representative of the
Chamber of Commerce, 5 July 1996).
Despite the failure of two previous bids for City Challenge Grant funding (developed
on a partnership basis) put forward by John Major's Conservative government,
Sheffield was finally awarded 04.4 million from the government's Single
Regeneration Budget (SRB) over 7 years period and from the European URBAN
initiative for 4 years. The SRB aims to improve the most socially and economically
distressed areas, though, only three inner city areas in the Northwest benefited.
However it was recognised that the city could not rely only on external funding:
We have to create jobs from growing our businesses. I think that whatever
successful you are with inward investment it is not going to solve our
problems. We have 30,000 local people unemployed and it is unrealistic to
think that we are going to create 30,000 jobs through inward investment
(Interviewee 15, representative of the Liaison Group, 24 June 1996); and
Central goverment and indeed European funding do have an influence
regarding the determination of priority areas for investment. The idea of
this funding is to kick start things (Interviewee 18, representative of the
Chamber of Commerce, 5 July 1996).
As in other city initiatives, and despite its importance, representatives of the voluntary
sector were excluded from the decision making. This was strongly criticised by a
member of one of the extensive number of community groups in the city:
The SRB is now going to become a private company in Sheffield with the
Council and TEC as the shareholders and other partners as board
members. As we understand it, the voluntary sector will have some
representation on the Board but in the negotiation process it was clear that
some issues would not be addressed...The Council and the TEC have
excluded the voluntary sector from any involvement (Interviewee 20,
member of a community group, 25 July 1996).
Even though the proliferation of partnerships around the economic regeneration in the
1980s and 1990s have succeeded in changing the city's image as well as attracting
substantial external funding, Seyd (1993) notes that one of the weaknesses of the
coalition strategy has been to give higher priority to development projects rather than
the city' s human resources. The commitment to social regeneration from the Liaison
Group was minimal due to "the lack of resources to develop an understanding of the
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needs of particular local communities" (interviewee 15, a member of the Liaison
Group, 24 June 1996). The same representative stated: "we have to focus on city wide
issues and trying to create the conditions in which other organisations can tackle local
issues". In particular, all the interviewees agreed that the rate of local unemployment
(still 12 percent in 1994) and social polarisation has not substantially changed and still
remains high (Sheffield City Liaison Group, 1994). Thus, a former leader of the
Council noted that "there are some parts of the city where youth unemployment is still
15 percent and this one of the things that we have not sorted out". Similarly, the impact
is also highly uneven spatially with some traditionally poor wards such as Burngreave,
Castle, Manor, Park and Sharrow still having a high unemployment rate (about twice
the Sheffield average), while others which are better off such as Hallam and Ecclesall
have an unemployment rate of less than half the average (Sheffield City Liaison Group,
1996). Additionally, one of the Labour MP summarised this issue by saying:
The social aspects have been very difficult mainly because the Council has
had its budget cut all the time and it was a problem that we
recognise.. .There is a lot more to be done in making sure that the
regeneration benefits poor people but this is something that the Council
cannot do without some government support. We could have been more
successful if we would have had more abilities as a Council (Interviewee
14, former leader of the Council and Labour MP, 21 June 1996).
Regarding the longevity of the Liaison Group, it was expected to discuss its future since
"all its agreements will expire in March 1997" (interviewee 15, representative of the
Liaison Group, 24 June 1996). Nevertheless, at the time of writing and with a new
Labour central government in power, it is difficult to predict the Government's impact
on not only the nature of the coalition but also on the power of Councils. Thus, prior to
the elections, some Labour MPs forecast that a new Labour central government would
give greater recognition to the role of Councils in local economic development
strategies.
Despite the formalisation of different coalition arrangements in the last few years and
although relationships between local authority and local business have improved since
the mid 1980s, there is still a residual lack of trust between the Council and the private
sector. The problem has not yet overcome "if we select someone from this University
the other University will be upset, if we have some from the Council, then the business
sector will be upset" (interviewee 1, former City sports officer, 4 June 1996). What is
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clear is that the proliferation of coalitions of various kinds around the economic
regeneration in the 1980s and 1990s, enduring for various lengths of time, has become
a significant feature of the city's economic development strategies. As we shall see in
the following section, such coalitions as well as the shifts in the political culture of the
city from the 1970s to the 1990s also were also reflected in the politics of leisure and
sports in the city.
6. 4. Sports Policy in the City
In the sole and brief period that the Conservatives took power in the city (1968), the
city's Recreation Department was created and incorporated services such as arts,
museums and libraries as well as sport and active recreation (Taylor, 1990). Prior to the
Games, sports provision in the city was very much 'community' orientated, concerned
with sport as welfare (Coalter et al., 1988), but heavily reliant on an ageing stock of
leisure facilities, which had not benefited from investment, largely due to financial
constraints (Renshaw, 1993). One of the members of the Recreation Department (5 July
1996) argued that this lack of investment was not typical of British cities in the 1960s
and the 1970s, and that this continued throughout the 1970s and 1980s with sport
receiving little capital investment for new public sector facilities. Indeed, Sheffield had
not built a major new sport or leisure community facility since 1975 (SCC DEED,
1990). This could be explained by the decline of central government funding and local
government's inability to raise local taxes. By the beginning of the 1980s, the city was
served by a network of facilities, many of which were dated and in need of repair or
replacement. In particular, Gratton (1989) pointed out that while swimming
participation was growing in the country generally, Sheffield's demand was in decline
due, principally, he argued, to the general low quality of the city's pools.
When the Council was exploring new ideas to regenerate the city's economy in the
early 1980s, the Economic Development Department initially advocated an approach
based on a return to manufacturing, but some members of the Recreation Department
began to suggest a move towards service industry and leisure. In 1984, the Recreation
Department produced a report, titled Leisure Challenge: A Prospect for the Lower Don
Valley (Sheffield City Council Recreation Department, 1984), to replace the lost
manufacturing industry, contributing to economic regeneration and job creation
(Taylor, 1990). In the mid-1980s, the SERC commissioned Coopers and Lybrand
consultants to investigate ways and means of regenerating the Lower Don Valley. One
of the recommendations of this report was to focus on the idea of developing one or
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more flagship projects that would clearly demonstrate the city's commitment to
regeneration and to the changing image of the city. It was in this context that the
proposal to seek the nomination for the 1991 World Student Games emerged. Prior to
the Games, local Councillors used Indianapolis as a model of a city that had embarked
on a sports strategy for rebuilding its city centre and changing its image (Rosentraub et
al., 1994; Rosentraub, 1997).
We went to Indianapolis to monitor the impact of sport in a city that
attempted to regenerate itself after the car industry decline. They built major
sports facilities with professional teams, which have attracted a lot of
crowds and created secondary expenditure. We then thought that it may
work here (interviewee 6, former chair of the Recreation and Leisure
Services Committee, 6 June 1996).
The attraction of the 1991 Games to Sheffield has been described as the result of the
enthusiasm of two men: Peter Price, Chair of the Recreation and Leisure Services
Committee, and Gerry Montgomery, the city's Director of Sport (Seyd, 1993; Solley,
1991; Taylor, 1990) whose support for the project appears to have been influenced by
personal circumstances:
In the middle 1980s, people started to take on board our plan for the eastern
part and the next thing that happened is that the Assistant Director for Sport
in the Recreation Department, who was married to a Yugoslavian woman,
went on holiday to Zagreb in 1978 when the Games were being held there.
He saw this event and started to think, this is interesting, and maybe
Sheffield could do something like this. So, Gerry came back with a twinkle
in his eyes about the Games and started to talk to Peter Price and we got the
Games (Interviewee 17, Leisure Services Department officer, 5 July 1996).
Thus, the concept of Sheffield as an 'urban sports centre' and tourist attraction,
boosting the city and restoring civic pride, quickly developed (Gratton, 1989; Roche,
1992; Dobson and Gratton, 1996), with the Games as a key element for urban
regeneration. Gratton suggests that the Games were:
A means of transforming the local economy, firstly through the immediate
economic impact of tourists during the Games and on a longer-term basis
through a change of image from a northern industrial steel city to a
modern service based economy.
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It was expected that the Games would improve Sheffield's international reputation and
attract investment, while at the same time providing the city with state-of-the-art sport
and leisure facilities (Bramwell, 1997; House of Commons, 1995; Seyd, 1993). It was
also believed that these facilities would be heavily utilised by the local population and
therefore, the level of participation in sport, particularly for indoor sports, would
increase. All these effects were summarised by Peter Price:
Sheffield as the venue for the World Student Games will bring prestige and
world recognition and as such the city will benefit economically from an
expansion of its tourist market, with the city being established as a national
and international venue for sport. With its range of high quality leisure
facilities, the city will be established as a leading destination attraction. This
will also make a contribution towards the local economy by the spending
multiplier (Price, 1990).
In November 1986, the Council approved a bid, believing that the cost of rurming the
Games would be met by generated income and the capital costs of the facilities would
be met by government grants, charities, and private sources (Foley, 1991; Roche,
1992). The decision to bid for the Games was taken without prior economic impact
analysis, or consultation to ascertain the opinion of local residents regarding the public
funding of this event (Bramwell, 1997; Dobson and Gratton, 1996). However, by 1988,
new central government legislation constrained the Council's capital borrowing and
spending, with central government unwilling to support this event financially. This
meant that EC grants could not be gained since matching funds would not be available.
The city faced a critical dilemma and at the time estimated that at least £110 million
was needed to develop the facilities for the Games. A private trust was created to run
the facilities and to access private funding. This private trust, the Sheffield Leisure and
Recreation Trust (SLRT), was established in March 1988 to provide the facilities and
manage their future use. The capital was raised through foreign bank loans with a
twenty-year repayment period (Loftman and Nevin, 1996; Seyd, 1993). Subsequently,
two subsidiaries of the SLRT were established with different roles: firstly, Universiade
(GB) Ltd. was to administer and raise finances for the Games and secondly, a joint
public-private board, Sheffield for Health Ltd, was to manage the Games and two of the
major facilities (Ponds Forge Swimming Pool and Sports Centre and the Don Valley
Athletics Stadium) (see figure 6.2); a further major new facility, the Sheffield Arena,
was put in the hands of an American company, Sport Marketing Group International
(SMGI) sub-contracted to Sheffield for Health Ltd. This was the only new facility,
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Figure 6. 2: Location of World Student Games facilities within Sheffield
Source: Bramwell (1997)
The Games involved the largest sports facilities construction programme seen to date in
Britain, with a total cost of the Games estimated at around £180 million. Construction
of the new facilities accounted for nearly £150 million, with £27 million required for
the running of the event itself (Bramwell, 1997; Middleton, 1991; Roche, 1992). Except
for the Arena, which was funded with £34 million by SMGI, the Council underwrote
the rest of the construction. In addition, refurbishment of the Lyceum Theatre, as part of
the Cultural Festival of the Games, was also funded to the tune of £12 million
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(Bramwell, 1997; Loftman and Nevin, 1996). By mid-1990, only £500,000 had been
raised, and Universiade (GB) Ltd. was forced to cease trading and wound up with debts
of nearly £3 million. Event organisers in 1991 were only able to achieve a small
proportion of the income targets predicted in 1990 for the areas of sponsorship, ticket
sales and merchandising (15%, 45% and 18% respectively). A negotiated television
sponsorship contract with British Satellite Broadcasting was lost, when this company
amalgamated with Sky TV in 1990. Subsequently the Games never secured major
national television coverage (Dobson and Gratton, 1996). Consequently its ability to
raise commercial sponsorship was severely limited. After all these setbacks, in June
1990, the city was compelled to take direct responsibility for the running of the Games.
Prior to the Games, several studies were undertaken to estimate the economic impact of
this event to Sheffield's economy. One of these studies, commissioned from Cambridge
Economic Consultants in 1989, predicted the creation of 1,436 jobs locally in a period
of approximately 2.6 years (3,672 job years), with an estimated 4,068 further job years
for operating the facilities after the Games (Foley, 1991). Foley argued that the number
of jobs predicted was clearly overestimated. He forecasted 1,250 jobs in the local
economy and 2,163 in the region. The facilities were expected to generate an additional
390 jobs in each year following the Games. In essence, these figures represent a small
number of jobs when considering the high level of public investment. However, a
former city Director of Sport justified the use of the Games by saying:
The economic impact has been significant. It has been carefully
analysed...whether they are marketing very well is another issue. The
WSG have only ever been portrayed as a financial disaster, they lost £10
million, but when you are re-building a new city, spending £150 million in
facilities and £10 million on marketing is nothing. They did not handle it
very well, the local authority felt that central government should have
helped them (Interviewee 1, Former City Director of Sport, 4 June 1996).
After the Games, no study was commissioned to evaluate their actual economic impact
in the local economy (Bramwell, 1997; Dobson and Gratton, 1996). As a result, the
city's commitment to the Games was criticised as a high-risk strategy, being politically
expedient but financially questionable (Darke, 1992; Roche, 1992). With respect to this,
a representative of the community groups (25 July 1996) stated: "the District Auditor
Report actually slammed the Council for the way that the Games were handled". But it
was not only the District Auditor, but also the Council's Chief Executive and the
Internal Audit Service, which criticised the operation of the event. It was also criticised
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as being the product of a lack of consideration of alternatives (Critcher, 1991). Because
of the escalation of the facilities costs from £110 million in 1988 to £147 million, the
payment of debt charges commenced in 1992 and was rescheduled to end in 2013, with
every adult paying an additional £25 annually in local tax (Darke, 1992; Dobson and
Gratton, 1996). At this time, local (Sheffield Star, 1991; Sheffield Telegraph, 1991) and
national media, in conjunction with national government (Conservative) and local
(Liberal Democrat) opposition parties were very critical of the Games. The city's
external image (improvements of which was one of the objectives outlined before) was
negatively affected (Bramwell, 1997; Roche, 1992). Thus, despite the fact that the
media seems to play a prominent role in partnerships in some British cities (Lawless,
1989) and in American cities, this was not evident in Sheffield.
The local media generally got quite a lot of mileage out of this. They could
give you great stories about the Masters Swimming Championships and
next week when there is no big event they ask people how they feel about
the fact that there are not many social services because all this money has
been spent in these new facilities. You also got the opposition of political
parties like the Liberal Democrats locally and the Conservatives nationally
saying in the Houses of Parliament that Sheffield is an incompetent city
(Interviewee 17, Leisure Services Department officer, 5 July 1996); and
We had some bad publicity after the Games, which is a bit unfair. We ran
the Games on budget.. .when we were plarming for the Games, the national
economy was doing quite well, but by the 1990s, we were in the middle of
recession, and we couldn't raise the £10 million in co-operative
sponsorship. £10 million of the actual Council's budget of £600 million is
nothing.. .We ended up having to pay the money back over a very short
period of time. That's not been sorted out. Despite all the difficulties there
have been substantial benefits, I think that it was the right thing to do
(Interviewee 14, former leader of the Council, 21 June 1996).
The debt of the Games and the constraints imposed by central government have
considerably reduced the local spending in the traditional local provision of services,
with the closure of local libraries, community recreation facilities and parks. At the
political level, despite the increase in support of the Labour Party nationally, Sheffield
represents a case where, since the Games, the reverse has occurred. Most of the
interviewees took the view that there was a possible link between the lack of funding in
certain areas of the city with the reduction of local services, and the loss of support for
the Labour Party (see Table 6.1, which shows the outcomes before and after the
Games).
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It is due to a number of factors: one is the psychological effect of the Games
and the sporting facilities. It gave the impression that the Council was
concentrating on one particular area of policy and ignoring everything else.
It is a very unfortunate coincidence that with the exception of one Councillor
in Hillsborough and one in Wharncliffe, the North of the city is Liberal
Democrat and those areas have not received any money yet. After the
Games the people got fed up with the Council because they ignore
everybody else ...Voting trends in the last few years would indicate that
perhaps, in the next 3 years, the Liberal Democrats will control local urban
politics (Interviewee 20, member of a community group, 25 July 1996); and
The attempt to create major sporting facilities meant that money has to be
withdrawn from other funding programmes. It has been unpopular in some
areas. Politically speaking the east of the city is still a Labour stronghold,
the western part has become Liberal Democrat which was a direct
consequence of the investment that Labour has made (Interviewee 16,
Liberal Democratic City Councillor, 24 June 1996).
City Council Elections
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Table 6.1 Sheffield MDC Councillors Elected 1973-92
Source: Seyd (1993, p 155)
According to Seyd, the local public-private partnerships held up surprisingly well
throughout the pre and post-Games period. However, the SERC did not survive the
post-Games stresses and strains, even though the local business community had
remained largely supportive. Only one prominent local businessman, Bev Stokes,
transgressed the convention established in 1986 that criticism of members of the
partnership should not be voiced in public by appearing on a national television
programme that was heavily critical of the Council. There was also, however,
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opposition to the Games from within the District Labour Party and from within the
Labour Group. Seventeen Labour councillors, once they became aware of the deficit
the Council would have to meet, voted to reduce the size of the Games and one, Peter
Duff, (former Deputy Chairman of the Employment Committee) resigned from the
Council ostensibly in response to this issue (Seyd, 1990; 1993; Strange, 1993). The
schism in the local Labour Party has been described as a divide between visionaries
who were politicians committed to the development of the city in a new mould, and
traditionalists who argued for increased social expenditure rather than investment in
sport (McColl, 1994). Furthermore, political opposition was not the only opposition to
the proposals. During the Games, a group that called itself the 'Stuff the Games' group
demonstrated publicly against the staging of the Games in Sheffield. Thus opposition to
the Games came from a wide variety of political backgrounds but not (critically) from
local business, which from the mid 1980s paid business rates set nationally rather than
locally and were therefore relatively unaffected by the cost of local government
expenditure.
The principal justification of the high level of public sector expenditure on the Games
promoted by urban leaders was that these would bring long-term benefits, especially to
the local population. However, the Games and subsequently the cost of running the
major sports facilities also had an enormous effect on the community with a
considerable dissatisfaction with the closure and the deteriorating condition of
community facilities. Another effect was the concentration of leisure and sport
provision at fewer facilities, with disadvantaged people having difficult access because
of the high entry price especially to the Ponds Forge leisure pool and the cost of travel
into the city centre. Sheffield was one of the first local authorities to introduce a
'Passport to Leisure' in 1985, which is a discount on the full charge for the old and new
facilities, but for the worst off, the Council offers the 'Gold Passport to Leisure' Card
which provides an even greater discount. The Council pays for it and underwrites this
card scheme:
Most leisure facilities these days are not cheap. It is very difficult for a
family to use swimming pools... The perception of local people is that now
the facilities are very expensive because the Council subsidised things
very heavily in the past, but they are not so expensive now (Interviewee
19, Leisure Services Department City Councillor, 9 July 1996); and
Everything seems to be situated outside the centre or in the south of the
city apart from Hillsborough. This effectively cuts off half of the city as a
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market place, because if someone wants to use Ponds Forge and lives at
Chapeltown, it is £2.10 for a return ticket plus the entrance
fee... Community sports facilities have been neglected in order to support
major sports facilities (Interviewee 20, member of a community group, 25
July 1996).
In addition, the use of the major facilities has also put more emphasis on the
requirements of major sports events rather than on the needs of local residents for
recreational participation as a member of the Leisure Services Department officer
recognised:
We do not have any particular policy to encourage the use of facilities after
events. Basically people are given information about when the facility will
not be available, and when it will be next available. It is a major problem, I
am responsible for two sports development schemes (swimming and diving)
and any time that there is a major event in Ponds Forge, our schemes just
stop. We do not have other small local facilities to absorb this on a temporary
basis (Interviewee 5, Leisure Services Department officer, 5 June 1996).
The leader of the Council, Mike Bower, sought to redress the loss of political support
by placing more emphasis on the links with the community in order "to make the
Council more accessible, more accountable" (interview with a representative of a
community group, 25 July 1996). This is also reflected in the recent change of "the
chair of the Leisure and Tourism Committee, Mike Pye, who was sacked as the person
responsible for the Council policy on major facilities and replaced by Councillor
Nicholson, because a change in the direction was needed due the potential dangers of
closing community facilities" (Interviewee 16, Liberal Democratic Councillor, 24 June
1996).
When the goverment announced its local government 'Spending Assessment Levels'
in 1990, the implication for Sheffield in 1991 was that the Council had to reduce its
budget by £35 million (Taylor, 1990) (Spending Assessment Levels are figures
published by central government which represent what the government assesses to be
the spending requirements for each local authority, given local circumstances, to
provide an appropriate standard of services. Spending significantly beyond these levels
attracts either a penalty and/or the imposition of a financial 'cap' or limit on local
expenditure). As a consequence, the Recreation Department had to reduce its services
by one fifth. However, Taylor (1990) suggests that in terms of local government leisure
policy, this combination of legislation and spending constraints imposed by central
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government should be seen as a catalyst for development, rather than as a crisis for the
city's leisure service. A Council officer also reflects this opinion in comments:
As the government constrained budgets, the local government became
unable to fund the previous level of local provision. Services started to
suffer, as did some very old facilities around the city. The dilemma was
whether to continue to fund recreation services when the budgets were
being reduced. The conclusion they came to was that they have to replace
the facilities with new ones, and they will need to be attractive enough to
encourage people to pay more... and the whole concept of building
facilities that could be used for events came along because it was possible
to subsidise community recreation programmes by making a profit on
events (Interviewee 17, Leisure Services Department officer, 5 July 1996).
New ways of running the old facilities by Community Trusts were developed and in
particular, three community swimming pools represent a different managerial role with
respect to the traditional bureaucratic local authority:
At the King Edward Pool, four local businessmen decided to form a
Charity Trust to keep it open. Since then, the Trust has made £100,000 to
re-invest in maintaining the building. ..which it would not be able to do
under the local authority control. This example should be replicated at
other local facilities through partnerships with or without local authority
involvement. However, the other two pools have not developed as well as
King Edward (Interviewee 17, a member of Sheffield University, 17 June
1996).
The stock of old community facilities was to remain under the direct control of the
Leisure Services Department, but the new facilities were to be operated by the Sheffield
for Health Trust. A Leisure Services Department officer described these two different
leisure operators as the "Sheffield Harrods and Woolworths syndrome":
...The new facilities are Harrods and the older facilities are the cheap
Woolworths. It illustrates the differences which occurs when an awful lot
of money goes into the support of the new facilities and a lot less is spent
on the old ones (Interviewee 5, Leisure Services Department officer, 5
June 1996).
In April 1995, Sheffield for Health was replaced by a more commercial-like, private
company, Sheffield International Venues Limited (SIVL) owned by the Sheffield City
Trust (see figure 6.3), but with any operating loss underwritten by the Council. As one
153
Sport, Urban Regeneration and Urban Regimes: The case of Sheffield 	 Chapter Six
of the representatives of the Recreation Department relates, the change of name from
Sheffield for Health to SIVL represented an attempt to further free the operator of the
major facilities from the bureaucratic and employment constraints of the local
authority-type operations to which Sheffield for Health had been subject:
The city was obviously concerned about the level of subsidy that they had
to put in [and] perhaps the financial under-performance of the facilities.
But it was also a concern for the facilities' operators about flexibility and
the ability to sort of deal with the things in the way that they wanted to do,
and there was a mutual agreement that some changes were needed. A new
company has been established (SIVL), a new chief executive has been
appointed and shortly the whole operation, will change, whether it does
change very much remains to be seen. When it was Sheffield for Health,
they were still having a lot influence from the Council, about how the
company should operate, how to target groups. Now, that it is SIVL, there
is probably greater freedom for the company to decide what markets it
wants to be in, what services, what prices (Interviewee 5, Leisure Services
Department officer, 5 June 1996); and
SIVL is being developed...to...become a genuine operating company
and.. .which would be virtually independent of the Council except for the
debt guarantee. But the idea is that SIVL will become independent and
profit making, and the more profit it makes, the more impact on that debt-
repayment. So this becomes a net positive for the Council and not a drain
(Interviewee 11, member of Sheffield University, 17 June 1996).
A personal communication from a member of the new company (Letter, 20 February,
1997) explained in more detail the conditions of this agreement: "the importance of the
amendment is that the Trust and SIVL are not and must not be seen to be owned by the
Council. Such an arrangement would destroy the Trust's ability to be the borrower of
the original capital and financial and legal arrangements would collapse. The Council's
legal connection with the Trust and SIVL is that the board of each has one Councillor
respectively representing the city's interests. The law requires that the Council's
representation should not exceed 20 percent of the total number of board members".
However, the setting up of the new company was severely criticised during interviews
with representatives of the community groups and a representative of the Liberal
Democrat Group on the Council because this organisation was going to be considerably
less accountable to the Council. The classic tension between flexibility and revenue
maximisation, on the one hand, and public service priorities and accountability, on the
other, was evident in the cleavage between the partnership members and the Liberal
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Democrats and some community interests.
The leader of the Council (Mike Bower) was very surprised that there was
no opposition to the creation of the SIVL, when the Liberal Democrats
were denied information because of commercial confidentiality. However,
this private company is publicly administered and if you are not on the
board you do not have a say. SIVL is going to be the same with the
Council having a token two or 3 representatives on a board of 10 or 12
(Interviewee 20, a representative of a community group, 25 July 1996).
Besides the World Snooker Championships held at the local Crucible Theatre every
year, since 1991, one of the areas on which the city has focused, is the staging of
national and international sport events. Over 300 major events ranging from World
Championships to regional events have been held in the city, attracting 700,000
competitors and spectators and with an estimated £31 million income boosting the local
economy since 1991 (Sheffield City Council, 1995; Williams, 1997; Sheffield
Telegraph s
 2 June 1995). In 1996, the city hosted the European Football Championships
(Group D) and the sixth World Masters Swimming Championships. Gratton (1998)
estimates that both events attracted 67,000 competitors with a £9.5 million income.
Related to this economic activity, the Liaison Group started to value the economic
potential of sport to enhance local growth. In addition to the already established
professional football teams such as Sheffield Wednesday (the world's oldest football
club) and Sheffield United, new professional teams are operating in the city, in new
emerging sports (ice hockey and basketball). In addition, the Sheffield Eagles (a rugby
league premiership club) came to the city in 1996 (located in the Don Valley Stadium).
According to a former city Director of Sports (4 June 1996) "Sheffield Sharks
(basketball) was created only because of the facilities". The ice-hockey team (Sheffield
Steelers), based at the Arena, represents an interesting example of how a sport with a
low profile in Britain, can, in Sheffield, gain attendances of 8,000 spectators per match.
This phenomenon was based on a good marketing campaign:
The ice-hockey people have done a very good job in the short term... in
the first 2 or 3 years, they were literally throwing tickets to get people into
the Arena. They managed this at the same time as they have gradually
built up a successful team. (Leisure Services Department officer, 4 June
1996).
The accompanying Table 6.2 provided by Dobson and Gratton (1996) offers a useful
summary of the benefits and costs of the Games:
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Benefits Costs
1. Economic rejuvenation
2. Unparalleled set of facilities in Britain
3.Attraction of major international, national and
regional events
4. Tourism development
5. National Success of sporting teams grown out
of WSG facilities
6. Improved infrastructure
7. Organisational skills to host major events
8. Development of a thriving retail and cultural
quarter
9. Attraction of governing bodies of sport
10. National and international TV exposure
11. Designation by Sports Council of 'City of
Sport' status
12. Renewed confidence in Sheffield and the
development of a sporting 'feel good factor'
1.	 Financial:	 £147m	 for	 facilities,	 £10.4	 m
running costs
2. Under-utilised facilities
3. Polarisation of participation between rich and
poorer sections of the community
4. View that the Games damaged the interests of
the working class majority of the city who expect
from the council decent housing, education and
social services
5.	 Increasing	 debt	 charges,	 associated	 with
financial mismanagement of the Games
6. Employment opportunities scarce
7. High admission prices to facilities
8. Lack of community based facilities, threatened
closures and parks in disrepair
Table 6.2. Benefits and Costs of the World Student Games
After the Games and alongside sports facilities development and a major sport events
strategy, an idea based on the links between the local and national dimension around
sport emerged, leading to the development of the Sport Sheffield Project. Originally,
the aim was to host national sports teams or squads in the city, which would influence
local community sport development and attract government money. To this end, in
October 1992, the Council submitted a bid of £188,000 to the central government body
(The Foundation for Sports and the Arts) to fund a four-year local community
programme. The overall cost of the project was estimated at £230,000. However,
official correspondence from the Department of National Heritage (DNH) to one of the
Sheffield MPs on 20th May 1993, stated that this project should be implemented
"without assuming grant-aid from national funding channels such as the Sports Council
and the Foundation for Sports and the Arts". However, although the bid for money to
support these activities was unsuccessful, the idea of formally linking groups involved
in sport in the city was developed into the Sheffield Sports Association (SSA) which
was originated at the two city's universities and in the City Recreation Department after
the Games, as a representative of the Sheffield Hallam University related in the
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following paragraphs:
Sheffield Sports Association started as informal meetings with people
from the Universities, the Colleges and the Recreation Department. We
conceptualised, we wrote it down in notes and we held press conferences
to publicise the idea. So, a certain amount was achieved, not a great deal.
We found that possibly we could have achieved more if we formalised a
bit more and we recognised from the beginning, that we really needed to
generate a resource so that somebody had the time to manage it and chose
people to get things going. That is when we wrote the memorandum for
co-operation and got everybody to sign up; and
We thought that it would be a good idea to have some academic activities
around sport. The Don Valley Stadium naturally would be the logical
home with some classrooms and laboratories. We actually tried to
establish that before the Games, we even bid for sponsorship. At that time
it costed £.1 million to create an extension to the Stadium, but we were not
able to raise that money (Interviewee 7, representative of the Sheffield
Hallam University and member of Sheffield Sports Association, 6 June
1996).
The Sheffield Sport project was officially launched to the members of the Chamber of
Commerce on 20 November 1992. On 16 May 1994, a memorandum of co-operation
was signed, and the SSA was established. This coalition of sports interests include two
members of the Council, two members of the City Trust, two representatives of the
universities, one representative of the Chamber of Commerce, a representative of
Sheffield College and two representatives from the Hospital Trusts. However, at the
time of writing and according to a member of SSA, this coalition is academically
driven, with little involvement of the private sector:
...amateur, almost unofficial, it has no resources, it has no power, and it
does not control anything... The only contribution that goes into Sheffield
Sports Association is the time of the people, and, the formal contribution
is from the local authority who are designated as chairing the meetings of
Sheffield Sports Association ...Right now, the two universities are doing
the work on behalf of the potential partners which includes the two
hospital Trusts and the Council (Interviewee 7, representative of the
Sheffield Hallam University, 6 June 1996); and
We have tried to get involvement and support from commercial sports
operator without much fortune. The local business community always say
yes when it comes to support sport in the city but always sat back and
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waited to see what happen.. .but they have been prepared to take advantage
of any business opportunities that is presented to themselves (Interviewee
19, Leisure Services Department City Councillor, 9 July 1996).
In contrast to the limited contribution of the private sector to the running of the
Sheffield Sports Association, it is in the Cultural Industry Quarter where its
contribution has been much greater as one of the Labour MP related: "...with a lot of
small companies (e.g. music, film, and so on) that have settled down there and are
investing their own money" (Interviewee 21, Labour MP, 26 July 1996). Following the
establishment of Sheffield Sports Association, the (British) Sports Council announced
plans to invite cities to bid for the title City of Sport, which, for a bid to be successful,
would involve a city demonstrating its commitment to providing facilities for and
hosting major events and promoting sports development (Sports Council, 1995). In
1995, Sheffield became the first city to obtain this title (closely followed by
Birmingham and Glasgow). Although the benefit of obtaining this appellation is limited
to its symbolic value, the construction of the bid demonstrated a common sense of
purpose for these different groups:
All the major agencies in the city recognise that having national City of
Sport status would actually help in attracting major events, in attracting
resources nationally associated with sports development either through the
Lottery or through specific initiatives like the BOA. This status was also
like a credential to apply for these funds and it will put us a step ahead on
cities that did not have it (Interviewee 11, Member of Sheffield
University, 17 June 1996).
Despite the absence of a substantial economic impact study of sport over the last five
years, and little empirical data to justify public investment in sport, Sheffield, in its
second phase of sporting development after the Games, has failed in its bid after
ambitious plans were rejected by the Sports Council such as the extension of the Don
Valley Stadium (declined by the Sports Council), the National Stadium (which is to be
located at Wembley in London), the National Basketball Centre (decision postponed),
the National Ice Stadium, for staging the 2002 Commonwealth Games (to be held in
Manchester). However, the coalition of sports interests around Sheffield Sports
Association anticipate that Sheffield would at least be nominated as one of the regional
branches of a National Academy, if not as the hub site of the Academy itself. In mid
1998, after a long period of debate about the model of the United Kingdom Sports
Institute and two rounds of competitive bidding and with a new Labour government,
Sheffield was finally nominated to be the hub site of a regional network by the
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Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport. It was intended that should Sheffield
be nominated as the hub site of the UKSI, the Sheffield Sports Association would
evolve into a limited company, the Sheffield Sports Institute (see Figure 6.3) with the
primary thrust of "running the British Academy of Sport and all associated services"
(Interviewee 7, representative of the Sheffield Hallam University and member of the
Sheffield Sports Association, 6 June 1996) and would be charged with maintaining the
various activities and provisions that are associated with maintaining the City of Sport
title. Thus a member of the partnership forecasts:
The Institute Company will arrange the appropriate programmes of
activities for the British Academy of Sport, for the local sports clubs, for
local and regional, national governing bodies and deliver those services at
a rate. Basically you have money coming in and direct revenue income
generated through the British Academy of Sport programme or revenue
income from university students or revenue income for providing services
for the local professional clubs (Interviewee 7, representative of the
Sheffield Hallam University and member of SSA, 6 June 1996).
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Figure 6.3: The Emergent Organisational Structure for Local Authority-Owned
Sports Facilities
A city Councillor (Leisure Services department) and a member of the Sheffield Sports
Association described the structure of the proposed company:
In essence, it would be a Trust (SIVL) with representatives from both
universities, the Council and the Hospitals (possibly). It may be that at a
later stage, not at the bidding, we will look to involve members of the local
business community. The business sector is not particularly represented on
the Sheffield Sports Association (Interviewee 7, representative of the
Sheffield Hallam University and member of the Sheffield Sports
Association, 6 June 1996).
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Academy of Sport
Though the government's policies are placing emphasis on developing elite sports, the
creation of this new company will attempt to combine both elite sports and 'Sport for
All', as a member of the Sheffield Sports Association explained:
Sheffield Sports Association or some strategic group may be attempting to
steer what is going on here in this company around the excellence domain
but through this route you are still trying to influence that.. .1 envisage that in
10 years time, the city will promote community recreation. We are going to
find £50 million for the next 5 years perhaps to setting a set of community
recreation centre networks around the city perhaps tied to schools to
promote grassroots sports (Interviewee 7, representative of the Sheffield
Hallam University and member of SSA, 6 June 1996).
This individual also has indicated how the different partners would contribute within
the new structure:
	.)
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If the universities teach students within the complex, either they would put
capital into it, which does not come from the (new national) Lottery, in
which case they own part of the company, or they do not put capital in it,
but they lease the teaching accommodation from the parent company in
order to do what they have to deliver, but they also undertake to deliver
any of the teaching that the Institute requires. Similarly, SIVL are already
putting their facilities at the Institute's disposal. So, they would use those
facilities to.. .draw money from there (Interviewee 7, representative of the
Sheffield Hallam University and member of the Sheffield Sports
Association, 6 June 1996).
However, the structure of the new company will not include responsibility for broader
sport development:
It (the Sports Development Unit) has no defined responsibilities to operate
on the kind of scale envisaged for the Institute, it would not play a role in
the sense that if you set up this Sport Sheffield Institute as part of the
British Academy structure, the Sports Development Unit is a very small
group with a very small budget within the local authority and as such is
not a key player in this game (Interviewee 7, representative of the
Sheffield Hallam University and member of the Sheffield Sports
Association, 6 June 1996).
This separation of sports development (essentially developing opportunities for sports
participation in the city, sports as welfare, as opposed to elite sport) from the
management of the new facilities highlights the potentially divisive nature of the
proposals put forward. With reference to figure 6.3, responsibility for those older sports
facilities which remain in the city, and for the Sports Development Unit is retained
within the traditional bureaucratic structures of the Leisure Department of the Council
(illustrated on the left-hand side of the diagram). Sport as a welfare function is thus
maintained in the traditional manner of running public services. A 'new managerialist'
approach (see Farnham and Horton, 1993; Leach et al., 1994) is, however, evident in
the mixed public-private management of publicly owned facilities which are operated
either for profit or as a means of fostering economic development (represented in the
lines of responsibility cited down the right-hand side of figure 6.3).
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6.5 Concluding comments
In the Sheffield context, the crisis of Fordism associated to the global economic
restructuring of the 1970s and the local government policies of the Conservative
Central Government brought about severe socio-economic problems to a city
traditionally dominated for much of the post-war period by a coalition between the
Labour party and the city's unions. For a brief period at the beginning of the 1980s, the
new-left wing Labour in the Council presented a distinctive and alternative economic
and political response to the crisis of the local economy, but with little involvement of
the local business community in local politics. In the post-1987 period, under the new
leadership of Clive Betts, the case of Sheffield appears to represent a shift from the
prepartnership characterisation of Sheffield as a city of political division and economic
decline to a new period of Labour realism associated with the proliferation of different
public-private partnerships and the promotion of a series of prestige projects as part of
the distinctive policy response to overcome the problems associated to the economic
restructuring, central government urban policies and the limited capacity of the
Sheffield Council to promote urban change (see Strange, 1997). All these factors
contribute to explain the emergence of a symbolic regime in the Sheffield context.
After recognising that the previous opposition from the City Council to local business
interests in strategy-making was likely to be counterproductive, there was an emerging
awareness of mutual dependency between the public and private sector for carrying out
urban development projects in the mid 1980s. By this time, the research revealed that
there was a nearly general agreement in respect of the programmatic goals for
regenerating the local economy as well as changing the image of the city. As will be
explained through the prism of Stoker and Mossberger's (1994) conceptual framework
in the concluding chapter, the implementation of the development strategies and the
formation of a 'symbolic regime' between local government and business groups were
far from straightforward.
After an embryonic partnership approach was initiated with the 'Image Working Party',
the first governing coalition was formalised with the establishment of the Sheffield
Economic Regeneration Committee in 1987, though this was in opposition to the
Central Government imposed Sheffield Development Corporation. Despite initial
struggles, which threatened to emerge after the setting up of the Sheffield Development
Corporation in 1988, the power of social production was ultimately exercised, and all
parties incorporated in the symbolic regime co-operated in an attempt to attract the
1991 World Student Games.
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The shifts in the political culture of the city alluded to above were reflected also in the
politics of leisure and culture in the city. Sport and sports politics, as a 'non-political'
activity, was seen as something that members of the symbolic regime could identify
with. The Leader of the Council, Clive Betts, played a central role in formulating and
promoting the city's development strategy while Councillor Peter Price was identified
as important in the promotion of the Sheffield's regeneration flagship scheme, the 1991
World Student Games. Therefore, in the period of New Labour/ new realism the
opportunity to use an international sports event such as the 1991 World Student Games
as a catalyst to attract inward investment and provide a new identity through sport was
readily accepted by coalition partners in SERC. However, some elements within the
business community, and within the political community (including some members of
the local Labour Party) were opposed to the symbolic message of the sports city
strategy developed through the World Student Games. A number of Labour Councillors
thought that such expenditure of money should be directed more towards the provision
of traditional local services.
Though the partnership approach adopted is claimed to have succeeded in changing
Sheffield's image of industrial decline and political division, the commitment to social
regeneration from the symbolic regime was minimal. Indeed, different commentators
argue that social polarisation in the city has not substantially changed and still remains
high. In addition, the case of the 1991 World Student Games may help to illustrate the
negative impact of using an ambitious urban project, which burdened the local
population with a long-term debt repayment. Regardless of the tangible and intangible
benefits that sports related projects can bring to cities such as Sheffield (e.g. economic
rejuvenation, attraction of major sports events, formation of new professional teams or
attraction of one of the new regional branches of the British Academy of Sport), the
1991 World Student Games also brought with it some considerable costs, partly
exemplified by financial mismanagement (the f 1 0 million debt), reductions in public
services and higher prices in local services. In addition, the financial problems
associated with the Games reduced confidence in SERC. With a new leader in the
Council (Mike Bower), the Sheffield City Liaison Group was established as a second
phase of the development of the symbolic regime. The Games also involved the
debureaucratisation of leisure services with the formation of private companies (e.g.
SIVL) and trusts to operate some of the facilities opened for the World Student Games.
This new approach to management of the public sporting infrastructure contrasts
markedly with the city's older remaining sporting facilities that were to operate under a
traditional public sector ethos.
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7.1 Introduction
As in the case of Sheffield, this chapter seeks to examine urban governance and sports
politics in Bilbao to uncover the implications for the nature of urban politics and cultural
and sports policies in the city. It also sought to outline ways in which culture attractions
have been used as part of the policy responses for revitalising its economy as well as for
promoting itself as a major culture centre, in particular, through the siting of a new
European Guggenheim Museum.
It will be argued that the material manifestation of an urban regime in Bilbao, and the
struggle to shape it, are reflected in the activities surrounding five key events, which are
chronologically described as follow (see Figure 7.3). The first relates to the development of
a Strategic Plan for Metropolitan Bilbao produced by the Basque Government together
with the Bizkaia County Council in 1989, but which excluded the Council from its
deliberations. As a consequence, during the period 1987-1990, when Mayor Gorordo
(PNV) was in power ongoing disputes with both the Basque government and the central
government took place over who should lead the regeneration process. At the same time,
the Council developed a second, 'alternative', approach to urban regeneration, which when
rejected forced his resignation in 1990. The arrival of a new Council leader, Ortuondo
(PNV) facilitated the adoption of a more collaborative approach between Bilbao Council,
national government, the Basque administration and business interests. The third key event
was the establishment of the first private-public partnership, Bilbao Metropoli 30, in 1991
after Ortuondo gained the leadership of Bilbao Council. Such partnership was a coalition of
the thirty local authorities of the Metropolitan Area, which also includes the Council, in
association with the Basque government, the province of Bizkaia and the private sector.
This Association was launched to implement the Strategic Plan for Metropolitan Bilbao,
which Gorordo had opposed. The fourth event was the establishment of a new public-led
partnership, an urban development corporation type organisation, Bilbao Ria 2000 (in
1993) by the Spanish central government in conjunction with the Basque authorities to
promote the regeneration of Bilbao and its metropolitan area. Finally, the same year, the
fifth key element, a City Urban Plan was approved. An account of the investigation of
urban governance in the city is given in the following sections of this chapter.
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7.2 A recent history of Bilbao
Founded 700 years ago, Bilbao is Spain's fifth largest city and second largest port. The city
of Bilbao is at the core of the Metropolitan Area of Bilbao, which includes some 30 towns
and municipal districts around the Nervion River and a population of nearly a million
inhabitants. Bilbao is located at a site on a bend in the Nervion River just inland from its
mouth, nestled in a green valley surrounded by steep hillsides limiting the physical
expansion of the city. The industrial revolution arrived in Spain via Bilbao at the beginning
of the 19th century. Afterwards, commercial and industrial companies such as Euskalduna,
the Bank of Bilbao, or Compariia Maritima of Nervion, together with high-class residential
development grew up around the centre of the city. The combination of a long commercial
tradition, financial and investment capacity, and manufacturing led to the city's rapid
industrialisation. As a result, considerable capital was attracted to the city, placing Bilbao in
a powerful economic position.
Over the years, the gradual expansion of the city centre, approved in 1891, has led to an
amalgamation of out-lying areas such as Begoria and Deusto. This expansion connects both
sides of the Nervion River, which became a symbol of the city's industrial landscape. The
river divides the city in two and, as such, is the centre-piece of the whole area with a
combination of industrial and residential uses. The industrialisation process not only
affected the city physically, but also led to socio-spatial division of the population, with the
working class people situated predominantly on the left side' of the river, while the
business and residential areas were located around the centre of the city and on the 'right
side' of the river (Arpal and Minondo, 1978; Clemente, 1981; Leonardo, 1989).
In the 1960s and the 1970, Bilbao was characterised by rapid industrialisation, population
growth and unplanned urban development. During this period the city, renowned for its
steel and shipping industry, enjoyed virtually full employment and the highest levels of per
capita income in Spain. At this time, the industrialisation of Bilbao and Bizkaia produced
"50 percent of the total Spanish shipping output and 70 percent of the steel production"
(Interviewee 17, ICV politician, former mayor of the city, 2 February 1996) which
contributed to the economic growth of the rest of the country. This economic growth
attracted immigrants in large numbers into Bilbao, which made a real impact on the
population. This incoming population was located in peripheral neighbourhoods,
predominantly Recaldeberri, Zorroza and Txurdinaga (Escudero, 1990; Leonardo, 1989)
(see figure 7.1). However, the rapid urbanisation of these neighbourhoods was not always
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regulated by the Council which provoked large scale deficits in housing and other public
services as in other major Spanish cities (Escudero, 1990; Gonzalez, 1993; Leonardo,
1989).
Figure 7.1: Map of Bilbao and Surrounding Districts (1. S. Ignacio; 2. Deusto; 3. Uribani; 4.
Zurbarin; 5. Txurdinaga; 6. Begona-Casco Viejo; 7. Santutxu; 8. Bilbao La Vieja; 9. Abando; 10. Indautxu; 11. Amezola;
12. Recaldeberri; 13. Basurto-Olabeaga; 14. Zorroza).
Source: Leonardo (1989)
The steel and shipping industries started running down by the world recession of the 1970s.
This situation was aggravated by the negative effect of the political situation and terrorism
which have undermined the local economy with profound effects on the socio-economic
structure in the form of massive unemployment, plant closures, systematic divestment in the
Basque Country, growing marginalisation, and the creation of derelict areas on both sides of
the Nervion River. In the period 1975-91, 37 percent of the city's industrial jobs were lost
including the loss of 39.7 per cent of manufacturing jobs in Bizkaia County Council
(Caravaca and Mendez, 1994). At its peak in 1986 the unemployment rate in Bilbao stood
at 25 percent and it is still high. According to the Deiker Institute at the city's Deusto
University, the impact of the de-industrialisation process hit hardest at those under twenty
five years (with an unemployment rate of more than 50 percent for this age group) and
contributed to an increase in the traditional social divisions in the city with 14 percent of
population deemed to be suffering severe poverty (Deia, 11 October 1994; Leonardo,
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1989). Thus, the effects of the industrial decline were described at an interview by a former
mayor of the city in the following terms:
From 1976 to 1996, job losses have decreased from 200,000 to 85,000. This
situation is not ideal considering that local people under 20 years old can not
get jobs, people over 52 years old, are not working anymore, and living with
70 percent of their former income after the Altos Hornos closure.
Unemployment is higher than the official figure of 25 percent (Interviewee
17, ICV politician, former mayor of the city, 2 February 1996).
Concurrent with the socio-economic impacts of industrial development, the environmental
conditions of many residents were negatively affected. As a local Councillor explained:
"the industrialisation process around the Nervion River was not compatible with quality of
residential life" (Interviewee 2, PNV City Councillor, 16 January 1996). Subsequently,
industrialisation led to a divorce of the city from the river. The Nervion River has been the
source of the city's wealth, but also of its environmental ruin, with industries and harbour
facilities located along the riverbanks. Many of these activities are now closed or have
become obsolete. Moreover, the city itself (see table 7.1) and the Metropolitan Area have
both experienced population loss and outward migration.
1970 1981 1986 1991 1995
410,490 393,759 381,506 369,839 313,661
Table 7.1: Change in the population of Bilbao (1981-1995)
Source: EUSTAT: Censos de PoblaciOn and Padrones Municipales.
Despite the city's continuing role as the financial capital for the north of Spain, this has not
been able to compensate for the loss of industry. After leading the industrialisation process
over the last century, the Basque private sector, following the industrial decline, relocated
to other areas of Spain such as "Sagunto (Valencia) [Altos Hornos of Mediterraneo] or
Cadiz [Astilleros Espatioles]" (Interviewee 5, HB City Councillor, 31 January 1996). As a
result, the central government took ownership of some of the major companies and sites in
the city, which coincided with the national Re-industrialisation Process. The Basque
Country and in particular, the Nervion River area were considered as areas for urgent
reindustrialisation. In 1989, 123 projects were developed with an investment of nearly
64,000 million ptas and creation of 3,342 new jobs (Navarro, 1990; Pascual, 1992).
However, the re-industrialisation in the Basque Country was completely different to that in
other areas of Spain and faltered "because of the degree of politicisation between central
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government and the Basque institutions. This fact negatively influenced the attraction of
private funding" (interviewee 19; a member of the unions, 8 February 1996).
At the local level, despite the economic decline and the rising levels of unemployment in
Bilbao and along the left bank of the Nervion River, the Basque institutions did not
recognise the magnitude of the problem until the late 1980s when urban regeneration
became an important policy area (Rodriguez, 1996). This lack of institutional action was
justified in part by "the de-centralisation process which postponed any wide-ranging action
by the Basque institutions and the disputes between the Basque government and central
government" (Interviewee 2, PNV City Councillor, 16 January 1996). The PNV and the
Socialist Party (PSOE-PSE) in Euskadi as well as the Council were also blamed "for the
closing down of major industrial companies...without a plan to generate employment"
(Interviewee 14, IU City Councillor, 30 January 1996). This view was reinforced by a
former mayor of the city by saying, "there has not been enough encouragement to defend
Basque industry.. .and continuous blame has been placed on the social climate and Madrid
(central government), but there is also a local responsibility" (Interviewee 17, ICV
politician, former mayor of the city, 2 February 1996). Hence, according to another local
politician, "the PNV has not promoted substantial investment in Bilbao. In fact, Bilbao has
suffered from a lack of investment from both the central government and the Basque
government" (Interviewee 5, HB City Councillor, 31 January 1996). Alongside the complex
political situation has been the negative effect of terrorism which was generally accepted as
a significant barrier to the development of a 'good business climate' in the city. As a
representative of the National Conservative Party (PP) put it:
The political situation and the terrorism have reduced private investors'
interest in the Basque Country. It is said that Basque businessman went to
Japan seeking foreign investment for the Basque Country and the Japanese
considered the Basque Country as the second most dangerous area in the
world after Libya (Interviewee 10, PP City Councillor, 1 February 1996).
The fear of terrorism may be more imagined that real but exists and companies such as
Daewoo, Rolls Royce and VW were cited as examples of multinational companies
declining to locate in the Basque Country. As a local politician noted: "the only barrier to
success is terrorism and how it will affect the private investors. Without terrorism, I am
sure Daewoo's car company would be here" (interviewee 9; PSOE politician, 30 January
1996). However, a representative of HB minimised the effect of terrorism on private
investors and thus the urban regeneration process by saying: "except Madrid and Cataluria,
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there is no other area of Spain with more private investment than the Basque Country"
(interviewee 5; HB City Councillor, 31 January 1996).
7.3 Politics and the decentralisation process
The complexity of local politics in the Basque Country requires additional explanation. As
related in chapter 5, after a long period of centralised political control, the 1978
Constitution favoured a gradual shift of governance to the autonomous regions, which
awarded a special historical status to the Basque Country. Three tiers of government were
created within the autonomous community: the Basque government itself, the (historic)
Provinces (Diputaciones, equivalent to English County Councils) (Bilbao falls within the
Province of Bizkaia) and the local Councils.
The Basque Statute of Autonomy was passed in 1979 and regional elections held in the
early 1980s allowed the PNV, (founded in 1895), to take control with a minority vote.
However, the institutional competition between the Basque institutions over who should
lead the political process within the Basque Country has had important political
consequences (Juaristi, 1996). One of them was the resignation of the former lehendakari'
(president) Garaicoetxea of the Basque government after his victory in the 1984 autonomic
elections. An internal political crisis within his own political party (PNV) between
'regionalists' and `provincialists' about which level of government, either the Basque
government or the County Councils should have more power and resources, was the main
reason for his resignation. This dispute was made more acute by the fact that provincial
rights include important fiscal privileges, which allow the County Councils to collect local
taxes in the place of central government. As a consequence of this inter-organisational
rivalry, in 1986 the PNV split and the former lehendakari Garaicoetxea formed a new
political party, Eusko Alkartasuna (EA). Another political consequence was the resignation
of Mayor Gorordo in December 1990. In regard to the inter-governmental rivalries, a local
politician commented:
The arrival of the Basque government during the 1980s was very influential:
firstly, it needed to design its own policies and secondly, there was a lack of
co-ordination between all three levels of government (within the Basque
Country) with a dispute about attracting more responsibilities. Recently, the
Historical Territories Law has been approved which defines the
competences to be adopted by both the Basque government and the County
Councils. However, this law had a political cost with the split of the PNV
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based on different models of the conceptualisation of the Basque Country
(Interviewee 10, PP City Councillor, 1 February 1996).
Afterwards the PNV was also forced to share power in a succession of coalitions, albeit
always as the main partner. In the three tiers of government, at the time of the research, the
PNV was in coalition either with nationalist parties and/or with the Socialist Party (PSOE-
PSE). From 1990 to 1993, at the regional level, PNV was in coalition with the Basque Left
-Euskadiko Eskerra (EE) and later, in 1990-91 and again from 1994, with the Eusko
Alkartasuna (EA), as well as with the Socialist Party (Juaristi, 1996; Ross, 1996) (see Table
7.2). The complexity of local politics is also indicative of the wide political spectrum which
includes the nationalist parties, on the right, the conservatives (PNV); in the middle left,
Eusko Alkartasuna and on the radical left, Herri Batasuna (HB) which are particularly
significant in the Basque Country. The spectrum is completed by the national parties such
as on the right, Partido Popular (PP), on the left, the Socialist party and a coalition of
different left-minded parties and organisations Izquierda Unida (IU). In addition to this
range of political parties, the former mayor of Bilbao, Gorordo, after his resignation in
1990, created a new political party Iniciativa Ciudadana Vasca (ICV) in 1995.
The political control of the city has rested with the PNV since 1979. This is important,
since Bilbao is the only capital of the Basque Country where the PNV has been
continuously in power, albeit in coalition. Mayor Ortuondo (PNV) took power in 1991 and
formed a coalition with the Socialist Party. As Ortega (1995) comments, this coalition
represented a shift in terms of the political democracy away from Mayor Gorordo's period
with the exclusion of the rest of the opposition political parties from local decision-making.
Since 1995 and only for two years, the PNV has been in a new coalition, this time with the
party winner of the 1996 general elections the national Conservative Party (PP). After its
dissolution, the PNV formed a new coalition with the Socialist Party, EE and TU. The
political representation in Bilbao Council from 1987 to 1995 is shown in figure 7.2.
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Central Government
1982-86 PSOE
1986-89 PSOE
1989-93 PSOE
1993-96 PSOE
1996-2000 PP
Basque Government
1980-86 PNV
1986-90 PNV-PSOE
1990-91 PNV-EA-EE
1991-94 PNV-PSOE/EE
1994-98 PNV-EA-PSOE/EE
Bilbao Council
1983-87 PNV
1987-90 PNV
1990-91 PNV-PSOE
1991-95 PNV-PSOE
1995-97
1997-99
PNV-PP
PNV-PSOE-EE-
IU
Table 7.2: Coalitions at central government, Basque government levels and the
Council.
Bilbao City Council
PNV	 PSOE-	 PP	 HB	 EE	 EA	 IU
PSE
Local Political Parties
Figure 7.2: Bilbao City Council: 1987-1999
With the de-centralisation process many key responsibilities such as urban planning, culture
and tax systems were transferred to the Basque County Councils, not without a considerable
rivalry between the different tiers of government at the Basque level as well as that of
central government. In particular, the Basque tax system dating from 1878 was reinstalled
in 1981 in two Basque County Councils (Bizkaia and Guipuzcoa) after it had ceased
following the Spanish Civil War in 1939 (Castells, 1989). This aspect is extremely relevant
because since 1981 the Basque Country as a whole and two of the three Basque County
Councils, in particular, have recovered their financial autonomy. The third one, Alava had
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continued with this special status because of its support to Franco during the Spanish Civil
War. In essence, each territory has its own Treasury and collects its own taxes through the
so-called Foral DiputaciOn. Though this tax system has given greater manoeuvre to the
County Councils, at least in principle, in terms of how County Councils spend their money,
according to a former mayor of Bilbao, "it has been insufficient to completely reduce the
Bizkaia and Bilbao's infrastructure deficit from both the central and the Basque
governments" and he estimated: "the deficit in Bizkaia to be around £1,750 million
(358,000 million ptas) in 1977 (as identified in the report produced by both the Bilbao and
San Sebastian Chambers of Commerce) as a result of County Councils suffering from a
lack of funding" (Interviewee 17, ICV politician, former mayor of the city, 2 February
1996). However, according to a representative of the unions, "the claims about the
insufficient investment from the central government in Euskadi are false. This company
where I am working has received 140,000 million ptas in the last 14 years to maintain 1,700
jobs" (interviewee 19; a member of the unions, 8 February 1996).
The Local Government Act of 1985 established the function of municipalities at national
level. However, in the Basque Country most of the functions designated as belonging to
local governments have been assumed by the County Councils because of the poorly
defined municipal competences under a permanent dispute between the Basque government
and its Historical Territories. Although it was expected that the Basque parliament would
launch a new Municipal Law which transferred some functions from County Councils to
municipalities, it has yet to develop this. This delay has reinforced the long-standing
problems faced by municipalities as in the case of Bilbao, in particular the loss of power
and the financial dependency upon the County Councils and the Basque Government and
the Central Government (Gavira, 1994; Ortega, 1995). In addition, much of Basque politics
has also turned to the struggle between the rural areas and small towns on the one hand and
the major provincial capitals on the other. As a local politician noted "the ideology of the
PNV comes from rural areas... Rural voters are considered more important than urban
counterparts" (Interviewee 9, Socialist City Councillor, 30 January 1996) which is
extremely relevant for an understanding of Basque politics. Powers are executed by means
of a parliamentary system, composed of seventy-five members distributed equally among
the three Basque Provinces (Castells, 1989).
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7.4. Approaches to the Regeneration of Bilbao
Despite the assertion that successful contemporary urban governance requires the
development of coalitions of interests with the private sector, the urban regime underlying
development in the case of Bilbao is dominated by the public sector. In effect, the strategies
and organisational coalitions developed reflect inter-organisational rivalries between tiers of
local, autonomous community and central governments, and between political parties at the
local, the Basque Country and central government levels. As we have noted, the material
manifestations of the urban regime in Bilbao and the struggle to shape it fall into five
distinct events outlined earlier. Figure 7.3 offers the framework for understanding the
process of urban regeneration of Bilbao.
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Figure 7.3: Framework for Urban Regeneration in Bilbao
Source: Compilation by the author
After the PNV finally acknowledged the magnitude of the economic decline in Bilbao,
there was recognition by the main local politicians and the business leaders that action
needed to be taken to regenerate its economy. As a representative of Metropoli 30 pointed
out:
There was a feeling that Metropolitan Bilbao was losing prestige within the
international context, mainly in the European network of cities. In 1989 the
DATAR report, [a ranking of 200 European cities], indicated that
investment was necessary in Bilbao. ..The main public and private actors
were dissatisfied with the position that Bilbao held within this ranking
(Interviewee 1; member of Metropoli 30, 10 January 1996).
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7.4.1. The Strategic Plan of Metropolitan Bilbao
The first event is the initiation of a Strategic Plan for Metropolitan Bilbao in 1989. This
was the product of the Bizkaia County Council together with the Economic and Planning
Department of the Basque government. These two levels of government, with little or no
consultation with the Bilbao Council produced a long-term economic regeneration strategy
for Metropolitan Bilbao (Rodriguez, 1996). The strategy essentially revolved around
building on Bilbao's prominent position in the economy of Northern Spain and the Basque
Country, to establish itself as a prominent service sector capital in the Atlantic arc of
Northern Europe. The strategy was to be spelt out more fully in 1991 following the creation
of Bilbao Metropoli 30, a public-private partnership organisation with a strategy
development function (Martinez Cearra, 1993).
One of the key features of the Plan, entrusted to Arthur Andersen consultants, was the
proposal to build a cultural icon, a symbol of Bilbao's regeneration, and something which
would declare it as a player in the global field of economic and cultural relations. The
Basque government therefore entered into negotiations with New York's Guggenheim
Foundation to agree to the siting of a new European Guggenheim Museum on Bilbao's
riverfront. The Council was once again excluded from these negotiations as it was from the
Strategic Plan as a former mayor of the city confirmed (interviewee 17; ICV politician,
former mayor of Bilbao, 2 February 1996). However, a member of his former political
party (PNV) explained the exclusion of the Council:
Bilbao Council was excluded because they did not want to lead this process
with the other Basque institutions. It was a period of disagreement between
the Council and the Basque institutions. These conflicts were more
concerned with personal differences rather than the contents of the Strategic
Plan itself (Interviewee 6; PNV politician, 29 January 1996).
The opinion of a representative of the unions was similar in nature to the PNV politician
claiming that "Gorordo created contradictions with his own political party due to his
aspiration of being lehendakari" (interviewee 19, a member of the trade unions, 8 February
1996).
The Strategic Plan in conjunction with the Council's Urban Plan, as a local Councillor
noted, "seeks to regenerate its economy and change Bilbao's image associated with
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industrial decline into a post-industrial city in order to foster an entrepreneurial climate
with the attraction of new services" (Interviewee 2; PNV City Councillor, 16 January
1996). The newer post-industrial image of Bilbao, which follows American industrial city
models such as Baltimore (with a similar background to Abandoibarra) and Pittsburgh
(both areas are run-down ports), was seen as a central component in the city strategy
(Interviewee 1, representative of Metropoli 30, 10 January 1996). The Strategic Plan
focuses its main strategies on large scale urban renewal operations such as building
transportation networks, cleaning-up the river, the transfer of inner-port facilities to a
newly built outer-port harbour, the urban development of two derelict inner-city sites,
Abandoibarra (to be transformed into a new emblematic area with the location of prestige
cultural prestige projects such as the Guggenheim Museum and the Convention Centre)
and Amezola (see figure 7.4). The capital expenditure involved in Bilbao's main urban
development projects was estimated in 320,000 million ptas (approximately £1,600
million) (see table 7.3). Local authorities decided to bring in the world's most celebrated
architects which also forms part of the marketing of the city. Along with the innovative
design of the Guggenheim Museum by Frank 0. Gehry, Sir Norman Foster built the Metro
system, Santiago Calatrava was commissioned to build a bridge and the airport terminal
and Sir James Stirling designed a new station and bus terminal, now being developed by
his former partner Michael Wildford.
Despite the lifespan of Metropoli 30 being restricted to "eight or ten years as in the British
UDC", the implementation of the Strategic Plan would be phased over a twenty years
period (Interviewee 1; representative of B.M. 30; 10 January 1996). It is uncertain what
will happen in the 10 years after Metropoli 30 has ceased to exist.
The Strategic Plan would be phased as follows: 1. (1985-1995) (Project
Initiation) Projects are not implemented in isolation, they are co-
ordinated to ensure they are mutually complementary with a high
percentage of public investment expected. 2. (1996-2000)
(Consolidation) Further public investment takes place to optimise the
projects by complementary provision. For example, air connections to
America and Japan would be improved. 3. (2000-2005) (Profits) The
opportunities have been created and private investment is then
forthcoming. 4. (2005-2010) (Success) (Interviewee 1; representative of
Metropoli 30, 10 January 1996).
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STRATEGIC PROJECTS
(in
COST
million pesetas)
ARCHITECTS
1. Airport 10,000 S. Calatrava
2. Harbour:	 phase 1: 36,000
phase 2: 66,000
3. Underground:	 line 1: 70,000 N. Foster
line 2: 40,000
4. Southern by-pass 12,000
5. RENFE freight terminal 4,500
6. New railway access
to the harbour 5,000
7. Bilbao passenger interchange 40,000 M. Wildford
8. Guggenheim museum 20,000 F. 0. Gehry
9. Conference and music centre 6,000 F. Soriano & D. Palacios
10. Development of Abandoibarra 5,000
11. Euskalduna bridge 2,500
12. Development of Amezola 3,000
TOTAL 320,000
Table 7.3. Estimated costs of strategic projects in Bilbao
Source: Ortega (1995, p. 242) and Bilbao Metropoli 30 (1993).
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Fig.7.4. Bilbao and its main projects (1. Underground; 2. Southern by-pass; 3. Passenger
Interchange; 4. Alhondiga; 5. Town Hall; 6. Conference and Music centre; 7. Guggenheim Museum; 8.
Euskalduna bridge).
7.4.2. Gorordo's alternative regeneration plan
The second key event relates to the response from Mayor Gorordo about the lack of
consultation and the imposition of some of the major projects from the other level of Basque
institutions such as the Guggenheim Museum or the Convention centre, which undermined
the capacity and legitimacy of the Bilbao Council to lead the regeneration process. In
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particular, the Guggenheim Museum was questioned because it had little or nothing to do
with Basque identity (Tellitu et al., 1997; Zulaika, 1997). Instead, Mayor Gorordo proposed
an 'alternative' cultural centre-piece, the building of a 'glass cube' on top of the Alhondiga,
a large stylish and historic building, a former wine store in the centre of the city which
reflected the Basque character of the city more clearly. The symbolic function of this new
building, which was to be the tallest in the city, was a fusion of the historic (the old winery)
and the new (the glass cube), to be designed by the Basque architect Oteiza. Arguments
raged over the relative merits of the two proposals, and Gorordo staked his political career
on the building of the cube. He threatened to resign if the executive board of his own
political party (PNV) would not back his plan, and he did so in December 1990.
Throughout the 1980s, Mayor Gorordo entered into a major political confrontation with the
Basque institutions and the national government, based on the demands for more resources
and competences for Bilbao Council. At the level of the Basque institutions, Mayor
Gorordo claimed to the executive board of the PNV that the Councils should have had more
resources than the Bizkaia County Council (Ortega, 1995). However, he lost this dispute,
because his own political party supported the view that power and resources should be
controlled by County Councils rather than by municipalities (interviewee 16, a member of a
neighbourhood association, 12 February 1996). As part of this institutional competition, the
leadership of the Council has been constantly under attack from the Bizkaia County
Council and the Basque government. A former mayor of Bilbao reinforced this idea by
saying that the PNV has always believed more in the Basque level of government rather
than local Councils. This is reflected in the extensive budget of the Basque government and
the County Councils with respect to local authorities. By contrast, in 1993, the Bilbao
Council's budget was 38,000 million ptas, 2,000 million less than in 1992 (Ortega, 1995).
Thus, the room for manoeuvre of the Bilbao Council was tightly constrained.
At the level of the central government, Mayor Gorordo made a request that Euskalduna, a
ship yard company strategically placed at the industrial riverfront site (Abandoibarra),
should be handed over to the Council. The central government refused to grant the land to
the city, which was part of Mayor Gorordo's strategy for obtaining more resources. Against
this background to undertake his own regeneration plan, Gorordo was forced to borrow
money from banks which led the Council to extensive long-term financial debts and placed
it "on the brink of bankruptcy" (Interviewee 12, a member of Ria 2000, 13 February 1996)
(see also Ortega, 1995).
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7.4.3. Bilbao Metropoli 30
After the extensive financial debts accrued by Mayor Gorordo together with a period of
ongoing dispute with both the Basque government and the central government, the arrival
of new Council leader, Ortuondo (PNV) facilitated the adoption of a more collaborative
approach with both of these public administrations (Interviewee 6; PNV politician, 29
January 1996). As part of the process of urban governance in Bilbao, Mayor Ortuondo said:
"the most important thing is not who is going to undertake these projects, but how to
undertake them" (Ortega, 1995, p. 25). This pragmatic co-operation sought to change the
previous antagonism with Basque institutions and central government as well as to attract
more resources from the other levels of government. In relation to both aims, former Mayor
Gorordo, in the political manifesto of his new political party (ICV) complained about the
long-standing lack of funding from the Basque and central government for the re-payment
of the substantial financial debts of the Council when he was the mayor, by saying "it is
striking that the same Councillor who was asking for money unsuccessfully in 1987, 1989
and 1990; in 1992 obtained 2,400 million ptas from the Bizkaia County Council".
If, previously, there were also concerns about "the lack of communication between public
and private sectors" (Interviewee 10, a PP City Councillor, 1 February 1996) and the "need
for joint efforts in order to lead the regeneration process" (Interviewee 2, PNV City
Councillor, 16 January 1996), this new period facilitated the establishment of a public-
private partnership organisation in 1991, Bilbao Metropoli 30. This strategic level body
took on the role of developing regeneration strategies for Bilbao and its Metropolitan Area.
The Basque government was then convinced about the need to develop a Strategic Plan
involving private companies (interviewee 17; ICV politician, former mayor of Bilbao, 2
February 1996). Most specifically, a representative of the unions identified two private
companies "Iberduero and Iberdrola as instrumental in creating Metropoli 30. In particular,
the president of Iberdrola and current chairman of Metropoli 30 (Garrido)" (see also Ferrer,
1995; Martinez Cearra, 1993). Additionally, a Socialist local Councillor noted "though
Mayor Ortuondo is its symbolic president, the main proponent of this organisation was the
Basque institutions" with Metropoli 30 regarded as the only likely recipe for progressing
plans (interviewee 9, PSOE Councillor, 30 January 1996). The Metropoli 30 strategy
initially identified seven key areas to develop:
1. investment in human resources;
2. a service-based Metropolitan Area in an industrial region;
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3. improved intra-metropolitan mobility and external accessibility;
4. recovery of the environment;
5. urban renewal;
6. Bilbao as a cultural centre; and
7. coordination of governmental and private sectors.
The focus of the Strategic Plan was on the centre of Bilbao, and in particular on two sites,
Abandoibarra (where the Guggenheim and a Convention Centre were to occupy parts of the
waterfront site) and the Amezola site. Both sites were formerly owned by the Spanish
central government (except for the Guggenheim and the Convention Centre), having been
formerly used by central government owned enterprises. However, Metropoli 30 took no
responsibility for developing projects. As an example, despite the fact that the development
of Bilbao as a cultural centre was one of the key areas, Metropoli 30 did not play any role
in the decision to host the Guggenheim Museum in the city (Rodriguez, 1996).
As far as the private sector is concerned, it has been involved in the development of
Metropoli 30's strategy but not its implementation. Moreover, despite the fact that
Metropoli 30 incorporated private sector organisations, it was not very successful in
attracting private funding either for its running costs (which were in the early years 90
percent met by public funds) or for the projects that it promoted for development. However,
by 1996, the pattern of its funding had slightly changed with "the private sector
contributing 70 percent and the public sector the rest" (Interviewee 1, a member of
Metropoli 30; 10 January 1996). In 1995, the private members' contribution was increased
by 10 percent while the main enterprises such as BBV, BBK and lberdrola were increased
by 20 percent (El Correo Espanol, Deia and El Mundo del Pais Vasco, December 14,
1994). Despite these contributions, the funds of the Association are extremely limited (£1,1
million (220 million ptas) in 1994). From this budget, 40 percent goes to the Revitalisation
Plan, 12 percent is for international promotion of Bilbao and 23 percent is for marketing.
According to a representative of this organisation, member contributions "are not great in
order to facilitate a small flexible structure and vary based on: 1. the net value of the
business; 2. the number of employees; 3. the location of the organisation (whether or not in
Metropolitan Bilbao)" (Interviewee 1, a member of Metropoli 30, 10 January 1996).
Nevertheless, having begun with 19 organisations in 1991, (of which only three were public
institutions), it had risen to 126 by 1996, including public sector bodies, the universities,
business groups and voluntary sector bodies (see Martinez Cearra, 1993; Rodriguez, 1996).
The seven priorities cited in the strategy were added to in 1993 when, following the
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pressure of adverse publicity and lobbying by particular local authorities, social
development of the Metropolitan Area as an eighth theme was added. Notwithstanding this
new theme, little action has been taken to foster local social development through the
actions of Metropoli 30. The reason for not including it originally within the Strategic Plan,
despite the important social problems in the city, was explained by a representative of
Metropoli 30 thus:
The boom was still present in 1989, but by 1993, Bilbao was sinking into
economic decline, with some areas of severe poverty. It was then that
'social action' was incorporated and community groups of a variety of
natures were invited to become members. Community groups have been
incorporated, such as Caritas, Red Cross and the Once Foundation in 1993,
to ensure that a 'dual society' was not created. Social action is now
considered an essential part of the Strategic Plan. Previously these groups
were less relevant as their activities were originally not included in the Plan
(Interviewee 1, a member of Metropoli 30; 10 January 1996).
Members of Metropoli 30 are expected "to have a participative rather than just an
investment role" (Interviewee 1, a member of Metropoli 30; 10 January 1996). In this
respect, "new members should provide expertise and knowledge" (Interviewee 6, PNV City
Councillor, 29 January 1996). To this end, campaigns have been launched to attract new
members around common interests, for example, "electronics companies and consulates"
(Interviewee 2, PNV City Councillor, 16 January 1996). A general consensus within the
coalition is achieved through the continued co-operation between the committees. In
particular, the Association produces an Annual Progress report, which attempts to measure
regeneration performance and makes predictions for the future. The presentation of this
report provides a common ground where the main public and private leaders have "an
opportunity to re-affirm commitment to the projects" (Interviewee 1, a member of
Metropoli 30, 10 January 1996).
The enlargement of the Association does not represent any significant commitment
according to a local Councillor who cited a typical exchange between Metropoli 30 and a
potential member, "when, for example, BBK (a Basque semi-public bank) was invited to
participate, they asked what will it cost?, Metropoli 30's response was that there is no
commitment, only a small fee" (Interviewee 9, PSOE City Councillor, 30 January 1996). In
essence, the commitment of private and public sector included in Metropoli 30 is more
symbolic than effective as the former mayor suggested: "Ria 2000 is more proactive in its
involvement in land management. By contrast, Metropoli 30 has been criticised even by
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members of the PNV as merely emulating the Chamber of Commerce" (interviewee 17,
ICV politician, former mayor of Bilbao, 2 February 1996). However, a representative of the
Casco Viejo Chamber of Commerce within the city highlighted its role by saying: "it is a
very dynamic organisation, sometimes ahead of the public institutions. A general consensus
is achieved in Metropoli 30. This situation does not happen in the Basque Country very
often because political fights postpone taking decisions" (Interviewee 13; Casco Viejo
Chamber of Commerce, 13 February 1996).
Metropoli 30 seeks to attract external investment such as European funds which "are used
to create private-public partnerships, an example of such is the European Institute of
Software. The projects are not managed by the Association, merely resourced" (Interviewee
1, a member of Metropoli 30, 10 January 1996). Metropoli 30 also aspires to increase the
involvement of local people through individual committees (Martinez Cearra, 1993). As an
example, in July 1995, a committee involving the private and public sector (such as the
Basque government, Bizkaia City Council, Hotels groups, Chamber of Commerce or
Travel agencies) was set up, named the Bilbao Tourist Initiative with the aim of enhancing
cultural tourism (Interviewee 6, PNV City Councillor, 29 January 1996).
Though the Spanish central government is excluded from Metropoli 30, the incorporation
of 30 municipalities into this coalition, according to an HB City Councillor, was justified
due to "the political coalition between the PNV and the Socialist Party operating for the
past eight years with all these municipalities being run either by the PNV or the Socialist
Party". On the other hand, those local Councils, which were not controlled by these
political parties tended to take little part since social planning was sacrificed to economic
development priorities. However, as a member of the Basque Socialist Party noted "as soon
as Metropoli 30 and Ria 2000 started developing projects, municipalities realised the
importance of being integrated" (Interviewee 9, PSOE City Councillor, 30 January 1996).
This change was also reflected by a local politician who noted that "initially some members
joined Metropoli 30 because it was deemed important to be seen as a member, but
nowadays there is a clear desire to make a positive contribution to the regeneration process"
(Interviewee 10, PP City Councillor, 1 February 1996). Although, Metropoli 30 states that
there are no limitations in the number of partners involved, specific groups such as
opposition political parties, neighbourhood associations, trade unions, small and medium-
sized firms, ecological organisations, professional sports teams and local citizens are
systematically excluded. A member of a union's organisation explained their 'symbolic'
involvement in the regeneration of the city as follows:
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The unions are only used to legitimate policy action such as with the de-
industrialisation process rather than to collaborate in the regeneration
process (Interviewee 19, a member of the trade unions, 8 February 1996).
The exclusion of the most significant professional sports club in the city, Athletic de
Bilbao, was explained by a Socialist City Councillor by the fact that "the chairman of this
club (Lertxundi) was not a member of the PNV, despite the long term involvement of all
the previous chairmen in this political party" (Interviewee 8, PSOE City Councillor, 30
January 1996). With Mayor Ortuondo in power, the opposition political parties have also
been excluded not only from Metropoli 30, but also from Ria 2000: "of thirty nine elected
politicians in the Council, thirteen are excluded in planning the future of the city"
(Interviewee 14, IU City Councillor, 30 January 1996). In this way, the needs of local
residents are not represented in the decision making of these two organisations as the
representative of the Casco Viejo Chamber of Commerce argued: "the main weakness of
this Plan is that it does not market the city to its primary audience, the citizens who do not
believe in this regeneration process" (Interviewee 13; Casco Viejo Chamber of Commerce,
13 February 1996). Despite the enlargement of Metropoli 30, two members had
discontinued their membership "because of economic difficulties". Nevertheless, the
process is considered dynamic with "new members expected to join while some existing
members may be leaving" (Interviewee 1, a member ofMetropoli 30, 10 January 1996 .
7.4.4. Bilbao Ria 2000
As stated before, the Council was involved in disputes with the Central Government er
the ownership of some of the most strategic sites formerly occupied by state owned
companies. In particular, Mayor Gorordo claimed that the Central Government should
return these sites to the city and made such a request. However, the Central Go emment
refused to grant the land to the city. Although the arrival of Mayor Ortoundo represented a
shift in local politics, the Central Government played a central role in the establishment of a
new partnership Bilbao Ria 2000 in 1993, as a representative of this coalition recognised
"the origin of Ria 2000 was in Madrid and not in Bilbao" (Interviewee 12, representative of
Ria 2000, 13 February 1996) (see also Rodriguez, 1996). The coalition came originally
from the Socialist government, through the Ministry of Public Works, Transport and the
Environment (MOPTMA), which launched a programme 'Coordination of Action in Cities'
(following the aid given to Barcelona and Seville with the Olympics and Expo in 1992) to
reproduce the same integrated approach in other Spanish cities. The emergence of Ria 2000
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was facilitated by "the political connection between the Socialist parties in Bilbao and
Madrid" (Interviewee 9; PSOE City Councillor, 30 January 1996) as well as by the
economic weakness of the Bilbao Council. This coalition, according to a representative of
Ria 2000 "overcame previous political differences between Central Government and Bilbao
Council". Ortega (1995) noted that the initial idea was to create a Basque and Central
Government Consortium. However, the consensus about this idea was broken in July 1992
as a result of the negative response from Central Government, which, instead, imposed a
public limited company. After this, Bizkaia County Council decided to claim the repayment
of debts from state companies to the Basque Government in case the Central Government
refused to return one of the most strategic pieces of land, Abandoibarra. Finally, the Basque
institutions accepted the Central Government's policy and in October 1992, the Socialist
Minister, Borrell signed the constitution of /ha 2000.
The emergence of Ria 2000 represented "the first real partnership with all the public
institutions involved.. .and the most important development in Bilbao for the last twelve
years" (Interviewee 8; PSOE City councillor, 30 January 1996). The coalition of
government actors originally involved partners from Central Government, the Basque
Government, the Bizkaia County Council and the Council who recognised that "they
needed to co-ordinate efforts in order to succeed" (interviewee 12, representative of Ria
2000, 13 February 1996). The initial compromise was based on the use of land owned by a
group of state companies, who subsequently loaned it to Ria 2000. According to a
representative of this organisation, the primary trust of Ria 2000 is "to generate
infrastructure on two sites, Abandoibarra and Amezola, in terms of transport, office spaces,
private housing, etc, to allow regeneration plans to be fostered because, unlike in Barcelona
and Seville's events, the capital expenditure of the Central Government in Bilbao is
limited" (Interviewee 12, representative of Ria 2000, 13 February 1996).
The Executive Board of Ria 2000 is 'political', and includes senior members of all levels of
government and representatives of the following political parties, PNV, PSOE, EA and PP.
According to a City Councillor, "despite the impression of tension in the Basque Country,
Ria 2000 offers a model where the relations between the PNV and the PSOE are better than
in any other part of Spain. ..There is not any other institution where the PSOE and the PP
work together as here" (Interviewee 2, PNV City Councillor, 16 January 1996). Opposition
political parties (as in Metropoli 30) were excluded from decision-making. Consensus is
achieved through "unanimous agreements...so that no one party leads the organisation...the
mayor of Bilbao is the president, but the Council only contributes 16 per cent. In reality, the
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central government is the main partner, but its contribution is split between state
companies" (Interviewee 12, representative of Ria 2000, 13 February 1996). The Executive
Board placed the implementation of these projects in the hands of professionals with the
aim of achieving maximum efficiency in the use of public resources "without costing
central government any money" (Interviewee 12, representative of Ria 2000, 13 February
1996). The first action of Ria 2000 organisers as such was to analyse the economic
situation and "it was discovered that the expenses were greater than incomes. The main
asset is the land and this is what would have to be sold. As a result, a general agreement
was reached and a small economic contribution was required from each level of
government" (Interviewee 12, representative of Ria 2000, 13 February 1996) (see also
Rodriguez, 1996). Figure 7.5 shows the membership of, and sources of funding for, Ria
2000, with 50 percent of funding from the Central Government and 50 percent from all the
three levels of Basque institutions.
Figure 7.5: Participants in Bilbao Ria 2000
Source: Promotional Leaflet of Bilbao Ria 2000
However, not all the institutions participate on the same footing, as a Socialist local
Councillor explained "their participation depends upon the projects, for example, RENFE
(a state railway company) will provide land valued at 5,000 million ptas to undertake the
regeneration of the railway network. The other members do not participate in the same
way" (Interviewee 9, PSOE Councillor, 30 January 1996). A representative of Ria 2000
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reinforced this view by describing the first operative agreement reached in May 1993 which
constitute the first intervention of three interconnected operations in Bilbao. As such, the
Central Government agreed to relocate the old Renfe Freight Terminal station (located in
Abandoibarra) to Santurtzi and to loan the site occupied by a ship yard company,
Euskalduna to the Bizkaia County Council.
Central Government negotiated the building of a new railway station which
allowed for the removal of the old station in order to construct a Business
Centre; the Council contributed to 15 percent of the land and Bizkaia
County Council agreed to build a new bridge...when expenditures and
income balanced at the amount of 23,000 m. ptas, a second phase was
initiated (Interviewee 12, representative of Ria 2000, 13 February 1996).
After land was then freed, the second operation in Abandoibarra involves the creation of a
mixed area for advanced services with the location of cultural, entertainment and
commercial infrastructures (including the Guggenheim Museum, the Convention Centre, a
Business Centre, hotels and a shopping area `Ria 21'), high income houses and the
enlargement of Deusto University. As a result, the Central Government obtained the right
to build. Despite the high level of commitment of the Council to Ria 2000, their limited
financial autonomy resources meant that all these emblematic operations are contingent
upon contributions from the Basque and Spanish institutions and contributions from the
EC's Structural Funds (interviewee 2, PNV City Councillor, 16 January 1996). The actions
realised by Ria 2000 can be portrayed as a clear example of market-led regeneration as the
main alternative was the generation of money through the urban development projects in
Abandoibarra and Amezola (Rodriguez, 1996; Ortega, 1995).
The initial design of the Business Centre spanned 200,000 square metres associated with a
budget of 60,000 million ptas of which "substantial private investment (60 percent of the
project) was expected" (Interviewee 12, member of Ria 2000, 13 February 1996). However,
the lack of private investment together with the over-provision of offices in the city has
temporarily postponed this project though it had evolved into only 80,000 square metres in
1996 (Tellitu et al., 1997). In this respect, the participation of the private sector remains
more opportunistic and is only motivated towards the real-estate market —housing- and
leisure (Interviewee 10, PP City Councillor, 1 February 1996). Another development, the
shopping centre `Ria 21', due to open in the spring of 1998, contains leisure entertainment
complexes such as 21 screen cinemas, 100 small shops and so on. However, the conditions
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for creating this commercial area has been strongly criticised by local small retailers as the
representative of the Casco Viejo Chamber of Commerce explained:
As public institutions do not have enough resources to undertake some
projects, urban plans have to be modified to allow private sector funding of
these projects...but after that, the private sector acts with total freedom. This
is not a true public-private partnership, instead it is a private exploitation of
the lack of resources of public institutions (Interviewee 13; Casco Viejo
Chamber of Commerce, 13 February 1996).
The third initiative, Amezola, is nowadays partly initiated and includes the transformation
of an underused railway station into the Bilbao Passenger Interchange with 73,000 square
metres of housing with 20 percent public houses and green areas (32,000 square metres). In
response to criticisms of the project's speculative nature, a representative of Ria 2000
justified it by saying: "although Ria 2000 is seen to be speculating with the selling of
houses, certain wealth will be generated...Amezola has created public work valued at 5,000
million ptas and private groups are already investing in the housing sector" (Interviewee
12, member of Ria 2000, 13 February 1996). The Abandoibarra and Amezola
developments were included, outside the Bilbao Urban Plan, in a special plan (P.E.R.D.
Criticisms of Ria 2000 echo those addressed at Metropoli 30, that is they relate to the
geographical centralisation of urban developments on central Bilbao, and the economic
focus of the plans with little or no consideration given to address the physical and social
inequalities in the city or the wider metropolitan area. More recently there have been
proposals to promote development in two socialist local authorities (Barakaldo and Sestao),
neighbouring the city of Bilbao, and lying on the deindustrialising left bank of the river. As
a consequence, Barakaldo City Council has recently joined Ria 2000 after benefiting from
EC funds (the European Regional Development Fund) to the tune of 1,800 million ptas.
Such proposals have been insufficient to deflect criticisms about the lack of political
accountability and social concern of this coalition. In addition to these criticisms,
Rodriguez (1996) notes the overwhelming concern of Ria 2000 with economic feasibility
as the guiding principle for intervention.
The creation of Ria 2000, according to a Socialist Councillor, has undermined the role of
Metropoli 30 considering that "Ria 2000 runs the main projects where the future of the city
is directed...Ria 2000 should be enhanced by the main actors of Metropoli 30 which at
present is merely symbolic" (Interviewee 9, PSOE City Councillor, 30 January 1996).
Another City Councillor reinforced its symbolic role after saying "Metropoli 30 usually
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sends you magnificent reports, but, in fact, it is Ria 2000 who leads the regeneration
process...The strategies of Metropoli 30 are already developed by the Council" (Interviewee
6, PNV City Councillor, 29 January 1996).
Despite the assertion that the private sector is important for economic regeneration, most of
the respondents recognised that the commitment of private sector to the city so far has been
limited. Though, Garrido, chairman of Metropoli 30 underlined that the period from 1994
to 1997 was crucial for assessing the real involvement of private investors in the
regeneration process (Deia, 22 June 1994 and El Correo Espaiiol, 15 May 1994), at the
moment, all the development projects rely on the public sector. The main barriers to private
investment were (and still are) considered by most of respondents to be the political
situation in general, and terrorism in particular. In fact, a local Councillor argued that
private investors "may be reluctant to participate because of the uncertainty of the future of
the Basque Country" (Interview 6, PNV City Councillor, 29 January 1996). In an attempt to
attract corporations, the Basque government has agreed to provide huge subsidies and tax
breaks to those companies willing to establish their plans in the Basque Country. According
to a member of Ria 2000 "in the long term the fiscal incentives could be more determinant
than any other urban planning action, but private investors not only consider fiscal
incentives but also the political environment". This proposal has recently been rejected
because of EC regulations. Unfortunately, institutional, financial and political constraints
have combined to slow down the process of implementation of most of these projects.
7.4.5. Urban Planning in Bilbao, Bizkaia and the Basque Country
The complexity of Basque politics also affects urban planning at the three levels of
government. The City Urban Plan represents the fifth initiative in the local development
process. As noted, the city had developed over the previous decades in a chaotic and
unregulated way with substantial socio-cultural and environmental deficits in its
neighbourhoods. Indeed, the previous Urban Plan dated from 1964 (Leonardo, 1989).
Thus, the city has not been able to reach the minimum standards of green space, service
provision and population density that the national 1976 Land Law established. In the case
of green space, this decreed a standard of 5 square metres per inhabitant, compared to 1.18
provided in Bilbao in 1993 (Bilbao Metropoli 30, 1993, p. 151).
After the Basque Statute of Autonomy, the Basque government approved its °IA, n Land
Law in 1990 and the following year, it started to develop the Directives of Territorial
190
Sport, Urban Regeneration and Urban Regimes: the case of Bilbao 	 Chapter Seven
Arrangement (DOT) to guide future partial, territorial and municipal urban plans in the
Basque Country. At the same time, in 1992, the Bizkaia County Council adopted the
Partial Territorial Plan of Metropolitan Bilbao (PTPM) to co-ordinate all 30 municipal
Urban Plans. After a long period of inter-governmental disputes and legal problems, the
general directives (DOT) were finally approved in 1994.
Bilbao was the last Council within the Metropolitan Area to modify its Urban Plan which
"responds to the DOT's criteria which suggests that there should be no industrial model for
the Basque Country" (Interviewee 5, HB City Councillor, 31 January 1996). After lengthy
and complex political disputes, the Urban Plan, initially developed in 1990, was finally
approved in 1993 with the support of PNV, PSOE and subsequently PP, but was opposed
by political parties such as HB, EA and EE. The Neighbourhood Associations also made
demonstrations against this Plan and at the time of writing are still against it. The Urban
Plan was approved when PNV and PSOE were in coalition at all three different levels of
government. Therefore, according to a representative of a Neighbourhood Association,
"these political parties did not have any problem getting a consensus to implement the
projects" (Interviewee 16; a member of a neighbourhood association, 12 February 1996).
Prior to the approval of the Urban Plan, the other two levels of government imposed,
through the P.E.R.I system, several initiatives such as the Guggenheim Museum, the
Conference and Music centre as well as changes to the road network around Bilbao.
The Urban Plan covers four areas: socio-cultural provision, roads, green spaces and
transport, and focused its main strategy on the recovery of the Ria and the urban renewal of
its adjacent areas to increase open space and cultural and service land uses (PGOU, 1992).
The Urban Plan seeks to reorientate the city's economy as a centre of consumption. Despite
the fact that the transformation of Bilbao should eventually cover the whole city, the Urban
Plan considers Abandoibarra as the centre of the socio-cultural and tertiary sector activities.
According to a local Councillor, "Bilbao has to locate its major economic transformations
in Abandoibarra where the private sector will be interested" (Interviewee 2, PNV City
Councillor, 16 January 1996). In the same line of argument, a representative of Ria 2000
claimed that:
Nobody could expect to solve all the deficits of Bilbao with one project.
Abandoibarra will be 170,000 square metres of public space. From this,
130,000 metres will be used for green spaces, including the Ribera and the
Casilla Parks and the docks (harbour).. .Unfortunately due to the economic
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situation, Abandoibarra and Amezola are not going to be used for reducing
these large deficits...they will be used to finance the main projects
(Interviewee 12, Ria 2000, 13 February 1996).
The new Urban Plan seeks to increase the ratio of green spaces to 9.5 square metres per
capita. However, Ortega argues that in order to reach this ratio, the Urban Plan includes the
urban parks in Bilbao (which represent only 4.68 metres) and the nearby mountain areas
such as Kobeta, Arraitz and Artxanda. Moreover, in a city with a huge stock of empty
houses, (30 per cent) (Ferrer, 1995) and with a large part of the population (80 per cent)
unable to afford houses costing over £60,000 (according to a report by the Basque
government, cited by Ortega), the Urban Plan proposes to build 14,000 new houses in a
period of 8 years. However, from this entire urban renewal project, the promotion of new
private housing (10,000 houses valued between £85,000 and £100,000) has clearly replaced
council housing (only 4,000 houses). The Urban Plan expects also to improve the housing
conditions of low-income families-described as some of the most deprived in the Basque
Country, examples are Bilbao Old Quarter, San Francisco, Urazumutia and Zabala. In
1993, the EC granted 40 percent of the total cost of housing scheme (500 million ptas) with
the other levels of Basque government contributing the rest (Ferrer, 1995).
At the moment few new houses for the low-income population in these deprived areas have
been already developed. In particular, in the Old Quarter the rehabilitation of housing only
covered 408 houses in 1994, while in San Francisco, some areas have been demolished to
construct expensive houses (Ortega, 1995). As a local politician claimed "half of the public
sector houses will be used to re-locate people whose houses will be demolished"
(Interviewee 5, HB City Councillor, 31 January 1996). These urban renewal projects in
Bilbao's neighbourhoods were postponed because the Urban Plan seeks to generate
economic surpluses to finance other flagship projects in central areas of the city. According
to the Basque-Navarre Architecture Association, the Urban Plan is strongly criticised "for
its lack of economic resources to undertake all these projects" (El Correo Espanol, 6
October 1992). This lack of resources is leading "the Council and Bizkaia Council to sell
land, including the old derelict areas which are the city's main asset" (Interviewee 16,
representative of the Neighbourhood Association, 12 February 1996).
This Plan reflects clearly a lack of social dimension and increases "the gap between the
need of the population and the projects undertaken" (Interviewee 14, II.J City Councillor, 30
January 1996) and is biased in favour of "the main companies and the building
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constructors" (interviewee 16, representative of the Neighbourhood Association, 12
February 1996). Organisations such as Metropoli 30 and Ria 2000 were criticised in the
same manner because "neighbourhoods such as San Francisco, the Old Quarter, or
Urilibarri perceive all these projects in Abandoibarra and Amezola as being far from
relevant to their needs". In addition, the same representative blamed the Council for its
lack of concern about neighbourhoods' problems though "45 percent of the people have
severe poverty problems, 25 percent are unemployed". Overall, this urban regeneration
is leading to a tale of two cities with the revitalisation of the city centre surrounded by
areas that experience growing hardship as a local Councillor argued:
This regeneration could accentuate more inequalities in the city. This is the
main problem that Bilbao has to face. The whole regeneration process could
fail if the regeneration of Bilbao's neighbourhoods is neglected. In fact,
apart from a project in the Old Quarter, which has EC funding, no other
projects will be implemented in Bilbao's neighbourhoods (Interviewee 8;
PSOE Councillor, 30 January 1996).
In essence, the Urban Plan does not resolve the historical scarcities of Bilbao and fails
to regulate past urban planning shortcomings. The quality of life of local residents is
regarded as secondary to the need to generate funding for the high profile projects.
Some scepticism about the regeneration is publicly voiced, questioning the wisdom of
using substantial public resources to support these projects which are negatively
affecting not only the city but also the other levels of government. A Basque
Conservative Councillor responsible for urban planning implicitly admitted the high
risk of the whole regeneration of Bilbao:
The Urban Plan and the Strategic Plan are approved, things are being
done, but these are only small transformations. This urban regeneration
is slow because huge resources are needed...with these projects some
risks are being taken and nobody can predict the future. However, if no
action was undertaken, Bilbao would have died. My main duty is to
create the best conditions to make Bilbao attractive, but I cannot promise
to be successful (Interviewee 2, PNV City Councillor, 16 January 1996).
7.5 Sport, leisure and urban regeneration
With the advent of the first democratic Councils in 1979, the Bilbao Council began to
actively intervene in the development of sport in the city. Nevertheless, the city had
never excelled at having any strong sporting tradition (neither in terms of sports
infrastructure nor as hosting major sports events or supporting elite sport). In terms of
sports infrastructure, for example, there was a clear lack of sports facilities in the city
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with only two municipal facilities (Artxanda and La Casilla) and another trade union
sports facility (San Ignacio). These were run on an informal basis by the independent
Club Escolar of Bilbao, with no public involvement.
With the decentralisation process extended also to sport, the promotion of 'Sport for
All' became a priority of the Bilbao Council in the 1980s as part of a general trend in
the rest of the country. Popular events started to flourish along with various sports
campaigns, e.g. for promoting swimming, mini-basketball and cycling, and '24 hours of
Sports for All' due to the increasing demands for sport. Complementing this boom in
sports activities, from 1983 to 1987 was the Council's involvement in providing sports
facilities (also with significant contributions from the Bizkaia County Council and the
Basque government) which contributed extensively to the development of the local
sports. However, sports facilities were located in the outskirts of Bilbao, neglecting the
city centre, which has no municipal sport facilities. Prior to the Local Government Act
of 1985, which stated that all Councils with over 20,000 inhabitants should create a
municipal sports service, Bilbao created its own Sports Institute (IMD) in 1984 with the
primary trust of the management of all municipal sports activities. As a local sports
officer pointed out that the combination of municipal sport services and the gradual
increase of sports facilities contributed to an increase in resources for sport, with many
local sports clubs starting to benefit from subsidies.
Bilbao has supported mass participation without having a well-defined sport policy, and
with only "ad hoc developments such as the use of the main street of Bilbao (The Gran
Via) for multi-sports activities on Sundays during the Gorordo period"(Interviewee 15,
member of ASFEDEBI, 12 February 1996). This campaign was regarded as being for
Gorordo's political gain according to a Socialist City Councillor, rather than attempting
to fulfil the objectives of 'Sport for All'. Furthermore, the construction of sports
facilities already initiated in the former period (1983-1987) declined considerably,
though attempts have been made to maximise the use of existing facilities with local
universities and schools.
After the arrival of Mayor Ortuondo, significant changes have taken place in the
organisation of municipal sports. Prior to 1991, responsibility for sport was located in
the 'Culture, Sports and Tourism' Department, but after the 1991 elections a new
department entitled 'Women, Youth and Sport' was set up. In the current organisation
of sport, responsibility for sport is now divided between the IMD and a new Sports
Department. Since the establishment of a separate Sports Department, the role of the
IMD has gradually been reduced to managing only 5 municipal sports facilities (The
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Casilla, Artxanda, Txurdinaga, the Fango and San Inazio) with its own budget. On the
other hand, the new Sports Department is responsible for all other sport and leisure
activities. In particular, the Sports Department has been involved in two development
schemes: "the building of new outdoors sports facilities and youth participation, in
particular, through, a 'school sport' programme called 'Fun Sunday, Sports on Sunday'
developed since 1994" (Interviewee 7; sports Council officer, 31 January 1996).
However, as the same representative noted, the separation of responsibilities between
the two bodies has resulted in a clear "lack of co-operation between them".
The sport budget increased substantially in the period 1983-1987, but since then, it has
remained the same (Interviewee 8; PSOE City Councillor, 30 January 1996). After
Mayor Gorordo, the increase in the municipal deficit in 1991-1992 contributed to a
significant cut in public services. Ortega (1995) notes that 221 million ptas was directed
away from the IMD to fund other areas. The restructuring of the Sports Department has
also resulted in a considerable reduction in the level of subsidy of local sports clubs.
The new criteria focus on "funding activities such as the school sport programme and ad
hoc sporting events rather than directly assisting local sports clubs" (Interviewee 7;
sports City Council officer, 31 January 1996). In 1995, an association of Bizkaia Sport
Federations (ASFEDEBI) was set up with the support of the Department of Sports of
Bizkaia County Council to manage the activities of initially eight and subsequently ten
sports Federations at the County level. This Association contributes to the current
school programme with qualified staff, in return for which it receives funding
(Interviewee 15, representative of ASFEDEBI, 12 February 1996).
The static sports budget has resulted in "ad hoc increases for renovating existing
municipal facilities" (Interviewee 8; PSOE City Councillor, 30 January 1996). In
particular, in 1993, 770 million ptas (£ 3.8 m) were allocated to San Inazio (300 m
ptas); Txurdinaga (150 m ptas); Artxanda (110 m ptas); Rekalde (95 m ptas), Deusto
(65 m ptas) and La Casilla (50 m ptas) (Egin, 16 March 1994). In the subsequent period,
although the sports budget was said to be focused "on building sports facilities"
(Interviewee 3; sports City Council officer, 11 January 1996), only two new facilities
have been built, San Inazio and Zorrotza. Another area affected by the decrease of
funding relates to concessionary groups. Many of the concessions previously offered to
specific groups such as the retired have been revoked.
Though the importance of sport in economic and social policy areas is generally
accepted, urban leaders clearly does not consider sport as an important means of re-
imaging Bilbao or combating social exclusion as a number of respondents claimed. In
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the same line of argument, when, in the mid 1980s, the Strategic Plan was formulated,
sport was not valued as an important part of the economic regeneration strategies:
Initially, tourism and sport were not part of the Strategic Plan. The Plan
focused on different areas only to ensure objectives could be met. Later on,
tourism and leisure initiatives were included within some areas of the Plan.
For example, Urban Renewal Plans include sports facilities, Human
Resources consider the relationship between leisure and education; Cultural
Plans consider the relationship between hotels and culture (Interviewee 1,
representative of Metropoli 30, 10 January 1996).
Culture is rather different from sport in the sense that the construction of the
Guggenheim Museum was a key element of the regeneration strategy. Culture is
significant in the context of Bilbao and the Basque Country, not simply as an attraction
of inward investment, it is also significant as (potentially at least) a symbol of Basque
nationalism. Though parallel arguments could be made with respect to sport, such links
have not been made. Certainly Basque Sports are publicly funded, both by the Basque
government and by the Bizkaia County Council as an aspect of cultural policy.
However, elite sports and professional sports teams in Bilbao are not supported as a
means of city marketing. Bilbao is regarded as unusual in this respect, compared to
other Basque major cities such as San Sebastian and Vitoria, which are using
international sporting events and professional sports clubs as part of their economic
initiatives:
San Sebastian uses sport as part of the marketing of the city with
international events (e.g. Tour de France, Marathon World Cup...). At
the local level, clubs have the same problems as in Bilbao. Vitoria
receives institutional support for ad hoc activities. In particular, the
County Council and the Basque government support a premier
basketball team, Taugres because they play in Europe (Interviewee 18,
member of Bilbao Patronato, 5 February 1996).
A Basque Conservative City Councillor justified the lack of public funding of sporting
excellence by saying: "the philosophy of the Council regarding elite sport is that they
should have their own operational autonomy. This is illustrated by Athletic de Bilbao's
plan to develop a new football stadium which the Council can not economically support
when many neighbourhoods do not have their basic needs covered" (Interviewee 6,
PNV City Councillor, 29 January 1996). Just as with planning, cultural policy, which
includes sports policy, is spread across the Bizkaia County Council, and the Council.
The Basque Physical Education and Sport Law established the County Council's
responsibility for sport. Funding to sport federations and individual sports organisations
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is undertaken predominantly by the Bizkaia County Council and provision of sporting
facilities and funding of sporting events is primarily the responsibility of the Councils.
7.5.1 The Case of the Guggenheim Museum
The use of culture as part of the economic regeneration strategies of many American
cities has subsequently influenced other West European cities such as Frankfurt,
Rotterdam, Barcelona or Bilbao which are competing to establish themselves as major
centres of cultural consumption (Bianchini and Parkinson, 1993; Harvey, 1990;
Williams, 1997). However, Bilbao can obviously be compared to neither New York nor
to other European cities. Prior to the Guggenheim Museum, since the mid 1960s, there
have been different projects to locate a Basque Museum of Contemporary Art in the
Basque Country. As such, in 1982, San Sebastian, considered to be the cultural capital
of the Basque Country, was proposed to host this museum which the lehendakari
Garaicoetxea supported, but it was finally postponed (Zulaika, 1997). Later on, at the
end of the 1980s Mayor Gorordo, as we have noted, also proposed an alternative
cultural centrepiece, the Alhondiga which, according to him, "represented the same idea
but with more emphasis on mass culture than elite culture". This project combined
consumption and production-oriented cultural activities by including, among other
things, a public library, the location of the Basque Museum of Contemporary Art and a
Conference and Music Centre (Tellitu et al., 1997; Zulaika, 1997). The Alhondiga
project was very controversial with the Basque goverment refusing to support it as a
member of the PNV noted "it lacked any real economic foundation due to the lack of
consultation with the other levels of government, whereas the Guggenheim Museum has
a detailed well thought out plan" (Interviewee 6, PNV Councillor, 29 January 1996).
If franchised professional sport teams are characteristic of the North America culture,
the Guggenheim Museum represents the first idea of franchised arts. Under the new
direction of Thomas Krens, the expansionist idea of the Guggenheim Foundation was to
sell the franchise of the Guggenheim Museum to any city that would cover all expenses
for running the museum (building and paintings) while the Guggenheim Foundation
would provide the management and knowledge (know-how). Under such conditions, the
Guggenheim Foundation would expect to obtain two benefits: first, to get enough
money to recover from its own difficult financial situation, and second, to display most
of its collections given the limited capacity of its New York' Museum (Tellitu et al.,
1997; El Mundo, 14-15-16 February 1992). Prior to Bilbao, different 'global' cities such
as Boston, Venice, Salzburg, Osaka, Tokyo or Spanish cities such as Madrid, Santander
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or Salamanca had refused to accept the conditions set by the Guggenheim Foundation
for hosting the museum (Tellitu et al., 1997; Zulaika, 1997).
Though one of the key features of the Strategic Plan was to build a cultural icon, in
reality, the decision to host this museum in Bilbao had been made possible only after
the political direction of the PNV reacted as the opportunity arose (Tellitu et al., 1997;
Zulaika, 1997). However, this opportunistic stance to cope with economic restructuring
contrasted sharply with the promises of the 1990 political manifesto of the same
political party where the need to create a Basque Museum of Contemporary Art was
clearly stated. The initial agreement between the Bizkaia County Council and the
American Foundation took place on May 1991. As part of this compromise, the Bizkaia
County Council would be in charge of building the museum, at an estimated cost of
$100 million, and of paying another $20 million to the Guggenheim Foundation for its
know-how. To these expenses would be added, $50 million for buying paintings and an
expected gross annual budget of $13.5 million to be covered by the Basque
administrations (Guggenheim Museum Bilbao, 1992). On February 1992, the
lehendakari, Ardanza and the representatives of the Foundation signed the contract for
the definitive location of the museum not in the Alhondiga building as was initially
thought, but in Abandoibarra. The Bilbao Council would only provide the land to locate
the museum, but without contributing to its running costs. The innovative design of the
new museum building, opened in 1997, was thus considered a hallmark building for the
city.
As regime theory suggests, urban leaders usually use different mechanisms to justify the
public funding of major projects. In the case of the Guggenheim Museum, local urban
leaders have cited, among others, the favourable figures of economic impact studies, the
Guggenheim Foundation name, and the prestige of Gehry as positive factors. The
economic impact study commissioned to Peat Marwick consultants predicted the
creation of 500 jobs during the four-year building plan, with an estimated 200 further
jobs for operating the museum. It was also envisaged that the museum would attract to
the city around 600,000 visitors annually, the same order as the New York Guggenheim
Museum in 1990 or the Prado and the Dali Museums in Spain (Guggenheim Museum
Bilbao, 1992; El Correo Espanol, 9 February 1992; El Mundo, 15 February 1992).
Typical of this line of argument was the statement by a local Councillor who defended
the huge public investment on this project in terms of the extensive benefits that it
would bring to the whole population:
It allows Bilbao to use the Guggenheim Foundation name to attract
other commercial ventures. It also sensitises Bilbao to the fact that it
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does not only offer a museum...but also those things are done for its
neighbourhoods. In essence, if this regeneration process is able to
create wealth, employment, these aspects will facilitate resources to
develop initiatives in its neighbourhoods.. .The Guggenheim is not only
cultural, but is mainly economic, because through these projects
Bilbao's economy will be promoted and this will create jobs for its
neighbourhoods (Interviewee 2, PNV City Councillor, 16 January
1996).
The Guggenheim Museum combined with other existing historical cultural assets such
as the Bellas Artes and Historico Museums, the Arriaga Theatre, and the Philharmonic
Orchesta, is expected to enhance the potential of Bilbao as a 'cultural capital'. However,
in a city with a strong tradition of municipal cultural centres where all neighbourhoods
obtained subsidies for the promotion of traditional cultural activities, ranging from
Basque language classes (euskera) to music groups, much of the current Council's
cultural budget was spent on "the renovation of local theatres such as the Arriaga, the
Campos or the Merced Church", while public subsidies for local cultural activities have
been reduced "the Council helps all groups... but with 'ad hoc' funding" (Interviewee 6,
PNV Councillor, 29 January 1996). Not surprisingly, a considerable controversy has
taken place on the extensive public resources used in these prestige cultural projects
concentrated at the city centre, particularly when there is a low level of cultural
infrastructure in Bilbao's neighbourhoods "there is a clear lack of cultural sites, theatres
and in particular, public libraries (there are only 13)" (HB City Councillor). The same
Councillor also criticised the Basque cultural policy after saying, "there has only been a
huge investment in just a few major projects". With respect to this, a representative of
the Neighbourhood Associations stated "the huge investment in this museum is
particularly significant, while, in turn, important Basque artists such as Oteiza, Chillida
or lbarrola do not receive any help" (Interviewee 16, member of a Neighbourhood
Association, 12 February 1996).
The Guggenheim Museum has attracted serious criticism around four issues: first, for
the conditions of the agreement between the Bizkaia County Council and the
Guggenheim Foundation; second, for the validity of the economic impact study and its
outcomes; third, for the exclusion of important Basque artists within the cultural
products of the Museum; and finally, for having little relation to the Basque distinctive
heritage and identity (Tellitu et al., 1997; Zulaika, 1997). Regarding the last point,
among others, one well-known Basque artist, Ibarrola argued that "there had not been
any consultation with any Basque artist in the design of this project. More important,
the Guggenheim Museum is not the outcome of any Basque cultural policy designed to
satisfy the needs of Euskadi" (Tellitu et al., 1997, p. 118).
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Benefits Costs
1. Economic rejuvenation
2. Innovative museum building
3. Tourism development
4. Enhancement of other local cultural assets
5. Development of a thriving cultural quarter
at city centre
6.	 National	 and	 international	 exposure	 and
renewed confidence in Bilbao
1.	 Cultural production owned and controlled by the
Guggenheim Foundation.
2. Annual subsidy by the Basque administrations
3. Employment opportunities scarce
3. Closure of local libraries, lack of funding for cultural
and sports activities at local and autonomous levels.
4. Exclusion of important Basque artists
5.	 Perceived as an attack to the distinctive Basque
heritage and identity
Table 7.4. Benefits and Costs of the Guggenheim Museum Bilbao
Source: Compilation by the author.
The accompanying table 7.4 offers a summary of the benefits and costs of the
Guggenheim Museum. The funding of the Guggenheim Museum (more than 23.500
million ptas) and associated elite cultural projects appears to have had a considerable
negative effect on the city's cultural policy with the reduction of the local spending in
cultural centres, the closure of local libraries (e.g. two in the period 1991-94), but also
to the revenue funding of the whole cultural budget of the Basque Country in general,
and that for sport, in particular. Sport is included within the responsibilities of the
Culture Department of both Bizkaia County Council and the Basque government. Sport
is funded under two headings of 'sport' and 'youth and community action' and these
two combined budgets actually decreased in the period 1989-1993 by one third, while
the total cultural budget of the Bizkaia County Council grew by 47 percent. Much of
this growth was attributable to the Guggenheim project itself (museum and exhibition
funding grew by more than 400 percent in the period 1991-1993) (Bilbao Metropoli 30,
1993, p. 185) (see Table 7.5).
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
Culture total (million ptas) 5,038 6,041 6,452 7,674 7,239
General Services 7,7% 7,1% 7,3% 7,1% 6,8%
Youth and Community Activities 21,5% 17,4% 16,4% 12,6% 11,8%
Sports 8,5% 18,0% 17,3% 11,5% 8,3%
Heritage 40,9% 37,1% 37,1% 47,5% 51,1%
Cultural Promotion	 21,3% 20,4% 21,9% 21,3% 22,0%
Table 7.5: Bizkaia County Council expenditure in culture (1989-1993)
Source: Bilbao Melropoli 30 (1993, p. 183)
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However, after the completion of the Guggenheim Museum, the sports budget is
expected to increase, according to a representative of the Association of Bizkaia Sport
Federations:
Despite the fact the number of sports federations has increased, the
Bizkaia Sports Federation has received the same budget for the last five
years. In the first few years the budget was constrained and then the
Bizkaia County Council cut back its own activities to share this money
with the federations. But this could not be sustained and funding for sports
was reduced further. Recently, in a meeting with the Bizkaia County
Council Sports director and the politician responsible for sport, it was
agreed that after the investment in these high profile cultural projects, the
sports budget would be increased (Interviewee 15, representative of
ASFEDEBI, 12 February 1996).
7.5.2 Professional sport teams and Basque Sports
Although it has become increasingly common for city authorities in the developed
economies of the European Union and North America to make use of sporting events
together with professional teams for economic, social and symbolic purposes (see
chapter 2), Bilbao offers a distinctive feature to this trend. The significance of Athletic
de Bilbao, (founded in 1898), the most important professional sports team and the sole
team of national significance in the city, goes beyond sporting symbolism. This club
occupies a profound place in the identity of the city and the Basque Country
(MacClancy, 1996). Its proud refusal to select any non-Basque players (a tradition
which dates from 1919), however, ties it to a traditional sense of Basque identity rather
than a 'modern' identity. As a sports officer related "Athletic de Bilbao is more than a
club. It has a special meaning within the Basque Country where it is usually said that
there is nothing more than Athletic" (Interviewee 3; sports City Council officer, 11
January 1996). However, despite its manifest importance and as part of the re-imaging
of the city, the club does not actually receive any financial support from any of the three
levels of government. A Socialist Councillor explained this fact as part of political
differences:
Around six or seven years ago and after changing the initial land-use
specification, Athletic de Bilbao got some money instead. However with
the chairman Letxurdi, this assistance was cut off because of political
differences between him and the personnel responsible for sport in the
Basque government (Interviewee 8; PSOE Councillor, 30 January 1996).
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In this sense, it is worth noticing that all chairmen of the club have been close to the
PNV. Nevertheless, the case of Bilbao is regarded as unusual in terms of financial
support to professional teams compared with, for example, other autonomous
governments (e.g. Galicia) or cities (e.g. Marbella) which support various premier
league football teams (Interviewee 5, HB City Councillor, 31 January, 1996). Unlike
most Spanish premier league football teams (which are limited companies), Athletic de
Bilbao raises its income mainly from its members. Of course, this policy severely limits
its financial autonomy.
In 1995, another professional team in the city, Bilbao Patronato Basketball, sponsored
by a semi-public regional bank, the BBK, gained the right to be promoted to the first
division, however an initial payment of 368 m ptas was required. This issue created a
campaign in the city to generate funds and the Council was asked to participate in the
project. Mayor Ortuondo confirmed initially the support of the Council for this project,
firstly, through the renovation of the Casilla Basketball Arena and secondly, through the
encouragement of other institutions such as Metropoli 30 to collaborate in the project
(El Correo Espanol, 15 June 1994; Deia, 14 June 1994). In the end, the city's basketball
team failed to gain promotion to the first division as a result of a lack of financial
support from the three levels of Basque institutions and its sponsor, the BBK. The
Council only collaborated in a symbolic way "by giving us moral support rather than
funding" (Interviewee 18, member of Bilbao Patronato, 5 February 1996). Although the
BBK was willing to maintain its sponsorship of the club, a representative of this bank
noted that "we were not able to make the initial payment of 368 million ptas"
(Interviewee 20, representative of the BBK, 8 February 1996). This case has negatively
affected the further sponsorship of other professional teams by the BBK as a
representative of the Bilbao Patronato confirmed:
The BBK is the only institution, which clearly supports sports, in part
due to its obligation to spend money on social activities. However,
although they support our basketball team and other sports such as
handball and football, they do not want to be linked with any other team
again after their negative experience with the basketball team because
their image could be damaged if it is perceived that they have not given
enough money (Interviewee 18, member of Bilbao Patronato, 5 February
1996).
Traditionally, the Council has not fully supported elite sport. Important clubs such as
the Nogara club (several times the Spanish ice-hockey champion team), a professional
cycling team (KAS) and a first division rugby team (Santutxu) had previously gone out
of existence. A Socialist City Councillor explained the case of the Nogara club:
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"unfortunately, its sports facility, which at that time was private, closed down. Although
high participation was highlighted, the city was unable to build a new ice-hockey arena"
(Interviewee 8; PSOE city councillor, 30 January 1996). More recently, the folding of a
premier league women's handball team, problems with volleyball and the financial
difficulties of the Bilbao Patronato Basketball Club and the city's water polo national
league team, have all been cited as examples of Bilbao's parsimony in support for elite
sport (Interviewee 15, representative of ASFEDEBI, 12 February 1996). Part of these
financial difficulties were explained due to the significant influence of the Athletic de
Bilbao which "creates problems for any team which wants to develop here such as the
Barakaldo Handball Team" (Interviewee 18, member of Bilbao Patronato, 5 February
1996). A sport officer used the same argument to justify the failure of the Bilbao
Patronato to get institutional and financial sponsorship. The contribution of the
commercial sector and the Basque government, it was claimed, "is diminishing every
year" while associations such as Metropoli 30 and Ria 2000 do not support sports
projects. A representative of Bilbao Patronato reinforced this issue: "Metropoli 30 does
not consider sport as part of its strategy.. .despite the fact that the funding of a premier
league basketball team will be cheaper than the Guggenheim Museum". In addition,
Bilbao lost also an opportunity to host a high-performance facility, which eventually
went to the neighbouring city of Getxo. According to representative of the Socialist
Party "in Bilbao it has not been understood that 'Sport for All' could benefit from using
elite sports. This is one of the deficits in terms of sport" (Interviewee 8; PSOE City
Councillor, 30 January 1996).
Basque sports, regularly played in northern Spain and the southwest of France, are
regarded as a means of reinforcing the distinctive Basque culture. Despite their
importance as symbol of national identity, Bilbao does not have any indoor public
fronton for pala. The only indoor fronton in the city is owned by a private club,
Olympico, which subsequently has given over the management of this facility to a
private company `Asegarce' which aims to revitalise this sport in Bilbao. However,
according to a representative of a local sporting club "this company does not receive
any public funding" (Interviewee 11, representative of Club Olympico, 1 February
1996). Indeed, only Asegarce supports the Basque sport of pelota, despite the assertion
made by a representative of a semi-public bank that "it is worth sponsoring this sport
due to its influence in areas such as Santander, Navarra, the Basque and the French
Basque Country" (Interviewee 20, representative of the BBK, 8 February 1996). In
addition to the enhancement of Basque culture generated by Basque sports, the
development of Basque sports could contribute to a substantial growth of cultural
tourism. However, as a representative of a local sports club noted, "they (Basque
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Sports) are sadly disappearing because of the limited contribution of the business sector
to sport".
Though all the city political manifestos refer to sport, a representative of a sports club
noted that "political parties do not consider sport as part of the marketing of the city". In
addition to this lack of vision, a representative of ASFEDEBI noted that "politicians
only occasionally used sport for their political gain" (Interviewee 15, representative of
ASFEDEBI, 12 February 1996). The city's priority in terms of sport was said to be
'Sport for All' but all parties recognised the city's lack of facilities both in absolute
terms, and in comparison with surrounding municipalities in the Metropolitan area. A
report by Bilbao Metropoli 30 (1993, p. 149) highlighted that in 1989, the provision for
sports facilities in wider Metropolitan Bilbao was 1.49 square metres per inhabitant,
whereas in Bilbao it was only 0.80. This lack of sports facilities in Bilbao with respect
to other municipalities was explained by a representative of Ria 2000 "Bizkaia County
Council has invested more than municipalities in the period 1984 to 1990 with the aim
of improving the standards of all municipalities" (Interviewee 12, representative of Ria
2000, 13 February 1996). However, political moves to secure votes also affect the
implementation of policies in Bizkaia, and political rivalry between the Council and
Bizkaia County Council has affected some initiatives such as the operation of school
swimming.
As a city sports officer admitted, the major weakness in terms of sports facilities in the
city is a lack of "football grounds, a major facility to accommodate major international
events and a track and field stadium" (Interviewee 3; sports Council officer, 11 January
1996) (see also Bilbao Metropoli 30, 1993). Swimming pools were added to this list by
a representative of ASFEDEBI because "swimming at certain levels can only be done in
private clubs. There is no municipal swimming club". Furthermore, a representative of
the Chamber of Commerce pointed out that "in a meeting [on 23 January 1996], it was
concluded that Bilbao's main deficiencies were: big musical events and sports facilities
suitable for major events.. .in Bizkaia, there are no 50 m swimming pools capable of
holding international events" (Interviewee 13; Casco Viejo Chamber of Commerce, 13
February 1996). To tackle this problem, "the Bizkaia County Council Sports Director
confirmed that his department planned to build one 50 m swimming pool. This
swimming pool should be located in Bilbao due to its high maintenance requirements
and the large catchment" (Interviewee 15, representative of ASFEDEBI, 12 February
1996). In relation to the track and field stadium, while other nearby Councils such as
Basauri, Getxo, or Galdacano have one, Bilbao does not. There was some discussion at
a political level of building a sports stadium on Artxanda, on the hills overlooking the
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city, though, the most recent proposal located this in a peripheral area of Bilbao,
Zorrotza. However, this facility "will not contribute to locate major events in the city"
(Interviewee 8, PSOE City Councillor, 30 January 1996). Despite the generally
recognised lack of facilities for 'Sport for All' as well as for hosting major sporting
events, the new Urban Plan was not seen as giving the matter real prominence. No new
sport facilities will be built and in particular, the number of football pitches will be
considerably reduced. A local Councillor related the limitations of the Urban Plan in
terms of sport:
The Urban Plan has left Bilbao without a sports arena because of
political conditions and speculation. Furthermore, this plan projects that
some football pitches will disappear, despite City Councillors'
assurances that they would remain the same. However, they are going to
keep neither the same number nor the same locations.. .The Etxebarria
Park project will reduce the number of pitches from two to one. The
Ibarsuri's football club will also be reduced from two pitches to one.
Garellano's football pitch will disappear and will be moved to Zorrotza.
There will not be new facilities (Interviewee 5, HB City Councillor, 31
January 1996).
Though the aim of the Bilbao sports policy is to locate, at least, one municipal sport
facility in all neighbourhoods, extensive differences are still apparent in Bilbao's
neighbourhoods. In particular, the centre of Bilbao lacks a municipal sport facility with
only two private clubs, Olympico and the Arniche. One of them, the Olympico Sports
club, founded 100 years ago and with 3,135 members, has no agreement with the
Council to share its facilities (Interviewee 11, representative of club Olympico, 1
February 1996), particularly in this area where there is a large proportion of old people
and not everybody can afford to join private clubs. Although the centre of Bilbao does
not offer spaces on which to locate sports facilities, a new project aimed at converting
the Alhondiga wine store into a Sport Arena was considered (Interviewee 6, PNV City
Councillor, 29 January 1996). However, the feasibility of this project remains
ambiguous and a Socialist City Councillor expressed "a great lack of information
regarding this project". In addition to the Alhondiga proposal and the sports stadium in
Artxanda, covering of the bullfighting arena was considered for major events. However,
all plans were predicated upon the urban development in Abandoibarra and Amezola,
and so, the development of sporting facilities was unlikely to progress past the 'wish
list' stage.
Traditionally the city has never had any municipal sport clubs. Hence, according to a
city sports officer, "local clubs establish agreements to use its municipal facilities. They
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even run these public facilities, for example, all the public football pitches are run by
clubs, with the council in charge of any infrastructure maintenance". Although there
were said to be concessions for using municipal facilities, ASFEDEBI complained that
current charges were such that some sports clubs were effectively priced out of
facilities, with all clubs required paying for using municipal facilities. Indeed, the same
representative described the Bilbao Council as the municipality "with little interest not
only in elite sport but also in 'Sport for All'. Bilbao Council is perhaps the worst
municipality of the Bizkaia County Council. In other places with swimming clubs such
as Barakaldo, Getxo, Sestao or Santurtzi, their Councils lease at a charge their facilities
to these clubs. In Bilbao, the swimming federation has been unable to hire a swimming
pool to set up a municipal swimming club".
The future of sport in the city remains problematic, according to both the Socialist and
HB Councillors. The latter added "unless the politicians change, Bilbao will not have
the same sport facilities and events as in other cities". In addition, as a local politician
noted some conflicts have arisen not only between the IMD and clubs, but also with
sports municipal personnel because of the recent introduction of a managerialist
approach in the running of municipal sports services (Interviewee 8, PSOE City
Councillor, 30 January 1996). Maybe in the future, elite sport will flourish, but now
Bilbao, as it was stated, is concentrating on a 'Sports for All' approach. However, a
representative of Metropoli 30 also suggested that sport in the latter part of the 1990s
was beginning to be more valued within the regeneration of the city:
The Strategic Plan is a dynamic process. In 1989, the feeling about sport
and tourism was different and now they are considered increasingly
relevant to regeneration...Metropo/i 30 supports sport projects in the
Metropolitan Area, which stimulate the regeneration process. As a result,
the Association has good relations with the Council and its Sports
Department and also with the Athletic de Bilbao (Interviewee 1, member of
Metropoli 30, 10 January 1996).
Representatives of the Socialist Group, despite their criticism of the political group of
PNV in the Council for failing to acknowledge the relationship between 'Sport for All'
and elite sport provision reinforced this issue. Thinking may thus be changing in the
post-Guggenheim development period, though evidence of investment had yet to
materialise at the time of writing.
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7.6.Concluding remarks
In many senses the implications of economic crisis for Bilbao, with the decline of its
traditional industries associated with Fordist production by the world recession of the
1970s, and the kind of strategies to replace these with new forms of accumulation, are
similar to those for many cities in the developed economies of the European Union and
North America (see Harvey, 1990; Rodriguez, 1996; Williams, 1997). Despite the
reported influence of global factors and the severe economic and industrial decline in
Bilbao and its metropolitan area, the combination of the recent history of institutional
competition between the Basque institutions over who should lead the political process
in the Basque Country which coincided with the initial stages of the decentralisation
process and the political complexity associated with terrorism could help to explain why
Basque urban leaders postponed taking policy responses to cope with urban change until
the late 1980s.
Subsequently, as was made abundantly clear by a number of respondents, the main urban
leaders in Bilbao were greatly influenced by the 'American entrepreneurial model'
(perceived as a single, unified approach), with special reference to Pittsburgh and
Baltimore as examples of effective urban restructuring. In this way, the case of Bilbao
does not essentially differ from what Harvey characterises as a general trend of using
prestige urban development projects, in which large-scale emblematic cultural projects
were seen as central to the wider process of urban regeneration (see also Cochrane et al,
1996; Henry, 1993; Rodriguez, 1996). Nonetheless, Bilbao seeks to promote its
comparative advantage by the launching of the spectacular post-modern building of the
Guggenheim Museum.
As was explained in the case of Sheffield, in terms of Stoker and Mossberger's typology
of urban regimes, the Bilbao political scenario serves to illustrate the transition from an
embryonic symbolic regime (e.g. Metropoli 30) to an instrumental regime and in
particular, a development urban regime formed around Ria 2000. However, the
description of Bilbao's recent politics given, makes it clear that cooperation between
coalition members in Bilbao was not achieved without some difficulties.
Despite the fact that the political control of the city, the Diputacion and the Basque
Country has rested with the PNV since the first democratic elections in 1979, the PNV
has failed to impose its leadership and this has had important political consequences
(Juaristi, 1995). One of them was the resignation of the former lehendakari' (president)
Garaicoetxea of the Basque government after his victory in the 1984 autonomic
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elections. The other was the resignation of the former Mayor Gorordo in 1990 after an
initial period of ongoing disputes between Bilbao City Council and the other levels of
Basque government and central government throughout the 1980s (where powers and
local leadership were challenged by a number of Basque governmental initiatives) as
well as due to his opposition to the Metropolitan Area economic development strategies,
most notably to the Guggenheim Museum. However, the arrival of a new Council leader,
Ortuondo, (from the same political party as Gorordo) in 1991, was deemed important to
adopt a more collaborative approach between the three levels of Basque institutions and
local business interests on economic development. One of the first outcomes of the
emergence of new forms of local politics was the setting of the first private-public
partnership, Bilbao Metropoli 30, (with the exclusion of national government) the same
year as the primary thrust to implement the Strategic Plan for Metropolitan Bilbao.
Although many commentators advocate a greater role for cities as the principal agents of
economic changes, from the research it was found that both the Basque institutions and
Central Government rather than the Bilbao City Council have played a central role in
promoting major changes in local politics. Indeed, the executive board of the PNV
exercised command power in some of the major political decisions (e.g. establishment of
Metropoli 30, the maintenance of political schisms, or the attraction of the Guggenheim
Museum) while the pre-emptive power of Central Government contributed to the
establishment of Bilbao Ria 2000. Related to the latter, the failure of Bilbao Metropoli
30 to exercise, in Stone's terms, pre-emptive power over city politics, the pragmatic
leadership of Mayor Ortuondo and particularly, the influence of the Spanish central
government facilitated the establishment of new governing realignments in the form of a
new public-led coalition, Bilbao Ria 2000, in 1993. The research revealed that Ria 2000
was deemed as the first real governing coalition with all levels of public institutions
willing to cooperate to promote significant urban changes.
Unlike Stone's typology of urban regimes in the US, one of the apparent defining
features of the embryonic symbolic urban regime initially formed around Metropoli 30 is
that it is public-sector led. Involvement of the private sector was said to be important in
the development of Metropoli 30's strategy. However, the initial involvement and further
incorporation on to the board of Metropoli 30 has not been complemented in practice by
involvement in strategy implementation. As several informants stated, the role of the
private sector in Bilbao's regeneration (as in Sheffield) is more symbolic than real. In
fact, the major urban projects already developed in Bilbao and its Metropolitan Area to
offset the economic and industrial decline, such as the Guggenheim Museum and the
Convention Centre, are public-sector dominated in investment terms with contributions
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from the Bizkaia County Council, the Central Government, and European funds. The
limited contribution of the private sector in the case of Bilbao could be explained by the
degree of local politicisation and in particular, terrorism which were (and still are)
having a negative effect on the local economy.
Unlike Stone's typology of urban regimes in the US, one of the apparent defining
features of the embryonic symbolic urban regime formed around Metropoli 30 is that it is
public-sector led. Involvement of the private sector was said to be important in the
development of Metropoli 30's strategy, in particular, two important private utilities
companies were identified as instrumental in this strategy. However, the initial
involvement and further incorporation on to the board of Metropoli 30 has not been
complemented by involvement in strategy implementation. As several informants stated,
the role of the private sector in Bilbao's regeneration is more symbolic than real. In fact,
the major urban projects already developed in Bilbao and its metropolitan area to offset
the economic and industrial decline, such as the Guggenheim Museum and the
Convention Centre, are public-sector dominated in investment terms, in particular, with
contributions from the Bizkaia County Council, the Central Government, and European
funds. The limited contribution of the private sector in the case of Bilbao could be
explthnea by the degree of local politicisation and in particular, terrorism which were
(and still are) having a negative effect on the local economy.
The hegemony of the embryonic symbolic regime formed around Metropoli 30 has thus
been under challenge -for failing as yet to attract significant private investment (though it
remains to be seen if this situation may change in the post-Guggenheim development
period and with an apparent decrease of terrorism and normalisation of urban politics). In
addition, the nature of culture as an apolitical arena of post-modern politics has been
contested in Bilbao as being constructed without reference to local people, and as failing
to account for local identity. This was evident in the resistance to the Guggenheim
Museum. However, the ability of critics of the symbolic regime to mobilise alternative
strategies has been barely evident in the city during the development of these strategies.
A further complicating local feature is the significance of issues of culture for the Basque
Country. In effect, embracing the globalization tendencies of inter-city competition was
planned around a 'post-modern' cultural centrepiece, the Guggenheim Museum that
owed its identity to the New York Guggenheim Foundation rather more than to its
Basque location. Planners refer to Manhattanization in the Bilbao context (Gonzalez,
1993). The decision to locate the Guggenheim Museum was more an opportunistic
stance rather than being part of an integrated cultural policy with the combination of
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consumption and production-oriented cultural activities. Not surprisingly, the whole
process has been quite controversial with heated debates surrounding the economic,
political, cultural and social effects of this project and associated elite cultural projects
(see Tellitu eta!., 1997; Zulaika, 1997).
While in Sheffield the symbolic use of sport to promote the city on the international
stage was recognised, in the case of Bilbao this phenomenon, as was generally
acknowledged by all respondents in the city, was less evident. Thus, local political and
sporting proponents alike saw the city as standing out in its failure to promote its identity
by funding its major professional-elite sporting clubs, in contrast to the other major
Basque and Spanish cities. This is particularly relevant in the case of Athletic de Bilbao,
the sole major national league team in the city, which occupies a profound place in the
identity of the city and the Basque Country. Its proud refusal to select any non-Basque
players, however, ties it to a traditional sense of Basque identity rather than to a
'modern' identity. Some sports such as basketball, volleyball, handball, the Basque pala
and the like, which have enjoyed increased professionalization and media coverage in
recent years are thus absent from the current portfolio of sports associated with Bilbao.
Support for Basque Sports and for other sporting federations is provided by the Council
and in particular, by the Bizkaia County Council. However, sporting facilities for both
'Sport for All' and for sporting excellence are relatively sparse in the city, even
compared with other, smaller neighbouring authorities within the Bilbao Metropolitan
area. To make matters worse, the sporting budget of sport of the Bizkaia County Council,
at least in principle, is suppressed by virtue of the cost of the Guggenheim project and
associated elite cultural projects. The shift in the political culture of the Bizkaia County
Council because of these elite cultural projects also was reflected in the politics of sport
and culture in the city. As such, in the post-1990 period, under Mayor Ortuondo, there
was a squeeze on local government expenditure on sports and culture as well as a shift in
the traditional management of sports policy in the city towards a more managerialist
approach with the privatisation of some sports activities.
Though it is too soon to evaluate many of the effects of the entrepreneurialism and
regimes leading urban change in Bilbao, the instrumental regime formed around Ria
2000 is fairly young and the relative powers and commitments of each of the tiers of
government are still subject to considerable debate. In fact, the stability of this
instrumental regime remains to be seen as it is formed around the idea of materialising
various visible projects, such as initiatives in Bilbao' riverfront, Amezola and lately in
the Metropolitan Area of Bilbao. The capacity and independence of this development
urban regime in Bilbao is substantially more dependent on resources from higher levels
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of government rather than from local private investors, and on the decisions of national
and regional political actors to implement most of the urban projects. In turn, it is also
clear that the combination of institutional, financial and political constraints have
contributed to slow down the process of implementation of most of these projects with
some scepticism publicly voiced about the process of local urban regeneration.
As in the case of many American and European cities, the entrepreneurialism adopted in
Bilbao and its associated large scale projects has had relatively little success in spreading
the proclaimed economic growth to excluded social groups. Indeed, despite the reported
growth of service activities, current unemployment rates remain stubbornly high. Finally,
there is growing evidence that the relationship between local needs and elite-oriented
projects has given risen to contradictions and tensions within Bilbao's neighbourhoods
and between the neighbourhoods and the city centre.
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Conclusions
This thesis applies regime analysis to evaluate the role of sport and leisure as part of the
regeneration strategies associated to the promotion of entrepreneurialism and urban regimes
as one of the new forms of urban governance in two European cities, Bilbao and Sheffield.
This concluding chapter summarises the findings of the empirical research and relates the
examples of Bilbao and Sheffield partnerships and urban regimes for economic regeneration
from the mid 1980s to 1995 to evaluate the relevance of urban regime theory for cross-
national urban political analysis. To begin with, the chapter offers a review of the debates
surrounding the decline of the main features of the dominantly Fordist regime of
accumulation operating in the post-war period in most Western economies and its apparent
transition to a new era. Secondly, these debates, linked to the emerging pattern of changes in
the economic, political, social, and cultural areas of Western cities, provide a broad context
to analyse and compare the diversity of political responses for urban economic changes, the
evolution of the role of local government in policy making, and the role of sports and leisure
in the formation of urban regimes in Britain, Spain and the US. Thirdly, it then examines to
what extent the empirical findings of urban governance in the two cities selected illustrate
some of the key features of the so-called 'new urban politics' with the emergence and
operation of urban regimes and their implications for the nature of urban and sports policies
in both cities. The final section concludes with a discussion on general themes emerging
from the two case studies and discusses the extent to which global forces and strategies are
manifested in, mediated by, or resisted at, the focal level.
The debate about Fordism and Post-Fordism
In the post-war period, most of Western economies were facing severe and compound
economic and social problems. As a response to these problems, it was generally recognised
that the international production system was best organised along Fordist-Keynesian
principles as a dominant economic order under the internationally undisputed hegemony of
the US. However, the international expansion of Fordism as capitalism's regime of
accumulation was unevenly developed through most Western countries. In the Spanish case,
for example, it only came to fruition in the early 1960s, characterised by Peck and Tickell
(1994) as a 'delayed Fordism'. Under these principles, most of the Western economies
managed to favour, in a time of relative economic growth and political consensus, the
expansion of a welfare state that greatly influenced the provision of collective services (in
areas such as education, housing, health or sports and leisure). In this way, the benefits of
mass production and mass consumption (at least, in theory) were relatively widely spread
among the population.
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The expansion of national Fordisms was thus facilitated by a set of key institutions, in
particular, the nation-state and to lesser extent, local governments (Duncan and Goodwin,
1988; Goodwin et al., 1992; Harvey, 1989). In Britain, for example, during the social
democratic period, central government was deemed as the main actor for economic
regulation while local government was acting as a decentralised agency of the former in the
provision of the majority of welfare services. Under these intergovernmental arrangements,
Saunders (1981) described the nature of British post-war urban politics as that of a 'dual
state'. However, the Saunders thesis can not be straightforwardly applied to all liberal
democracies and in particular, the US and Spain. Within this general framework, the
literature on urban politics at this time focused upon the power of the nation-state, the formal
relationship between central and local government as well as the study of who exercises
control within `Fordise cities. Political power politics was characterised as relatively non-
conflictual with a stable process of group competition being responded to by elected
politicians. Non-local influences on the extent and nature of power exercised by local groups,
the lack of local government autonomy from higher levels of government, or the activities of
elite groups around growth-related politics, occupied a subordinate position within the
political science debate of this time (Dahl, 1961; Fainstein and Hirst, 1995; Harding, 1995;
Hunter, 1953; Molotch, 1976; Mollenkopf, 1992; Stoker, 1995).
Despite some shortcomings, the Fordist-Keynesian principles held firm, at least, until the
early 1970s in most industrially advanced Western countries. Since then, as has been
reflected in the flourishing of competing urban theories under a new urban political-economy
paradigm, the main social and economic features underpinning the Fordist model apparently
began to crumble with the appearance of political, economic and social changes operating at
the international, national and local level. The apparent break up of the Fordist model has
opened a wider debate in the political science literature, operating at different levels of
analysis, from forms of production and management organisation, to the macroeconomy,
culture, and urban governance. Though there are major differences in the interpretations of
the main features that appear to characterise the new era, competing theories of transition
identify as new features: the flexibilisation of production systems, the fragmentation of the
labour market, greater differentiated consumption, an economy largely dominated by
multinational corporations and greater autonomy from the nation state control, and the
increasingly entrepreneurialist role adopted by contemporary cities (see Amin, 1994; Jessop,
1994; Mayer, 1994; Stone, 1989; Stoker, 1995).
Some of the most recent approaches to theorising these changes speculate whether the
emergence of these new identities are part of the so-called transition from a Fordist model or
'Keynesian welfare state' to a new phase of capitalism, variously described as: 'flexible
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accumulation' (Amin, 1994; Harvey, 1990), a `Schumpeterian workfare state' (Jessop, 1990,
1994), or a 'post-welfare society' (Painter, 1995); or whether instead, the changes currently
operating are part of a temporary crisis of the Fordist model. These changes have also been
accompanied by shifts at the cultural level. The analysis of these changes forms part of an
apparent transition from a relatively permanent and stable aesthetic of 'modernism' to 'post-
modernism' characterised by diversity, difference, ephemerality, and the commodification of
cultural forms (see Harvey, 1990).
One consequence of the globalisation of the economy is the rise of more flexible production
systems within a new international division of labour. Another is the loss of political and
economic standing of the nation-state. The apparent diminution of the power of the nation-
state, though contested by some commentators (see, e.g., Hirst, 1995; Harvey, 1990; Harding
and LeGales, 1997; Scott, 1997), has been accompanied by an increased significance in the
roles of transnational bodies (e.g. new governing institutions such as the EC or multinational
companies), sub-national bodies, and in particular, in the significance of cities in the new
global economy (Amin, 1994; Borja and Castells, 1997; Hambleton, 1990; Jessop, 1990,
1994; Moulaert and Demaziere, 1996). At the same time, there is now a broad consensus that
the combination of economic and political transformations in the context of globalisation has
shaped the nature of traditional urban politics, for example, with the transformation of the
economic bases of many European industrial cities from manufacturing to services.
Alongside this, there has been an increase in the demands for conceding more capacity to the
local governments, in some ways analogous to that enjoyed by European cities in the pre-
nation state period. However, according to regime theory, the traditional formal authority of
local governments alone is simply unable to promote economic growth and change at the
local level (see Stone, 1989, 1993).
As a response to new challenges such as the globalisation of the economy, growing urban
competitiveness or limited powers and resources available to contemporary local
governments, some of the dominant neo-liberal political responses mostly adopted by
Western cities can be summarised by the combination of local entrepreneurialism, the
redefinition of the traditional scope of local government, the emergence of private-public
partnerships, privatisation of traditional public services, and the promotion of high profile
projects in consumer areas including sports, culture and leisure. These neo-liberal policy
responses have led some commentators to point out that most Western cities are now being
managed and governed in different ways as part of the so-called 'new urban politics'.
Much of the literature on urban governance indicates that one of the distinctive policy
responses to cope with processes of change, is the expansion of entrepreneurialism among
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many Western city governments, as with their US counterparts, seeking to create favourable
conditions conducive to promote economic development (Hall and Hubbard, 1998; Harvey,
1990; Logan and Molotch, 1987; Stone, 1989). In this way, it is also argued that the
increased involvement of Western cities in policies explicitly aimed at economic
development as a legitimate aim has meant a decline of their traditional involvement in
service distribution. The traditional role of local government in most Western countries has
thus progressively shifted to that of 'enabler', close to the American model of urban
development (Borja and CasteIls, 1997; Cochrane, 1991; Goldsmith, 1992; Harding, 1995;
Osborne and Gaebler, 1992; Rhodes, 1994; Stoker, 1995). Moreover, the redefinition of the
role of local government has occurred alongside a growing emphasis on the promotion of
public-private partnerships and coalitions in urban contexts to overcome the limited capacity
of contemporary local governments (Amin, 1994; DiGaetano, 1997; Harvey, 1990; Harding
and LeGales, 1997; Harding, 1994; Stone, 1989; Stoker, 1995; Stoker and Mossberger,
1994). Another significant response has been the decentralisation of management of public
services with an apparent replacement of the existing bureaucratic management of the Fordist
period by a new `managerialise approach with a greater involvement of private interests
(Henry, 1993; Farnham and Horton, 1993; Leach eta!., 1994).
The proclaimed ascendancy of entrepreneurialism on Western cities brought about, as one of
the ways to induce new economic growth, the growing emphasis on the development of a
series of highly visible flagship projects in sports, culture and leisure. With a close
resemblance to previous US initiatives, sports related projects are integrated in the economic
regeneration strategies of some British and Spanish cities as a means of promoting economic
growth after the decline of traditional industries, a catalyst for urban renewal and re-imaging
with emphasis placed upon immediate and visible results (in relation to Britain, Spain and
the US, see, for example, Baade and Dye, 1988; Bianchini and Parkinson, 1993; Brunet,
1994; Chapin, 1996a; Crompton, 1995; Cochrane et al., 1996; Loftman and Nevin, 1996;
Sack and Johnson, 1996). In this way, enhancing the attractiveness of a city forms an
important part of the symbolism of post-modern urban politics.
There have, however, been considerable criticisms of the prevalence of entrepreneurialism,
partnerships and urban regimes or high-profile sports-related projects that growth machine or
regime theories encourage, leading urban regeneration in post-modern urban politics. One of
the major arguments relates to the contradictory effects of these neo-liberal policy responses,
in particular to the relative lack of success (e.g. of job creation or of attraction of mobile
service-sector capital) in spreading the claimed economic benefits of urban regeneration to
all city residents (Keating, 1991; Hambleton, 1990; Harding, 1994; Kasarda, 1993; Harvey,
1990; Mayer, 1994; Squires, 1991). In the same line of argument, many of the reported
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economic successes of American and Western European cities have often been accompanied
by an increase of social and spatial polarisation. In fact, there is growing evidence that
entrepreneurialism itself is a cause of increasing, rather than decreasing, social and spatial
conflicts within a 'two-tier' city. In contrast to previous British urban policies, one of the
most extreme examples of this trend can be found in Thatcherite urban policies as much as in
the US (DoE, 1994; Hambleton, 1990; Lawless, 1988b; Parkinson, 1989; Stoker and Young,
1993; Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 1995). A number of authors also regard the growing use
of prestige urban projects as an ephemeral and a high-risk strategy to lead the regeneration of
contemporary cities (Bianchini and Parkinson, 1993; Daniels, 1993; Harvey, 1990; Squires,
1991). In the same vein, the redirection of urban policy over the last two decades provides
more incentives to affluent and mobile consumers and private business at the expense of
local welfare services and low-income citizens (Harvey, 1990; Hambleton, 1990; Mayer,
1994; Scott, 1997).
All these features have lead to a general recognition within the contemporary political
science literature of the need to analyse and compare the variety and the significance of local
government's responses for urban economic regeneration in the political economy of cities
across Britain, Spain and the US. It is also important to address the role of sport and leisure
in urban regime or coalition formation and the role of urban regimes in the development of
sports strategies. The cases of two European cities, Sheffield and Bilbao were investigated to
evaluate the key transformations of the nature of urban governance in the current global
economic restructuring. Specifically, it seeks to evaluate whether the concept of urban
regime theory developed by Stone is only limited to the US context or in turn, it provides
potential for understanding the politics of comparative urban development, or on a more
limited basis, to support or reject the Stoker and Mossberger's typology of urban regimes to
analyse cross-national processes of urban governance (see also Stoker and Mossberger, 1994;
DiGaetano and Klemanski, 1993; DiGaetano, 1997; Harding, 1994; Stone, 1989).
The nature of urban regimes in Britain, Spain and the US
As mentioned before, the expansion and consolidation of Fordism was uneven in Britain and
Spain compared to the US. National and local governments facilitated this process, however,
the forms and scope of national and local governments' intervention substantially differed
across these nations (Page and Goldsmith, 1987; Keating, 1991). This section seeks to
provide an overview of some fundamental similarities and differences in politics, party
system, business-city governing relations and urban planning powers between Britain, Spain
and the US that together can influence or constrain the development of urban regimes in
these nations. In Britain, in the postwar period, an economic growth and relative political
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consensus between the major political parties and corporatist arrangements favoured the
expansion of Fordism. During this period, Britain had also been regarded as a centralised
state, but a strong tradition of local government. Central government has almost no service
distribution functions that are part of local government responsibilities. To some extent, at
this time, despite the increasing financial dependency of local authorities on central
government, British local authorities enjoyed more capacity than their US and Spanish
counterparts.
In turn, the fragmented US political system has traditionally been more decentralised than in
both Britain (particularly, in the period of Mrs. Thatcher) and Spain (at least, during the
Franco period). Despite the fragmented and decentralised US political system, city
governments are constitutionally more limited in authority and resources than the federal and
to a lesser extent, state governments (Keating, 1991; Harding, 1994; Molotch, 1976; Stone,
1989). Although local government functions vary among American cities, local governments
have traditionally been more involved in policies of economic development than their
Western European counterparts. As such, the distribution of intergovernmental arrangements
of the US does not clearly respond to the dual state model of Saunders applied to describe the
post-war British politics.
Spain offers an important contrast to Britain and to the US because of its recent political,
economic and social history. The Franco regime was a highly centralised political system
relying on an autarchic economic system. Under this centralised political system, local
governments had a limited governing capacity to affect any policy change. With a complete
political subordination of local authorities to central government, Spanish local governance
was thus not dominated by managerial politics as in Britain or by concerns with policies of
economic growth as in the US. As a result of the weak autonomy and authority of local
governments, major urban areas were affected by extensive problems (Borja et al., 1977;
Capel, 1977, Gavira, 1994).
In the postwar period, British central government assumed that the expansion of the welfare
state, urban renewal dominated by state planning and the fostering of regional plarming were
sufficient to address urban problems. However, Britain was the first European country that
was subject to large-scale deindustrialisation, which brought with it problems of deprivation
in its major inner cities. From 1968 onwards, central government intervened more
specifically in declining inner areas by launching an urban programme similar to that
previously launched in American cities (Atkinson and Moon, 1994; Parkinson, 1989;
Lawless, 1988a; Rydin, 1993). These inner city initiatives focused mainly on social problems
of the inner city. As one of the policy solutions to growing urban problems, new
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intergovernmental relations were created with the establishment of partnerships of central
government and local authorities with the support of substantial central government funds,
which partly contributed to attenuate the limited financial contribution from the private
sector in inner cities. Until the arrival in power of the Conservatives in 1979, local authorities
rather than the private sector were thus considered the natural agency to tackle inner city
problems. As we shall see in the discussion which follows, the nature and scope of these
public-led partnerships differed from the kind of partnerships promoted at the US level.
In Spain, after the decline of the autarchic economic system, the adoption of Fordist
principles, among others, contributed to a late development of Fordism in the 1960s (see
Peck and Tickell, 1994; Coverdale, 1979; Harrison, 1993; Mateos and Soto, 1997). The
accelerated economic growth contributed to rapid industrialisation and urbanisation.
However, policy areas such as housing continued under central government planning control
and a co-ordinated urban policy was lacking. The beginning of the 1970s saw the rise of
highly organised social movements in the large urban areas, initially mobilised around
demands for public services and later on around pressures for political change. Despite rising
demands for essential public services, the late development of a welfare state provision was
minimal compared to Britain and even to the US (Alonso Teixidor and Hebbert, 1982;
Meng& 1982). The scope of local politics did not substantially differ at this time from the
early period of the Franco regime. In this context, neither the heavily fragmented and weak
local councils nor the uncoordinated efforts of central government were able to provide
essential welfare services (Borja, 1977; Capell, 1977; Castells, 1978; Wynn, 1984).
In the US there is a strong tradition of private culture in all areas, including urban policy,
while in Spain and in Britain, with a strong tradition of public culture, the private sector has
traditionally had a minor involvement in city politics. Although some form of public-private
co-operation has always existed in most Western countries, the kind of relationships between
local government and the business interests differs in the US context. Initiated in the post-
war period and continued in the late 1950s and 1960s, the urban renewal programmes
launched in American cities brought together partnerships of business interests and local
government with federal government funding, in response to urban economic decline, federal
government policies, and inherent limited capacity and financial weaknesses of local
governments. While adapting earlier than their European counterparts to global and national
forces, American cities have traditionally been exposed to an intense urban competitiveness
for attracting inward investment and development (Molotch, 1976; Keating, 1991; Orr and
Stoker, 1994; Savage and Warde, 1993). Considering the intense urban competitiveness and
the limited capacity of American local go % ernments, they have systematically been forced to
develop informal arrangements, mainly with business interests. Under those circumstances,
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in many of the resulting 'growth coalitions' or 'regimes' reported in US cities, business
groups have taken the key co-ordinating role with local authorities facilitating private
accumulation. In this way, the idea of local government in the US lends itself to the growth
machine and regime models identified by Logan and Molotch and Stone.
The nature of business-city government relations in the US, however, means that the concept
of an urban regime certainly is unlikely to be straightforwardly applied to European cities
(DiGaetano and Klemanski, 1993; Harding, 1994; Keating, 1991). Despite their different
socio-economic, cultural and political contexts, it is argued that British and Spanish city
governments share the characteristic of not being deeply involved in politics of economic
development, and the centralisation of politics in both countries contributed to reduce the
dependence of urban governments on private sources of investment as in the US context.
Therefore, unlike American cities, Spanish and British cities did not need to forge the variety
of public-private partnerships or 'urban regimes', as regime theory advocates, to govern their
respective cities during the Fordist period. However, since the 1970s, the combination of
global economic changes and national policies suggests that some British and Spanish cities
seem to be following an American model of urban governance. In Britain, many of the direct
pressures for change have predominantly come from central government. Since 1979, the
Thatcher and Major Conservative governments, partly driven by the American
entrepreneurialist approach to urban regeneration, sought to alter the traditional collaborative
pattern of central-local government relations (Atkinson and Moon, 1994; Bailey et al, 1995;
Bamekov et al., 1989; Cochrane, 1991; Edwards and Deakin, 1992; Hambleton, 1990;
Parkinson, 1989). The Conservative governments initiated a continuous attack over local
governments, many of which were controlled by the Labour party, reducing considerably the
two traditional sources of local financial capacity (the amount of central government grants
and their ability to determine local tax levels). Financial control on local government was
coupled with an increasing centralisation of decision-making and a growing urban
competitiveness for attracting central government funding. The attack on the traditional
values represented by the local authorities was also extended to the privatisation of urban
planning where local government powers were more extensive than in the US and Spain. In
addition, some local authority planning functions in certain urban areas have been transferred
to non-elected central government agencies, which has allowed central government to
maintain constraints on local government spending while diverting substantial government
funds to these agencies.
As already noted, under the Conservative governments, private sector-led entrepreneuralism
was deemed an essential policy response to promote local economic regeneration in inner
cities and metropolitan areas. As a reaction to national urban policies, for a brief period at the
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beginning of the 1980s, many Labour controlled cities (including Sheffield) challenged
central government entrepreneurialism by adopting alternative political and economic
approaches to stimulate local economic development (Blunkett and Jackson, 1987; Gyford,
1985; Parkinson, 1989). However, after the limited impact of these alternative approaches on
local economies and in line with central government policies, partnerships of local
authorities and the private sector began to crystallise with many British cities during the
1980s and 1990s seeking to attract inward commercial investment and limited central
government funds for urban regeneration strategies. These kinds of governing arrangements
differ from the previous model of arrangements of central and local governments.
In the early-post Franco era, there was a gradual shift of important legislative and executive
powers to the autonomous communities and to lesser extent, to the local authorities with the
country moving closer to a federal system. Despite institutional transformations, local
government in Spain still had a relatively small role in comparison with Britain and the US.
Indeed, the decentralisation process has clearly favoured the autonomous communities more
extensively than local governments. The reforms to strengthen the capacity of the weaker
local governments have thus been given a low priority from both the centrist UCD and the
Socialist governments of Suarez and Gonzalez (Gavira, 1994; Page and Goldsmith, 1987;
Tamames, 1995). Regional governments still control many functions and resources of local
government. With the Socialist government, the 1992 major prestige events (The Olympic
Games, Expo and the European city of Culture) provided a new context where
intergovernmental co-operation between the different levels of government was developed to
respond to economic restructuring. After these events, the central government encouraged
the development of local partnerships bringing together different levels of government and
the private sector to carry out development projects in some Spanish cities (Fernandez
Duran, 1996; Harding, 1994). Although legislative measures have recently been passed
giving local authorities more policy capacity, it is over the last decade that many local
authorities have started to increase their intervention in policies of economic development
(Busquets, 1990; Castells, 1990; Fernandez Duran, 1996). However, Spanish local councils
are highly dependent on higher levels of government funding, which contribute to attenuate
the limited participation of business interests in city politics.
After the decentralisation process initiated by the Reagan and Bush Conservative
governments, the federal government sought to decrease its involvement in local politics and
dismantled the national urban policy that had been developed over the last two decades. As
with the Conservative governments in Britain, the federal goverment also moved to reduce
the amount of funds granted to local authorities, which contributed to enhance their
dependency on local taxes and private sources (Peterson, 1981; Orr and Stoker, 1994).
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Similarly to the UK, the effect of these changes in the US central-local government
relationships has largely been to put greater pressure on local governments to be more
responsive to the increasing urban competitiveness for economic growth as well as to social
issues. Despite these changes, American local authorities continued to be more concerned
with policies of economic development than with policies of distribution. As was the case in
Spain, British city governments, however, are still financially more dependent on central
government resources (distributed through a highly competitive bidding processes) or
recently on European funds, but with more limited sources of local taxes and private income
than their American counterparts (see Harding, 1994). Nevertheless, the fiscal system varies
in these three countries. In Britain, since the reform of business property taxation in the early
1990s, where a uniform national business rate is set nationally, it is argued that the presence
or absence of a large business sector makes little difference to local authorities' budgets. To
compensate for the reduction of central government grants and limited business rates, British
cities, instead, have been forced to increase local taxes. Spain is close to the US model where
there is not an equalisation of national business rates and American and Spanish cities can
significantly boost local business rates to increase local authority resources.
Unlike the instrumental participation of business interests in the US context, the lack of
commitment of the private sector to the British local politics continued, to a lesser extent,
under successive Conservative governments. However, as Peck (1995) argues, the diversity
of central government agencies established by the Conservatives has played an important
role in articulating the interests of local business. In contrast to Spain, the UK lacks strong
regional or state banks to compensate for the limited participation of the business sector in
urban politics. Whereas British banks as well as building societies have a national orientation
and as such have little direct interest in any given locality, Spanish state banks are
constitutionally forced to contribute from their profits to a variety of social projects at local
or autonomous community levels. In the US, state banks have, until recently, been forbidden
to lend outside state boundaries which gave them a sense of belonging to the cities and
regions in which they operate and thus have tended to be more involved in local economic
initiatives and local coalitions. Moreover, there are fewer small-scale private business
initiatives in the property market in the UK and in Spain than is the case in the US. At the
political level, unlike American cities, there is no significant private sponsorship of local
electoral candidates in the Western European context. US political parties at the local level
are less programmatic, which increases the importance of non-political organisations (in
particular, business interests) over local political strategies while in Britain and Spain, highly
politicised parties rather than pressure groups, dominate urban policy making.
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We have briefly reviewed the global processes, the influence of central government policies
on local politics and the diversity of local responses to urban regeneration in the UK, Spain
and the US. One thing that is clear, is that if one can refer to urban regimes at all in the
European context, they are not going to be urban regimes of the same type described in
Stone's typology in the US since the private sector simply does not play the same kind of
role in the UK and Spain or in other Western countries (DiGaetano and Klemanslci, 1993;
DiGaetano, 1997; Harding, 1994; Keating, 1991; Peck, 1995). As such, DiGaetano and
Klemanski argue that the definition of urban regimes provided by Stone does not apply for a
cross-national study of urban governance. Thus what we are seeing in the UK and Spain is
what might be described as 'public-sector-led urban regimes'. Unlike the private-led urban
regimes of the US context, the empirical evidence shows that the command power often
attributed to the private sector in most European countries is frequently more apparent than
real. In this sense, the ideological hegemony of privatism inherent in the US seems to be very
much less evident in Britain and Spain or in other European countries. In Britain, the post-
1979 Conservative governments sought to expose cities to market forces after reducing local
governments funds. However, with the weakness of the local business sector and with the
equalisation of business rates, local governments have been forced to increase local taxes as
well as to compete for mainly central government funds and inward commercial investment.
The evolution of the nature of British urban politics in the last two decades —from welfare to
economic boosterism- has contributed to the emergence of new types of local governing
arrangements (DiGaetano and Klemanski, 1993; DiGaetano, 1997; Harding, 1994).
Unlike the centralised British political system, the decentralisation of Spanish politics during
the democratic period has meant an increase in the powers and resources of regional
governments rather than local authorities. Under the new intergovernmental system in Spain,
the strong role played by regional governments in the area of economic development seems
to be critical for any local economic development process (Page and Goldsmith, 1987). With
the increasing fragmentation of current local politics, contributions from different regional
and national governments as well as European Union funding (e.g. the Community's
Structural Funds) rather than private sources, exert a significant influence in local economic
development and urban regeneration as well as in the urban regime formation and capacity of
Spanish and British cities. Indeed, different levels of government as well as local urban
regimes in European cities are increasingly lobbying the European Community (compared to
the US federal government) for financial support of local economic regeneration policies. As
a result of the extensive financial dependence on higher levels of government in both Spain
and Britain, there is little evidence of private sector dominated growth coalitions or urban
regimes of the kind, which have traditionally developed in many American cities (Bailey et
al., 1995; Cochrane, 1991; DiGaetano, 1989, 1997; Keating, 1991; Harding, 1994; Lawless,
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1994). Similar to American local government, Spanish and more recently British local
governments have gained a limited governing capacity. Another distinctive element of the
apparent emergence of urban regimes in Western European cities is that either local
authorities themselves or regional and national governments, rather than business elites,
exercise pre-emptive power in many of the resulting urban regimes.
In terms of the role of sport and leisure in urban regeneration strategies, there has been a
common tendency in Spain and Britain over the last two decades (as had previously been the
case in the US) to reduce the emphasis on social spending and to increase expenditure on
aspects of sport and leisure associated with economic development. Much of the social
concern of the British Sports Council was to be removed after its restructuring under
Conservative proposals, and the establishment of the UK Sports Council, which was to put
greater emphasis on the achievement of sporting excellence rather than on `Sport for All'
(Henry, 1993; Houlihan, 1991; Gratton and Taylor, 1991). However when Labour came to
power the rhetoric of `Sport for All' and of social inclusion, in theory, reversed this tendency.
Whether Labour action is as different from Conservative action as its rhetoric was different
from that of its predecessor, remains to be seen. The Spanish Sports Council has moved in the
same direction as its British counterpart (CSD, 1992).
At the city level, the role of sport and leisure as a regeneration strategy and in urban
governance has grown in significance in particular in deindustrialising contexts as Western
European cities. Many American cities have pioneered this trend through the use of sports
facilities, professional teams and sports events which urban regimes and growth coalitions
support (Baade and Dye, 1988; Chapin, 1996a; Robinson-Barnes and Wright, 1996; Sack
and Johnson, 1996; Shropshire, 1995). This phenomenon has subsequently expanded,
following what Harvey called 'serial reproduction', to economic regeneration strategies in
other cities worldwide. In particular, some British and Spanish cities are examples of this
`post-modern' trend of using sports and leisure prestige projects as economic tools to replace
those traditional urban activities in decline, a catalyst for urban renewal and re-imaging
(Brunet, 1994; Cochrane et al, 1996; Roche, 1992; Henry, 1993; Hill, 1992, Loftman and
Nevin, 1996; Williams, 1997). Associated with this current worldwide trend of city 're-
imagining' through sport and other symbolic means, the symbolic regime reflects to some
extent the purpose of this tendency. However, sport could also be implicated in any of the
other types of regimes and their related strategies. Despite the plethora of studies on the post-
modern urban politics, and the role of culture in post-modern processes, relatively few
theorists have focused specifically on the role of sport in urban regeneration (see, for
example, Harvey, 1987; Chapin, 1996a, 1996b; Cochrane et al., 1996; Harvey, 1987; Henry
and Paramio-Salcines, 1998, 1999; Sack and Johnson, 1996).
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The accompanying Table 8.1 sets out some of the main political, economic and institutional
factors inherent in the US, Spanish and British contexts which can contribute to formation of
partnerships and/or regimes in a cross-national context. It is not exhaustive and merely
attempts to isolate the key features of each variant, and to highlight differences and
similarities between the notion of urban regimes, which may be attributed in the three
contexts. As such, the table provides a context against which the discussion of the two case
study cities of Sheffield and Bilbao can be located.
224
Conclusions
US Spain Britain
Local
Government
Constitutionally
limited autonomy
and authority
Facilitator of economic
growth to private interests
Franco period Before 1979
Weak autonomy
and authority
Democracy period
Great autonomy and authority
Provider of public services
After 1979
Greater autonomy
Enabler role
Reduction of local government
functions (enabler role)
Local
Financial
Resources
Taxation, private sources,
and federal funds
Conservative governments
Franco period Before 1979
Highly dependent on
central government funds
Democracy period
Taxation and central
government funds
After 1979
Reduction in federal funds Highly dependent on
higher levels of
government funds
Reduction in government funds, but
dependent on European funding
Nationalisation of business rates
Private
Sector
Large financial
contribution
Strong influence in city
politics
Franco period Before 1979
Little involvement in
city politics
Democracy period
Nationally rather than
locally significant
After 1979
Little involvement in
city politics
Active role in city politics fostered
by central government with limited
success
Levels
of
Government
Fragmented and
decentralised system with
federal state, state and
local governments
Franco period Before 1979
Centralised system
Democracy period
Centralised system
After 1979
Decentralised system Increased centralisation
Urban
Planning
High control over
land-use
Conservative period
Franco period Before 1979
Central government control
Democracy period
Extensive powers at local level
After 1979
Decentralisation to the
states and cities
Decentralised to regional and
local governments
Privatisation of some responsibilities
to central government agencies
Political
culture
Privatism tradition
Private sponsorship of
local candidates
Depoliticised local
bureaucracy
Absence of
programmatic parties
Public ideology
Delayed Fordism (Franco
period)
High influence of political
parties (After 1975)
Public ideology
Strong welfare tradition before 1979
High influence of political
parties
Other issues
Proactive role of media
Involvement of utilities
and state banks in city
politics
Involvement of regional
and state banks in city
politics
Absence of regional
banks or state banks
Sport
Early instrumentalisation
of sports prestige projects
Current instrumentalisation
of sports prestige projects
Outcomes
Development of public-
private partnership to
enhance the scope of local
governments
Franco period (Spain) and Before 1979 (Britain)
No need to develop
public-private partnership
Democracy period	 After 1979
Some features of this trend 	 Encouragement from central
government to involve private
sector, but with limited impact
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The cases of Bilbao and Sheffield
As already mentioned, the combination of local and non-local political-economic factors may
determine the conditions that can lead to the formation of different types of urban regimes in
the European context as one of the proclaimed policy solutions to cope with economic
restructuring and the weakness of local government in setting the local development agendas.
In terms of political control, for much of the post-war period the Fordist coalition consisting
of Labour local government and labour unions enabled Sheffield Council to dominate local
politics. In contrast to Sheffield, the centralisation of politics during the Spanish post-war
meant that the role of the Bilbao Council was less important in shaping local politics. In
terms of economic development, the Sheffield and Bilbao economies, renowned for their
steel-related industries, have been remarkably similar in the post-war period. Both economies
were also heavily dependent on central government investment and nationalised industries
and on private investors. However, since the 1970s the combination of external factors such
as the global economic restructuring and particularly, the influence of the Conservative
national government urban policies in the late 1970s and 1980s (Sheffield) and the entry of
Spain to the European Community in 1986 along with local factors such as the complex
political environment and terrorism (Bilbao), have undermined their local economies with
profound effects on the socio-economic structure of both cities. Similar to other major
European and American industrial cities, for instance, unemployment rates rose dramatically
in both cities, exceeding their national average.
Prior to the development of local public-private partnerships and the promotion of sports and
leisure-related projects, local politics in both cities had promoted, though different in nature,
alternative political responses. For a time in the early 1980s, the 'new urban left' group on
the Sheffield Council under the leadership of David Blunkett adopted a municipal socialist
approach to regenerate the local economy as well as a response to the Conservative
government urban policies (Blunkett and Jackson, 1987; Darke, 1992; Seyd, 1993; Strange,
1993, 1995). At a time that local business interests were not directly involved in city politics,
the Council itself assumed the responsibility of local economic development. As part of this
interventionist approach, the Department of Employment and Economic Development
(DEED) was established in 1981 with the emphasis placed on the maximisation of public-
sector led initiatives. In contrast to Sheffield's political control, with the decentralisation of
politics in the democratic period, local and regional politics in Bilbao have been controlled
by centre-right, principally the Basque Conservative Party (PNV), albeit in coalition. The
institutional restructuring of political power has had significant implications for governing
decisions in Bilbao. Initially, until the Basque institutions achieved a certain level of
governing autonomy in the late 1980, they postponed any intervention to assist the economy
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of Bilbao and its Metropolitan Area (Gonzalez, 1993; Rodriguez, 1996). Meanwhile, the
Socialist national government launched a national Re-industrialisation process including
Bilbao and the Basque Country, however, this substantially faltered in the Basque Country
because of the degree of politicisation between central government and the Basque
institutions. The Basque institutions subsequently launched a Strategic Plan for Metropolitan
Bilbao in 1989 as part of the urban regeneration strategies to ameliorate the negative effect of
economic decline at city and regional level. Parallel to these local development initiatives,
Mayor Gorordo battled over who should set the city's governing agenda and promoted
different strategies to the ones promoted by the other levels of Basque institutions and in
particular, to their post-modern centrepiece, the Guggenheim Museum (Ortega, 1995;
Rodriguez, 1996).
The nature of alternative political solutions adopted in Sheffield and Bilbao was clearly
affected by wider global economic factors and local particularities. In Sheffield, local factors
included a major confrontation with central government and local business interests, as well
as changes in the national urban policy of Conservative governments with severe constraints
on local government spending, planning (with the imposition of central government
agencies) and economic development policy. In Bilbao, there were clashes within the
different tiers of Basque institutions themselves over economic development policies (with
the resignation of the former lehendakari Garaicoetxea in 1984 and Mayor Gorordo in 1990)
(Juaristi, 1996) or with the Socialist central government affected the capacity of the Bilbao
Council to develop its own economic development agenda. Although the PNV has never
been hostile to the interests of local business, the complex local political environment
(Basque separatism and violence) also represents a significant constraint in any attempt to
achieve a good business climate.
Whether or not these different political responses (from the left in Sheffield and from the
right in Bilbao) to economic restructuring and national and regional politics represented a
sea-change in the nature of traditional urban politics, there are some signs of certain
convergence in the manner in which Sheffield and Bilbao have been dealing with urban
regeneration. That is, as regime theory advocates, the combination of the structural factors
mentioned above, along with the limited capacity of both City Councils to affect themselves
significant policy changes, have stimulated the formation of different urban coalition
arrangements in both cities (DiGaetano and Klemanski, 1993; DiGaetano, 1997; Harding,
1994; Stone, 1989; Stoker and Mossberger, 1994).
Drawing on the explanatory value of Stoker and Mossberger's typology for cross-national
urban political analysis, five elements of this model were adopted to analyse the context and
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behaviour of an emerging symbolic regime in Sheffield (initiated in the mid 1980s under the
leadership of Clive Betts and continued in the 1990s under a new leader of the Council, Mike
Bower) as well as the formation of an embryonic symbolic regime and its subsequent
transition to an instrumental regime in Bilbao (during the period of Mayor Ortuondo). In
addition, also explored are the implications of sport and leisure as part of the strategies
employed by these urban regimes.
Purpose
The significance of symbolic politics in Sheffield since the mid-1980s seems undeniable.
The first public-private partnership, the Sheffield Economic Regeneration Committee
(SERC) emerged in December 1986 after it was recognised that mutual dependency existed
between local elected politicians and local business groups in the promotion of significant
local economic development. Although the local authority maintained a strong role in local
politics, the shift in the political culture of Sheffield was said to facilitate the formation of the
SERC, which coincided with the third consecutive Conservative election victory in 1987, and
came at a time when central government was taking powers (as in the case of the Sheffield
Development Corporation or the Training and Enterprise Councils) and taking resources, out
of local government control. Under the strong influence of the Conservative governments
over local governments, the emerging symbolic regime in Sheffield, as Stoker and
Mossberger outline, was about communicating intentions and symbolic rewards such as the
commitment to local economic development and the fostering of an entrepreneurial climate
(SCC, 1988; Strange, 1993, 1997). The formation of the SERC and subsequent new
governing arrangements were also seen as part of the local strategies to change the previous
image of confrontation of the Sheffield Council with central government and local business,
as well as to reduce opposition, both internally and externally, to the Council political agenda
of the early 1980s. Nevertheless, the description of Sheffield politics given makes it clear
that positive relationships between key members of the 'regime' -locally elected politicians
and business groups in the city- do not have a long history of cooperation.
Despite challenge at the local level by those opposed to the World Student Games strategy,
the 'regime' has survived, albeit operating through a new form, the Sheffield Liaison Group,
emerging in 1992. In this way, with the formation of the SERC and the Sheffield Liaison
Group in different phases, the Sheffield political scenario fits more clearly with what Stoker
and Mossberger describe as a symbolic regime and particularly, an urban revitalization
regime, in terms of mode of functioning and purpose. This description of the type of urban
regime operating in Sheffield also coincided with the previous analysis undertaken by
Strange (1993).
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In the case of Bilbao, after a period of conflictual relations under the leadership of Mayor
Gorordo between the Bilbao Council and the Basque institutions, proponents of the first
public-private partnership (Bilbao Metropoli 30) set up in 1991, sought to institutionalise
public-private co-ordination in policies of economic development after the resignation of
Mayor Gorordo. Local politics were then united around the idea of changing the city's image
(as with Sheffield) of previous antagonisms between the Basque institutions themselves and
central government as well as the negative image associated with violence. As regime theory
argues, given the limited capacity of the Bilbao Council under the new leadership of Mayor
Ortuondo, this public-private partnership was also inevitably seen as a way to attract revenue
funding for carrying out major urban development projects in Bilbao and its Metropolitan
area. Associated with these goals, the co-operative arrangements between local politicians
and local business leaders formed around Metropoli 30 originally resembled features of an
embryonic symbolic regime and particularly, an urban revitalisation regime (as did SERC),
but also some features of an instrumental regime (Orr and Stoker, 1994; Strange, 1993).
However, after questioning the capacity of the embryonic symbolic regime formed around
Metropoli 30 to exercise, in Stone's terms, 'pre-emptive power' over the city's governing
agenda because of its failure to mobilise substantial private sector and institutional
investment, the political partnership between the Socialist parties at the Basque and national
levels was said to facilitate the incorporation of the Spanish central government into a new
public-led coalition, Bilbao Ria 2000 in 1993. This governing coalition, regarded as the first
real partnership with all the public institutions involved, clearly undermined the symbolic
role of Metropoli 30. In a similar vein to Sheffield, the process of the formation of Ria 2000
has not been without problems and conflicts. As such, it is clear that positive relationships
between key members of Ria 2000 -the three levels of the Basque institutions and central
government- do not traditionally have a long history of cooperation and exchange.
In broad terms, drawing on Stoker and Mossberger's typology, the formation and purpose of
this new public-led coalition resembles features of an instrumental urban regime and
particularly, a development urban regime. The purpose of the emerging instrumental regime
formed around Ria 2000 was primarily concerned with changing public land use owned by
the central government to generate funding to implement most of the ambitious urban
projects in Bilbao's riverfront and lately, in the Metropolitan Area of Bilbao. Institutional
coalition partners shared its commitment around the availability of selective incentives to
finance urban development projects. To this end, the Bilbao Council was driven to cooperate
with those who hold significant resources, the Basque institutions and the central
government.
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Main Motivation of Participants
There are five broad categories of participants identified in any governing coalition on a
cross-national basis in the urban regime literature: business leaders, locally elected
politicians, trade unions, local technocrats, and members of community organizations
(Stoker, 1995). In the case of Sheffield, with the formation of the SERC and the Liaison
Group in both major phases of the development of the symbolic regime, it is clear that local
government initially led the regime and its core symbolic strategy. Indeed, the leadership of
the Labour Group as well as local government officials, particularly from the Department of
Employment and Economic Development exercised coalition power in the formation of
SERC, which also mobilised people in the Chamber of Commerce, but with a small
representation of local business groups. The coalition formed around SERC brought together
24 members, including representatives of the Council, the city's business community, trade
unions, higher education institutions, central government agencies, and community
organisations (Lawless, 1989; Seyd, 1993; Strange, 1993, 1997).
As a representative of the Chamber of Commerce noted, local business decided to be
integrated within the diversity of local partnerships expecting that cooperation would
contribute to have some influence in the process of urban regeneration NNhich not 'nave
in the early 1980s and in particular, as a way of attracting external funding and changing the
image of the city. In addition to gaining influence and financial support from being within
local partnerships, the development of a symbolic prestige sport-related project such as the
1991 World Student Games also helped to mobilise the interest and support of local business
in changing the city's image. Although the current governing coalition, Sheffield Liaison
Group, is also certainly led by the Council, it has been influenced by local community
organisations more specifically, representatives of the two universities who were set to
benefit considerably from the proposal to build on the original initiative to develop a bid for
the attraction of the proposed British Academy of Sport. Perhaps one source of local
commercial involvement one might have anticipated was the city's two premier professional
football clubs, Sheffield Wednesday and Sheffield United. However, in contrast to the major
interaction between local governments and professional teams in the United States, local
government in the UK tends not to own the stadiums in which clubs play. Thus, despite
efforts to interest and involve the clubs by offering a proposal that they make use of the new
Don Valley Stadium, little response was forthcoming.
In the case of Bilbao, the Basque government and the Bizkaia County Council and to a lesser
extent, two private electric utility companies (with headquarters in Bilbao) were initially
identified as the main groups that exercised coalition power in the creation of Metropoli 30.
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Since its development, the president of Iberdrola, Garrido (one of the local electric utility
companies) chaired the executive committee of Metropoli 30. Participation in this public-
private partnership has widely expanded from 19 organisations in 1991 to 126 by 1996
(including public sector bodies, higher education institutions, business groups and local
community organisations) (Martinez Cearra, 1993; Rodriguez, 1996). In line with the
inclusive orientation of symbolic regimes, the incorporation of 30 municipalities of the
Metropolitan area in Metropoli 30 was justified due to the political coalition between the
PNV and the Socialist Party operating at the Basque and national level for the last decade
with all these municipalities being run either by the PNV or the Socialist Party. On the other
hand, those local Councils, which were not controlled by these political parties, tended to
take little part. Unlike SERC and the Sheffield Liaison Group, Metropoli 30 did not include
any representative from the Spanish central government.
Despite the enlargement of Metropoli 30, the Bizkaia County Council and the Basque
government, rather than the Bilbao Council itself or the private sector, have been leading this
public-private coalition. However, the political leadership in Bilbao Metropoli 30 should not
obscure the underlying political differences within the PNV political party itself about which
level of government should lead the Basque Country. In this competitive political process,
the political direction of the PNV, deeply attached to the historical traditions and rights of the
County Councils, has tended to increase the power and responsibilities of the County
Councils even at the expense of the new Basque government and the Basque local authorities
(including Bilbao City Council). Although the development of Bilbao as cultural city was a
key area within the Metropoli 30's development strategies, this public-private coalition has
not played any significant role in the decision to locate the Guggenheim Museum in the city,
which came from the political direction of the PNV though without the participation of the
Council (Zulaika, 1997; Tellitu et al, 1997). As the examples above noted, the degree of
politicisation of the Basque politics has played an important factor in shaping urban politics.
In Bilbao major private sector interests tend to be large employers, mainly local banks (e.g.
the BBK and the BBV) and industries with many of these business groups involved in
Metropoli 30. Unlike most American cities, local business groups have only been involved in
the development of Metropoli 30's strategy, but without a real commitment in the
implementation of most urban development projects in Bilbao and its Metropolitan area. A
local politician justified the symbolic commitment of coalition members within Metropoli 30
because initially it was deemed important to be seen as a member. Nevertheless, the
symbolic commitment of some regime partners in Metropoli 30 has substantially shifted to
pragmatism after the new public-led coalition, Ria 2000, started developing some urban
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projects. As a result, another local politician explained "nowadays there is a clear desire to
make a positive contribution to the regeneration process".
The motivation to participate on this public-led coalition was based on, as a representative of
the coalition suggested, the need to co-ordinate institutional efforts in order to promote
tangible results. That is, this public-led coalition was seen as the only viable way to
implement most of the urban projects in Bilbao and its Metropolitan area. Unlike the US
context where important resources are controlled by business organisations, the capacity to
implement most of the projects in Bilbao so far relies on the Basque institutions and mainly
on the Spanish central government.
Developin2 a common sense of purpose
For Stone, urban regimes in the US may be particularly unified under the use of selective
material incentives. Unlike the US context, Stoker and Mossberger consider that the
combination of material and non-material opportunities are likely to play an important part in
a cross-national context. The governing coalition around SERC was ephemeral in nature. The
ensuing financial problems associated to the 1991 World Student Games aggravated by the
limited contribution (not to say antagonism) of the Conservative government to the project
contributed to reduce confidence in the capacity of the governing coalition. However, despite
opposition at the local level by those opposed to the World Student Games strategy
(particularly some Labour party councillors) and at national level by the central government,
the core of the symbolic 'regime' (12 members) has survived, albeit operating through the
Sheffield Liaison Group. The new coalition emerged in 1992 under the leadership of Mike
Bower to overcome previous differences between the main coalition partners. The Liaison
Group, as with Bilbao's Metropoli 30, was described as a forum in which some individuals
and representatives of groups at a senior level in the city that previously had been involved in
partnerships continued to be united around non-material opportunities as in SERC.
In the case of Bilbao, if initially the strategic use of symbols served to unite public and
private leaders in Metropoli 30, the presence of significant material incentives in the form of
the availability of central government resources rather than non-material incentives was
deemed as an essential mechanism for establishing a common sense of purpose between the
main Basque and national public actors in Ria 2000. As Stone (1993) argues, the availability
of central government funding has greatly contributed to unite a limited number of
politicians (traditionally unwilling to co-operate) from the three Basque levels of government
and from the Spanish central government around the formation of a development urban
regime formed in Ria 2000.
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Quality of coalitions: Conkruence of Interests
According to Stoker and Mossberger's typology, the relationship between the partners in
symbolic regimes is likely to be one of 'competitive agreement', while the relationship
between the partners in instrumental regimes is likely to be one of 'political partnership'.
Although it is certainly the case that the relationship between local government and business
interests in the city had been competitive, this was only marginally the case in the Sheffield
context of the late 1980s and early 1990. Much of the sting may have been taken out of
business criticism of the local authority's spending by the introduction, in the early 1990s, of
centrally determined, uniform taxation rates for business across the country, which
disassociated the local tax bill for businesses from the spending of the local authority. Given
the introduction of a uniform nonlocal business rate and an acceptance of mutual benefits by
regime partners, there was a fairly strong congruence of interests that helped the symbolic
regime to survive the period of difficulty around the World Student Games. Nevertheless,
some other conflicts had taken place before. In particular, after an initial period of
antagonism with a low congruence of interests around urban planning between the SERC and
the non-elected central government agency, Sheffield Urban Development Corporation, a
final 'competitive agreement' was finally reached contingent on mutual concessions.
In the case of Bilbao, although internal and external political differences are still apparent
among the coalition partners, a 'political partnership' between the central government and
the three Basque institutions seems to bring together these regime partners in Ria 2000. As
regime theory stands, this public-led coalition originally was exclusively reduced to
representatives of all levels of government at senior level and representatives of certain
political parties. In this instrumental regime, the degree of commitments is actively
maintained through substantial subsidies provided mainly from central government to
finance most of the urban projects of Bilbao and more recently in its metropolitan area. Not
surprisingly, the Barakaldo City Council was recently incorporated into the coalition after
benefiting from substantial European Union Structural Funds. As Keating (1991) suggests,
the capacity of this public-led coalition in Bilbao is greatly determined by the formal political
agreement at national level between the PNV and the Socialist government and continued
with the Conservative Party (PP) since 1996 which has positively contributed to lobbying for
substantial central government funds (see El Mundo, 17 December 1998).
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Relationship with the wider political environment
In terms of cross-national research, the regime formation and operation in a European
context needs to be understood as product of both its relationship within the locality and its
relationships beyond its boundaries.
The Local Environment
In terms of the local environment, symbolic regimes seek to incorporate as many groups as
possible, influencing them to subscribe to the image of the city the regime is propagating.
This is in stark contrast to the exclusive orientation of instrumental regimes, which seek to
limit access to fruits of urban development. It is clear even from the brief history of the
symbolic project exemplified by the World Student Games that all has not been plain sailing.
Before the Games, some Labour members rebelled, and one resigned on the grounds of the
opportunity cost for social expenditure. Locally and (implicitly) nationally, many
Conservatives opposed the initiative on the grounds of controlling public expenditure.
Locally, social democrats complained about the lack of consultation and openness about the
decision to commit local taxpayers to such investment. These various politica/ camps found
voice during the Games in the 'Stuff the Games' group, which made public but fairly muted
protests. In addition, some business interests opposed those plans. However, the regime
proved hard enough to withstand such opposition. These groups had been marginalised,
whether within the Labour party or the local political system, within the local business
community, or within the wider community.
In the case of Bilbao, there has been a significant transition from the symbolic character and
the inclusive orientation of Metropoli 30 to the exclusive 'political' orientation associated
with Ria 2000. In line with the exclusiveness of instrumental regimes, it was said that
opposition political parties, neighbourhoods' organisations, trade unions, small and medium
sized firms, professional sports teams and local citizens are systematically excluded from the
decision-making process. This governing coalition has been criticised because of its lack of
political accountability and social concern (Rodriguez, 1996, Ortega, 1995).
In terms of the influence of the business interests in both urban regeneration processes, as
Strange (1997) argues, the representation of the business groups in Sheffield has been driven
by a small and rather parochial business representation. Nevertheless, the private sector in
Sheffield was considered essential as part of the aim of attracting external central
government and European funding and changing the previous reputation of political division.
In Bilbao, the private sector was involved in the early stages of the regeneration process in
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developing strategy; however, the implementation of most of the urban projects has been
dependent on non-local sources. So far, implementation of most of the urban developments
in Bilbao is publicly funded. Despite the range of fiscal incentives provided to the private
sector to increase their participation on a significant scale in the Basque Country, the
complex political environment associated with terrorism can help to explain the symbolic
commitment of the local private sector to local regeneration. Paradigmatic is the example of
the locally headquartered Basque national bank (BBV) whose interest in the city as a site for
investment is merely symbolic.
Non-local environment
Apart from the involvement of national government as well as the Basque authorities in
Bilbao, there were few nonlocal participants in both cities. However, the capacity of the
development regime formed around Ria 2000 in Bilbao and the urban revitalising regime
described in Sheffield have both substantially been dependent on non-local resources and
decisions. Common to most of the interviewees in Sheffield was the belief that the financial
contribution from higher levels of government has helped to 'kick start things', while in
Bilbao the instrumental regime is clearly dependent on the resources of the Spanish
government and the two levels of the Basque government. So far, the financing and
implementation of the main prestige urban developments in Bilbao is still largely dependent
on the Basque institutions and the Spanish government resources and to a lesser extent,
European Union funds. In contrast to the decentralised political system of Bilbao, most
urban-related British government resources in the 1980s and 1990 as well as European funds,
have been distributed through a highly competitive bidding process. That is, despite the
failure of two bids for City Challenge Grant funding, Sheffield was finally awarded £74.4
million from the government's Single Regeneration Budget over 7 years period and from the
European URBAN initiative for 4 years. Prior to obtaining these governmental funds,
Sheffield was also awarded £350 million from the Sheffield UDC. Unlike US counterparts,
the Bilbao and Sheffield cases confirm that regimes in both cities have mainly been
mobilised and united by the financial contribution of different levels of government and the
availability of European funds rather than the resources of the private sector. In the case of
Bilbao, for example, its appeal to transnational companies is limited because of the political
environment as most of respondents confirmed.
The development of the World Student Games had taken place against the backdrop of
increased centralisation of powers around central government. The government's refusal to
assist in substantive terms with the costs of staging the World Student Games and the
tightness of the financial screws on local government spending in general (and Sheffield in
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particular) might have completely neutralised the efforts of the symbolic regime altogether if
the difficult circumstances of staging the World Student Games had not been overcome.
Thus, although dependent to some degree on non-local resources, Sheffield was able to
proceed with, at best, lukewarm support from some arms of the central government (e.g.
Sports Council assistance was not suppressed by the government) but with no direct financial
help.
Apart from the involvement of national government agencies in the urban revitalization
regime in Sheffield and the involvement of national government industries in the
development regime in Bilbao, there are few non-local actors involved in the two cities
governing arrangements. The kind of coalitions developed in both cities thus shared their
parochialism. Following the typology of Stoker and Mossberger, table 8.2 summarises the
findings of the analysis of Sheffield and Bilbao regime formation and capacity.
Sport and Leisure in the regeneration process of Sheffield and Bilbao
With a close resemblance to other American and Western European economic regeneration
processes, governing coalitions in Bilbao and Sheffield have encouraged the use of sport and
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other symbolic means as one of the primary vehicles to promote economic growth. Prior to
the emergence of the governing coalitions in both cities, the City Council in the early 1980s
(Sheffield) and Mayor Gorordo in the late 1980s (Bilbao) had also pursued high-profile
development in leisure policy (with different success), but more centred on culture than on
sport. In Sheffield, the strategy was reflected in the establishment of a cultural industry
quarter while in Bilbao, the strategy to build a culture centrepiece, the Alhondiga, finally
failed. Afterwards, the significance of sport and leisure in the process of regeneration of both
cities seems to have also affected the traditional model of urban politics.
As the case of Sheffield illustrates, the strategy of public-private co-operation around SERC
mainly relied on an event-led planning approach, and flagship projects, in particular the
hosting of the 1991 World Student Games. Although it is not the unique economic
regeneration strategy, the sport-led strategy of Sheffield may represent the major symbolic
strategy to drive local regeneration as well as to boost its national and international image as
a 'city of sport'. Associated with the World Student Games and its National City of Sport
status, since 1991 the city has benefited from the staging of a large number of major sports
events, the emergence of new professional teams and the attraction of one of the regional
branches of the United Kingdom Sports Institute. Regardless of the tangible and intangible
benefits that sports related projects can bring to Sheffield, the symbolic regime in Sheffield
has been unsuccessful in sharing the financial costs and risks associated with its prestige
projects amongst its public and private sector partners. In contrast to the case of Manchester,
the financial situation was aggravated when the Conservative government refused to provide
financial support for the World Student Games. In this way, the World Student Games
brought with it some considerable costs, partly exemplified by financial mismanagement,
reductions in public services in order to support the major sports facilities, and higher prices
in leisure services. In the same vein, the adoption of a sport-related strategy has involved the
debureaucratization of local leisure services, with the formation of private companies and
trusts to operate some of the facilities opened for the World Student Games in particular as
well as some of the old local leisure facilities.
In contrast to the American context, the capital provided by the commercial sector to the
Sheffield's prestige sport-related projects, for example, was small (£34 million by SMGI for
the Sheffield Indoor Arena) and the capital itself was not local in origin. Most of the total
capital costs of the Sheffield's prestige projects were to be financed by Sheffield Council.
Perhaps one source of local commercial sector involvement one might have anticipated was
the city's two premier professional football clubs, Sheffield Wednesday and Sheffield
United. However, despite efforts to interest and involve the clubs by offering a proposal that
they make use of the new Don Valley Stadium, little response was forthcoming. What is
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more, professional sport in Sheffield has been enhanced by the building of facilities. The
newly formed Sheffield Steelers ice hockey team (owned by SMGI) and the rejuvenated
Sheffield Sharks basketball team (owned by Montgomery Leisure) both won their respective
national championships and qualified for European competition in 1995. Ironically, shortly
after Sheffield United Football Club was relegated from the English Premier League.
The location of the Guggenheim Museum in Bilbao represented a clear expression of what
marked out Bilbao from other cities to revitalise its local economy as well as to promote the
city externally in order to attract new business and cultural tourism. In this way, the
Guggenheim Museum seems to be more related to power politics than culture itself.
Moreover, it seems to be seen that the Guggenheim Museum could further encourage co-
operation of private sector. However, as with sport in Sheffield, the nature of culture as an
apolitical arena of the post-modern politics of urban governance has nevertheless been
contested in Bilbao, as being constructed without reference to local people and as failing to
account for local identity. In relation to the former, with the concentration of cultural
symbolic projects in the city centre, little importance has been attached to meeting traditional
local demands, which has created a tension between centre and periphery. In relation to the
latter, there has been significant resistance to the homogenisation of culture in the face of
globalisation tendencies as well as the consumption-oriented strategy, which the
Guggenheim Museum clearly exemplifies.
The ability of critics (e.g. exemplified by Mayor Gorordo's cultural integrationist approach)
to mobilise alternative strategies was finally overcome during the development of these
strategies. Culture is significant in the context of Bilbao and the Basque Country, not simply
as part of an attraction of inward investment and affluent visitors, it is also significant as
(potentially at least) a symbol of the preservation and projection of Basque nationalism.
Although parallel arguments could be made with respect to sport, such links have not been
made. Bilbao's case was seen, by political and sporting proponents alike, as standing out in
its failure to subsidise professional elite teams (unlike the other Basque major cities) or to
stage major sport-related projects. The case of Bilbao shows that cultural policy has had an
impact on sports policy. More significant is the case of the most important professional
sports team and the sole team of national significance in the city, Athletic of Bilbao, which
occupies a profound place in the identity of the city and the Basque Country. Despite its
manifest importance, which could be associated with the Guggenheim Museum to boost
city's image, the club does not receive any funding from any of the three Basque levels of
government. In addition, support for Basque sports and for sporting federations, at least, has
been suppressed by virtue of the cost of providing for the Guggenheim Museum. Finally, as
some commentators argue, Bilbao needs to adopt a more holistic approach to urban
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regeneration that embraces the role of sports, culture and leisure to improve the conditions of
certain disadvantaged neighbourhoods.
Summary
The alternative development of politics in Sheffield in the early 1980s and in Bilbao in the
late 1980s were characterised by disputes between central and local government and local
government and local business interests (Sheffield) and between the three levels of Basque
governments and central government (Bilbao) over local economic development. At the
same time, the political and ideological climate of national urban policy engendered by the
Conservative governments attempted to diminish the scope and redefine the role of British
local authorities, while the decentralisation process initiated in the post-Franco period has
brought back more powers to the autonomous communities rather than local authorities. In
the Basque Country, the PNV political party has tended to increase the powers of the County
Councils, even at the expense of the new Basque government and local authorities. Under
these circumstances, each level of the Basque government attempted to exercise command
power over the other to achieve its goals. Under these intergovernmental disputes, initially
there was no chance of building any stable regime in either Sheffield or Bilbao.
The structural economic decline linked to the globalisation of the economy, the conflictual
intergovernmental relations in both cities and finally, as regime theory stands, the limited
capacity of both City Councils to influence local politics were considered key factors in the
development of new local governing arrangements. In the face of a changing global
economic environment and within the context of increased centralisation of powers in
Britain and of decentralisation of powers in Spain, the local governing arrangements
involved in Sheffield and Bilbao have contributed to the promotion of urban change. In
terms of the range of actors involved, the emergence of a symbolic regime in Sheffield was
based on the co-operation between the Sheffield Council, central government agencies and
the local business interests, through a network of different formal and informal public-
private partnerships.
In turn, in Bilbao Metropoli 30, coalition politics has prevailed with coalition members
working together on specific projects, but failing to exercise pre-emptive power over the
city's governing agenda. However, a fragmented coalition of interests incorporating the
three levels of Basque institutions and the Spanish central government, rather than the local
business interests, co-operated with the formation of Ria 2000 to drive the regeneration of
Bilbao. Under the influence of both global and local forces, it can be claimed that the
Sheffield scenario fits very closely with what Stoker and Mossberger described as a
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symbolic regime and particularly, an urban revitalization regime, while the Bilbao case
shows symptoms of dynamics and seems to move from the failure to establish a symbolic
regime around Metropoli 30 to the transition to a new instrumental regime and particularly,
urban development regime in Ria 2000.
The symbolic regime in Sheffield incorporated as many local groups as possible to influence
them to subscribe to the new image of the city while the regime transition in Bilbao moved
from the inclusive orientation of Metropoli 30 to the exclusive orientation of Ria 2000.
Thus, there is a significant degree of congruence within the symbolic regime of Sheffield.
Unlike Bilbao, if we consider the 'motivation to participate', it is clear that non-material
factors were more important in establishing cooperation between the Sheffield's public and
private sectors. The coalition is diffuse in Sheffield with a large number of governing
coalition members working 'independently' through the co-ordinating mechanism of
initially SERC and later on, of the Liaison Group. In Bilbao, the coalition arrangements
were initially focused on the activities of Metropo/i 30 until the emergence of Ria 2400
which is currently acting as the dominant umbrella coalition in the city rather than the
Bilbao Council itself.
In turn, despite the expected dominant role of business interests in setting local development
agendas as in US cities, the example of Sheffield demonstrates that the Sheffield Council
still exhibits a larger capacity in the mediation of local interests. It is also clear that local
government (both elected Labour politicians and local government officials) has initially led
the regime and its core symbolic strategy, but it has subsequently been influenced by local
community organisations, more specifically, representatives of the two Universities who
were set to benefit considerably from the proposal to build on the original initiative to
develop a bid for the attraction of the proposed British Academy of Sport. Nevertheless,
Sheffield Council is clearly the most important actor in urban politics, because of its
democratic legitimacy, for being the largest employer in the city and for its superior
financial position to US counterparts.
In a decentralised political system, Bilbao Council's leadership was (and still is) clearly
undermined by its economic dependence upon Central Government and the other levels of
Basque institutions. Unlike the case of Sheffield, Bilbao Council has a limited influence in
local politics. As evidenced in the research, the formation of Metropoli 30 and some
symbolic projects, such as the Guggenheim Museum, initially had been led by the Basque
institutions and subsequently had been influenced by central government, specifically, Ria
2000 which is expected to promote changes in urban politics. In particular, the formal
political arrangements between the PNV and the political party in power at national level
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(either with the Socialist Party or with the Conservative Party) have facilitated the regime
formation and stability around Ria 2000.
As regime theory stands, the formal authority of local democratic institutions standing alone
is inadequate for carrying out governing decisions in contemporary urban politics. Local
governments have been required to be more involved in local economic politics as well as to
develop informal arrangements with private interests to enhance their governing capacity. To
explain the nature of contemporary political power, regime theory departs from the
community power 'social control' model of the post-war period to the new notion on power,
namely the 'social production' model, which Stone refers to as "power to, not power over"
(Stone, 1989, 1993; Stoker, 1995; Judge, 1995). The social production model of urban politics
is more concerned with how a broad range of institutional and non-institutional actors
cooperate to provide a capacity to act which is currently exemplified through the concept of
urban regimes. According to Stone and Stoker, the comparison of economic politics in
Sheffield and Bilbao offers the opportunity to address which forms of political power
structure have been used throughout the 1980s and 1990s. In the case of Sheffield, a mixture
of systemic power (the lack of access to resources of influence on the parts of the opponents),
command power (through the use of the party disciplinary machinery), and coalition and pre-
emptive power (used in the formation of different partnership arrangements) was employed in
the formation, stability and adaptability of a symbolic regime in Sheffield. In the case of
Bilbao, a mixture of systemic power, command power (exemplified by the influence of PNV
political party to force the resignations of the former lehendakari of the Basque Country as
well as of Mayor Gorordo), coalition power (used in the formation of Metropoli 30) and
finally, pre-emptive power (used in the formation of Ria 2000) was employed in the formation
of an embryonic symbolic regime and its further transition to an instrumental regime.
The regimes presented in Bilbao and Sheffield have adopted particular models of the city
strategy which have ignored the interests of certain sections of the population and reinforced
the notion of a two tier city, with benefits for non-local or professional locals. In particular,
the small number of jobs created in both cities was not correlated to the high level of public
investment. In Sheffield by 1991, just 22.7 percent of employees worked in manufacturing
while consumer services as a whole employed 71.3 percent (the four largest employers are
Sheffield Council, Royal Hallamshire Hospital, Sheffield University, and Northern General
Hospital). In Bilbao, despite the fact of the growth of service activities, total current
employment remained below 1975 levels and unemployment rates. Going further, the use of
substantial public resources to induce new economic activity has been substantially criticised
because of the negative distributive effects in Bilbao and Sheffield for local residents. In this
way, the subsidising of the Guggenheim Museum in Bilbao, like the World Student Games in
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Sheffield, has resulted in the postponement or decrease of investment in other local services
such as housing, employment, local arts groups and sport clubs. Similar criticism can be
directed at how the Guggenheim Museum has negatively affected the economic budget of the
other levels of Basque government.
Even though some improvements have been made in the local economy; the whole strategy
of Bilbao is highly risky due to the fact that the funding of local social, cultural, and physical
development is dependent upon the revenues generated from high profile projects. In
particular, one emblematic project, the Guggenheim Museum, cannot itself change the
image of Bilbao particularly when the negative impact of terrorism can undermine any
resulting improvement in terms of image. As regime theory recognises, there is a growing
significance of 'place' in business investment decisions, and Bilbao's appeal to transnational
companies is limited because of its political environment. The main reaction in Bilbao seems
to be scepticism about the regeneration process, with respondents feeling that the city and
regional governments have taken a gamble, especially since they are footing the bill without
any substantial central government funding or private investment.
After examining the political-economic context provided by the Bilbao and Sheffield cases, it
could be said that the nature and scope of urban regimes described in both cities do not follow
exactly all the salient conditions identified in the Stoker and Mossberger's typology. Although
one of the original purposes of this model was to provide a framework for comparative urban
political analysis, this approach permits a focus on two of the principal criticisms of regime
analysis —namely ethnocentrism and voluntarism. In terms of ethnocentrism, the account of
the kind of regimes found in Sheffield and Bilbao is found less readily in American cities. In
particular, the account of the regimes presented in both cities is intended to illustrate how
particular configurations of local political and economic organisation in both contexts, though
significantly different from those that may be anticipated in North American cities, can be
accommodated within the regime analysis. Thus the charge of ethnocentrism is only sustained
if the notion of partnership implied in regime analysis is not sufficiently flexible to
accommodate public-sector community organisation-led groupings because the business
participation in both cities has predominantly served to legitimate and to lend ideological
support rather than contributing economically towards regeneration strategies.
In relation to voluntarism, this was addressed by taking account of the contextual limitations
of local action in both cities. Some of the major factors affecting changes in both city-
governing realignments were affected by a wider context. In fact, one cannot explain the
emergence of a symbolic regime in Sheffield and a development regime in Bilbao without
understanding wider structural contexts. Nevertheless, local actors' behaviour is more
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constrained in Bilbao than in Sheffield. As such, Sheffield opted for developing a new
identity through sport, and this was the product of local interests and local coalition building.
In turn, in Bilbao the decision to develop a new identity through culture was the product of
the Bizkaia County Council rather than local actors or local coalition building. After all, the
major shortcoming of regime approach may therefore be said to be its failure to conceptualise,
and to provide advocacy for, those on whom power over is being exercised.
This cross-national research suggests that the Stoker and Mossberger's typology rather than
Stone's approach represents a more valuable instrument for conceptualising, explaining and
characterising policy changes found in Western European cities. In particular, Stone's urban
regime theory, according to DiGaetano (1997), fails to explain changes in the local governing
arrangements. Unlike the stability and adaptability of the regime portrayed in Atlanta, Stone's
approach can not be applied to explain the kind of changes in urban power structure produced
in Sheffield (with the reconfiguration of the symbolic regime) and in Bilbao (with the
transition from a symbolic to an instrumental regime).
Finally, despite research interest in sports development projects has tended to be dominated
by economic impact studies, this thesis attempts to go beyond a narrow economistic approach
to expand the relatively scarce number of studies which has specifically identified the role of
sport and leisure in regime or coalition construction and the role of regimes and/or coalitions
in the development of sports strategies. In this way, sport and sports policy, because of its
symbolic potential, seem set to play a significant role in post-modem construction of political
consensus and support, and therefore seems likely to play an increasingly significant part in
the activities of urban regimes in deindustrialising contexts.
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APPENDIX I
SAMPLES OF INTERVIEWS ARRANGEMENTS IN THE
TWO CASE STUDY CITIES
uis Paramio Salcines
Loughborough University
Department of Physical Education,
Sports Science & Recreation Management
LOUGHBOROUGH, LEICESTERSHIRE, LE11 3TU, ENGLAND
Telephone: 01509 263171
Head of Department 	 Direct Dial: 01509 223282/83
T. P. Jones, M.Sc., Adv.Dip.Phys.Ed., D.L.C.
	 Fax: 01509 231776
13 de Diciembre, 1995
Estimado/a Sr/Sra:
El Departamento de Physical Education, Sports Science y Recreation Management de
la Universidad de Loughborough (Reino Unido) esta actualmente realizando un
projecto de investigacion centrado en el analisis del proceso de Regeneracion Urbana
y sus implicaciones para el deporte.
Para llevar a cabo este projecto, dos ciudades han sido elegicias: Bilbao en Espada y
Sheffield en el Reino Unido. Ambas ciudades se caracterizan por haber sufrido
similares procesos de des-industrializacion y por el hecho de disefiar diferentes
iniciativas para paliar dichos efectos. A lo anterior y como aspect() innovador, se
atlade que este projecto es pionero en el estudio comparativo entre dos ciudades
representativas del Reino Unido y de Espana. Debido a esto, es por lo que como
disefiador y responsable del projecto junto con el Dr. Ian P. Henry, hemos
considerado que seria de gran utilidad conocer su opinion sobre los aspectos
anteriormente mencionados concernientes a su ciudad. Los resultados obtenidos del
projecto le seran facilitados posteriormente.
Mi intencion es despazarme a Bilbao el dia 18 de Diciembre y prolongar la estancia
hasta el dia 17 de Febrero. Durante este periodo, desearia pond-me en contacto con
usted personalmente para conocer su disponibiliciad y fijar una fecha para una
entrevista.
direccion en Espana durance este periodo sera:
Juan Luis Paramio Salcines
C/ Eirido de la Fuente, 1 4.A
28320 Pinto (Madrid)
Telefono: 691-11-52
Dandole Las gracias por anticipado se despiden atentamente
lak,	 I4e
Dr. Ian P. Henry
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Lougnoorougn university
Department of Physical Education,
Sports Science and Recreation Management
Loughborough, Leicestershire LEI 1 3TU
Telephone: (44) 0509 223292 Fax: (44) 0509 231776
E-mail: J.L.Paramio-salcines@lut.ac.uk
Direct Line: +44 (0) 1509 223292
Fax:	 +44 (0) 1509 223971
E-mail:J.L.Paramio-salcines@lbro.ac.uk
13th May 1996
Dear
I am a member of the Recreation Management Research Group under the supervision of Dr.
Ian Henry.
The Research Group is currently undertaking a comparative study between Great Britain and
Spain. More specifically, the area of interest is an analysis of the process of urban regeneration
within the two cities of Sheffield (U.K.) and Bilbao (Spain), and the implications of sports
policy within the strategies adopted. We are keen to elicit your views on the practical
programmes implemented, so that we can place these within the theoretical framework
developed for this research.
I am concious of imposing on your time, and I anticipate the the interview will not take more
than forty-five minutes. I will be more than happy to provide you with a precis of the analysis
and summary of the final report.
I will telephone you ascertain whether you are interested in helping further with this research
and if necessary to organise convenient time and place to meet.
I look forward to speaking with you soon.
Yours sincerely
Juan L. Paramio	 Dr. Ian Henry
270
